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Oral Poetry and Ancient Greek Poetry: Broadening and Narrowing the Terms

§1. The theory of oral poetry as set forth by Milman Parry and Albert Lord resists application to Archaic Greek poetry only if oral poetry is defined too narrowly by the opponents of the theory—and if the surviving poetry of Archaic Greece is treated too broadly as a general example of oral poetry. In what follows, I attempt not only to sketch a concept of oral poetry that is broad enough to accommodate the various forms of ancient Greek poetry but also to redefine these forms in terms of specific sub-types of oral poetry.¹

§2. The most secure basis for inquiry into the varieties of oral poetry is that of social anthropology.² From the vantage point of social anthropologists, various forms of song, poetry, and prose have functioned and continue to function in various ways in various societies without the aid of—in most cases without the existence of—writing.³ From this vantage point we should {17|18} not even be talking about oral poetry, for example, as distinct from poetry but rather about written poetry as possibly distinct from poetry: in other words, written

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¹ An earlier version, with ad hoc application to the theories of Wolfgang Kullmann, was printed in Critical Exchange (16 [1984] 32–54), a periodical committed to the publication of tentative versions of work still in progress.

² For my methodology, a particularly influential work has been Jacopin 1981, with its balanced treatment of parole as well as langue. Cf. also Leach 1982, especially p. 5, with incisive comments on the impact of Jacopin’s work.

³ For a forceful presentation, with an emphasis on oral song and poetry, see Zumthor 1983. At p. 34 the author stresses that oral poetry is not poetry minus writing. As an introduction to the characteristics of oral poetry, the standard works remain and will surely remain Parry [1971] and Lord 1960. The intellectual and emotional resistance to the findings of Parry and Lord stems for the most part from various cultural preconceptions of our own times concerning folk poetry, for an illuminating historical account of such preconceptions, centering on the dichotomy of “Volkspoesie” and “Hochpoesie,” see Bausinger 1980.41–55 (“Folklore und gesunkenes Kulturgut”). Cf. also Nettl 1965.13: songs can travel not only from “high” culture to “low,” but also the other way around. In the case of German traditions the two-way travel between “art music” and “folk music” is particularly intense (Nettl, p. 69). As songs travel “up” and “down,” there can be commensurate patterns of tightening or loosening, either way, in the built-in rules of song-making.
poetry is the marked member of the opposition, and the poetry that we call oral is the unmarked.\footnote{Cf. Introduction §§15–17.}

§3. From the vantage point of our own times, however, poetry is by definition written poetry, and what we need to do first is to broaden our concept of poetry. Aside from questions of oral poetry and written poetry, the very word poetry becomes a source of confusion, in that it excludes dimensions normally included in the word song.

§4. The semantic differentiation between poetry and song affects the nomenclature of constituent elements common to these two differently perceived media: for example, whereas poetry is said to have meter, song has rhythm. This conventional distinction has a long history. There are traces attested in the scholarship of the fourth century B.C., where proponents of a rhythmical approach to poetry had an ongoing argument with proponents of a metrical approach.\footnote{Cf. Pöhlmann 1960.29–48, especially 29–32, 47–48; also Henderson and Wulstan 1973.48–49 on the different systems of notation used by the rhythmicians and metricians.} The argument continues to this day, with the “metricians” emphasizing the patterns of alternating long and short syllables in the text as it is composed, and the “rhythmicians,” the patterns of rhythm in the song as it is performed. In their argumentation the rhythmicians tend to define poetry in terms of song while the metricians tend to define song in terms of poetry.\footnote{Cf. Allen 1973.96–125, especially pp. 98–100.} My position is closer to that of the rhythmicians, to the extent that the affinities between song and poetry in ancient Greece can be viewed in terms of an evolution of various kinds of song into something differentiated from song—let us call it poetry—so that song and poetry can then coexist as alternative forms of expression. This point is elaborated as the discussion proceeds.
§5. Another point to be elaborated concerns Archaic Greek poetry and song in general, which I define for the moment as all attested poetry and song from Homer to Pindar: throughout this book, I argue against the need to assume that the medium of writing was necessary for the medium of composition or for the medium of performance and reperformance.⁷

§6. Let us begin the extended discussion by considering the level of poetry, proceeding from there to the level of song. My premise stems from the observation of Albert Lord, based primarily on ethnographic fieldwork in South Slavic traditions, that composition and performance in oral poetry are aspects of the same process, in that each performance is an act of recomposition.⁸ Suffice it for now to add that so long as the traditions of oral poetry are

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⁷ On the role of the written text as an alternative to performance, see the discussion in Ch. 6, especially with reference to the work of Svenbro 1988. My argument that writing is not essential for either the composition or the performance of poetry and song in the Archaic period of Greece requires, already at this point, one major modification: a notable exception is the Archaic epigram, which does indeed require the medium of writing as an alternative to performance, though not for composition. As Alexiou 1974.13 and 106 argues, the epigram is a poetic form that compensates for emerging patterns of restriction against antiphonal types of lamentation performed in two choral subdivisions, where one subdivision took the role of the dead, engaging in a “dialogue” with another subdivision that took the role of the living; the medium of writing was necessitated as a substitute for actual performance, in the wake of social pressures, exerted within the new context of the emergent city-states, against ostentatious degrees of lamentation on the part of families with powerful ties to the older phases of the existing social system. Even in the case of the epigram, it can be argued that writing had no direct role in the actual composition of the poetry: it appears that the built-in mechanics of composition, which can be ascertained from the diction of the various attested epigrams, do not necessarily correspond to the various local patterns of spelling reflected by these epigrams. Two notable examples in Archaic epigrams are (1) the spelling-out of elided vowels (e.g., CEG 13.4) and (2) the spelling of “movable v” in violation of the meter (e.g., CEG 288; cf. Kock 1910.22). For an internal cross-reference to the genre of the epigram within Homeric poetry, cf. Iliad VII 89–90 and the commentary (with bibliography) of Gentili and Giannini 1977.22–25. As for the various other forms of song and poetry, which were not dependent on writing as their primary vehicle of expression, I agree with the general arguments of Herington 1985.41–57 (especially pp. 46–47) against presupposing the necessity of writing as an aid for the performance of songs in what he calls the “song culture” of the Archaic and Classical periods. I disagree, however, with his postulating the necessity of writing for the actual composition of songs (especially p. 41).

alive in a given society, a written record cannot by itself affect a composition or a performance, and that it cannot stop the process of recomposition in performance.⁹

§7. The basic forms of ancient Greek poetry are traditionally classified in terms of metrical types:

1. dactylic hexameter (Homeric and hymns,¹⁰ Hesiodic wisdom- and catalogue-poetry)¹¹

2. elegiac distich = dactylic hexameter + “pentameter” (as in Archilochus, Callinus, Mimnermus, Tyrtaeus, Theognis, Solon, Xenophanes, and so on) {19|20}

3. iambic trimeter (as in Archilochus, Hipponax, Semonides, Solon, and so on; also as in fifth-century Athenian tragedy and comedy).

§8. In each of these metrical types of Greek poetry, I propose that the format of performance was recitative as opposed to melodic. This is not to say that such forms of poetry had no prescribed patterning in pitch. But patterns of pitch in poetry were formally and functionally distinct from the patterns of pitch that we, on the basis of our own cultural conditioning, recognize as melody in song. On the level of form, the difference is not as drastic as suggested by the contrast of monotone with song. I find the term recitative more suitable than monotone, to the extent that it does not necessarily convey the absence of melody. I use the term recitation to indicate either the absence or the reduction of melody. The contrast between

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⁹ Cf. also Chs. 2§3–6, 2§12–16, 2§23–24, 3§3–5, 13§1–2, 13§46–49, and following.

¹⁰ For the moment, I shall include under the rubric “Homer” not only the Iliad and Odyssey but also the Homeric Hymns and the poems of the Epic Cycle, such as the Aithiopis and Destruction of Ilion attributed to Arctinus of Miletus (Proclus, p. 105.21–22 and p. 107.16–17 Allen, Suda s.v.), the Little Iliad attributed to Lesches of Mytilene (Proclus, p. 106.19–20; Phaenias F 33 Wehrli, in Clement Stromateis 1.131.6), and so on. I reserve for Ch. 2§38–39 a discussion of the patterns of differentiation between Homeric and Cyclic Epic. As we see in that discussion, as also later in Ch. 14, the patterns of attribution to Homer become progressively more exclusive as we move forward in time, from the Archaic to the Classical period and beyond.

¹¹ I use the term wisdom poetry to encompass both the Theogony and the Works and Days.
not-sung (or recitative) and sung (or melodic) is attested most clearly in fifth-century
Athenian tragedy, where the iambic trimeter of dialogue was “spoken” by actors while a wide
variety of other meters were sung and danced by a khoros ‘chorus’, to the accompaniment of an
aulos ‘reed’.

It bears emphasis that khoros ‘chorus’ in Greek is a group that sings and dances, to
the accompaniment of wind or string instruments, and that, in Greek traditions, the concept of
song is fundamentally connected with the concept of the chorus.

§9. In the claim just made for the iambic trimeter of Athenian tragedy, the argumentation
is relatively secure. What follows, however, is a matter of controversy. I am proposing that an
absence or at least a reduction of melody—and an absence of instrumental accompaniment and
dance—eventually developed not only in the iambic trimeter of dialogue in Athenian drama
but also in the iambic trimeter of the old iambic poets (Archilochus, Hipponax, Semonides,
Solon, and so on), in the elegiac distich of the old elegiac poets (Archilochus, Callinus,
Mimnermus, Tyrtaeus, Theognis, Solon, Xenophanes, and so on), and in the dactylic hexameter
of Homer and Hesiod. This proposition may at first seem startling, in view of such internal
testimony as Homer’s bidding his Muse to sing the anger of Achilles (Iliad I 1) or Archilochus’
boasting that he knows how to ‘lead a choral performance’ (verb exarkhō) of a dithyramb (F 120
W).

The significance of this evidence, however, is not what it may first appear, and we must
examine it more closely. To begin, the internal evidence of Homeric and Hesiodic

12 As the discussion proceeds, we shall see that some types of meter that are performed by the chorus are
transitional between not-sung and sung, such as the so-called parakatalogē, with reduced rather than full melody
(Ch. 1§18–20) and with reduced dancing (Ch. 1§35–37).

13 Details in Ch. 12, where I also reckon with various lines of argumentation that have been invoked to challenge
the notion of an inherited correlation of song and dance in the khoros.

14 The meter in which this utterance is composed is trochaic tetrameter catalectic, on which see Ch. 1§51–54; also
Ch. 1§30–33. Also in the same meter is Archilochus F 121 W, where the description ‘leading the choral
performance’ (again, verb exarkhō) applies to the choral leader of a paean. Further discussion of the concepts of
dithyramb, paean, and choral performance (verb exarkhō) in Ch. 3 and Ch. 12. For more on Archilochus F 120 W,
see N 1979.252n.
diction tells us that the word *aeidō* ‘sing’ (as in *Iliad* I 1) is a functional synonym, in contexts where the medium refers to its own performance, of the word *e(n)pē* ‘narrate, recite’ (as in *Odyssey* i 1), which does not explicitly designate singing. For some, the functional synonymity of *aeidō* ‘sing’ and *e(n)pē* ‘narrate, recite’ is proof that the narrative format must be song—that the Homeric (and presumably Hesiodic) poems were sung and accompanied on the lyre. For others, however, the equating of a word that refers to strategies of narrating Homeric and Hesiodic poetry with a word that refers to the format of singing to the accompaniment of a lyre proves only that such poetry had such a format in some phase of its evolution. Self-references in Archaic Greek poetry may be diachronically valid without being synchronically true. This phenomenon may be designated as *diachronic skewing*.

§10. For example, the epic poetry of Homer refers to epic poetry as a medium that was performed in the context of an evening’s feast. Yet we know that the two epic poems of Homer, by virtue of their sheer length alone, defy this context. If we look for the earliest historical evidence, we see that the actually attested context for performing the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was already in the sixth century not simply the informal occasion of an evening’s feast but rather the formal occasion of a festival of Panhellenic repute, such as the Panathenaia in

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15 Thus for example the *aoidē* ‘song’ of the Muses at Hesiod *Theogony* 104 is in the context of the poet’s bidding them to ‘narrate’ (*espēte*: Th. 114) and to ‘say’ (*eipate*: Th. 115). On *ennepō* as ‘recite’, see N 1974.11n29.

16 See for example West 1981, who makes this additional observation at p. 113: “We cannot make a distinction between two styles of performance, one characterized as *aeidein*, the other as *enepein*.”

17 Again, N 1974.11n29.

18 I am using the terms *diachronic* and *synchronous*, on which see Introduction §7–11, not as synonyms for *historical* and *current* respectively. It is a mistake to equate *diachronic* with *historical*, as is often done. Diachrony refers to the potential for evolution *in a structure*. History is not restricted to phenomena that are structurally predictable.

19 For further exploration of this subject, see N 1979.18–20. Note Kirk’s (1962.281) comparison of the size of the Homeric compositions with the “leap from the largish pot to the perfectly colossal one” in the evolution of monumental amphoras/craters during the Geometric Period. What interests me in this comparison is that the colossal size of a utensil defies its own utility (N, p. 20§5n5).
Athens. The performers at such festivals were *rhapsōidoi* {21|22} ‘rhapsodes’. In Plato’s *Ion* the rhapsode Ion is dramatized as just having arrived at Athens in order to compete in the rhapsodic contest of the Panathenaia (*Ion* 530ab). That the rhapsodes who performed at such festivals were in competition with each other is evident also from the reference in Herodotus (5.67.1) to *agones* ‘contests’ (ἀγωνίζεσθαι) in the public performance of “Homer’s words” by *rhapsōidoi* ‘rhapsodes’ in the city-state of Sikyon, which were banned under the reign of the tyrant Kleisthenes.

§11. In the case of Homeric poetry, the earliest phases of rhapsodic transmission are associated with the *Homēridai*, a corporation of rhapsodes who traced themselves to an ancestor called *Homēros* (Pindar *Nemean* 2.1; Plato *Phaedrus* 252b; Strabo 14.1.33–35 C 645; [S.] West 1988.36–40).

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20 For a convenient collection of testimonia concerning the performance of Homeric poetry at the Panathenaia, see Allen 1924.226–227: Lycurges *Against Leokrates* 102 (the law requires the performance of the poetry of Homer at the Panathenaia, to the exclusion of other poets), Isocrates *Panegyricus* 159, “Plato” *Hipparchus* 228b, Diogenes Laertius 1.57 (Life of Solon). Cf. also Hesychius s.v. *Braurōnios*. Herington 1985.139 calculates that the running time of the *Oresteia* trilogy of Aeschylus “could be more than a quarter of that of a full-length Homeric epic.” He concludes: “These and similar figures seem often to be overlooked in discussions about the practicability of delivering the Homeric epics complete on any one occasion (p. 269n58). A dynasty of tyrants in Athens, the Peisistratidai, played a major role both in the shaping of the Panathenaia and in making this festival the context for performance of epic (scholia to Aristides *Panathenaicus* 3.123; “Plato” *Hipparchus* 228b). The involvement of the Peisistratidai in the institutionalization of Homeric performance at Athens has been explained in terms of a “Peisistratean Recension” (for an introduction to this concept, with bibliography, see [S.] West 1988.36–40). The present book develops an alternative explanation that does not require the textual notion of a “recension.” For more on the Peisistratidai and their connection with the performance of Homeric poetry at the Panathenaia, see especially Chs. 2§30–31, 2§44, 6§28–30, 6§53–54, 6§83–85.

21 For example, “Plato” *Hipparchus* 228b, concerning the *rhapsōidoi* ‘rhapsodes’ at the Panathenaia. It appears that some cities were later than others in instituting formal occasions for rhapsodic performance: see Maximus of Tyre 17.5a concerning the “latecomers” Sparta, Crete, and Cyrene (ὅψε γὰρ καὶ ἡ Σπάρτη ῥαψῳδεῖ, ὅψε δὲ καὶ ἡ Κρήτη, ὅψε δὲ καὶ τὸ Δωρικὸν ἐν Λιβύῃ γένος).

22 On *agōn* as ‘contest’ in poetry, see *Homeric Hymn* 6.19–20 (cf. 5§2–3). When Heraclitus (22 B 42 DK) says that Homer and Archilochus should be banned from *agōnes* ‘contests’ in poetic performance, what is really being said is that *rhapsōidoi* ‘rhapsodes’ (as suggested by the playful use of ῥαψῳδεῖ) should not be allowed to perform Homer and Archilochus. The expression Ὀμηρείων ἔπεων ‘Homer’s words’ in Herodotus 5.67.1 probably refers to the *Seven against Thebes* tradition, not to the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*; see Cingano 1985, whose argumentation meshes with a line of thought that pervades this book: that the patterns of attribution to Homer become increasingly less exclusive as we move further back in time.
Contest of Homer and Hesiod, p. 226.13–15 Allen).\textsuperscript{23} The basic testimony is most clearly set forth in the scholia to Pindar (\textit{Nemean} 2.1c, III 29.9–18 Drachmann), while the equation of the Homeridai with rhapsodes is specified in the actual text of Pindar (\textit{Nemean} 2.1–3).

§12. The scholia to Pindar (again \textit{Nemean} 2.1c, III 29.9–18 Drachmann) also specify that rhapsodes such as Kynaithos of Chios, credited with the final form of the Homeric \textit{Hymn to Apollo}, could no longer trace themselves to Homer. In other words the tradition continued by Kynaithos is here being {22|23} discredited by the sources as no longer authorized by the Homeridai. This Kynaithos is said (ibid.) to have been the first rhapsode to recite Homeric poetry at Syracuse, in the 69th Olympiad (504/1 B.C.), according to Hippostratus (FGH 568 F 5). By implication, Kynaithos was the first recorded winner in a seasonally recurring festival at Syracuse that featured a competition of rhapsodes.\textsuperscript{24} As other possible examples of Homeric transmission not authorized by the Homeridai, I cite the traditions about the introduction of Homeric poetry to Sparta by Lycurgus the Lawgiver: he is said to have received the tradition not from the \textit{Homēridai} of Chios but from the \textit{Kreophyleioi} (Kreophyleioi) of Samos, who traced themselves back to an ancestor called Kreophyllos of Samos (Plutarch \textit{Life of Lycurgus} 4).\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. Brellich 1958.320–321. Elsewhere I have argued that the “signature” in the Homeric \textit{Hymn to Apollo} 172, where the speaker refers to himself as ‘the blind man of Chios’, is an idealized self-reference to Homer: see N 1979.5 and 8–9 (for a similar conclusion, from a different point of view, see Burkert 1979.57); the verb  \textit{οἰκεῖ} ‘he has an abode’ (from noun  \textit{oikos} ‘house, abode’) at line 172 suggests that Homer, as ancestor of the Homeridai, had a hero cult at Chios (cf. N 1985.76–77, 81§79n1). For other references to the Homeridai of Chios, see Acusilaus FGH 2 F 2, Hellanicus FGH 4 F 20 (both by way of Harpocratinus s.v.); Isocrates \textit{Helen} 65; Plato \textit{Republic} 599d, \textit{Ion} 530c.

\textsuperscript{24} For a defense of the reported date, 504/1 B.C., cf. West 1975, Burkert 1979, and Janko 1982.261–262n88; Burkert adduces, for comparison, a tripod with an epigram dedicated by Simonides on the occasion of his victory in a dithyrambic competition at Athens in 476 B.C. (Simonides EG 28). The relative lateness of the date here assigned to Kynaithos is puzzling to those who posit a relatively early date for Stesichorus, supposedly the earliest attested poet in the Hellenic West. But note the juxtaposition of Homer and Stesichorus in, for example, Simonides PMG 564 (Burkert 1979.56n16); also in Isocrates \textit{Helen} 64–65. I interpret such references to imply the appropriateness of conventionally juxtaposing performances of Homeric and Stesichorean compositions at a given festival.

\textsuperscript{25} Further details at 2§31–33. Cf. Burkert 1972, who offers an analysis of myths that connect the transmission of Homeric poetry by the Kreophyleioi with the transmission of Homeric poetry by the Homeridai. This testimony
§13. The ancient sources make it explicit that the rhapsodes, in performing Homeric poetry at the Panathenaia, were constrained by law to take turns in narrating the poetry in its proper sequence (“Plato” Hipparchus 228b and Diogenes Laertius 1.57). In other words, even if the size of either the Iliad or the Odyssey ultimately defied performance by any one person at any one sitting, the monumental proportions of these compositions could evolve in a social context where the sequence of performance, and thereby the sequence of narrative, could be regulated, as in the case of the Panathenaia.

§14. From this rapid survey of rhapsodic traditions in the performance of Homeric poetry, I conclude that the model of simultaneous composition and performance by an oral poet at a feast had evolved organically into a quite different model, with the continuity of composed narrative achieved through a continuum of performance by rhapsodes who take turns at occasions like a Panhellenic festival. The point that I am making about the context of Homeric performance applies also to the medium of performance: just as the Homeric testimony about the performance of epic by singers at feasts belies the synchronic reality of the performance of epic by rhapsodes at Panhellenic festivals, so also the Homeric testimony about the reception of Homeric poetry at Sparta may be compared with the remark of Maximus of Tyre 17.5a, cited at Ch. §10–12.

26 This detail about taking turns is apparently not taken into account in the arguments of Schnapp-Gourbeillon 1982.720 against N 1979.18–20 (et passim).

27 It remains to ask whether, in the case of the Panathenaia, the reported law about consecutive recitation (cf. also Ch. §9–10) was a reinforcement or extension of something that might already have been a convention of, say, the Homeridai. Cf. also Lycurgus Against Leokrates 106–107 about a customary law at Sparta concerning the performance of the poetry of Tyrtaeus.

28 Cf. §9–10. I infer that the rhapsodes who took turns reciting within the sequence were in competition with each other. I cite again the reference in Herodotus (5.67.1) to ἀγῶνες ‘contests’ (ἀγωνιζεθαι) in the public performance of “Homer’s words” by ῥαψῳδοί ‘rhapsodes’ (cf. Ch. §10–12). As H. Pelliccia suggests to me, the requirement for consecutive performance by rhapsodes has the effect of ensuring that competition does not result in the arbitrary selection, by ambitious rhapsodes, of the most popular sequences. [S.] West 1988.39–40 leaves room for the possibility that the division of the Iliad (and, by extension, of the Odyssey) into twenty-four “books” reflects traditional units of performance by rhapsodes at the Panathenaia. On the usage of ῥαψῳδία in the sense of a ‘book’ of the Iliad, see, e.g., Plutarch Apophthegmata 186ε.
about the singer’s singing to the accompaniment of the lyre belies the synchronic reality of the rhapsode’s reciting without any accompaniment at all. On the basis of available evidence, it appears that rhapsodes did not sing the compositions that they performed but rather recited them without the accompaniment of the lyre. 29 So also with Hesiodic poetry: the internal testimony of the composition represents a theogony that is simultaneously sung and danced by the local Muses of Helikon (Theogony 3–4, 8), 30 and yet we know that the Theogony, as also the other Hesiodic compositions, was in fact recited by rhapsodes. 31 This is not to say that hexameter could not be sung in the Archaic period: 32 only that hexameter evolved into poetry as distinct from song, and that its fundamental form of rendition, as poetry, was recitation. 33

§15. Similarly with old iambic and elegiac poetry we see that the internal testimony refers to choral singing and dancing to the accompaniment of the lyre (as in Theognis 791; cf. 776–779), 34 or singing to both the lyre and the aulos {24|25} ‘reed’ (531–534, 759–764), 35 or singing to

29 The expression ἀλυρα ‘without lyre’ in Plato Laws 810bc furnishes explicit testimony (cf. also Plato Ion 533b5–7). For testimonia about reciting rhapsodes holding a staff instead of a lyre, see West 1966.163–164 (though I disagree with his application of these testimonia to Hesiod Theogony 30). The iconographic evidence of vase paintings showing rhapsodes either with a lyre or with a staff (West ibid.) can be viewed as another example of the phenomenon that I have called the diachronic skewing of perspective on an evolving institution (on which see Ch. 189–10).

30 See Ch. 12 on the diachronic correctness of the description, in Hesiod Theogony 3–4, 8, of song and dance in the performance of the Muses.

31 For testimonia on the rhapsodic recitation of Hesiodic poetry, see Plato Ion 531a, 532a, Laws 658d; also 1§22–23. For an overview of the evolution from singer (aoidos) to reciter (rhapsōidos), see N 1982.43–49. Conversely, the concept of rhapsode can be retrojected all the way back to Homer and Hesiod, as when Plato refers to both as rhapsodes (Republic 600d).

32 For example, the hexameters attributed to Terpander, which counted as a lyric form, were sung: “Plutarch” On Music 1132c (Heraclides Ponticus F 157 Wehrli) and the commentary of Barker 1984.208n18. On the lyric hexameters (and quasi-hexameters) attributed to the archaic figure called Terpander as a model for those of the post-Classical poet Timotheus (including his attested Persians): see On Music 1132de and the commentary of Barker, p. 209n25.


34 Cf. Ch. 12§55–56.

35 Cf. Ch. 12§55–57.
the aulos alone (825–830, 943–944, 1055–1058, 1065–1068). But in fact the external evidence points in another direction, namely, that the attested traditional format of performing the iambic trimeter and the elegiac distich in the Classical period and beyond was simply recitative. The crucial passage is Aristotle Poetics 1447b9–23, about which it has been said that “it is our earliest explicit testimony about the mode of performance of elegiac.” This is not to say that elegiac distich and iambic trimeter had not in earlier stages been compatible with instrumental (and vocal) melody. In the case of elegiac we can cite not only the internal evidence of references to the aulos but even the possible external evidence of testimony in Pausanias and elsewhere for such earlier stages.

§16. The fact remains that the professional performers of old iambic and elegiac poetry were not singers but rhapsodes. The crucial passages in this regard are Plato Ion 531a, 532a, with references to rhapsodic performance of the poetry of Archilochus, and Athenaeus 620cd, 620cd. 

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36 Ibid. See also Archilochus F 58.12 W, where we read ἄδων ὑπὸ αὐλητήρος ‘singing to the accompaniment of the aulos-player’; cf. Theognis 533, 825. Note Hipponax F 153 W and Mimnermus T 5 GP, by way of “Plutarch” On Music 1134a: the author is discussing an unattested passage of Hipponax where the poet cross-refers to Mimnermus as an aulos-player (cf. T 2 and T 4 GP); this cross reference leads the author to assert that in earlier times elegiac poetry was sung to the accompaniment of the aulos. See also the report in Pausanias 10.7.5–6 that at an early stage elegiac distichs were performed to the accompaniment of the aulos at the Pythian Games, and that this practice came to an end in 582 B.C. Also, the testimony of “Plutarch” On Music 1134a suggests the possibility that at an early stage elegiac distichs were performed to the accompaniment of the aulos at the Panathenaia. In the case of Pausanias, Bowie 1986.23 argues that the specification of elegiai ‘elegiac distichs’ may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the word elegoi in the Echembrotus epigram quoted by Pausanias (Echembrotus, p. 42 GP II).

37 See the commentary of Else 1957.56–57, who integrates the evidence of this passage with that of Poetics 1459b32–1460a2 and Rhetoric 1409a7; cf. also Lucas 1968.61.

38 Rosenmeyer 1968.218 (by “elegiac” he is referring to the metrically determined category of elegiac distich). Rosenmeyer’s 1968 article (following Campbell 1964) concentrates on the elegiac distich because his purpose is to challenge the widespread view, encouraged by the internal testimony sketched in the preceding discussion, that elegiac distich was regularly accompanied by the aulos. As for iambic trimeter, it is more generally agreed that it was recited, not sung (cf., e.g., Gentili 1985.45–46).

39 Cf. n.36.

40 I suggest that the repertoire of rhapsodes would include such lengthy compositions in elegiac couplets as the Smyrneis of Mimnermus, on which see Bowie 1986.27–30.
632d, a difficult set of references to which we shall return presently. The notion of *rhapsōidos* ‘rhapsode’ can refer to amateur performances as well, as in Plato *Timaeus* 21b1–7, a passage that describes how the young Critias took part in “rhapsodic” contests in performing the poetry of Solon and others.\(^41\)\(^{25|26}\)

§17. All this is not to say that the references made in Archaic iambic or elegiac poetry to choral performance or instrumental accompaniment are diachronically wrong: as I have been arguing, they are in fact diachronically correct,\(^42\) and it is not without reason that even the performance of a rhapsode is from a traditional point of view an act of “singing” (e.g., Plato *Ion* 535b).\(^43\) Still, such references are synchronically inaccurate, becoming a source of confusion.

§18. In one particular case, the testimony of Athenaeus 620cd, 632d,\(^44\) we must make a special effort to sort out the chronologically diverse strata of information. For example, Athenaeus 620c quotes Clearchus (F 92 Wehrli) as saying that one ‘Simonides of Zakynthos used to perform, rhapsode-style, the compositions of Archilochus in theaters, while seated on a stool [diphros]’ (τὰ Ἀρχιλόχου, φησίν, Σιμωνίδης ὁ Ζακύνθιος ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ἐπὶ δίφρου καθήμενος ἐρραψῶδει)\(^45\) Also, there is a report of a rhapsode called Mnasion who performed the iambic poetry of Semonides (Athenaeus ibid.)\(^46\) and of a rhapsode called Kleomenes who performed the *Katharmoi* of Empedocles at the Olympics (Dicaearchus F 87 Wehrli, by way of

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\(^41\) Cf. Brisson 1982.61.

\(^42\) See Ch. 1§14–15. This formulation expands on the positions taken by Campbell 1964 and Rosenmeyer 1968. It can also serve as a friendly amendment to Bowie 1986.27, with whose basic point about the compatibility of the *aulos* ‘reed’ and the elegiac distich I agree.

\(^43\) On this point, see the survey by West 1981.114n8 on attestations of *aeidō* ‘sing’ as designating the performance of a rhapsode. Cf. also *Timaeus* 21b1–7, as cited immediately above. I agree with Campbell 1964.66 that the expression ἐν ὑμνῇ ‘in song [oidē]’ in Plutarch *Solon* 8.2 (with reference to Solon F 1 W) refers to “formal recitation like that of a rhapsode.” A similar point can be made about the use of ἀιδῶ ‘sing’ in Philochorus FGH 328 F 216 (by way of Athenaeus 630f). These considerations affect the arguments of Bowie 1986.19n29.

\(^44\) Cited at Ch. 1§15–16.

\(^45\) Cf. West 1981.125.

\(^46\) For the reading “Semonides” instead of “Simonides,” see West ibid.
Similarly, we read at Athenaeus 632d that the poetry of Xenophanes, Solon, Theognis, and the like was composed without melody (cf. also Aristoxenus F 92 Wehrli, with commentary). But we also read at Athenaeus 620c (＝ Chamaeleon F 28 Wehrli) that the poems of Homer, Hesiod, and Archilochus could be sung melodically. This statement follows up on the immediately preceding discussion, at Athenaeus 620b, of Homēristai. These Homēristai seem to be distinct from the rhapsōdoi, and they represent the innovative practice of taking passages that were traditionally recited and setting these passages to music (cf. the references to Homer at Athenaeus 632d; there is also a similar reference to Hesiod in Plutarch Sympotic Questions 736e). Such activity was characteristic of the post-Classical era, about which it has been said: “So great is the ascendency of song over speech that, in the [Hellenistic] revivals of tragic and comic texts of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., it even takes over the parts composed in iambic trimeters, intended originally for simple recitation.”

§19. Once such a phase is reached, where traditionally recited pieces of poetry are being set to music, it becomes easy to confuse and reinterpret the diachrony of various sung and recited meters that are obviously related to each other. For example, apparently on the basis of parallelisms in meter and diction between Homer and Terpander, a representative of Archaic

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47 West 1981.125 dates these testimonia to the fourth century B.C., or the end of the fifth at the earliest. On the setting for the performance of the rhapsode Kleomenes, we may compare the report that Dionysius I of Syracuse engaged rhapsodes to perform his poetry at Olympia (Diodorus Siculus 14.109).

48 See the useful references of West 1970.919.

49 As we see from a survey by Gentili 1979.26–31, with a focus on the performance of drama. Cf. also West 1986 on the hexameters of a newly-discovered inscription from Epidaurus, a fragment of a hymn that he dates “not later than the third century B.C.” (p. 45; cf. p. 44n19). The melodic notations preserved in this inscription reflect, in West’s opinion, a uniform instrumental cadence, hexameter after hexameter.

lyric who was credited with the composition of songs sung to the lyre,\(^{51}\) Heraclides Ponticus is cited as saying that Terpander set his own poems and those of Homer to music (f 157 Wehrli in “Plutarch” On Music 1132c). So also Stesichorus is described as having set what are described as his epē, loosely to be translated as hexameters, to music (“Plutarch” On Music 1132c). As we see later, this hexameter of Stesichorus is cognate with, but not identical to, the Homeric hexameter.\(^{52}\) Further, Archilochus is credited with the invention of the parakatalogē, that is, a delivery characterized by reduced rather than full melody, with the accompaniment of a musical instrument (“Plutarch” On Music 1141a).\(^{53}\) In “Aristotle” Problems 19.6, the parakatalogē is described as a form of delivery that explicitly contrasts with song.\(^{54}\) Archilochus is generally credited with ‘introducing the practice of having some iambics spoken with instrumental accompaniment and others sung with it’ (ἐτι δὲ τῶν ἰαμβείων τὸ τὰ μὲν λέγεσθαι παρὰ τὴν κρούσιν, τὰ δὲ ᾧδεσθαι, Ἀρχίλοχον φασὶ καταδείξαι “Plutarch” On Music 1141b).

§20. The reported distinctions, with reference to the “inventions” of Archilochus, between iambics that are sung as well as instrumentally accompanied and those that are not sung, that is, with reduced melody, though instrumentally accompanied, are valuable in revealing an intermediate stage in what I argue is an evolution from sung to spoken forms in the Archaic period. The claim that Archilochus was the actual inventor of the sung and the intermediate forms can be discounted as readily as the parallel claim that he invented the iambic trimeter (see On Music 1140f). What is essential is that these \{27|28\} “inventions” are then correlated with historically attested innovations that start with the late fifth century, such as those of Crexus, in setting iambic meters to music (On Music 1141b); Crexus was a contemporary of

\(^{51}\) See Ch. 1§14–15.

\(^{52}\) Cf. Appendix.

\(^{53}\) Cf. the commentary of Barker 1984.212n183, n185.

\(^{54}\) Cf. Aristides Quintilianus, pp. 5.25–6.7 (ed. Winnington-Ingram) on the recitation of poetry as an intermediate category, to be placed between the categories of speech and song. See further at 1§40. Cf. also Barker, p. 234n183.
Timotheus and Philoxenus (1135c). In the post-Classical period, when poetry is being set to music—that is, the period starting with the likes of Crexus, Timotheus, and Philoxenus—we see that the archaic forms of song, as also of reduced song, like *parakatalogē*, are being treated as if they too were such “innovations”.

§21. We can be satisfied with the diachronic correctness of ancient Greek poetry’s references to itself as song by noting that such self-references are traditional, not innovative. The traditional phrases in Homeric poetry and elsewhere about the subject of singing and song have an Indo-European ancestry. Even the word *rhapsōidos* ‘rhapsode’, designating the professional reciter of poetry, is built on a concept of artistic self-reference (‘he who stitches together the song’) that is likewise of Indo-European provenience. The institutional reality of formal competition among rhapsodes, immortalized for us in Plato’s dialogue *Ion* (530a), seems to be a direct heritage of formal competition among singers, as reflected directly in passages like *Homeric Hymn* 6.19–20 and indirectly in the numerous myths about such competitions. There is enough evidence, then, to conclude that what the rhapsodes recited was directly descended from what earlier singers had sung.

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55 Cf. the comments of Barker, p. 52n20.
56 For a similar line of thinking, note the report of Timomachus (FGH 754 F 1 in Athenaeus 638a), who says that one Stesandros was the first to set Homer to the lyre for a performance at Delphi; it is as if the medium of “Homer” had never been sung before, only spoken.
59 Cf. also Herodotus 5.67.1, on which see also Ch. 1§10–12. For further testimonia from inscriptions recording various contests of rhapsodes, see West 1981.114n13. Cf. also Brisson 1982.62–63, with a convenient summary of details, gleaned from the *Ion* of Plato, about the competition of rhapsodes at the Panathenaia.
60 Quoted at Ch. 2§48–49. Further details on this passage at Ch. 5§2–3.
61 For a survey of the institution of competition among singers, see Dunkel 1979; cf. N 1979.311§2n6. For an example of a myth about such a competition, I cite the story of a contest between Arctinus of Miletus and Lesches.
§22. There is no compelling reason to believe that the medium of writing had anything to do with the traditions of the rhapsodes. In fact there is positive evidence that their mnemonic techniques were independent of writing. The textual tradition of Homeric poetry as we have it stems from Hellenistic Alexandria, where the practice of accentual notation was invented. This textual tradition bears witness to certain archaic patterns of Homeric accentuation that were no longer current in the everyday Greek language—patterns that can now be verified through the application of Indo-European linguistics. This comparative evidence leads to the conclusion that these patterns were preserved through norms of recitation inherited by the rhapsodes; the factor of writing seems to be ruled out, since a textual tradition for the notation of accents was evidently lacking before Alexandrian times. Even in such matters of minute detail, we may infer that the oral tradition of the rhapsodes was inherited—albeit in an ossified or crystalized phase—from the oral tradition of the singers who came before them.

of Mytilene, two of the poets of the Epic Cycle (Phaenias F 33 Wehrli, in Clement Stromateis 1.131.6). A more famous example is the Contest of Homer and Hesiod tradition (pp. 225–238 Allen); for bibliography, see Janko 1982.259–260n80; cf. also Dunkel 1979.252–253. On the interrelationship of narrative structure between the Homeric Iliad and Odyssey on the one hand and the Epic Cycle on the other, see 2§37–40.

For further arguments, see N 1982.43–49.

This is not to say that in historical times they could not have owned texts of what they recited (cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 4.2.10); in any case, it is clear that the rhapsodes recited from memory (Xenophon Symposium 3.6).


Ibid.

Note also the bits of information adduced by Allen 1924.48 about the sunthutai Mousôn Hēsioideiôn ‘fellow-sacrificers to the Hesiodic Muses’ (IG VII 1785; cf. also 4240), a corporation that “owned the land at Thespiae which contained the sacred spots”: Allen offers the theory that this corporation was analogous to the Homēridai in that it seems to have exercised authority over the corpus of Hesiodic poetry. At p. 72 of Allen’s book, we find a parallel, not adduced at p. 48, that can serve as a powerful additional argument in favor of Allen’s theory: in Plutarch Banquet of the Seven Sages 149f–150a, there is mention of one Ardalos of Trojan, supposedly a contemporary of the Seven Sages and described as both an aulōdis ‘aulos-singer’ (aulos = ‘reed’) and a ἱερεύς τῶν Ἀρδαλείων Μοῦσῶν ‘priest of the Ardalean Muses’. The cult of these “Ardalean Muses” had been supposedly established by the ancestor of this Ardalos, also called Ardalos of Trojan (Plutarch 150a), who is elsewhere
§23. Up to this point, I have used the term oral tradition only in a broad sense—to the extent that the medium of writing is not to be taken as a prerequisite for either composition or transmission. As we approach the subject of oral poetry in particular, I am for the moment more interested in the applicability of the term poetry, as distinct from song, to the oral traditions of ancient Greece. We have seen that a differentiation seems to have taken place, which can be represented in the following diachronic scheme:

[insert chart 1]

By speech I mean everyday or unmarked language, and by SONG I mean special or marked language that is set off from speech on the formal level of phonology, morphology, syntax, or any combination of these three.\(^68\) From a functional point of view, SONG would be any speech-act that is considered set apart from plain or everyday speech from the standpoint of a given society.\(^69\)

§24. The perception of plain or everyday speech is a variable abstraction that depends on the concrete realization of whatever special speech, or SONG, is set apart for a special context. In small-scale societies, the setting apart would normally happen in terms of myth and ritual.

§25. I use the word ritual here not in terms of our own cultural preconceptions but in terms of the broadest possible anthropological perspective.\(^70\) For the moment, I invoke the working

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\(^67\) I print song types, not just song, to indicate the potential plurality of song types in opposition with any single given type of poetry. I elaborate on this point in what follows.

\(^68\) On the distinction between unmarked and marked members of an opposition, see Introduction §11–13.

\(^69\) On the notion of speech-act, see Introduction §15–17.

\(^70\) Cf. Leach 1982, especially pp. 5–6. For further elaboration, see Ch. 4§1–3. Most Classicists of my generation tend to resist the very concept of ritual in the wake of the earlier excesses of the so-called Cambridge School: see, for example, Herington 1985.123–124. Herington’s important contributions to our understanding of the earlier forms
definition of *ritual* offered by Walter Burkert: “Ritual, in its outward aspect, is a programme of
demonstrative acts to be performed in set sequence and often at a set place and time—sacred
insofar as every omission or deviation arouses deep anxiety and calls forth sanctions. As
communication and social imprinting, ritual establishes and secures the solidarity of the
closed group.” The insistence of ritual on a set order of things should not be misunderstood
to mean that all rituals are static and that all aspects of rituals are rigid. Even when a given
society deems a given ritual to be static and never changing, it may in fact be dynamic and
ever changing, responding to the ever-changing structure of the society that it articulates.
Also, even within the strict framework of a given ritual, the various rigid patterns that
conform to an ideology of unchangeability may be combined with various flexible patterns
that conform to the needs of the here and now. Such is the case with the festivals of Greek city-
states. \[30\]|31\]

§26. As for *myth*, it can be defined for the moment as “a traditional narrative that is used as
a designation of reality. Myth is applied narrative. Myth describes a meaningful and important
reality that applies to the aggregate, going beyond the individual.”

§27. In small-scale societies—rather than complex ones—we can observe most clearly the
symbiosis of ritual and myth, how neither is to be derived from the other, and how the
language of ritual and myth is *marked*, let us call it SONG, while everyday language, *speech*, is
*unmarked*. To repeat, the perception of plain or everyday speech is a variable abstraction that
depends on the concrete realization of whatever special speech is set apart for a special

of Athenian tragedy could be further enhanced through a broader perspective of ritual. In this regard I find it
helpful to cite the sketch offered by Seaford 1984.10–16. I agree with Seaford that his findings help confirm “the
unfashionable view that the performance of tragedy originated in the practice of ritual” (p. 14).

71 Burkert 1985.8.
72 My translation, with slight modifications, of Burkert 1979b.29. For an illuminating discussion of myth,
especially useful to those who are unfamiliar with the perspectives of social anthropology, I cite Leach 1982.
context, let us call it occasion. In small-scale societies, the setting apart is normally a matter of ritual and myth, and the idea of ritual includes not only such basic activities as sacrifice and prayer but also such diverse occasions as meeting, eating and drinking, courtship, hunting, gathering, farming, building, and traveling. The marked speech-acts associated with the special occasions of ritual and myth are what we are calling SONG. Internal criteria for marked speech-acts can be expected to vary from society to society: what may be marked in one may be unmarked or everyday in another. A striking example is the Bahutu convention of singing one kind of song while paddling upstream, another while paddling downstream. There are potential differentiations of marked and unmarked categories within everyday language as well.

§28. Marked speech-acts could be a matter of denial as well as affirmation or reinforcement, as in the case of the Greek word an-ain-omai ‘deny’, opposed to an unattested *ain-omai ‘affirm’. The form *ain-omai conveys that the thing affirmed is a social contract, in the broadest sense, as we can see from the derivative of *ain-omai, ainos, in the sense of ‘legislative decision or resolution’. In other words ainos is authoritative speech: it is an affirmation, a marked speech-act, made by and for a marked social group.

§29. In complex societies—and the situation in Archaic Greece can already be described as such—the pervasiveness of myth and ritual, as well as their connectedness with each other, may be considerably weakened. Still, the marking of speech, that is, the turning of unmarked speech into marked SONG, may persist as the basic way to convey meaning in the context of ritual and myth. There is a reflex of this pattern in the usage of the Greek verb μοῦ, which

73 Cf. Leach, pp. 5–6.
74 Nettl 1965.120.
75 For example, SIG 672.15. Commentary and further discussion by Edmunds 1985.105.
76 Further details at Ch. 682–4.
means ‘I have my mouth closed’ or ‘I have my eyes closed’ in everyday situations, but ‘I say in a special way’ or ‘I see in a special way’ in marked situations of ritual. The latter meaning is evident in the derivatives mustēs ‘one who is initiated’ and mustērion ‘that into which one is initiated, mystery [Latin mysterium]’. So also the word mūthos ‘myth’, it has been argued, is a derivative of the same root from which muō is derived; its special meaning seems to be ‘special speech’ as opposed to everyday speech. For an illustration of the semantics underlying the usage of these Greek words, I cite Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 1641–1644: the visualization and the verbalization of whatever it was that finally happened to Oedipus in the precinct of the Eumenides at Colonus are restricted, in that the precise location of his corpse is a sacred secret (1545–1546, 1761–1763). Only Theseus, by virtue of being the proto-priest by hindsight for the Athenians of the here and now, is to witness what happened, which is called the drōmena (1644). Here the visualization and the verbalization of the myth, what happened

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72 Chantraine DELG 728: from onomatopoeic mū, with the primary meaning of opening and closing the lips (cf. Aristophanes Knights 10: see Chantraine, p. 717).

73 We may compare the semiotics of whispering, which may count as a form of not-speaking in everyday or unmarked situations and as a form of special speaking in marked situations of secrecy, sacredness, and the like.

74 See Chantraine, pp. 717–718, with bibliography in support of the argument that mūthos ‘myth’ is likewise derived from onomatopoeic mū. Despite the morphological grounds for accepting this derivation, Chantraine expresses doubts on semantic grounds. I hope that my interpretation here helps dispel that doubt.

80 For more on mūthos ‘myth’, see 2§27–28 and following. “Surviving examples” in social institutions tend to reflect a general pattern in earlier stages but only a particular situation in later stages of attestation.

81 For the belief that the corpse of the hero was a talisman of fertility for his native or adoptive community, see Ch. 6§58–60. On the hero cult of Oedipus at Colonus as represented by the tragedy of that name, see Edmunds 1981, especially p. 223n8 (a reference that is accidentally omitted in N 1985.76–77).

82 The participle drōmena is from the verb draō, which means ‘do, perform’ within the world of tragedy but also ‘sacrifice, perform ritual’ within the “real world,” the outer world that frames the world of tragedy. See Ch. 13§11–13. The participle drōmena, as used outside of tragedy, designates ‘ritual’ (e.g., Pausanias 9.27.2, 9.30.12; cf. Burkert 1983.33n14). Inside tragedy, as here at Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 1644, it bears the more inclusive and ambiguous sense of ‘things that are done’, ‘things that are happening’. 
to Oedipus, are restricted to the sacred context of ritual, controlled by the heritage of priestly authority from Theseus.\footnote{N 1982b. The key lines are in Sophocles \textit{Oedipus at Colonus} 1641–1644.}

\section{§30} From an anthropological standpoint, \textit{myth} is indeed \textit{special speech} in that it is a given society’s way of affirming its own reality through narrative.\footnote{On the truth-value of myth: Leach 1982.2–7.} In Homeric diction, we see that the ancestor of our word \textit{myth}, Greek \textit{mūthos}, actually designates speech-acts, such as formal boasts, threats, laments, invectives, prophecies, prayers, and so on.\footnote{Detailed demonstration in Martin 1989.12–42. On the concept of \textit{speech-act}, see Introduction §15–17.} Let us for the moment \{32|33\} take as a given, then, that the function of marked speech is to convey meaning in the context of ritual and myth.

\section{§31} In most societies, not only the smaller-scale but the more complex as well, the pattern of opposition between marked and unmarked speech takes the form of an opposition between \textit{SONG} and \textit{speech} respectively, with the “singing” of \textit{SONG} being marked by a wide variety of patterns resulting from constraints on available features of \textit{speech} in the given language. From the standpoint of our own cultural preconceptions, singing is a patterning of both melody (stylized tone or intonation)\footnote{When differences in pitch have a lexical function (as in ancient Greek), it is a matter of tone; where they have a syntactical function (as in English), it is a matter of intonation: cf. Devine and Stephens 1985.151.} and rhythm (stylized duration and/or intensity).\footnote{On duration and intensity as aspects of “stress,” cf. Devine and Stephens, p. 152. Further discussion at Ch. 1§31–33.} From a cross-cultural survey of a variety of societies, however, it is evident that singing may also be equated with many other available types of stylized phonological patterning, such as isosyllabism, rhyme, assonance, and alliteration, and that the patterning of \textit{SONG} extends to the levels of morphology and syntax as well.\footnote{See Guillén 1985.93–121, especially pp. 103–104, and Bright 1963.29. One feature of the fusion of experience in ritual, as Tambiah 1985.165 suggests, is “the hyper-regular surface structure of ritual language: the poetic devices that constitute the ritual" (p. 166).} Moreover, there is a potential reinforcement of \textit{SONG} with
motor activity, as minimal as muscular tension\(^{89}\) or as maximal as corresponding movement of the body in the form of dance.\(^{90}\) With reference to dance, from this point onward, I argue that the activity of dancing to the \{33|34\} words of SONG is primary, while dancing without the subtext, as it were, of SONG is secondary.\(^{91}\)

§32. This topic brings us to yet another type of markedness, yet another level of reinforcement for SONG, instrumental music. I also argue that instrumental accompaniment of the words of SONG is primary, while instrumental solo is secondary.\(^{92}\) In the case of such as rhyme, meter, assonance, and alliteration generate an overall quality of union and a blurring of grammatical boundaries.” Cf. also Jakobson 1960.358.

\(^{89}\) Note the following remark of Merriam 1964.119: “Some connection is made between pitch and muscle tension; the musician becomes accustomed to the muscle tension which he knows to be correct. One Basongye musician expressed this by saying that he chooses a pitch ‘which does not make me sweat’, and the same musician very logically noted that he comes to know the voices of the people with whom he sings and thus chooses a starting pitch ‘in the middle’ which he knows will suit all the voices.”

\(^{90}\) Cf. Allen 1973.100. The concept of dance should not be defined narrowly on the basis of our own cultural preconceptions. The categories of stylized bodily movement corresponding to our notion of dance vary from society to society. Cf. Royce 1977. Further details are at Ch. 1§39. On dance as an optional element in ballad performance, see Nettl 1965.56; for more details, with reference to Faroese culture, see Wylie and Margolin 1981.99, 115, 117. I note in particular the following description, p. 99:

“At the village dancehall—or, before villages had dancehalls, in a house rented for the occasion—men and women link arms to form a long, twisting circle. Anyone may join the circle at any point. They dance with a rhythmically shuffling, kicking step to the singing of the ballads. There is no instrumental accompaniment. A skipari (leader) sings the verses of a ballad, while the rest of the singers join in on the verses (if they know them) and on the refrain. When one ballad ends, the ring keeps moving round for a few moments until a new skipari starts up a new one."

\(^{91}\) Cf. the ethnographic testimony discussed briefly by Merriam 1964.275.

\(^{92}\) Cf. Herzog 1934, Schneider 1957.32–33, and especially Sultan 1988.396–397. Note too Bake 1957.196–197 on the Indie traditional teaching that vocal music is “pure” sound while instrumental music is a “manifestation” of sound. As Nettl 1965.51 points out, the limitations of the human voice (not to mention the limitations of the human ear), as contrasted with the relatively greater freedom of sound-range in musical instruments, lead to differences in the patterns of evolution for vocal and instrumental music. In this connection it is useful to ponder the discussion of Bright 1963.27. See in general the survey of the relationships between language and music in Nettl 1964.281-292. On the tendency of specialization and even professionalization in the social position of those who perform SONG with instrumental accompaniment and, by extension, of those who perform musical instruments, see Nettl 1965.50. On the development of instrumental solo playing on the aulos, so that the aulōidos ‘he who sings to the accompaniment of the aulos [reed]’ gives way to the aulētēs ‘he who plays the aulos’, see
instrumental music, there can even come about a transition from marking speech as special to imitating special speech.\(^9\) In making these arguments, my central point remains that the essential characteristic of SONG is the simple fact of its actual markedness or distinctness from everyday speech.

§33. Let us pursue the argument with a tentative formulation on the level of phonology, considering the elements of rhythm and melody, prime constituents of our notion of singing. From the standpoint of the Greek language, what potentially sets SONG apart from speech is a differentiation in patterns of duration/intensity (eventually rhythm) and pitch (eventually melody).\(^4\) In a \{34|35\} later stage of development what sets song apart from poetry is a further differentiation on the level of pitch (melody), so that song is plus melody while poetry is minus melody or reduced melody. The notion of plus melody is in line with such terms as lyric poetry or melic poetry, applicable to the medium of the main figure of this book, the poet Pindar.

§34. My view of poetry as something derived from SONG and differentiated from song runs counter to the view of metricians for whom song is poetry set to music. According to this

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\(^9\) Hence the notion of “talking instruments,” as discussed by Stem 1957; cf. also Ong 1977b. On instrumental music as imitation of the “special speech” of bird song, see Merriam 1964.75. Conversely, at one step further removed, unusual vocal techniques like Alpine yodeling can be traced back to the imitation of instruments: cf. Nettl 1956.58.

\(^4\) On “stress” in ancient Greek, which includes the phonological features of duration and intensity but not pitch, see the fundamental work of Allen 1973; for an updated defense of Allen’s formulation, see Devine and Stephens 1985. From the standpoint of general phonetics, stress may be a matter of duration, intensity, and pitch. From a survey of typological evidence, Devine and Stephens, p. 152, point to “instances of languages in which intensity is independent of both pitch and duration (Japanese), languages in which intensity is independent of duration and combines with pitch as an exponent of stress (Estonian, Komi), and languages in which intensity combines with both pitch and duration as an exponent of stress (English).” When differences in pitch have a lexical function, as in ancient Greek, it is a matter of tone; where they have a syntactical function, as in English, it is a matter of intonation: see Ch. 18.30–31. In ancient Greek, pitch is thus a matter of morphology as well as phonology. This is being taught today as the sum total of Greek accentuation. Allen’s discovery, that ancient Greek also had a system of duration and intensity that was independent of its system of pitch, suggests that the two systems merged in Modern Greek, where the inherited patterns of pitch are correlated with both duration and intensity (Devine and Stephens, p. 146n83).
second of two possible lines of thought, music would be extrinsic to language. This other view, however, runs counter to the experience of fieldwork in ethnomusicology, a discipline that has built a strong case against the fallacy of treating music as a “universal language.”\footnote{Cf. Merriam 1964.10–11.} Our own cultural prejudices in favor of such a concept can be traced to medieval Europe, where the eventual dissociation of language and music was already under way.\footnote{See Zumthor 1972.100.} Toward the end of the fourteenth century, Eustache Deschamps already made a distinction between the “natural music” of language and the “artificial music” of traditional melodies.\footnote{Ibid.} But it is clear in this case that the association of language and music is primary. For example, a study of attested traditions of Provençal singing has shown that only with the eventual divorce of melody from “text” can melody take on the characteristics that we, from the standpoint of our own cultural preconceptions, can recognize as music.\footnote{Zink 1972.24: “Quand le divorce entre le texte et la musique sera consommé, la musique, paradoxalement, pourra prendre plus d’importance; elle sera développée pour elle-même et pour l’effet extérieur qu’elle produit, indépendamment des exigences internes du poème.”} With the advent of polyphony, the motet can triumph over its libretto; but before that, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the melodic traditions were still bound to phraseological traditions of song.\footnote{Zink, pp. 17–24; especially p. 23n2.} From the standpoint of medieval poetics, recognition as one good at melodies merely required a good vocal register;\footnote{Examples in Zink, p. 23n1.} a singer could be good at producing melodies and still be bad at producing words—and therefore a bad singer.\footnote{Zink, p. 20n3.}

§35. Of the two terms, \textit{lyric} and \textit{melic}, the first is the more elusive in that it tends to be applied in contemporary academic usage to practically all Archaic Greek poetry except Homer
and Hesiod. For my purposes, however, *lyric* is still the more useful term since it is more
general. As such, *lyric* is suitable for distinguishing the general notion of song from the more
specific one of poetry, which is restricted to the recitative medium of epic, elegiac, and iambic
trimeter. From here on I use the word *lyric* as a parallel to *song*, excluding the elegiac
and the iambic trimeter. In current usage such exclusion is generally not observed. It is
instructive to notice, however, one particular constraint even in current usage against the
application of the term *lyric*: we cannot say that the iambic trimeter of Athenian tragedy and
comedy is *lyric* for the simple reason that it is patently recited as opposed to sung. As for what
is sung, we call that *lyric* by way of opposition to what is recited. Thus the opposition of *lyric*
meters and iambic trimeter in Athenian drama is that of song and poetry. We may note the
dictum of Aristotle to the effect that iambic trimeter approximates, more closely than any
other meter, everyday speech in real life (*Poetics* 1449a22–27; cf. *Rhetoric* 1408b33). Thus the
opposition of *song* and poetry in tragedy not only recapitulates diachronically an earlier
opposition of *song* and speech: it also imitates synchronically the actual opposition of *song* and
speech in “real life.”

§36. Whereas the iambic trimeter of tragedy regularly imitates speech, the dactylic
hexameter of epic occasionally imitates *song*, whenever Homeric poetry “quotes” a speech-
act like a song of lament.\(^{102}\) Thus the dactylic hexameter of epic, unlike the iambic trimeter of
drama, is not used as a contrast to song; rather it can be used as an imitation of song. This
distinction between these two kinds of poetry helps explain Aristotle’s perception that the

\(^{102}\) A prominent example is *Iliad* XXIV 723–776, where the narrative gives a direct quotation of three different
laments, performed by three of Hektor’s female next of kin on the occasion of the hero’s funeral. At this funeral
there are also professional *aoidoi* ‘singers’ (XXIV 720) who sing a more stylized kind of lament, called the *thriōnos*
(721), while the nonprofessional singers, next of kin to the deceased, are singing a less differentiated kind of
lament, called the *goos* (XXIV 723, 747, 761). Correspondingly, at the funeral of Achilles, his next of kin, the
Nereids, sing undifferentiated laments (*Odyssey* xxiv 58–59), while the Muses sing a differentiated *thriōnos* (xxiv 60–
rhythms of dactylic hexameter, unlike those of iambic trimeter, are not close to those of
everyday speech (Poetics 1449a27–28). In any case, the art of imitating speech, as achieved in the
medium of the iambic trimeter, can be measured by its realistic effects: the more the realism,
the greater the artifice.103

§37. Undifferentiated SONG as opposed to speech can be imagined as having had features
that ranged all the way from what we see in differentiated song to what we see in poetry. Thus,
for example, SONG in any given society may or may not require melody. In other words what
counts as poetry for us may in another given society count as song if there are no melodic
prerequisites. In this light, I cite a particularly useful formulation by Dan Ben-Amos, based on a
wide cross-cultural variety of ethnographic data:

The existence or absence of metric substructure in a message is the quality first
recognized in any communicative event and hence serves {36|37} as the primary
and most inclusive attribute for the categorization of oral tradition.
Consequently, prose [= what I have been calling speech] and poetry [= what I
have been calling SONG] constitute a binary set in which the metric
substructure is the crucial attribute that differentiates between these two major
divisions. It serves as the definitive feature that polarizes any verbal
communication and does not provide any possible intermediary positions. A
message is either rhythmic or not. However, within the category of poetry [in
my sense of SONG], speakers may be able to perceive several patterns of verbal
metrical redundancy which they would recognize as qualitatively different
genres.104

103 On the concept of imitation as a narrowed version of the concept of reenactment, see Ch. 1§47–48.
104 Ben-Amos 1976.228. He quotes at this point Andrzejewski and Lewis 1964.46, who note, as an example: “the
§38. This statement, useful as it is, can be made more precise with reference to the term metric substructure. First, I turn to the cross-cultural linguistic evidence assembled by W. S. Allen, showing that all phraseology has built-in rhythm. In line with this thinking, I would argue that the inherited words of SONG contain the rhythm, from a diachronic point of view. In an earlier work on Greek and Indic metrics, I had put it this way:

At first, the reasoning goes, traditional phraseology simply contains built-in rhythms. Later, the factor of tradition leads to the preference of phrases with some rhythms over phrases with other rhythms. Still later, the preferred rhythms have their own dynamics and become regulators of any incoming non-traditional phraseology. By becoming a viable structure in its own right, meter may evolve independently of traditional phraseology. Recent metrical developments may even obliterate aspects of the selfsame traditional phraseology that had engendered them, if these aspects no longer match the meter.

Such a formulation, to be sure, presupposes that the traditional phraseology of SONG, generating fixed rhythmical patterns, is itself already regulated by principles of phonological,

Somali classify their poems into various distinct types, each of which has its own specific name. It seems that their classification is mainly based on two prosodic factors: the type of tune to which the poem is chanted or sung, and the rhythmic pattern of the words.” The formulation of Ben-Amos may be compared with that of Aristotle Poetics 1447b9–23, as discussed at Ch. 1§15–16.

105 Allen 1973.99–101, who prefers in the end not to use the word rhythm (p. 101). I continue to use it here in the sense of “a system that operates in terms of stress (duration or intensity or both).”

morphological, and syntactical parallelism and repetition that serve to differentiate SONG from speech. 107

§39. Granted, a factor like rhythm may become stylized to the point that it can become transferred from the words of song, in the forms of dance and instrumental music. 108 I am arguing, however, that patterns of convergence and parallelism between the rhythm in the words of SONG and the rhythm in the forms of dance and instrumental music are primary, while patterns of divergence and contrast are secondary. In any case the perception of rhythm depends ultimately on the innate human capacity for language. 109 In that sense the very process of dance is related to the inner rhythms of language. The linguistic factor of stress, which seems to be the basis of rhythm in languages like Greek, is psychologically perceived in terms of body movement. 110 We may compare the discussion in Plato Laws 653e–654a (also Laws 665a), where the combination of rhythmic and melodic idiom is synthetically visualized as khoreiā ‘choral song and dance’. 111 I am proposing that the phraseology of SONG tends to stylize

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107 On the fundamental role of parallelisms and repetitions in differentiating what I am calling here SONG and speech, see Guillén 1985.93–121, especially pp. 103–104 with reference to the work of Žirmunskij 1965 following Steinitz 1934.

108 There is a particularly interesting example cited by Allen 1973.259n1: in the Luganda traditions of accompaniment, short syllables are regularly accompanied by one drumbeat and long syllables, by two drumbeats. See also Ong 1977b.


110 I cite the formulation of Allen, p. 100 (where “stress” is intended to include the components of duration and intensity; cf. Ch. 1§31–33): “Implicitly or explicitly underlying this identification of stress as the basis of rhythm is the conception of rhythm as movement, and of stress, in the production of audible linguistic phenomena, as the motor activity par excellence.” Cf. Wylie and Margolin 1981.115, quoting from a 1906 description of Faroese ballad performance and dancing, where the dancers coordinate their voices and movements: “What, moreover, should be well looked after in the ballad singing is to ‘get the word under the foot’, as the old ones used to say. One gets the word under the foot when one stresses one word or syllable at the same time that one steps along with the foot."

111 In light of this image I would translate skhēma as ‘dance-figure’ in Plato Laws 654e and 655a, despite the fact, noted by Barker 1984.142n60, that the usage of Plato does not restrict skhēma to the context of the dance. For the notion of skhēmata as ‘dance-figures’, postures and gestures that represent, see Barker 119n10 on Xenophon.
and regularize its own built-in rhythms, and that these regularizations result diachronically in what we call *meter*.\(^\text{112}\)\(^{38|39}\)

§40. Similarly, I also propose that the phraseology of *SONG* can stylize and regularize its own built-in tones or intonations, resulting diachronically in what we call *melody*.\(^\text{113}\) If we combine the two proposals, we get a scheme where both rhythm and melody in *SONG* could be viewed as regularized outgrowths of *speech* that serve eventually to distinguish *SONG* from *speech*. In terms of this composite scheme, I am now ready to substitute *rhythm or melody or both*...
for *metric substructure* in the formulation of Ben-Amos. The result is a formulation that is not
alien to ethnomusicology. On the general topic of the connections discovered by
ethnomusicologists between music (what I have been calling SONG) and language, I cite a
general theory, built on a broad cross-cultural sampling of ethnographic data, offered by
Bruno Nettl:

My own theory is based on the assumption that an undifferentiated method of
communication existed in remote times, one which was neither speech nor
music [= SONG] but which possessed the three features that they hold in
common: *pitch*, *stress* [which I reinterpret in the specialized sense of *intensity*],
and *duration* .... There must have been a long, gradual stage of differentiation
and specialization in culture, during which the two [= language and “music”]
became distinct .... This theory, then, postulates three stages in the development
of music: (1) undifferentiated communication, (2) differentiation between
language and music, and (3) differentiation between various musical styles. The
{39|40} last stage is, of course, the only one for which we have any data at all,
and even that ... is fairly recent.114

§41. In this connection, consider the earlier theories of Curt Sachs,115 postulating three
kinds of origins for melodic traditions: “logogenic” (from language), “pathogenic” (from
motion), and “melogenic” (from “music”). On the basis of what we have noted about the

114 Nettl 1956.136. Cf. also Bright 1963, especially p. 27; also Merriam 1964.285. There are important elaborations in
Nettl 1964.281–292; note in particular his analysis of the correlation between the pattern of strong word-initial
accent in the Czech language and the pattern of stressed notes beginning musical phrases in Czech folk music,
both vocal and instrumental (1964.283); also his observation that, in English folk songs, the melodic contour
“tends to descend at the end of a section, phrase, sentence, or song,” corresponding to intonational patterns in
the language.

relationship of language and motor activity, the category “pathogenic” is unnecessary. As for the category “melogenic,” it may be useful for describing historically attested situations where a given melodic tradition has lost or at least outgrown its “logogenic” moorings, and where such a tradition is then recombined with or superimposed on originally unrelated phraseology.\textsuperscript{116} Still, I would offer a formulation for melody that parallels what I have offered for rhythm: that the primary situation is that of convergence and parallelism between the patterns of tone or intonation or both in the words of SONG on the one hand and the patterns of melody, dance, and instrumental accompaniment on the other hand.\textsuperscript{117} I would also argue, conversely, that the secondary pattern is that of divergence and contrast.\textsuperscript{118}

§42. It should be stressed, however, that contrastive patterns between dance or instrumental accompaniment on the one hand and song on the other, even (40|41) if they are diachronically secondary, are even more effective than parallel patterns in marking off the language of SONG from the language of speech. Intensified contrast in form further marks what is already marked in function. We should expect partial contrast, for example, in the patterns of melody in the song and of tone or intonation in the words of the song, or in the patterns of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Cf. Herskovits and Herskovits 1947 on Trinidad melodies: “But not all melodies are rephrasings of old ones. Sometimes a tune heard, a European tune, can be ‘swung’ into a desired rhythm, with perhaps a change of a few measures, or no change at all. In this case, the words to a traditional song might be joined to the new melody, or a proverb might be used and to it added lines from older songs.”
\item \textsuperscript{117} Note the description of “logogenic” melodies: they are “narrow of range, using small intervals,” whereas corresponding dances are “tight, controlled, expressed through narrow steps” (Merriam 1964.253). See Bake 1957.200 on the Indie tradition of the bhāṣikasvara ‘speech tone’, which has the narrowest pitch compass and is employed, according to tradition, in performing the words of the (White) Yajur Veda. Note too the following formulation: “The melodic line follows the text in every detail; the words prescribe the rhythm and the flow; there is one note to each syllable, pitch is independent of duration. One might say that the melody only supports the words” (Bake ibid.; cf. West 1981.115 and 116, who draws particular attention to the old three-pitch and four-pitch patterns).
\item \textsuperscript{118} In the case of Balinese music lessons for the young, Merriam 1964.152 notes: “Those instruments which do not play the melody are ignored for the moment, for the melody must be learned first.” On patterns of primary convergence and secondary divergence between SONG and speech, cf. the bibliography assembled by Nettl 1964.290–291. Cf. also the discussion of the factor of “tension” in Allen 1973.110–112.
\end{itemize}
ictus in the verse and of stress (duration and intensity) in the words of the verse, or in the patterns of the colon in the stanza and of the clause or phrase in the words of the stanza, and so on.\footnote{Cf. Allen, p. 111: “One could envisage a form of which the pattem is determined by some prosodic feature $x$, such that there is another feature $y$ whose distribution in the language is partially coincident with that of $x$. In such a situation one could speak of tension between $x$ and $y$ where the two factors failed to coincide in composition, and of ‘concord’ or ‘harmony’ where they coincided and so reinforced the metrical pattern; and such a counterpoint between the patterns of the two features could arguably be manipulated by the poet for artistic ends.}

§43. In light of these arguments, supported by the insights of ethnomusicologists, I offer a broadened outline of possible developments, with special reference to the development of Greek music. Whereas SONG may or may not have required melody, song must be plus melody as opposed to poetry, which is minus melody or reduced melody. Whereas SONG may or may not have required dance and instrumental accompaniment, given forms of song may be plus dance or plus instrumental accompaniment or plus both.

§44. Let us pursue further the point, made earlier, to the effect that the parallelisms between patterns of dance or instrumental accompaniment and patterns of rhythm or melody in SONG are diachronically primary and that the contrasts between them are secondary.\footnote{Cf. Ch. 1§39 and following.} If indeed SONG is marked speech, then such elements as dance and instrumental accompaniment can be viewed as ramifications of SONG that can in turn be further differentiated as either parallel to the SONG or contrasting with it or, even further, parting with it altogether, as in forms of dance or instrumental music that exist independent of SONG. This is not to say something altogether naive and pseudo-historical, such as “in the beginning there was song, which was both danced and instrumentally accompanied.” Rather it is to speak of the linguistic foundations of singing, dancing, and instrumental accompaniment. It is to speak of diachronic potential: SONG, as a marked form of language, is structurally capable of generating
differentiated subforms such as dance and instrumental music. From a diachronic point of view, then, dance and instrumental music are optional realizations of the stylized speech-act. From the standpoint of traditions with song, dance, and instrumental accompaniment surviving together, analogous forms with any of these constituents missing are liable to be viewed as the result of a tearing away of that constituent from a unified whole, as we read in Plato Laws 669d–670a. In this connection, we may follow the formulation of A. M. Dale, who makes use of Milton’s concept of {41|42} Voice and Verse as uniting to form Song: “For the Greek lyric poet Voice and Verse were not a pair of sirens; Verse was merely the incomplete record of a single creation, Song.”

§45. To set up language as the diachronic foundation of dance and instrumental music is in line with A. M. Dale’s view that “song, with its dance, was a function of the words themselves when they were alive—that is, in performance.” More fundamentally, it is in line with Aristotle’s view that the basis of musical rhythm is the syllable (Metaphysics 1087b33 and following). Still, the fundamental function of dance and instrumental music, whether their patterns are parallel or contrastive with the patterns of language that they accompany, is to mark special speech as opposed to everyday speech, that is, SONG as opposed to speech. An ideal example is Athenian drama, in which the dancing and instrumental accompaniment further distances the words sung in the lyric meters by the khoros ‘chorus’ from the words recited in the iambic trimeter by the actors.

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121 Dale 1969.166.
122 Dale 1969.168. For reinforcement of this view on the level of testimony about the actual performance of song, see Pratinas PMG 708 (in Athenaeus 617b-f) and Plato Republic 398d.
123 Cf. also Plato Republic 400a and Cratylus 424c. See the comments on these and other passages by Pöhlmann 1960.30.
§46. Let us examine more closely the medium of the chorus, as attested in Athenian drama, in which song, dance, and instrumental accompaniment survive together. To repeat, analogous forms that happen to lack any of these constituents are viewed as a tearing away of that constituent from a unified whole (Plato Laws 669d–670a). Wherever song has the capacity of being danced, as in the case of Greek choral lyric, dancing to the song is dancing to its rhythms and melodies on the level of form and to its words on the level of content. In Greek, this correspondence is mīmēsis or mimesis, which can best be translated as ‘reenactment’ or ‘impersonation’.125

§47. In general the noun mīmēsis, as well as the corresponding verb mimeisthai, designates the reenactment, through ritual, of the events of myth (e.g., Lysias 6.51).126 In the case of a highly stylized ritual complex like {42|43} Athenian drama, the act of reenactment, mimeisthai, is equivalent to acting out the role of a mythical figure (e.g., Aristophanes Women at the Thesmophoria 850).127 The acting out can take place on the level of speech alone or else on the level of speech combined with bodily movement, that is, dance: hence the force of πρός ‘corresponding to’ in the expression πρός τὰ πάθεα αὐτοῦ ‘corresponding to his sufferings [= pathos plural]’ at Herodotus 5.67.5, describing the singing and dancing by tragikoi khoroi ‘tragic

125 Cf. Koller 1954 on the inherited concept of mīmēsis; for a balanced updating of Koller’s synthesis, addressing the criticism of Else 1958, see Nehamas 1982. Following Halliwell 1986.110, I concede that the semantic range of mimesis was shifting, even before Plato, away from the notions of reenactment or impersonation, to accommodate such distinct notions as imitation or the reproduction of appearances. As I shall argue presently, however, such distinct notions are more limited in scope. For Plato’s views on mimesis, see Halliwell, pp. 116–122 (also p. 53). As for Aristotle, Halliwell, p. 128, begins his account by mentioning as a possibility “that Aristotle’s guiding notion of mimesis is implicitly that of enactment: poetry proper (which may include some works in prose) does not describe, narrate or offer argument, but dramatises and embodies human speech and action.”

126 In the case of Lysias 6.51, mimeisthai refers to the misuse rather than proper use of a priestly costume by Andocides; still, as Halliwell, p. 113, points out, Andocides is “acting out the part of a priest in full.”

127 Cf. Halliwell, p. 114, on the nuances of mimesis in Aristophanes Women at the Thesmophoria: “Aristophanes’ parody involves, and deliberately confuses, both an ordinary usage of mimesis terms (for impersonation) and a newly developing application of the language of mimesis to the fictional status of dramatic poetry.”
choruses’, at Sikyon in the time of the tyrant Kleisthenes, in reenactment of the pathe a ‘sufferings’ of the hero Adrastos.\textsuperscript{128}

§48. While the fundamental meaning inherent in mīmēsis is that of reenacting the events of myth in ritual,\textsuperscript{129} by extension mīmēsis can also designate the present reenacting of previous reenactments. This narrowed view of reenactment, where the focus is on the present reenactment of a previous reenactment without considering the whole chain of reenactments extending from the past into the future, corresponds to the more specialized and episodic notion of imitation. In that the newest instance of reenacting has as its model, cumulatively, all the older instances of performing the myth as well as the “original” instance of the myth, mimesis is a current imitation of earlier reenactments. This is the sense of mīmēsis in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo 163, where a choral group called the Deliades are described as being able to ‘imitate’, mīmeisthai, the voices and musical sounds of a wide variety of Ionians who are described as assembling for a festival on the island of Delos (162–164).\textsuperscript{130}

§49. The sense of wonder about the mīmēsis performed by the Deliades concerns the accuracy or exactness of their reenactment: everyone will say, when they hear the sound of their own voices reenacted by the Deliades, that they are hearing their own way of speaking

\textsuperscript{128} Further discussion of this passage at Ch. 13§11–13. Cf. the discussion of Royce 1977.73, including this interesting quotation from Boas 1944.14–15 concerning the dance traditions of the Kwakiutl: “In the Cannibal Dance, the women’s War Dance, and some others, there is a fixed fundamental gesture like a basso ostinato that is broken at intervals by special gestures of pantomimic character which is descriptive of the text of the song.”

\textsuperscript{129} For the perspective of a social anthropologist on the reenactment of myth in ritual: Leach 1982.5–6.

\textsuperscript{130} I single out the helpful commentary of Barker 1984.40n4, especially with respect to the reading κρεμβαλιαστύν at Hymn to Apollo 162, which he interprets as “the locally grown rhythmic form, since rhythm is what krembala were used to emphasize.” Barker argues that this passage is “advertising the rhythmic and linguistic versatility of the Delian chorus, who might be asked to perform pieces from any of the literary and musical traditions of Ionia and the islands (ibid.).” Cf. Burkert 1987.54: “Contrary to what both others and I myself have written [Burkert 1985.110], I am inclined now to take this [= lines 162–165] as indicating mimetic elements in [the] performance of choral lyrics.” Cf. also Bergren 1982.93.
This line of thought corresponds to the celebrated description of mīmēsis in the Poetics of Aristotle as the mental process of identifying the representing ‘this’ with the represented ‘that’: οὗτος ἐκεῖνος ‘this is that’ (1448b17). In the performance of the Deliades, the represented ‘that’ is not only whatever the visiting Ionians have sung before. Whatever they have sung before is simply the latest in an ongoing series of previous reenactments, ultimately reenacting a given myth. So also with the formulation of mīmēsis by Aristotle (again Poetics 1448b17): the represented ‘that’ identified with the representing ‘this’ can be perceived not only as the previous experience but also as the sum total of previous experiences. ‘This’, then, is particular, the experience in the here and now, whereas ‘that’ is potentially universal, a cumulative synthesis of all previous experience. Aristotle goes on to say that the mental process whereby ‘this’ is being identified with ‘that’, by way of mīmēsis, is a source of pleasure (Poetics 1448b11, 13, 18). This pleasure is not incompatible with an anthropological understanding of ritual: “Fixed rhythm and fixed pitch are conducive to the performance of joint social activity. Indeed, those who resist yielding to this constraining influence are likely to suffer from a marked unpleasant restlessness. In comparison, the experience of constraint of a peculiar kind acting upon the collaborator induces in him, when he yields to it, the pleasure of self-surrender.”

§50. Such a formula of equating the particular ‘this’ with the universal ‘that’, as implied by the use of the verb mīmeisthai in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo and as explicitly linked with the concept of mīmēsis in the Poetics of Aristotle, is a fundamental expression of assent in many languages: besides the many attestations in Greek (e.g., τοῦτον ἐκεῖνον ‘this is that’ = ‘yes’ in

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131 Cf. Aeschylus Libation-Bearers 564 and the commentary of Nehamas 1982.56–57. Cf. also Theognis 367–370, as discussed at Ch. 12§70.
132 On which see Sifakis 1986, especially p. 218.
133 Tambiah 1985.123.
§51. From the standpoint of ritual, then, the activity of the chorus in an institution like Athenian drama, where, song, dance, and instrumental accompaniment can function as a unified whole, is a matter primarily of reenactment, insofar as the performers reenact the events of myth, and only secondarily of imitation, insofar as the performers at one given occasion imitate the performances of previous occasions.

§52. This is not to say, however, that reenactment is not imitation. All ritual reenactment is imitation, though of course not all imitation is ritual reenactment. Moreover, imitation is pertinent to the differentiation of SONG into song as opposed to poetry: we see a synchronic use of such a differentiation in Athenian drama, where the opposition between sung or lyric meters on one hand and the spoken iambic trimeter on the other hand imitates the real-life opposition of SONG on the one hand, with its ritual context, and speech on the other, with its nonritual context. The imitation is effective: poetry actually seems closer than song to speech in that it does not have the same degree of specialized patterning in melody. Nor is it correlated with dance or in most cases with instrumental accompaniment.135

§53. And yet, if indeed poetry is to be derived from SONG, it is really one step further removed from speech: to repeat the diachronic construct, song is specialized by retaining and

134 I cite the description of an all-female ritual, as attested in an Ismaili community south of Mashhad in Eastern Iran, which entails the narration of a story as the central event of a ritual meal (Mills 1982). At crucial moments in the retelling of this story (described as a combination of Aame-Thompson tale type 480, “The Kind and the Unkind Girls,” and 510A, “Cinderella”), the girl who is the chief participant, to whom the story is primarily addressed, has ritual food spooned into her bowl by the widow who tells the story, to which the girl answers yes at each of these crucial moments (as recorded in Mills, pp. 185–186).

135 Cf., for example, Dale 1968 on recitative anapaestic meters in drama.
refining melody from SONG, while poetry is specialized by losing or failing to develop the melody that is potential in SONG. In terms of differentiation, some form of SONG had to lose melody, or fail to develop melody, so that poetry could be differentiated from song. In Athenian drama, this form was the iambic trimeter. From a diachronic point of view, however, this meter did not have to be the form that imitated speech: we hear from Aristotle (Poetics 1449a21) that the trochaic tetrameter catalectic had been the earlier format of spoken poetry as opposed to song. But the conventions of Athenian tragedy seemed to allow only one meter to serve as the canonical format for imitating speech at any one given time: in attested tragedy, for example, the trochaic tetrameter catalectic is not isofunctional with the iambic trimeter—it is marked off from it by virtue of being associated with “scenes of heightened tension.” Moreover, there is evidence that the trochaic tetrameter catalectic was in certain situations delivered in a reduced melodic form known as parakatalogē. There is no need to argue, however, that iambic trimeter could never be sung after having become the imitative format of speech: there are sporadic traces, even in Athenian drama, of sung iambic trimeter as also of sung dactylic hexameter and sung elegiac distich. Still, the

136 There are parallels in medieval traditions: poetic genres where melody is absent are characterized by patterns of prosodic elaboration that seem to serve as compensation for the lost melodic component: see Zumthor 1972.99. On the old French distinction between dit and chant, see Zumthor, p. 406.
137 On the use of the trochaic tetrameter catalectic as a medium of dialogue, that is, imitated speech, see Pickard-Cambridge 1968.158–160. This is not to say that this meter could not be sung, danced, or instrumentally accompanied: see Pickard-Cambridge, pp. 156–158.
138 We may recall the primary nature of the opposition SONG and speech, as discussed by Ben-Amos (quoted at Ch. 1 §35–38).
139 West 1982.78, following Pickard-Cambridge, p. 159, who cites, for example, Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 887–890, Euripides Herakles 855–874.
140 See Pickard-Cambridge 1968.158–160 (also Comotti 1979.21). It may be misleading to some that West 1982.77 uses recitative to translate parakatalogē. To repeat, I view parakatalogē as an intermediate stage between sung and spoken: the parakatalogē is described as a form of delivery that explicitly contrasts with song in “Aristotle” Problems 19.6. See Ch. 1 §18–20.
141 Dale 1968.86 and 208.
appropriate way to imitate the single format of *speech* with the multiple formats of *SONG* is to contrast a single spoken meter with the plurality of sung meters. If Aristotle *Poetics* 1449a21 is right in saying that the trochaic tetrameter catalectic used to be the medium for imitating *speech*, then I am ready to posit a stage where even iambic trimeter, like the trochaic tetrameter catalectic, used to be delivered in the format of *parakatalogē*, and where this type of modified melodic delivery used to be the only approximation of *speech*. Then another stage of differentiation could have led to the iambic trimeter of Classical tragedy, with its non-melodic delivery, while trochaic tetrameter catalectic persisted with a modified melodic delivery. At such a stage of differentiation, only iambic trimeter could imitate *speech*, whereas the trochaic tetrameter catalectic would be imitating something that is now more than just *speech*.

§54. At another stage further removed, the appropriate way to imitate the single format of *speech* with the multiple formats of *SONG* would be to contrast a non-metrical form with the plurality of metrical forms. The non-metrical form would be prose:

[Chart 2]
{46|47}
I suggest that the opposition between *recited* meters on one hand and *spoken* prose on the other hand once again imitates the real-life opposition of *SONG* vs. *speech*. Again, the imitation is

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143 As in Euripides *Andromache* 103–116.
144 In line with this argument it is crucial to note that *parakatalogē* is incompatible with dance, as Rossi 1978 has argued on the basis of Aristophanes *Wasps* 1528–1537. To put it more accurately: *parakatalogē* is compatible only with a special kind of stylized dance, a mimesis of dance (in this sense, a mimesis of a mimesis), not with dance itself. That is to say, *parakatalogē* is one stage removed from dance, just as it is one stage removed from singing. Dance becomes reduced, just as melody, in a format of reduced song. Moreover, it may well be that the ritual content itself is correspondingly reduced.
effective: prose seems closer than poetry to *speech* in that it does not have the same degree of specialized patterning in rhythm. And yet, if indeed prose is predicated on poetry, as Herodotus implies in the first sentence of his *Histories*,\(^{145}\) then prose is really one step further removed from *speech*: to extend the diachronic construct, while *song* is specialized by retaining and refining melody from *song*, poetry is specialized by detaching melody from *song*, and prose is specialized by at least partially detaching rhythm from poetry.\(^{146}\) Further, just as one form of poetry can coexist and interact with many forms of song in the medium of Athenian drama, so also the form of prose coexists and interacts with forms of poetry in such forms of expression as represented by the *Lives of the Seven Sages* tradition and even by the *Histories* of Herodotus.\(^{147}\)

§55. Before proceeding any further in our consideration of the distinctions between *song* and poetry, we must confront a semantic problem occasioned by our own cultural preconceptions. Whereas the stylized rhythms of poetry are known to us as *meter*, we think of the stylized rhythms of song simply as *rhythm*. This mode of nomenclature is hardly appropriate to the traditions of Greek lyric, where song operates on principles of rhythm that are clearly cognate with the principles of meter in the recitative poetry of, say, Greek epic. In fact it is common practice to speak of the rhythms of Greek lyric in terms of *meter*.

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\(^{145}\) Full discussion in Ch. 8.

\(^{146}\) We may also adduce the prose of Gorgias (82 DK). For a parallel phenomenon in medieval traditions, where poetic compositions can be subjected to a conscious process of *dérimage* or “un-rhyming” into prose, see Zumthor 1972.99–100; also Kittay and Godzich 1987. In light of a distinctly juridical function associated with much of early medieval prose, and the fact that the form of an “un-rhymed” composition is perceived as conveying the content of a different level of truth-value from the “rhymed” (Zumthor, p. 98), it is interesting to compare the juridical dimension of early Greek prose authors like Herodotus, as discussed at Ch. 9.

\(^{147}\) On which see Ch. 11§30–32. We find a parallel in the medieval genre of the *chantefable*, such as *Aucassin et Nicolette*, with alternating song (the melody of the *laisses* has been preserved) and prose: see Vance 1986.161–163. I note in particular the following summary: “Prose is unmarked speech ‘at large’, while verse is the marked speech of a social constituency with precise boundaries” (Vance, p. 163). For the Chinese analogue known as *chu-kung-tiao*, see Chen 1976.
§56. This much said, I should note that my theory about poetry as a differentiated
derivative of SONG can be supported by the ancient Greek metrical evidence. To make this
point, I offer in the Appendix a survey of two fundamental types of Greek lyric metrical
patterns, the so-called Aeolic and dactylo-epitrite meters. All the attested lyric poetry of
Pindar, with only a few exceptions, is composed in one or the other of these two kinds of
meters.\footnote{For a convenient metrical overview, see the analysis of Snell in the SM edition of Pindaric fragments, pp. 162–174. In only one case, Pindar Olympian 13, is there a coexistence of the two types \textit{within one composition} (Aeolic modulating into dactylo-epitrite; cf. Bacchylides \textit{Epinician} 3). For an exceptional case of a Pindaric song composed in neither Aeolic nor in dactylo-epitrite meters, I cite \textit{Olympian} 2, composed in Ionic meters.} In the Introduction, I singled out Pindar’s compositions as the {47|48} centerpiece for illustrating the traditions of lyric poetry, that is, song. In later chapters we see that the actual content of this poetry reaffirms both explicitly and implicitly the thematic connection between epic and lyric, which reflects on the formal connection between poetry and song. In the Appendix, finally, I present the case for arguing that these connections are verified by the form—or, better, forms—of lyric poetry.

§57. Specifically, I argue that the dactylic hexameter, the meter of epic, took shape from
the phraseology of the two basic metrical systems inherited by Pindar, the Aeolic and the
dactylo-epitrite (both surveyed at length in the Appendix). More generally, I also argue that
the three major types of meter in Greek poetry, that is, dactylic hexameter, elegiac distich, and
iambic trimeter, are differentiated equivalents of cognate types of meter found in Greek song,
as in the inherited medium of Pindar. Whereas elegiac distich and iambic trimeter can be
connected with dactylo-epitrite, dactylic hexameter is more easily explained in terms of both
the Aeolic and the dactylo-epitrite heritage of Pindar.\footnote{Cf. Appendix and following.}

§58. Further, it can be shown that the three basic meters of poetry, dactylic hexameter,
elegiac distich, and iambic trimeter, are not only derived from SONG but also differentiated
from the corresponding meters of song. To begin, we may note that the meters of Greek song are either strophic, built on the principle of the colon, the constitutive element of both the relatively simpler stanzas of monody and the more complex stanzas of the choral medium, or stichic, built on the principle of the verse.\textsuperscript{150} Other available terms of description are asynartetic, where the divisions between cola are overt, and synartetic, where they are latent.\textsuperscript{151}

§59. The notion of asynartetic is compatible with that of parakatalógē, a category of song where both melody and dance become reduced or \{48|49\} eliminated altogether.\textsuperscript{152} Whereas both melody and dance are bound to a strophic framework, the category of parakatalógē is associated with an asynartetic or stichic framework.\textsuperscript{153}

§60. The stichic meters of lyric are a transitional point of differentiation from song, whereas total differentiation is achieved in the stichic meters of nonlyric, that is, of poetry proper.\textsuperscript{154} The stichic rather than strophic meters of lyric are actually attested as usable for extended narrative of a type parallel to epic, composed in the dactylic hexameter, which is the stichic meter of nonlyric par excellence. A worthy example is Sappho F 44 V, a poem with a

\textsuperscript{150} On the concept of colon, see Appendix. For stikhos in the sense of verse, cf. Aristophanes Frogs 1239. On the concept of a distinction between the monodic and the choral medium, see Ch. 3§3–6.

\textsuperscript{151} Cf. West 1982.43. It is important, however, not to confuse synartetic with strophic and asynartetic with stichic, in that the category of asynartetic accommodates not only verse but also strophes where the colon is clearly delineated; conversely, the category of synartetic does not accommodate strophes where the colon is clearly delineated. Granted, there are cases where the direction of development is from asynartetic to synartetic (cf. Wilamowitz 1921.421). Still, it hardly follows that the constituents of the strophe are built from the constituents of the verse. As the discussion proceeds, it in fact becomes evident that the direction of development is the reverse: from colon to verse portion, not from verse portion to colon. In any case asynartetic is a category that is roughly halfway between strophic and stichic. Cf. 13§27–30.

\textsuperscript{152} Reduction of melody: Ch. 1§18–20; reduction of dance: Ch. 1§53–54.

\textsuperscript{153} Cf. Rossi 1978 on Aristophanes Wasps 1528–1537.

\textsuperscript{154} On the Alexandrian poetic practice of generalizing units taken from the synartetic framework of strophic song into the stichic units of verse in poetry, see Rossi 1971.86. For later developments in the genres of the nomos and the dithurambos, where the principle of strophic responsion is abandoned, see Gentili 1985.35. As it is pointed out in “Aristotle” Problems 19.15, the abandonment of responsion entails greater freedom for experimentation in both the rhythms and the melodies.
heroic setting: it is composed in a stichic meter\textsuperscript{155} that is clearly cognate with various strophic meters of Lesbian lyric poetry.\textsuperscript{156} Such stichic meters of narrative lyric poetry, conventionally sung to the accompaniment of the lyre, are doubtless more closely related than is the spoken meter of hexameter to the format of the South Slavic \textit{guslar} who sings to the accompaniment of the \textit{gusle}.

§61. Let us reformulate in terms of the concepts just introduced. The fundamental argument in the Appendix is that the sequences of cola in the strophic meters of song are cognate with the verses in the stichic meters of poetry. Perhaps the clearest example is the case of the strophic sequences of Stesichorus, which are built from units such as the following:\textsuperscript{158}

\[a \simeq \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} = i a\]
\[b \simeq \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} = i a^\sim\]
\[c \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} = \sim i a\]
\[d \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} = \sim i a^\sim\]

\[L \simeq \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} = i a \& i A\]
\[M \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} = \sim i a \& i A \{49\} 50\]

\[A \simeq \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} \hspace{0.5em} \text{-} = \text{pros}\]

\textsuperscript{155} The meter in question is \textit{glyc@2da}, on which see Appendix. All of Book II of the canonical Sapphic corpus was composed in this meter: Hephaestion 7.7, p. 23.14–17 Consbruch.

\textsuperscript{156} For example, \textit{glyc@da} in Sappho F 94 V, on which see Appendix.

\textsuperscript{157} Cf. West 1973.188: “If there was epic or heroic balladry in (say) 1600 [B.C.], its characteristic verse was most likely the glyconic [= glyc], whose cognates are used in Sanskrit and Slavic epic.” On the Middle High German evidence for melodic traditions of epic sung in strophic form, see Brunner 1970.160.

\textsuperscript{158} Cf. Appendix and following. For the metrical symbols, see Appendix.
These shapes are not only prototypical of those found in, say, the so-called dactylo-epitrite meters of a Pindaric strophe: they are also identical with some of the major components in the meters of poetry, that is, in the dactylic hexameter (CB''), in the elegiac distich (CB''| CC), and in the iambic trimeter (bM).\textsuperscript{159}

§62. These meters of poetry are not only derived from SONG but also differentiated from the corresponding meters of song. As a finishing touch of differentiation between poetry and song, meters of song can avoid patterns that have been appropriated for poetry: thus, for example, the dactylo-epitrite metrical repertoire of Pindar’s compositions contains the ingredients needed to generate equivalents of the dactylic hexameter, elegiac distich, and iambic trimeter, and yet it is precisely these patterns of spoken poetry that the lyric poetry of Pindar, let us call it song, consistently avoids.\textsuperscript{160} It appears that the parent forms were covering their tracks. The poetic structure of the parent forms shades over, within that structure, those of its aspects that match various aspects that have become distinctive features of the respective daughter forms.

\textsuperscript{159} See Appendix and following.

\textsuperscript{160} Cf. Rosenmeyer 1968.230. One apparent exception is Pindar Pythian 9.4, 12. Another is Pythian 1.92 (\ldots , on which see Gentili and Giannini 1977.17), where part of the sequence looks like a dactylic hexameter; it is not in fact a hexameter since there is no correspondence with the final word boundaries of hexameter. There is an analogous situation in Pindar Nemean 9: at the beginning of each strophe is a unit matching the hexameter in its initial and final word boundaries but clashing with the primary caesura patterns of hexameter.
§63. With any differentiation of poetry from song through the loss of melody, there would have to come about a new structural strain in the oral tradition. Melody can be an important feature in the mnemonics of oral tradition in song, as we know from the studies of folklorists who scrutinize the transmission and diffusion of song: melody helps recall the words.\footnote{Cf. Klusen 1969.72–83, cited in an interesting discussion by Rösier 1980.104n176. As a counterweight to the notion of *gesunkenes Kulturgut* in Klusen’s work, see Bausinger 1980.41–55.} We are reminded of the anecdote about the Athenians captured after the debacle at Syracuse who ingratiated themselves with their captors by singing passages from Euripides: these memorable passages were evidently parts from choral lyric, not iambic trimeter (as we see from the wording τῶν μελῶν ἀναφέροντας ‘singing from his lyrics’ in Plutarch *Nicias* 29.3).\footnote{Cf. also Satyrus in *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 1176 fr. 39 col. xix.} In terms of a \{50|51\} differentiation of oral SONG into oral poetry as opposed to oral song,\footnote{On which see Ch. 1§51–53.} I offer this axiom: with the structural strain brought about by the loss of melody in poetry, there would come about, for the sake of mnemonic efficiency, a compensatory tightening up of rules in the poetic tradition.\footnote{See, for example, Dale 1968.25–31, especially p. 29, on phraseological and prosodic irregularities in the sung varieties of dactylic hexameter—which are irregularities only from the standpoint of the regularities in the nonsung variety. Cf. West 1982.98, 128 (especially n125). See also Zumthor 1972.99 on a comparable situation in medieval European traditions: “Dans les genres non chantés, le perfectionnement des effets sonores semble une sorte de compensation de la perte de la mélodie.” As for Zumthor’s list (ibid.) of formal features that serve to differentiate poetry from song, I should emphasize that all these formal features are potentially present in song.} This tightening up would entail an intensification of both phraseological and prosodic regularities, as we see in the formulas and meters of Homer, Hesiod, and the old elegiac and iambic poets. I also suggest that the concept of *formula*, stemming ultimately from Milman Parry’s study of Homeric phraseology, applies primarily to such regularities stemming from the differentiation of oral poetry from oral song. In other words the formula is to be seen as characteristic primarily of oral poetry as opposed to song. In
order to account for the distinct regularities of oral song as opposed to poetry, the concept of formula could be considerably broadened.\(^{165}\)

§64. For song, it seems most useful to distinguish three dimensions of regularity: phraseological, rhythmical, and melodic. These three dimensions correspond to the tripartition of melos ‘lyric poetry’ into logos, rhuthmos, and harmoniā in Plato Republic 398d (cf. Aristotle Poetics 1447a21–23). The rhythmical dimension would be represented by meters and the melodic, by modes.\(^{166}\) The process of oral composition in song, then, can be conceived as an interaction of phraseology, rhythms, and modes. {51|52}

\(^{165}\) See N 1979b.614–619.

\(^{166}\) For more on the notion of mode, see Ch. 3§1–2 and following.
The Authoritative Speech of Prose, Poetry, and Song: Pindar and Herodotus I

§1. The *historiā* ‘inquiry’ of Herodotus, like the *ainos* of epinician poets like Pindar, claims to extend from the epic of heroes. Like the *ainos* of Pindar, the *historiā* of Herodotus is a form of discourse that claims the authority to possess and control the epic of heroes. I propose to support these assertions by examining the structure of Herodotus’ narrative, traditionally known as the *Histories*, and by arguing that the traditions underlying this structure are akin to those underlying the *ainos* of Pindar’s epinician heritage. With reference to my working definition, in Chapter 1, of *song*, *poetry*, and *prose*, I argue that the study of Herodotus, master of prose, will help further clarify our ongoing consideration of the relationship between song in Pindar and poetry in epic.

§2. As in the songs of Pindar, the figure of Homer is treated as the ultimate representative of epic in the prose of Herodotus (e.g., 2.116–117). In fact, the poetry of Homer along with that of Hesiod is acknowledged by Herodotus as the definitive source for the cultural values that all Hellenes hold in common:


déven ðè éγένοντο έκαστος θεών, εἰτε αἰεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοι τέ τινες τά εἴδεα, οὐκ ἤπιστέατο μέχρι οὐ πρώην τε καὶ χθές ως εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἠλικίην τεταρκοσίοις ἔτεσι μεν πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι καὶ οὐ πλέοσι. οὕτοι δὲ εἰσὶ οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἐλληνι καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημῆναντες, οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι

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1 In making this attempt, I reach an important turning point at Ch. 9§16.
2 Further commentary on this passage at Ch. 14§14.
But it was only the day before yesterday, so to speak, that they [= the Hellenes] came to understand wherefrom the gods originated [= root gen-], whether they all existed always, and what they were like in their visible forms [eidos plural].

For Hesiod and Homer, I think, lived not more than four hundred years ago. These are the men who composed [= verb poieō] a theogony [with root gen-] for the Hellenes, who gave epithets [epōnumiai] to the gods, who distinguished their various tīmai [= spheres of influence] and tekhnai [= spheres of activity], and who indicated [= verb sēmainō] their visible forms. And I think that those poets who are said to have come before these men really came after them. The

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3 Herodotus here is contrasting the relatively recent fixing of the Hellenic heritage with that of the Egyptian.
4 The relative pronoun ὅθεν ‘wherefrom,’ used here as an indirect question, reflects the “prooemium style,” discussed in detail at Ch. 8§4 and 8§6.
8 On the pertinence of this word to the speech-activity of Herodotus, see Ch. 8§20, 233, and following.
9 On eidos as ‘visible form’, there is further elaboration at Ch. 9§15.
10 Such a ranking makes Hesiod and Homer more canonical, more Panhellenic: see Ch. 3§3–4. In his allusion to the other poets, Herodotus probably means Orpheus and Musaeus; for the conventional ideology that presents them as predecessors of Homer and Hesiod, see Lloyd 1976.247, 251. Cf. Hippias 86 B 6 DK; Aristophanes Frogs 1032–1035; Plato Apology 41a; cf. also Ephorus FGH 70 F 101, Plato Republic 363a, 377d, 612b. We may note with particular interest the tradition that Homer was descended from Orpheus: Pherecydes FGH 3 F 167, Hellanicus 4 F 5, Damastes 5 F 11; or from Musaeus: Gorgias 82 B 25 DK. Cf. Lloyd 1975.177 on the Herodotean scheme of 3 generations = 100 years.
first part of what precedes\textsuperscript{11} is said by the priestesses of Dodona.\textsuperscript{12} The second part, concerning Hesiod and Homer, is my opinion.\textsuperscript{13}

§3. Not only does Herodotus stress the Panhellenic importance of Homer \{216|217\} and Hesiod. He takes both a Homeric and a Hesiodic stance. Let us begin with his Homeric stance,\textsuperscript{14} which is evident at the beginning of the \textit{Histories}, the so-called prooemium.\textsuperscript{15} Although I have no doubt that Herodotus had Homer in mind when he composed the prooemium of the \textit{Histories}, I plan to show in what follows that the prose narrative of the \textit{Histories} is the product of an oral tradition in its own right, related to but not derived from the poetic narrative of the \textit{Iliad}.\textsuperscript{16}

§4. I now quote the prooemium of Herodotus in its entirety:

\begin{quote}
'Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ως

a) μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἓξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἔζιτηλα γένηται
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{11} That is, the discussion at Herodotus 2.52.1 and following, not quoted here.

\textsuperscript{12} The priestesses are named later by Herodotus (2.55.3).

\textsuperscript{13} I stress that the discourse of Herodotus acknowledges at 2.53 the authority of Homer and Hesiod (above) in the context of acknowledging at 2.52 and 2.53.3 the authority of the Oracle of Zeus at Dodona.

\textsuperscript{14} The Hesiodic stance of Herodotus will be taken up at Ch. 9§7.

\textsuperscript{15} On the aptness of Latin \textit{prooemium}, a word borrowed from Greek \textit{prooimion} (on which see Ch. 12§33 and following), as applied to the first sentence of the \textit{Histories} of Herodotus, see Krischer 1965. Unlike Krischer, however, I do not think that the resemblances between the prooemium of the \textit{Iliad} and the prooemium of the \textit{Histories} (on which see Ch. 8§6) can be ascribed simply to the imitation of Homer by Herodotus.

\textsuperscript{16} This point is perhaps more simple than it seems at first sight: I mean that the rhetoric of Herodotus’ \textit{prooemium} in particular and his entire composition in general is predicated on the traditions of speaking before a public, not of writing for readers. To me, that in itself is enough to justify calling such traditions \textit{oral}. See Ch. 6§46. To many others, however, this same word \textit{oral} has a much more narrow meaning, restricted by our own cultural preconceptions about writing and reading. Cf. Introduction §16. On the important distinction between reading aloud and silent reading, see Ch. 6§50 and following; cf. Svenbro 1987, following Knox 1968. On silent reading in the late medieval context, see Saenger 1982.
b) μὴτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεὰ γένηται,

τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι᾽ ἡν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι.\(^{17}\)

Herodotus prooemium

This is the public presentation [=noun apo-deixis]\(^{18}\) of the inquiry [historia]\(^{19}\) of Herodotus of Halikarnassos, with the purpose of bringing it about \{217|218\}

a) that whatever results from men may not, with the passage of time, become evanescent,\(^{20}\) and

b) that great and wondrous deeds—some of them publicly performed [= verb apo-deik-numai]\(^{21}\) by Hellenes, others by barbarians—may not become akleà [= without kleos].

In particular\(^{22}\) [this apodeixis of this historiā concerns] why (= on account of what cause [aitiā]) they entered into conflict with each other.\(^{23}\)

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\(^{17}\) Following Krischer and others I have supplied indentations in order to delineate the syntax; I have also set off as (a) and (b) the two negative purpose clauses, coordinated not only by μὴτε.../μὴτε... but also by the homoioteleuton ...γένηται/...γένηται.

\(^{18}\) The Ionic form apodeixis in the usage of Herodotus, guaranteed by the testimony of inscriptions written in the Ionic dialect (see, for example, LSJ s.v. ἀποδείκνυμι), apparently reflects a conflation of apo-deik-numai ‘present publicly, make public’ and apo-dek-omai ‘accept or approve a tradition’. Such a conflation seems to be at work in Herodotus 6.43.3; as M. Lang points out to me, the implication is not only that whatever is accepted is made public but also that whatever is made public is accepted. Such acceptance is the presupposition of a living tradition. On the syntax of what is introduced by ἀποδεξίας ἤδε, see Ch. 9§7n34 below. For an earlier mention of the contexts of apo-deik-numai ‘present publicly’, see Ch. 6831.

\(^{19}\) For the semantics of historiā ‘inquiry, investigation’, see Ch. 9§1 and following.

\(^{20}\) For more on the semantics of exitēla ‘evanescent’, see Ch. 8§14.

\(^{21}\) I discuss the translation ‘performed’ below.
§5. It is important to pay careful attention here in the prooemium to the development of thought that links the noun *apodeixis* ‘public presentation’ with the verb from which it is derived, *apo-deik-numai*, to be found in the clause b that follows. We would expect this verb in the middle voice to mean ‘make a public presentation of’, that is, ‘publicly demonstrate, make a public demonstration’; there are contexts where such a translation is indeed appropriate. Thus when Xerxes has a canal made in order to turn the isthmus of Mount Athos into an island, he is described as ἐθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι ‘wishing to make a public demonstration of his power and to have a reminder of it left behind’ (Herodotus 7.24; cf. 7.223.4). Combined with the direct object *gnōmēn*/*gnōmās* ‘opinions, judgments’, this verb in the middle voice is used in contexts where someone is presenting his views in public; the contexts include three specific {218|219} instances of self-expression by Herodotus (2.146.1, 7.139.1, 8.8.3). Yet in the context of the prooemium, and also in other Herodotean contexts

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22 The adverbial τά τε ἄλλα καί... that precedes the relative construction ...δι’ ἦν αἰτίην... has the effect of throwing the emphasis forward from the general to the specific, to parallel the movement from general to specific in the negative purpose clauses (a) and (b). For more on Herodotean devices of shading over and highlighting, see Ch. 2§36n95.

23 This final clause, τά τε ἄλλα καί δι’ ἦν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἄλληλοις, is difficult. I interpret it as an indirect question, thus disagreeing with Erbse 1956.211 and 219: he takes the whole construction as an elaborated direct object of a hypothetical ιστορῆσας in a hypothetical expression Ἡρόδοτος Ἀλικαρνησσέος ἱστορῆσας ἀπέδεξε τάδε, which has supposedly been reshaped into the actual expression that we read in Herodotus, Ὡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἡδε. I also disagree with Erbse’s view (Ch. 8 §1) that δι’ ἦν αἰτίην... is a relative construction as opposed to an indirect question (in other words that the construction is equivalent to τὴν αἰτίην δι’ ἦν...). Relative constructions can in fact be used for the purpose of indirect question: cf. Herodotus 2.2.2 Ψαμμήτιχος δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἐξονταναμένος πόρον οἰδένα τοῦτον ἀνευρεῖν, οἱ γενοῖςτο ἀνθρώπων ‘when Psammetichus was unable to find, by way of inquiry, a method of discovering who were the first race of men...’; Herodotus 1.56.1 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐφάρροντις ἱστορέων, τοὺς ἐν Ἕλληνων δυνατώτατοι ἔοντας προσκτήσατο φίλους ‘after this, he took care to investigate which of the Hellenes were the most powerful, for him to win over as friends’; Thucydides 5.9.2 τὴν δὲ ἐπιχείρησιν, ὅ τρόπῳ διανοοῦμαι ποιεῖσθαι, διδάξα ‘I will inform you in what way the attempt that I have in mind is to be accomplished’. In most cases the relative clause is linked with verbs that express or connote the speech-act of narration: see Ch. 8§6.

24 Comparable to these three instances of *apo-deik-numai* + *gnōmēn*/*gnōmās* as object is *apo-phain-omai* + *gnōmēn* as object at Herodotus 2.120.5: here again Herodotus is going publicly on record. On the synonymity of *apo-deik-
where *apo-deik-numai* in the middle voice is combined, as here, with the direct object *ergon/erga* ‘deed(s)’, it is to be translated simply as ‘perform’ rather than ‘make a public presentation or demonstration of’. Thus in Powell’s *Lexicon to Herodotus* we can find 29 contexts where *apo-deik-numai*, in combination with direct objects like *ergon/erga*, is translated as ‘perform’.  

In the prooemium that we have just read, for example, the reference is to the *megala erga* ‘great deeds’ that have been *apodekthentha* ‘performed’ by Hellenes and barbarians alike. If we translated *apodekthentha* here as ‘publicly presented’ or ‘demonstrated’ instead of ‘performed’, the text would not make sense to us. So also ‘performed’ is suggested in a context like the following, where a dying Kallikrates expresses his deep regret:

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ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστί οἱ ἀποδεδεγμένον ἔργον ἑωυτοῦ ἄξιον προθυμευμένου ἀποδέξασθαι
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Herodotus 9.72.2

that there was no deed *performed* by him that was worthy of him, though he had been eager to *perform* [one].

Clearly this young man’s sorrow is not over the fact that he has not made a public display of a great deed but over the more basic fact that he does not have a great deed to display. The obvious explanation for these usages of *apo-deik-numai* in the sense of *performing* rather than *publicly presenting or demonstrating or displaying* a deed is that the actual medium for publicly presenting the given deed is in all these cases none other than the language of Herodotus. In other words, performing a deed is the equivalent of publicly presenting a deed because it is ultimately being displayed by the *Histories* of Herodotus.

*numai* and *apo-phain-omai*, see the cooccurrence of these two words at Herodotus 5.45.1–2 (as discussed in Ch. 11§4).

25 Powell 1938.38 s.v. ἀποδείκνυμι B II (middle).
§6. Similarly saying something is in the case of Herodotus the equivalent of writing something because it is ultimately being written down in the Histories (e.g., 2.123.3, 4.195.2, 6.14.1, 7.214.3; cf. also Hecataeus FGH 1 F 1).\textsuperscript{26} In other words saying and writing are treated as parallel speech-acts.\textsuperscript{27} This sort of parallelism goes one step beyond what we have seen in the use of ana-gignôskô ‘know again, recognize’ in the sense of ‘read out loud’, as in Aris\{219|220\}tophanes Knights 118, 1011, 1065.\textsuperscript{28} This meaning of ana-gignôskô is a metaphorical extension of the notion of public performance, as we see in Pindar Olympian 10.1, where the corresponding notion of the actual composition by the poet is kept distinct through the metaphor of an inscription inside the phrēn ‘mind’ (10.2–3).\textsuperscript{29} As for the language of Herodotus, in contrast, not only the composition but also the performance, as a public speech-act, can be conveyed by the single metaphor of writing. For Herodotus, the essential thing is that the writing, just like the saying, is a public, not a private, speech-act (again 7.214.3).\textsuperscript{10} The historiā ‘inquiry’ that he says he is presenting in the prooemium of the Histories is not a public oral performance as such, but it is a public demonstration of an oral performance, by way of writing. Moreover, the very word apodeixis, referring to the ‘presentation’ of the historiā in the prooemium, can be translated as the ‘demonstration’ of such oral performance.

§7. Whereas Herodotus represents his writings as a public presentation, Thucydides represents his as if they were private: they are a κτῆμα ... ἐς αἰεί ‘a possession for all time’

\textsuperscript{26} Cf. Ch. 6\textsuperscript{846 and 883.}
\textsuperscript{28} Cf. Ch. 6\textsuperscript{849.}
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid. Cf. the use of ana-gignôskô ‘read out loud’ in Diogenes Laertius 9.54, with reference to the “public première” of various compositions by Protagoras (80 A 1 DK); cf. also the anecdotes in Plutarch On the Malice of Herodotus 862a-b (Diyllus FGH 73 F 5) and in Lucian Herodotus 1–2 about public “readings” supposedly performed by Herodotus himself.
\textsuperscript{30} Hartog, p. 294, suggests that the writing of the name of Ephialtes at 7.214.3 is as if the words of Herodotus were emanating from “une stèle d’infamie.” For more on Herodotus 7.214.3, see Ch. 8\$28.
(1.22.4), where the noun *ktēma*, derivative of the verb *kektēmai* 'possess', conveys the notion of private property.\(^{31}\) Moreover, Thucydides avoids the words *historiā* and *historeō*,\(^{32}\) as also *apodeixis* ‘public presentation’ (with only one exception, at 1.97.2).\(^{33}\) In the *Histories* of Herodotus, by contrast, precisely such words designate the performative aspect of the words of Herodotus taken all together. To return to the first words in the prooemium to the *Histories* of Herodotus, this whole composition is in itself an act of *apodeixis* ‘public presentation’:

'Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε 'this is the *apodeixis* of the *historiā* of Herodotus of Halikarnassos'.\(^{34}\)

§8. Wherever *apo-deik-numai* designates the performance of a deed (or the execution of a monument, as in Herodotus 1.184, etc.), the *performance* (or *execution*) is tantamount to a *public*
presentation as long as it can be sustained by a medium of public presentation. As Herodotus declares in the prooemium, the apodeixis ‘public presentation’ of his Histories is for the purpose of ensuring that the great deeds performed by Hellenes and barbarians alike should not be akleā ‘without kleos’. This purpose of sustaining kleos is a traditional one, already built into the inherited semantics of the verb apo-deik-numai: the great deeds are already being literally apodekhthenta ‘publicly presented’ because they are in the process of being retold in the medium of Herodotus—just as they had been retold earlier in the medium of his predecessors. These predecessors of Herodotus, as the wording of the transition from the prooemium to the Histories proper makes clear, come under the designation of logioi (Herodotus 1.1.1). For reasons that become clear as the discussion proceeds, I consistently translate logioi as ‘masters of speech’.

§9. In order to grasp the concept of logioi, I draw attention to the word for the particular subject of the Histories, namely, the aitiā ‘cause’ of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians: τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δὲ ἣν aitiān ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοις ‘in particular, [the apodeixis concerns] why (= on account of what cause [aitiā]) they entered into conflict with each other’ (Herodotus prooemium). This word is immediately picked up in the first sentence of the Histories proper: Περσέων μὲν νῦν οἱ λόγιοι Φοίνικας aitiās φασί γενέσθαι τῆς διαφορῆς ‘the logioi of the Persians say that it was the Phoenicians who were the cause of the conflict’ (Herodotus 1.1.1). This transition reveals that Herodotus, in concerning himself with the aitiā ‘cause’ of the conflict, is implicitly a logios ‘master of speech’ like his pro-Persian counterparts,

35 A monument can be such a medium, as in the case of μνημόσυνα ‘monument’, direct object of apo-deik-numai (ἀποδέξασθαι), at Herodotus 1.101.2. Immerwahr 1960.266 remarks: “The conception of fame underlying both monuments and deeds is exactly the same.” Cf. Hartog 1980.378n3.

36 It is from such contexts of apo-deik-numai that we begin to understand the basis of its apparent conflation with apo-dek-omai ‘accept or approve a tradition’, on which see Ch. 883.
explicitly called *logioi*, who concern themselves with the question: who were the cause of the conflict?  

§10. As we learn from the language of Pindar, it is the function of *logioi* ‘masters of speech’ to confer *kleos*:

\[
\text{πλατεῖαι πάντοθεν λογίοισιν ἐντὶ πρόσοδοι | νᾶσον ἐκλέα τάνδε κοσμεῖν· ἐπεὶ σφιν Αἰακίδαι | ἔπορον ἔξοχον αἰσαν ἄρετὰς ἀποδεικνύμενοι μεγάλας}
\]

Pindar *Nemean* 6.45–47

Wide are the approaching paths from all sides, for the *logioi* to adorn this island with glory [*kleos*]; for the Aiakidai have conferred upon this island an exceptional share [i.e., of glory], presenting [*apo-deik-numai*] great achievements [*aretē* plural].

Just as both Hellenes and barbarians can have their deeds *apodekhthenta* ‘publicly presented’ and thus not become *akleā* ‘without *kleos*’, by virtue of *apodeixis* ‘public presentation’ as explicitly conferred by Herodotus, so also the lineage of Achilles, the Aiakidai, can go on ‘publicly presenting’, *apodeiknumenoi*, their achievements even after death—by virtue of the

37 On the semantics of *aitiā* ‘cause’ and *aitioi* ‘responsible ones’ [= ‘the cause’] as in Herodotus *prooemium* and in 1.1.1, see Krischer 1965.160–161; also Ch. 8§19. For a parallel transition from prooemium to narrative proper by way of repeating, with variation, a key word (in this case *aitiā* followed by ἐπολέμησαν ‘cause ... getting into conflict’ picked up by aitirous followed by διαφορῆς ‘cause ... conflict’), see Krischer ibid., who points to the prooemium of the *Iliad* (ἐξ οὖ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε ‘starting with what time they first quarrelled, standing divided’ at I 6) and the first line of the narrative proper (τίς τ’ ἄρο σφωθε ἔριδι ἐξικατέκε μάχεσθαι; ‘who, then, of the gods set them off against each other, to fight in a quarrel?’ at I 8). Krischer also adduces the proemia to the *Catalogue of Ships* (ἀρχούς at *Iliad* II 493, picked up by ἠρχον at ii 494), to the *Odyssey* (νόστιμον ἦμαρ at i 9, picked up by νόστου at i 13), and to the *Theogony* (ὁ τι πρῶτον γένετ’ αὐτῶν at line 115, picked up by ἦ τοι μὲν πρῶτοτα Χάος γένετ’ at 116).

38 For the phraseology that immediately follows this passage, see Ch. 7§5.

39 For this interpretation, see Farnell 1932.285.

40 Cf. the remarks at Ch. 8§4 on the syntactical continuity of ἀπόδεξις... ἀποδεχθέντα.
public display implicitly conferred by the logioi, who are described here in the language of Pindar as a source of kleos.\(^{41}\)

§11. Elsewhere the language of Pindar draws the logioi into an explicit parallelism with aoidoi ‘poets’, and the emphasis is on their enshrining the achievements of those who have long since died: \{222|223\}

\[
\text{ὀπιθόμβροτον αὖχημα δόξας | οἶον ἀποιχομένων ἄνδρῶν δίαιταν μανύει | καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς, οὐ φθίνει Κροίσου φιλόφρων ἄρετά.}
\]

Pindar Pythian 1.92–94

The proud declaration of glory that comes in the future is the only thing that attests, both for logioi and for singers [aoidoi], the life of men who are now departed; the philos-minded achievement [arete] of Croesus fails\(^{42}\) not.\(^{43}\)

This explicit parallelism of logioi and aoidoi should be compared with that of logoi ‘words’ and aoidai ‘songs’ in Nemean 6 (ἀοιδαὶ καὶ λόγοι 30)\(^{44}\) the same poem from which I have just quoted the only other attestation of logioi in Pindar’s epinician lyric poetry.\(^{45}\) Let us turn back, then, to Nemean 6:

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\(^{41}\) The Aiakidai are not only the immediate lineage of Aiakos, including the sons Peleus and Telamon, the grandsons Achilles and Ajax, and so on, but also the ultimate lineage of Aiakos, extending into the here and now, into the population of Aegina in Pindar’s time: see Ch. 6§56 and following.

\(^{42}\) The Greek verb phthi- in the intransitive expresses various images of transience, most notably the failing of liquid sources and the wilting of plants (for a survey of passages, see N 1979.174–189; also Risch 1987).

\(^{43}\) The song goes on to declare that the virtue of Croesus contrasts with the depravity of the tyrant Phalaris (Pindar Pythian 1.95–98). Thus the logioi, like the aoidoi, have in their repertoire such Hellenes as Phalaris, not just non-Hellenes like Croesus (cf. n54 below).

\(^{44}\) This emended reading is adopted in the edition of SM; the manuscript reading άοιδαι καὶ λόγοι, however, in conjunction with the papyrus reading aοιδοι και λοι (Π41), makes it possible to read instead άοιδοι και λόγοι, if λόγοι may be scanned as a disyllable (on which see, for example, Famell 1932.284).

\(^{45}\) Cf. Ch. 8§9.
In the direction of this house, Muse, steer the breeze, bringing good kleos, of these my words. For even when men are departed, aoidai and logoi bring back the beauty of their deeds.

In short the language of Pindar makes it explicit that logioi ‘masters of speech’ are parallel to the masters of song, aoidoi, in their function of maintaining the kleos ‘glory’ of men even after death, and it implies that this activity of both logioi and aoidoi is a matter of apodeixis ‘public presentation’.

§12. As for Herodotus, I have already argued that he is by implication presented at the very beginning of his Histories as one in a long line of logioi, and he makes it explicit that his function of maintaining kleos is a matter of apodeixis. Accordingly I find it anachronistic to interpret logioi as ‘historians’.

§13. The medium of logioi, as the contexts of apodeixis make clear, is at least ideologically that of performance, not of writing. Like the poets, the logioi can recreate with each performance the deeds of men. That is what Pindar’s words have told us. Thus the arete ‘achievement’ of a Croesus, for example, as we have just read in Pindar’s Pythian 1, does not

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46 The quotation here follows the emended reading adopted in the edition of SM: see above.
47 Alternatively, if we follow the reading ἀοιδοὶ καὶ λόγοι (above): aoidai and logoi.
48 Cf. Ch. 888. Note too that the Egyptians as the most proficient logioi of all humans are described as μνήμην ἑπασκέοντες ‘engaging in the practice of memory’ in Herodotus 2.77.1.
49 Cf. Ch. 888.
50 Pocci Famell 1932.116.
51 Cf. Ch. 889.
‘fail’ (verb *phthi-*) because it is transmitted by *logioi* and *aoidoi*. In this particular case we even have actual attestations of parallel but mutually independent Croesus stories in the prose narrative of one who speaks in the mode of a *logios* (Herodotus 1.86–91) and in the poetic narrative of an *aoidos* (Bacchylides *Epinician* 3.23–62). It would seem then that the *logios* is a master of oral traditions in prose, just as the *aoidos* is a master of oral traditions in poetry and song.

§14. The notion that a *logios*, just like an *aoidos*, can prevent the transience of a man’s *arete* ‘achievement’ is found not only in Pindar: we have seen it conveyed twice in the prooemium of Herodotus. The first time around, it occurs in the negative purpose clause ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται ‘with the purpose of bringing it

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52 Cf. Ch. 9§11n42.

53 See Ch. 10§3 and following. See also Ch. 10§7 for iconographical evidence on the story of Croesus that is even earlier than the testimony of Pindar and Bacchylides (500 B.C.: Beazley 1963.238 no. 1).

54 I use the word *prose* here in the sense of a mimesis of speech: Ch. 1§53. In the case of an opposition between *logioi*, masters of speech, and *aoidoi*, masters of song, we can say that *speech* or *speaking* is unmarked, while *song* is marked. On the terms *unmarked* and *marked*, see Introduction §12. One cannot define *logioi* in terms of *aoidoi*, in that *logioi* is the unmarked category in the usage of Herodotus. Herodotus is implicitly a *logios* even by virtue of not being an *aoidos*. Moreover, I have already argued (9§8–9 above) that the syntax of the transition from the prooemium to the first sentence of the *Histories* proper is for us explicit evidence that Herodotus considered himself a *logios*. It is only for Herodotus that this consideration is implicit, not explicit. I would therefore disagree with the view that the use of the word *logios*, in the three attestations besides Herodotus 1.1.1, shows that it is appropriate only to non-Hellenes in Herodotus (2.3.1, 2.77.1, 4.46.1). In two of these attestations (2.77.1 and 4.46.1), non-Hellenes happen to be singled out within the category of *logioi*, but there is no indication that the category itself is foreign to Greek institutions. Even if we accepted the view that *logioi* implies non-Hellenes, we would still have to reckon with Herodotus’ practice of referring explicitly to things foreign while at the same time referring implicitly to things Greek (cf. Hartog 1980). Finally *logios* is not the only word for the referent in question, that is, for the master of speaking before an audience. Besides the opposition of *logios* and *aoidos* in the diction of Herodotus, we find the parallel opposition of *logopoios* ‘speechmaker, artisan of speech’ and *mousopoios* ‘songmaker, artisan of song’, where the first referent is Aesop and the second referent is Sappho herself (Herodotus 2.134.3 ... 135.1 Αἰσθώπος τοῦ λογοποιοῦ ... Σαπφός τῆς μουσοποιοῦ). The significance of this application of *logopoios* to the figure of Aesop in particular will be discussed in p. 325. Elsewhere in Herodotus, the word *logopoios* applies to a predecessor of Herodotus, Hecataeus (Herodotus 2.143.1 Ἐκαταιώ τῷ λογοποίῳ; also 5.36.2, 5.125); further discussion in p. 325. It is the likes of Hecataeus that Herodotus had in mind when he used the word *logioi* in the first sentence of the *Histories* proper (1.1.1).
about that whatever results from men may not, with the passage of time, become exitēla [= evanescent]’. This clause is then coordinated with another negative purpose clause, this second one being more specific than the first: μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροις ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται ‘and that great and wondrous deeds—some of them performed by Hellenes, others by barbarians—may not become akleā [= without kleos]’.

§15. In other attested contexts, the adjective exitēlos can designate such things as the fading of color in fabrics (Xenophon *Oeconomicus* 10.3) or in paintings (Pausanias 10.38.9), the loss of a seed’s generative powers when sown in alien soil (Plato *Republic* 497b), and the extinction of a family line (Herodotus 5.39.2). The references to vegetal and human evanescence reveal this adjective to be semantically parallel to the verb *phthi-*-, which I have been translating as ‘fail’ in its application to the transience of man’s aretē. Moreover, the adjective *aphthiton*, derived from *phthi-* and translatable as ‘unfailing, unwilting’, is a traditional epithet of kleōs in the inherited diction of praise poetry, as when the poet Ibycus makes the following pledge to his patron Polykrates:

καὶ σύ, Πολύκρατες, κλέος ἀφθιτον ἐξεῖς

ὡς κατ’ ἀοιδὰν καὶ ἐμὸν κλέος

Ibycus SLG 151.47–48

You too [i.e., you as well as the heroes just mentioned in the song],

Polykrates, will have kleōs that is unfailing [*aphthiton*],

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55 I disagree with the proposal of Krischer 1965.166 that the two negative clauses reflect different media.

56 On the references of *phthi-* to vegetal and human evanescence, see n42 above. Cf. Steiner 1986.38.

57 Cf. Introduction §5n10.
in accordance with my song, my kleos.\textsuperscript{58}

What emerges then from this comparison of phraseology in song, poetry, and prose is that the two negative purpose clauses in the prose prooemium of Herodotus—the first one intending that human accomplishments should not be evanescent and the second, that they should not be without kleos—amount to a periphrasis of what is being said in the single poetic phrase kleos aphthiton.

§16. In this regard we may compare various Platonic passages concerning the concept of collective memory as a force that preserves the extraordinary and \{225\|226\} erases the ordinary.\textsuperscript{59} To be noted especially is the expression τινα διαφοραν ... ἔχον ‘that which has some distinctness to it’ in designating that which deserves to be recorded, at Plato Timaeus 23a. In this sense the memory of oral tradition is at the same time a forgetting of the ordinary as well as a remembering of the extraordinary (but exemplary). Such an orientation is parallel to what is being expressed by τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ‘in particular’ in the prooemium of Herodotus.\textsuperscript{60} Also to be noted are the similarities between the prooemium of Herodotus and the following Platonic passage:

\begin{quote}
πρὸς δὲ Κριτίαν τὸν ἡμέτερον πάππον εἶπεν ... ὅτι μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστὰ τήδ’
εἰ ἔχεις τὰ πάλαιά ἐργα τῆς πόλεως ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ φθορᾶς ἀνθρώπων ἠφανισμένα, πάντων δὲ ἐν μέγιστον, οὗ νῦν ἐπιμνησθείσιν πρέπον ἂν ἠμῖν εἰς σοὶ τε ἀποδοῦναι χάριν καὶ τὴν θεὸν ἠμὰ ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει δικαίως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς οἴόνπερ ὑμνοῦντας ἐγκωμιάζειν.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. Ch. 6§75.
\textsuperscript{60} As discussed at Ch. 8§4. On the Herodotean device of highlighting the extraordinary by shading over the ordinary, see also Ch. 2§36n95.
He [= Solon] said to Critias my grandfather ... that there were, inherited by this city, ancient deeds, great and wondrous, that have disappeared through the passage of time and through destruction brought about by human agency. He went on to say that of all these deeds, there was one in particular that was the greatest, which it would be fitting for us now to bring to mind, giving a delightful compensation [kharis] to you [= Socrates] while at the same time rightly and truthfully praising [ἐγκωμιάζειν] the goddess on this the occasion of her festival, just as if we were singing hymns to her [Ὕμνον].

The emphasis in the phrase πάντων δὲ ἐν μέγιστον ‘there was one in particular that was the greatest’ is comparable with the emphasis in the phrase τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δ’ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἄλληλοισι ‘in particular, [this apodeixis of this ιστορία concerns] why (= on account of what cause [aitiā]) they entered into conflict with each other’ in the prooemium of Herodotus.  

§17. The reciprocal relation between the man whose accomplishments or qualities are celebrated by kleos aphthiton and the man who sings that kleos (226|227) is made explicit in the words quoted earlier from Ibycus. To paraphrase: “My kleos will be your kleos, because my song of praise for you will be your means to fame; conversely, since you merit permanent fame, my song praising you will be permanent, and consequently I the singer will have permanent fame.

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61 Solon, explicitly designated here as the wisest of the Seven Sages (Plato Timaeus 20d; cf. p. 243), is represented as a friend and possibly a relative of the father of Critias, Dropides, whose name he mentions in several passages of his attested poetry (20e; also Plato Charmides 157e); see Solon F 22 W. Another poet who mentions Dropides is Mimnermus (Plato Charmides 157e); see Mimnermus PMG 495.

62 Cf. Ch. 884.
as well.” A parallel relation exists between the man who presents an *apodeixis* ‘public presentation’ of his *Histories* on the one hand, and on the other the Hellenes and barbarians whose accomplishments are *apodekthenta* ‘publicly presented’ and thereby not evanescent, not without *kleos*.

§18. The self-expressive purpose of Herodotus, to maintain *kleos* about deeds triggered by conflict, brings to mind the *Iliad*. Besides the fact that Homeric poetry refers to itself as *kleos*, Achilles himself specifically refers to the Iliadic tradition, which will glorify him forever, as *kleos aphthiton* (IX 413). Moreover, this glorification is achieved in terms of a story that ostensibly tells of a conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon in the context of a larger conflict between Achaeans and Trojans, that is, the Trojan War. This larger conflict is subsumed by the even larger conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, subject of *historiā* ‘inquiry’ on the part of Herodotus. Like the Homer of Pindar, the Homer of Herodotus is being subsumed by a form of communication that goes beyond epic.

§19. The notion that the framework of the *historiā* of Herodotus subsumes the framework of the *Iliad* is implied by the prooemium of Herodotus as compared with that of the *Iliad*. The expression δι’ ἥν αἰτίην ‘on account of what cause …’ in the prooemium of Herodotus, which asks the question why the Hellenes and barbarians came into conflict with each other, is functionally analogous to the question posed in the prooemium of the *Iliad*: that is, why did Achilles and Agamemnon come into conflict with each other (*Iliad* I 7–12)? The latter conflict

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63 Cf. Ch. 6§73.
64 See, for example, *Iliad* II 486, XI227, as discussed in N 1979.15–18.
65 Further discussion at Ch. 8§45.
66 More below on this subject.
67 This phrase is picked up by αἰτίους in the next sentence, at Herodotus 1.1.1.
68 The question “who caused the conflict between them?” at line 7 of *Iliad* I is answered with “Apollo” at line 8, followed by an explanatory clause at lines 8–9 (introduced by γάρ) that tells why Apollo caused the conflict: he
results in the mēnis ‘anger’ of Achilles (Iliad I 1), which in turn results in the deaths of countless Achaeans and Trojans (I 2–5)." These heroes would not have died when they did, in the course of the Iliad, had it not been for the anger of Achilles; in other words the prooemium of the Iliad assumes that the original conflict of Achilles and Agamemnon resulted in the Iliad. Similarly the prooemium of the Histories of Herodotus assumes that the original conflicts of Hellenes and barbarians resulted in the Histories. In both cases the search for original causes motivates not just the events being narrated but also the narration. From the standpoint of the prooemia of the Iliad and of the Histories, Herodotus is in effect implying that the events narrated by the Iliad are part of a larger scheme of events as narrated by himself.

§20. For Herodotus, the question of the prooemium, δι’ ἥν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοις ‘on account of what cause they came into conflict with each other’, begins to be answered in the first sentence of the narrative proper: Περσέων μὲν νῦν οἱ λόγιοι Φοίνικας αἰτίους φασὶ γενέσθαι τῆς διαφορῆς ‘the logioi of the Persians say that it was the Phoenicians who were the cause of the conflict’ (Herodotus 1.1.1). The semantic relationship here between the noun aitīā ‘cause’ and the subsequent adjective aitios, which I have just translated as ‘the cause’, can best be understood by considering the definition of aitios in the dictionary of Liddell and Scott as ‘responsible for’ in the sense of ‘being the cause of a thing to a person’. There is a juridical dimension of aitios in the sense of ‘guilty’ and aitīā in the sense of ‘guilt’, operative throughout.

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70 For poetic parallels to the device of recapitulating a key concept of the prooemium in the first sentence of the narrative proper, see Ch. 8§9.
71 LSJ s.v. aītioς II (+ genitive of the thing and dative of the person).
the *Histories* of Herodotus. We may compare the semantics of Latin *causa*, which means not only ‘cause’ but also ‘case, trial’, and the derivatives of which are *ac-cūs-āre* and *ex-cūs-āre*. In the case of Herodotus’ main question, what was the *aitiā* ‘cause’ of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, the inquiry proceeds in terms of asking who was *aitios* ‘responsible, guilty’. From the standpoint of the *logioi* who speak on behalf of the Persians, Herodotus says, the Phoenicians were first to be in the wrong, *aitioi* (1.1.1): they abducted Io, and ‘this was the first beginning of wrongs committed’ (τῶν ἀδικημάτων πρῶτον τοῦτο ἄρξαι 1.2.1). This wrong is then righted when the Hellenes abduct Europa, and ‘this made things even for them’ (ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ίσα πρὸς ίσα οφί γενέσθαι 1.2.1). But then the Hellenes reportedly committed a wrong, thereby becoming *aitioi* ‘responsible’ (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Ἑλληνας αίτιους τῆς δεύτερης ἀδικίης γενέσθαι, when they abducted Medea. This wrong is in turn righted when Paris abducts Helen 1.2.3). Up to this time, from the standpoint of the Persian *logioi*, there have been two cycles of wrongs righted: first the barbarians were *aitioi*, and the Hellenes retaliated; then the Hellenes were *aitioi*, and the barbarians retaliated. From then on, however, according to the Persians, the degree of wrongdoing escalated when the Achaeans captured Troy: 

οἱ Ἀχαῖαις ἀνισορροπηθέντες στρατεύεσθαι· προτέρους γὰρ ἀρξαί 
οἱ Ἑλληνες ἀνισορροπηθέντες στρατοπεδήσαντες, ἀρχαῖα 

Herodotus 1.3.4

From here on, [they say that] it was the Hellenes who were very much in the wrong [*aitioi*], because it was they who were the first to begin to undertake a

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military campaign into Asia, instead of their [= the Persians’] undertaking a military campaign into Europe.

According to this Persian scenario then, the third and greatest cycle of wrongs to be righted is completed when the Persians finally invade Hellas.

§21. Against this backdrop of the Trojan and Persian Wars, the testimony of Herodotus links up with the ongoing inquiry into the aiτία ‘cause’ of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians. We have heard from the barbarians. Now we hear from Herodotus:

tαῦτα μὲν νυν Πέρσαι τε καὶ Φοίνικες λέγουσι. ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἐρέων ώς τούς ἢ ἄλλους κως ταῦτα ἐγένετο, τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἄδικων ἐργῶν ἐς τούς Ἑλλήνας, τούτον σημήνας προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὁμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιώμος, τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρά γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά. τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὃν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμά ἐν τῶντῷ μένουσαν ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως.

Herodotus 1.5.3–4

So that is what the Persians and Phoenicians say. But I will not go on to say whether those things really happened that way or some other way. Instead, relying on what I know, I will indicate [= verb σεμαίνω] who it was who first committed wrongdoing against the Hellenes. I will move thus ahead with what I have to say, as I proceed through great cities and small ones as well. For most of those that were great once are small today; and those that used to be small were great in my time. Understanding that the good fortune [εὐδαιμονία] of men never stays in the same place, I will keep in mind both alike.
§22. The very next word brings into focus the cause that Herodotus gives for the conflicts between Hellenes and barbarians that he is about to narrate: it is Croesus the Lydian (1.6.1), who is described as the *turannos* ‘tyrant’ (ibid.) of the mighty Lydian Empire that preceded and was then replaced by the Persian Empire. It was Croesus, says Herodotus, who first compelled {229|230} Hellenes to pay tribute to a barbarian (1.6.2); ‘before the rule of Croesus, all Hellenes were still free [eleutheros]’ (πρὸ δὲ τῆς Κροίσου ἀρχῆς πάντες “Ἐλληνες ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι 1.6.3). Herodotus’ overall narrative explains the cause of the Ionian Revolt, which ultimately provokes the Persian invasion of Hellas, as provoked in the first place by the ‘enslavement’ of the Hellenes of Asia (5.49.2–3). At the time of the Ionian Revolt, the ‘enslaved’ Hellenes were subject to the Persians; but the very first man to have ‘enslaved’ them was Croesus, tyrant of the Lydian Empire.

§23. It is important to notice that Herodotus qualifies his assertion that Croesus was the first man ever to ‘enslave’ free Greek cities:

οὗτος ὁ Κροῖσος βαρβάρων πρῶτος τῶν ἡμείς ἰδμεν τοὺς μὲν κατεστρέψατο Ἐλλήνων ἐς φόρου ἀπαγωγήν ...

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73 Note the asyndeton that highlights the introduction of this subject: Κροῖσος ἦν Λυδὸς μὲν γένος, παῖς δὲ Ἀλυάττεω, τύραννος δὲ ἐθνέων τῶν ἐντός Ἄλυως ποταμοῦ ... (Herodotus 1.6.1).

74 Cf. also the first sentence of Herodotus 1.27.1.

75 For the notion, as expressed here in Herodotus 1.6.3, that the Hellenic cities were *eleutheros* ‘free’ before Croesus, see Ch. 10850. The first Hellenic city that Croesus attacks is Ephesus (1.26.1–2). He then proceeds to attack each of the other cities of the Asiatic Ionians and Aeolians (1.26.3), in each case contriving an aitia ‘cause’ to justify his actions (1.26.3 ἄλλοισι ἄλλας αἰτίας ἐπιφέρων, τῶν μὲν ἐδύνατο μέξονας παρευρισκείν, μέξονα ἐπατιώμενος, τοῖς δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ φαύλα ἐπιφέρων). In no instance does Herodotus indicate the specific aitia.

76 Cf. Hohti 1976.42–43. For Herodotus, the *ktisis* ‘colonization’ of Asia by Hellenes does not count as a provocation because he clearly does not accept the Persian premise that all Asia belongs to the Persians (see 1.4.4). In fact the Croesus narrative shows that Herodotus thinks of the Hellenes’ cities in Asia as rightfully theirs: the enslavement of these cities by Croesus led to the mistaken Persian premise. Furthermore by implication the crime of Croesus is pertinent to the concept of the Athenian Empire: Ch. 10850 and following.
This Croesus was the first barbarian ever, within our knowledge, to reduce some Hellenes to the status of paying tribute ...  

The expression τῶν ἡμεῖς ἰδοῦν ‘within our knowledge’ picks up the earlier expression that leads to the identification of Croesus as the cause of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians—or at least of that part of the conflict that is narrated by Herodotus:

τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, τοῦτον σημίνας προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὡμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀστεὰ ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιῶν.

Relying on what I know, I will indicate [= verb σέμαινo] who it was who first committed wrongdoing against the Hellenes. I will move thus ahead with what I have to say, as I proceed through great cities and small ones as well.

§24. The wording of what we have just read is reminiscent not of the Iliad, prime epic of the Trojan War, but of the Odyssey. Thus we come to the second aspect of the Herodotean appropriation of Homer. In the discussion that follows, the focus is on two particular passages in the Odyssey that serve to illuminate the wording of Herodotus.

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77 See Ch. 10§50–51 for a discussion of how the theme of ‘enslavement’, that is, of making free Greek cities pay tribute, is developed by the narrative of Herodotus; also, how the theme of Croesus the Tyrant is formulated in the mode of an ainōs; finally, how the ainōs applies to Athens and its Athenian Empire, the heir to the Persian Empire, in turn the heir to the Lydian Empire.

78 Still to come, at Ch. 9§7, is a discussion of the Herodotean appropriation of Hesiod.
§25. Let us begin by considering the prooemium of the *Odyssey*. After a reference to the destruction of Troy by Odysseus (*Odyssey* i 2), the hero’s many subsequent wanderings are described in the following words:

\[\pi\lambda\lambda\omega\nu\ \delta'\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omicron\pi\omicron\nu\ \iota\delta\epsilon\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\epsilon\alpha\ \kappa \ai\ \nu\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\nu\ \omega\]

*Odyssey* i 3

He saw the cities of many men, and he came to know their way of thinking [*noos*].

The correlation here of *seeing* (*i\delta\epsilon n*) with consequent *knowing* (*\kappa \ai\ \nu\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\nu\ \omega*) recapitulates the semantics of perfect *oida*: “I have *seen*: therefore I *know*.”\(^{79}\) This general quest of Odysseus is parallel to a specific quest that was formulated for him by the seer Teiresias; this brings us to the second pertinent passage from the *Odyssey*. In this passage we find Odysseus himself saying to Penelope:

\[\epsilon\pi\epsilon\ \mu\acute{a}l\alpha\ \pi\omega\lambda\lambda\ \beta\rho\omicron\omicron\dot{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\ \acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\gamma\nu\ \epsilon\lambda\theta\epsilon\i\nu\]

*Odyssey* xxiii 267–268

since he [= Teiresias] ordered me to *proceed through* very many *cities* of men.

Teiresias had told Odysseus to undertake this quest after the hero has killed the suitors (xi 119–120);\(^{80}\) specifically Odysseus is to go inland, with an oar {231|232} on his shoulder, until it is

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\(^{79}\) See Snell 1924.61 for areas of semantic overlap between perfect *oida* ‘I know’ and aorist *eidon* ‘I saw’, therefore ‘I witnessed, experienced’. For example, *κακ\:\\, \pi\\alpha\lambda\\nu\:\\, \epsilon\pi\i\delta\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\\omicron\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\OMICRON\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\OMICRON\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\OMICRON\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\OMICRON\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicron\\\omicronton} \nu\omicron\nu\ \omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicron\\omicr0

\[^{80}\] As for the instructions of Teiresias concerning the *nostos* ‘safe homecoming’ of Odysseus (xi 100–118; *nostos* is the first word, at xi 100), the themes that are emphasized—not to mention the wording itself—are strikingly parallel to what we find in the prooemium of the *Odyssey* (i 1–10).
mistaken for a winnowing shovel (xi 121–137; xxiii 265–284). This experience, says Teiresias, will be a sêma ‘sign, signal’ for Odysseus (xi 126; xxiii 273). In such contexts the coding of a sêma in the dimension of seeing is analogous to the coding of an aînos in the dimension of hearing. The sêma of Teiresias bears a twofold message: what is an oar for seafarers is a winnowing shovel for inlanders. The message of this sêma, however, is twofold neither for the seafarers nor for the inlanders since the former can surely distinguish oars from winnowing shovels while the latter are presented as knowing only about winnowing shovels. Rather the message is twofold only for Odysseus as the traveler since he sees that the same signal has two distinct messages in two distinct places: what is an oar for the seafarers is a winnowing shovel for the inlanders. In order to recognize that one sêma can have more than one message, Odysseus must travel—πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστεα ... ἔλθεῖν ‘to proceed through many cities of men’ (again xxiii 267–268). The wording brings us back to Herodotus, who describes himself as ὁμοίως

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81 This point is elaborated in N 1983.51. Cf. Ch. 6§35. On aînos as a code, see 6§4.

82 There are further levels of interpretation, as discussed in N 1983.45. Let us consider the gesture of Odysseus, prescribed by the seer Teiresias, where he plants into the ground the handle of what he is carrying, at the precise point where it is no longer recognized as an oar (Odyssey xi 129). The picture of the implement planted into the ground is a sêma ‘sign’ bearing a twofold message. On the one hand it can mean “the sailor is dead,” as in the case of Odysseus’ dead companion Elpenor, whose tomb is to be a mound of earth with the handle of his oar planted on top (xi 75–78, xii 13–15); in fact the tomb of Elpenor is designated as his sêma (xi 75). On the other hand it can mean “the harvest is finished”: to plant the handle of a winnowing shovel in a heap of grain at a harvest festival is a stylized gesture indicating that the winnower’s work is done (Theocritus 7.155–156; I infer that the time of the year is July or August: cf. Gow 1952 II 127). Cf. Hansen 1977.38–39 (also p. 35 on the Feast of St. Elias, July 20th). The first meaning reflects the god-hero antagonism between Poseidon and Odysseus, on the level of nostos ‘homecoming’; the second reflects the more complex god-hero antagonism between Athena and Odysseus, on the two levels of nostos ‘homecoming’ and noos ‘way of thinking’: this point is elaborated in N 1983.53n31. On the role of Athena as patroness of pilots, and the related themes of noos and nostos, see N 1985.74–81. The complexity of the gesture of Odysseus in planting his implement is reinforced by the inherent symbolism of the winnowing shovel: just as this implement separates the grain from the chaff, so also it separates true things from false things; I compare the discussion of krixis in the sense of separating, discriminating, judging at Ch. 2§25 and following.

83 To decode the code of a sêma, one has to know the noos ‘way of thinking’ of the one who encoded it: hence the expression καὶ νοῦς ἐγνω ‘and he came to know their noos’ in Odyssey i 3. For a survey of contexts where the sêma is the code, see N 1983. It may be possible to take the interpretation further: by knowing the noos ‘way of thinking’
\[25\] and small ones as well' (again 1.5.3), in his quest to investigate the cause of the conflict that he is to narrate.

Figuratively Herodotus travels along the ‘roads of logoi’ from city to city, much as Odysseus travels in his heroic quest. This argument meshes with the larger argument that the Homeric stance of Herodotus engages not only the *Iliad* but also the *Odyssey*.

§26. It would be a mistake, however, to explain this as well as other correspondences in the wording of Homer and Herodotus as a simple matter of borrowing by Herodotus. It is a built-in tradition in the diction of Herodotus to imagine the process of narration itself as if it were a process of traveling along a road: for example, when he is ready to investigate the replacement of the Lydian Empire of Croesus by the Persian Empire of Cyrus, Herodotus says that he is about to tell—‘the true and real logos [=word]’ (τὸν ἑόντα λόγον 1.95.1),\(^84\) though he would be capable of revealing three other alternative ‘roads of logoi [= words]’ (ἐπιστάμενος... καὶ τριφασίας ἀλλας λόγων ὀδοὺς φῆναι 1.95.1).\(^85\) Here we see a close parallelism between the traditions of Herodotus’ *historiā* and Pindar’s *ainos* in that the same image of narration as the process of traveling along a road is extensively used in the diction of epinician poetry.\(^86\)

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\(^84\) On τὸν ἑόντα λόγον here at 1.95.1 in the sense of ‘the true and real logos’, see Woodbury 1958.155–156 and n34.

\(^85\) Note the wording: ἐπιδίζηται δὲ δὴ τὸ ἑντεθὲν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τὸν τε Κῦρον ὡστὶς ἑὼν τὴν Κρισεου ἀρχὴν κατείλε, καὶ τοὺς Πέρσας ὀτρεπ τρόπω ἡγήσαντο τῆς Ἀσίης ‘Next, I look for the logos that tells what kind of a man Cyrus was—to have conquered the empire of Croesus—and how the Persians achieved hegemony over Asia’ (1.95.1). For other examples of hodos ‘road’ in the sense of ‘alternative version’, see Herodotus 1.117.2 (here the choice is between one true logos and one false one) and 2.20.1 (note the use of the word σῆμαινε ‘indicate’ here) in conjunction with 2.22.1.

\(^86\) For Pindar, see the list compiled by Slater 1969.373 s.v. ὁδός (b); also id. p. 275 s.v. κέλευθος. Cf. Becker 1937.50–85. Precisely in the context of saying that he knows three roads of song but will tell the “real” story, Herodotus uses the word γράφω ‘write’ in referring to his authoritative version (1.95.1). By implication, writing can be for
§27. The ideological correspondence between the quest of Odysseus and the quest described by Herodotus runs even deeper. Matching the sēma ‘signal’ that Odysseus gets from Teiresias is a sēma given by Herodotus when he *indicates* who committed the wrongdoing that led to the conflict that he narrates while traveling down the road through cities large and small: as we have seen, the word that expresses the idea of ‘indicate’ is sēmainō, derivative of sēma (1.5.3). The choice of this word in indicating that the wrongdoer was Croesus is apt in that sēmainō denotes a mode of communication that is implicit as well as explicit. The narrative of Herodotus never says explicitly how the wrongdoing of Croesus is linked with the previous wrongdoings in the ongoing conflict between Hellenes and barbarians. Up to the point where Croesus is named, the series of wrongdoings had reached a \{233|234\} climax in the Trojan War.

In the version attributed to the logioi who speak on behalf of the Persians, the Hellenes were in the wrong when they undertook the Persian War, about to be narrated in the *Histories*. But the narrator of the *Histories* never says explicitly that this version is false. Instead he keeps saying it implicitly. Something else happened between the Trojan War and the Persian War, and that was the ‘enslavement’ of the Hellenes of Asia by Croesus (1.5.3, in conjunction with 1.6.1–3). Thus even if the Hellenes had been in the wrong when they undertook the Trojan War, the barbarians had already retaliated for that wrong. The Ionian Revolt, in reaction to the ‘enslavement’ of the Hellenes (Herodotus 5.49.2–3), would not count as wrongdoing in the latest cycle of wrongdoing and retaliation, in that Herodotus clearly does not accept the Persian premise that all Asia belongs to the Persians (1.4.4). Thus the real wrong in the latest cycle of wrongdoing and retaliation is the invasion of Europe by the barbarians in the Persian

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Herodotus the authoritative speech-act in that whatever he *writes* can be equated with whatever he would *say* publicly (cf. Ch. 6§46, 8§3, 8§5).

87 Cf. Ch. 8§19 and following.

88 On this attitude of Herodotus, see Ch. 8§20 and following, above.

89 See again Ch. 8§20 and following, above.
War. Again, Herodotus does not say this explicitly but implicitly, and the word that he uses to designate his mode of communication is σῆμαινo (1.5.3). We are reminded of the mode in which the god Apollo himself communicates:

ο ἃναξ, οὔ το μαντεῖον ἔστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἄλλα
σημαίνει

Heraclitus 22 B 93 DK

The Lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither says nor conceals: he indicates [=verb σῆμαινo].

§28. In his investigations of causes, Herodotus himself follows the convention of communicating in this mode. For example, in discussing the cause alleged by Croesus for his attack in Cyrus, namely, the usurpation of Median hegemony by the Persians, Herodotus promises to indicate the original cause of the usurpation:

... δι᾽ αἰτίην τὴν ἕγω ἐν τοῖσι ὀπίσω λόγοις σημαίνω

Herodotus 1.75.1 {234|235}

... on account of a cause [aitia] that I will indicate [=verb σῆμαινo] in later logoi.

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90 Cf. Ch. 6§35. Cf. also Herodotus 6.123.2, where the communication of the Pythia or priestess of Apollo’s Oracle is again denoted by this verb σῆμαινo, as well as Theognis 808 (the only instance of σῆμαινo in the attested nonepigraphic elegiac and iambic poetry of the Archaic period). In Herodotus 7.142.2, what the words of the oracle are actually supposed to mean is also expressed by way of the word σῆμαινo.

91 Cf. also Herodotus 7.213.3: ...δι’ ἄλλην αἰτίην, τῆν ἑγὼ ἐν τοῖσι διψει λόγοις σημαίνω ’... on account of another cause [aitia] that I will indicate [= verb σῆμαινo] in later logoi’. Here the ‘other cause’ has to do with explaining why Ephialtes was killed—a cause that Herodotus says is not connected with the man’s guilt in betraying the Hellenes at Thermopylae. For that betrayal, however, Herodotus does not hold Ephialtes guilty: τοῦτον αἰτίαν γράφω ’I declare him in writing to be responsible [aition]’ (7.214.3). On the use of grapho ’write’ in denoting the discourse of Herodotus, see Ch. 8§6 above. But Herodotus does not think that the death of Ephialtes is causally related to his
As François Hartog points out, he who *sēmainei* ‘indicates’ does so on the basis of some privileged position of knowledge, as when scouts, having their special vantage point having ascended to an elevated place, can then run down to indicate to those below the movements of the enemy (Herodotus 7.192.1 ἐσήμαινον, 7.219.1 ἐσήμηναν). The privileged position of Herodotus brings to mind the ultimately privileged position of the Delphic Oracle, with its all-encompassing knowledge, revealing mastery of such “facts” as the number of grains of sand in the universe (Herodotus 1.47.3). When Herodotus *sēmainei* ‘indicates’, he seems to have comparable authority within the realm of what he indicates, revealing mastery of such “facts” as the full dimensions of Scythia as it stretches from Istros to the sea (4.99.2), the precise length of the Royal Road leading from the Mediterranean seacoast all the way to Susa (5.54.1), and more figuratively, all the ‘roads of *logoi*’ along which his predecessors have traveled (2.20.1). Most important, he also knows who is *aitios* ‘responsible’ for the all-encompassing conflict that he narrates as he *sēmainei* indicates that it is Croesus (again 1.5.3).

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92 Hartog 1980.368f. Cf. the expression *koruphē logon* ‘summit of words’, as discussed at 8§31.

93 Ibid. The first word of this very first oracular utterance quoted by Herodotus is *oida* ‘I know’.

94 Note the wording of Herodotus 5.54.1: εἰ δέ τις τὸ ἀτρέκέστερον τούτων ἔτι διήτηται, ἐγὼ καὶ τούτο σημανέω ‘but if anyone seeks even more accuracy than this, I shall indicate [*sēmaino*] that as well’.

95 Cf. Ch. 9§26 above.

96 Here and elsewhere I have interpreted 1.5.3 thus: Herodotus *sēmainei* ‘indicates’ that Croesus was *aitios* ‘responsible’ for the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and barbarians. It is to be understood that the word *aitios* in this passage is implied by what Herodotus has been saying in the prooemium (δι’ ἣν αἰτίναν) and thereafter as discussed at Ch. 8§8 and 8§19; to be *aitios* is to be *aitios* of an *adikia* ‘wrong’ (1.2.1), and Herodotus at 1.5.3 *sēmainei* ‘indicates’ that Croesus was the first, as far as Herodotus knows, to commit *adika erga* ‘wrongdoings’ against the Hellenes.
§29. Thus when Herodotus sēmainei ‘indicates’, he does so on the basis of superior knowledge. We now see that he is doing something more than simply qualifying his statement when he indicates that Croesus was aitios ‘responsible’ for the conflict that he will narrate:

οὗτος ὁ Κροῖσος βαρβάρων πρῶτος τῶν ἥμεις ἴδμεν τοὺς μὲν κατεστρέψατο Ἑλλήνων ἐς φόρου ἀπαγωγήν

Herodotus 1.6.2

This Croesus was the first barbarian ever, within our knowledge, to reduce some Hellenes to the status of paying tribute...

These words pick up the earlier wording:

τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, τοῦτον σημήνας προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὡμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀστεα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιών.

Herodotus 1.5.3

Instead, relying on what I know, I will indicate [= verb sēmain] who it was who first committed wrongdoing against the Hellenes. I will move thus ahead with what I have to say, as I proceed through great cities and small ones as well.

Figuratively Herodotus owes his privileged position of knowledge to the many roads of logoi ‘words’ that he travels (again 1.95.1)97 as he proceeds through cities great and small.

§30. This privileged position is analogous to that of Odysseus, who ‘saw the cities of many men, and came to know their way of thinking [noos]’ (Odyssey i 3), the same man who was

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97 Cf. Ch. 8879.
ordered by the seer Teiresias ‘to proceed through very many cities of men’ (xxiii 267–268).\textsuperscript{98} Moreover, the discourse used by Herodotus in expressing his superior knowledge is likewise Odyssean. To \textit{sēmainein} ‘indicate’ is to speak in a code bearing more than one message. Messages can be immediate as well as ulterior, even about the central theme of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, presented as an extension of the Iliadic theme of the Trojan War. In this respect the discourse of Herodotus is akin to that of the \textit{aīnos} as represented in the \textit{Odyssey}. When the disguised Odysseus tells his host Eumaios a story about the Trojan War, bearing both the immediate message that he needs a cloak and the ultimate message that he is to be identified as Odysseus (xiv 462–506),\textsuperscript{99} \{236|237\} he is complimented by Eumaios for telling a good \textit{aīnos} (xiv 508).\textsuperscript{100} In fact Odysseus is traditionally represented as a master of the \textit{aīnos}, as evident from his particularized epithet \textit{poluainos} ‘he of many \textit{aīnoi}’ (e.g., xii 184).\textsuperscript{101}

§31. Thus the Homeric stance of Herodotus, in reflecting both Iliadic and Odyssean themes, is analogous to the stance of the disguised Odysseus as he tells his \textit{aīnos}: the subject is Iliadic, but the context is Odyssean. The Homeric stance of Herodotus is also analogous to the stance of an epinician poet like Pindar, whose medium is likewise a type of \textit{aīnos}.\textsuperscript{102} Like Herodotus, Pindar too conventionally represents himself as traveling along ‘roads of \textit{logoi}’.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, Pindar’s diction reveals an ideology according to which he too has a lofty vantage point of knowledge. As a seer \textit{sēmainei} ‘indicates’ by way of a \textit{koruphē} ‘culmination, summing up’ of \textit{logoi}

\textsuperscript{98} Cf. Ch. 8§23 and following.

\textsuperscript{99} For a discussion of the immediate and ultimate messages in the “code” of what the disguised Odysseus has to say, see N 1979.233–241. For a study of the word \textit{khlaīna} ‘cloak’ as a symbol of ambiguous discourse, I cite the unpublished work of R. Ingber.

\textsuperscript{100} See the arguments in N ibid. supporting the notion that the \textit{Odyssey} is referring to the \textit{aīnos} as a distinctly poetic form of expression.

\textsuperscript{101} N, p. 240§19n1, after Meuli 1975 (=1954) 742–743n2.

\textsuperscript{102} Cf. Ch. 6§2 and following.

\textsuperscript{103} Cf. Ch. 8§79.
'words' (Pindar *Paean* 8a.13-14 καὶ τοιῇδε κορυφὰν σάμαινεν λόγων), so also the man who gets praise from Pindaric song must understand the poet's *koruphe* of *logoi*:

εἰ δὲ λόγων συνέμεν κορυφὰν, ἵνα, ὅρθαν ἑπίστα, μανθάνων οἶσθα

proteφων

Pindar *Pythian* 3.80-81

If you understand, Hieron, the unerring culmination (*koruphe*) of words (*logoi*), you know, learning from those who have gone before, that...

§32. How then are we to read the message of Herodotus, if indeed he stands in such a privileged position of knowledge? We must look for signs, and we come back to the *sēma* 'sign' given by Herodotus when he *sēmainei* 'indicates' that Croesus the Lydian was *aitios* 'responsible' for the conflict that is {237|238} narrated (1.5.3). The immediate message here is that even if the Persian *logioi* were correct in determining who was *aitios* 'responsible' for each wrongdoing up to the Trojan War—in which case the ancestors of the Hellenes would have been in the wrong—the Persian War nevertheless puts the Persians, not the Hellenes, in the wrong because of the intervening wrongs committed by Croesus. But there is also an ulterior message here, one that we can best understand by first confronting the question: who was in the wrong in the *Iliad*?

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104 The seer represented in this Pindaric passage is probably Cassandra: see SM *ad loc*. Cf. also Pindar *Olympian* 7.68-69 τελευτάθην δὲ λόγων κορυφαὶ ἐν ἀλήθεια πετοῖσα 'and the *koruphai* of *logoi* were accomplished, falling into place in truth [*alētheia*]' (this passage concerns an oath about the future, as sworn by Lachesis the Moira 'Fate', in conjunction with the Will of Zeus: *Olympian* 7.64-68). For *apo-korupho* in the sense of 'sum up' (note also the imagery of achieving a high vantage point in the English expression), see Herodotus 5.73.2. Bundy [1986] 18 paraphrases ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὁμοίως παντὸς ἔχει κορυφῶν at Pindar *Pythian* 9.78-79 as follows: "By judicious selection and treatment [*kairos*] I can convey the spirit [*koruphe*] of the whole just as well." Cf. Race 1979.254, 265n11.

105 Cf. Ch. 8§20 and following.
§33. The main theme of the *Iliad*, the *mēnis* ‘anger’ of Achilles, which leads to the deaths of countless Achaeans and Trojans, is caused by the insult of Agamemnon, whom Achilles holds *aitios* ‘responsible’ (*Iliad* I 335; cf. XIII 111). In the later reconciliation scene between the two heroes, however, when Achilles finally renounces his *mēnis* (*Iliad* XIX 35, 75), Agamemnon claims that he was not *aitios* (*Odyssey* xix 86), but that it was Zeus—along with *Moîra* ‘Fate’ and an *Erínūs* ‘Fury’—who inflicted upon him a baneful *atē* ‘derangement’ (*Iliad* XIX 87–88). Even the other gods hold Zeus responsible for creating a new phase of conflict between Achaeans and Trojans (*Iliad* XI 78 Ἴτιόωντο)—a phase triggered by the conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon in the *Iliad*. As for the overall conflict between Achaeans and Trojans, triggered by the abduction of Helen, Priam can claim the same sort of exculpation: it was not Helen who was *aitiē* ‘responsible’ to him for all his woes, but rather all the gods (*Iliad* III 164). Such claims that the phase of the war narrated by the *Iliad*—or, for that matter, the entire Trojan War—was all part of a grand divine scheme is perfectly in accord with what the *Iliad* announces about its own plot: it is the Will of Zeus (*Iliad* I 5). At the beginning of the *Cypria*, the entire potential narrative of the Trojan War is equated with the Will of Zeus (F 1 Allen). King Alkinoos even tells a weeping Odysseus that the Trojan War was devised by the gods so that poets may have something to sing about for men of the future (*Odyssey* viii 579–580). In the same line of thinking Telemachus defends Phemios when this poet sings about the suffering of the

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106 Cf. Ch. 8§17 and following.
107 In contrast Achilles says that the Trojans are not personally *aitiō* ‘responsible’ to him (*Iliad* I 153); similarly Poseidon says that Aeneas is not personally *aitios* to the Achaeans (*Iliad* XX 297).
108 Cf. Ch. 8§17 and following.
109 This point, that the traditional plot of an epic narrative is programmatically equated with the Will of Zeus, is elaborated in N 1979.82§25n2.
110 N 1979.131§17n1. Cf. also *Odyssey* xi 558–560: Odysseus is telling the shade of Ajax that no one else but Zeus was *aitios* ‘responsible’ for the tragic misfortune that befell Ajax.
Achaeans after the Trojan War, on the grounds that Phemios is not aitios for what he narrates (Odyssey i 347–348; cf. xxii 356); rather it is Zeus himself who is aitios (Odyssey i 348). \{238|239\}

§34. In contrast the overarching narrative of Herodotus about the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, linked as it is with the epic conflict between Achaeans and Trojans, seems on the surface to be preoccupied with a different and non-poetic perspective, inquiring into the question: who were juridically responsible? Here too, however, the word conveying responsibility is aitioi.

§35. Let us for the moment examine the question from a juridical point of view: who then was in the wrong? The Persian view is that the Hellenes were in the wrong when the Achaeans undertook the war against the Trojans, though the Trojans had been in the wrong earlier when Paris abducted Helen. On the surface, then, it is a juridical matter of a series of retaliations for wrongs committed.

§36. But another principle is at work whenever retaliation happens—a principle that is not made explicit at the beginning of Herodotus’ inquiry. Accepting the authority of the Egyptians, whom he describes elsewhere as the supreme logioi among all men ever encountered by him (\(\lambda\omega\gamma\iota\omega\tau\alpha\tau\iota\) 2.77.1),\(^{112}\) Herodotus says that he personally does not believe that Helen was at Troy when the city was destroyed by the Achaeans (2.120). At the same time he clearly accepts the premise that the destruction of Troy was in retaliation for the abduction of Helen (ibid.). In fact Herodotus reasons that the absence of Helen from Troy sealed the fate of the Trojans. It made it impossible for them to offer compensation to the Achaeans and thus avoid retaliation since the Achaeans refused to believe that Helen was not in Troy until they destroyed it (ibid.).

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\(^{112}\) If indeed Herodotus is implicitly a logios, on which subject see Ch. 888, then his expressed opinion about the authority of the Egyptians as supreme logioi (2.77.1) is in line with the prominence of his narrative about his own journey to Egypt in Book II of the Histories.
The cause for the Trojans’ predicament is made clear when Herodotus finally makes explicit something that had been kept implicit up to this point:

άλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἔχον Ἑλένην ἀποδοὺναι οὐδὲ λέγουσι αὐτοῖς τὴν ἁληθείν ἐπίστευον οἱ Ἑλληνες, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ γνώμην ἀποφαίνομαι, τοῦ δαίμονίου παρασκευάζοντος ὁκὼς πανωλεθρίη ἀπολομένοι καταφανὲς τούτο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιήσωσι, ὡς τῶν μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων μεγάλαι εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμωρίαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τῇ ἐμοὶ δοκέει εἴρηται.

Herodotus 2.120.5

The fact is, they [= the Trojans] did not give back Helen because they did not have her. What they told the Hellenes was the truth, but they did not believe them. The reason is, and here I display [= verb apo-phai-nomai] my judgment [gnome],113 that the power of a supernatural force [daimōn] arranged it that they [= the Trojans] should be completely destroyed and thereby make it clear to mankind that the gods exact enormous retributions for enormous wrongdoings. I say this in accordance with what I have decided about the matter.

§37. We begin to see that the narrative of Herodotus is describing implicitly the workings of the gods as it describes explicitly the deeds of men. I now argue that when Herodotus sēmainei ‘indicates’ that Croesus should be held aitios ‘responsible’ for the conflict that is being narrated (1.5.3),114 he is also indicating, by way of his overall narration, that Croesus is destined

113 For this expression, see Ch. 8§5.
114 Cf. Ch. 8§20 and following.
to incur retribution from the gods—retribution that will take the form of some human action that can be explicitly narrated.

§38. What we are about to see is a pattern of narration where a man who does wrong, who is *aitios*, pays for that wrong by suffering a great misfortune, for which he then holds a god responsible, *aitios*. Then the given god makes clear that it was really the wrongdoer who was juridically responsible for the wrong that he did, and that the god is ‘responsible’ only for the transcendent scheme of divine retribution for that wrong.

§39. Croesus the Lydian suffers the great misfortune of losing his mighty empire at the hands of Cyrus the Persian, whose empire he had attacked. When Cyrus asks Croesus why he had taken up arms against him, Croesus replies:

> ὃ βασιλεὺ, ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἔπρηξα τῇ σῇ μὲν εὐδαιμονίῃ τῇ ἐμεωυτοῦ δὲ κακοδαιμονίῃ *aitios* δὲ τούτων ἐγένετο ὁ Ἑλλήνων θεὸς ἐπάρας ἑμὲ στρατεύσοθαι

Herodotus 1.87.3

O king, I did it because of your good fortune [*eudaimoniā* = having a good *daimōn*] and my bad fortune [*aitios*] is the god of the Hellenes, who impelled me to take up arms. But the one who is responsible [*aitios*] is the god of the Hellenes, who impelled me to take up arms.

This outcome, a violent shift from good to bad fortune, is the central theme already formulated in the initial words of Herodotus as he began his inquiry into the responsibility of Croesus:

> τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἄδικων ἐργῶν εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, τοῦτον σημήνας προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὡμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀστεά ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιών. τὰ γὰρ τὰ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρὰ γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἐμὲ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρά. τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὄν ἐπιστάμενος
Relying on what I know, I will indicate [= verb sēmainō] who it was who first committed wrongdoing against the Hellenes. I will move thus ahead with what I have to say, as I proceed through great cities and small ones as well. For most of those that were great once are small today; and those that used to be small were great in my time. Understanding that the good fortune [eudaimoniā = having a good daimōn] of men never stays in the same place, I will keep in mind both alike.

§40. Maintaining the implicitness of the divine scheme in his narrative, Herodotus tells how the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi rejects the accusation of Croesus that Apollo is responsible for the king’s misfortune: Croesus is informed by the Oracle that he had read the wrong message into its ambiguous utterance, which had told him only that he would destroy a great empire if he attacked the empire of Cyrus (1.91.4; cf. 1.53.3). This ambiguity brings to mind once again the words of Heraclitus, describing how Apollo speaks through his Oracle: the god neither says nor conceals, but he sēmainei ‘indicates’ (22 B 93 DK).115 Returning to the narrative of Herodotus, we note a particularly significant detail: the Oracle goes on to say that Croesus, in misunderstanding Apollo’s message, has no one but himself to hold as responsible for the misfortune. The word used is aitios: ἑωτὸν αἴτιον ἀποφαινέτω ‘let him [= Croesus] publicly display himself as the one responsible [aitios]’ (1.91.4).

115 See Ch. 8§27.
§41. There is an interesting juridical distinction here. The god Apollo is clearly the cause of the Lydian king’s misfortunes, in that it was Apollo’s Oracle that gave Croesus the opportunity to make his mistake, but Apollo is not legally responsible, aitios. Croesus made the mistake.\textsuperscript{116} There is an analogous theme in Homeric poetry. We have seen how the gods are presented as the causes of human misfortunes and thus accused by mortals as aitioi ‘responsible’. But here too the gods can disclaim legal responsibility, as when Zeus says:

\begin{quote}
ō pópoi oĩon dē νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αίτιώνται.

ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασὶ κάκ’ ἐμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ

σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίσιν ύπὲρ μόρον ἀλγε’ ἐχουσιν
\end{quote}

\textit{Odyssey} i 32–34 {241|242}

Alas, how mortals hold us gods responsible [= aitioi]!

For they say that their misfortunes come from us. But they get their sufferings, beyond what is fated, by way of their own acts of recklessness [atasthaliai].

The notion that mortals are responsible for the misfortunes that they suffer as retribution for their wickedness is a prominent one in the \textit{Odyssey},\textsuperscript{117} setting it apart from the \textit{Iliad}, which stresses the Will of Zeus as the force that controls the plot of the epic.\textsuperscript{118} In other words, whereas the \textit{Iliad} stresses that a grand divine scheme is at work in all human actions, even when one mortal wrongs another, the \textit{Odyssey} in contrast stresses the responsibility of mortals in committing any wrong. The difference, however, is not as great as it first seems. Even the \textit{Iliad} acknowledges the legal responsibility of a wrongdoer, and even the \textit{Odyssey} acknowledges

\textsuperscript{116} Croesus comes to admit this after hearing the Oracle’s response to his recriminations: Herodotus 1.91.6.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Odyssey} i 33–34, as quoted immediately above, should be understood in conjunction with i 6–7.

\textsuperscript{118} Further discussion at N 1979.113§24n3.
a divine scheme in human actions. Thus when Agamemnon claims that not he but Zeus was
aitios ‘responsible’ for his conflict with Achilles (Iliad XIX 86), as the gods inflicted atē
‘derangement’ upon him (Iliad XIX 87–88; 134–136), he nevertheless acknowledges that he is
legally in the wrong and expresses his willingness to offer retribution for his wronging Achilles
(Iliad XIX 137–138). Conversely even the Odyssey acknowledges a grand divine scheme in the
actual pattern of retribution for wrongdoing, most notably when Odysseus takes vengeance
upon the reckless suitors through the active planning of the gods, especially of Athena.

§42. At the risk of oversimplification, it could thus be said that the Iliad stresses the divine
scheme in why a mortal commits a wrong, while the Odyssey stresses the divine scheme in how
a mortal pays for that wrong. In light of what we have just observed concerning the usage of
the word atē in the overall scheme of the Iliad, we may note with interest that the primary
wrongdoers of the Odyssey, the suitors, are nowhere overtly described as being afflicted with
atē.\textsuperscript{120} \{242|243\}

\textsuperscript{119} Dodds 1951.3 remarks: “Early Greek justice cared nothing for intent—it was the act that mattered.” Dodds also
points out (ibid.) that even Achilles as the aggrieved party accepts Agamemnon’s premise, that he had not acted
of his own volition (xix 270–274; cf. I 412). Further observations on this point at Ch. 9§5.

\textsuperscript{120} I believe that this pattern of omission in the Odyssey is the reflex of an opposition in theme between the Iliad
and Odyssey (above). In other words the divergences in the uses of atē in the Iliad and the Odyssey do not reflect
divergences in the actual meaning of atē. See Francis 1983.97–99 for passages in the Odyssey where we can find
latent implications of atē for the suitors in an Iliadic sense. Moreover, atē can apply in an Iliadic sense to other
characters in the Odyssey (e.g., Helen at Odyssey iv 261, who is afflicted by Aphrodite). Conversely in the Iliad atē
applies at least once in an Odyssean sense, where Phoenix says that the Litai, goddesses of supplication
personified (Odyssey ix 502), afflict with atē a man who does wrong in cruelly rejecting supplications (Iliad IX 510–
512). The message here is intended for Achilles, for whom atē would be a form of punishment. See Ch. 4§6. Yet
another dimension to consider is the meaning of atē in juridical discourse: in the Law Code of Gortyn, for example,
ata actually means ‘damage’ (6.23, 43; 9.14 Willetts) and even ‘obligation, indemnity, loss in a lawsuit’ (e.g., 10.23–
24; 11.34–35, 41); see Francis, p. 121n83. Thus atē can refer both to crime, that is, how someone commits a wrong,
and to punishment, that is, how someone pays for a wrong. In terms of cause and effect, atē can be both. To quote
Wyatt 1982.261n18 (following Stallmach 1968.88n160): “Indeed, this is the meaning of personification—taking the
act (or state) and making it also the cause of the state. Or, put grammatically, placing in subject position what
should be the object or the instrument of the action.” For the imagery of atē as even reflected by its etymology
§43. Applying these Homeric perspectives of human accountability to the narrative of Herodotus, we can see that the story of Croesus conveys both an Iliadic and an Odyssean moral perspective. The narrative dramatizes both why a mortal commits a wrong and how he pays for that wrong—all in accordance with an implicit divine scheme. Let us briefly reexamine the narrative with these themes in mind.

§44. After Croesus subjugates the Hellenes of Asia—which is the very context in which he is marked as responsible for the overall conflict between Hellenes and barbarians from the standpoint of the Histories of Herodotus—¹²¹ the Lydian king turns his attention to the Hellenic islands; and he is dissuaded from attacking them only through the ingenuity of one or another of the Seven Sages (the narrative leaves it open—either Pittakos of Mytilene or Bias of Priene, 1.27.2).¹²² Turned away from attacking in this direction, Croesus thereupon resolves to attack the Persian Empire, and for this new acquisitive enterprise he seeks the alliance of what are characterized as the two foremost cities of Hellas, Athens and Sparta (1.53.1, 1.56.2–3). The stage is now set for the ultimate conflict between Hellas and Persia. The stage is also set, by way of highlighting Athens and Sparta, for the here and now of the apodeixis ‘making public’ of Herodotus’ inquiry.

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¹²¹ Cf. Ch. 8§20 and following.

¹²² The basic testimony on the concept of the Seven Sages is conveniently assembled in DK no. 10 (pp. 61–66). The canonical list attributed to Demetrius of Phaleron in Stobaeus 3.1.172 is as follows: Kleoboulos of Lindos, Solon of Athens, Khilon of Sparta, Thales of Miletus, Pittakos of Mytilene, Bias of Priene, Periandros of Corinth. In Plato Protagoras 343a, Myson is in place of Periandros. In Ephorus FGH 70 F 182, it is Anacharsis the Thracian who is in place of Periandros; also in Plutarch Banquet of the Seven Sages. Diogenes Laertius also mentions Pythagoras as an optional variant in the grouping (1.41, 42). For other variations, see again Diogenes Laertius 1.40–42 and the references in DK, p. 61 (cf. also Privitera 1965.55–56). One particular variation, noted at Ch. 12§8, is the membership of Aristodemos in the grouping of the Seven Sages. On the theme of Solon as the wisest of the Seven Sages, see, for example, Plato Timaeus 20d (cf. Ch. 9§16 above).
§45. The narrative of Herodotus effectively dramatizes a divine scheme that accounts for both why Croesus is indeed in the wrong and how he pays for that wrong. Yet another of the Seven Sages, Solon of Athens, visits the court of Croesus when the Lydian king is at the height of his wealth (Herodotus {243|244} 1.29.1). In the dialogue between the Sage and the Tyrant, it becomes clear that Croesus thinks that he himself is the most ‘fortunate’ of all men, in that he is the richest, and the word used for the concept translated here as ‘fortunate’ is olbios (1.30.3, 1.34.1). In responding to the tyrant, however, the sage understands the same word olbios differently. Whereas the understanding of the tyrant is simplex, that of the sage is complex, corresponding to his privileged mode of communication. In the Herodotean narrative that dramatizes the encounter between Solon and Croesus, the sage communicates in the mode of an ainos, a code that carries the right message for those who are qualified and the wrong message or messages for those who are unqualified.123

§46. The understanding of the word olbios by Croesus, as narrated by Herodotus, is symptomatic of the tyrant’s derangement, or atē. Although the noun olbos denotes ‘wealth’,124 it becomes clear from Solon’s teachings to Croesus that the adjective olbios here means something more than simply ‘wealthy’ or even ‘fortunate’. From Solon’s represented vantage point, this word has an implicit meaning that transcends material wealth and good fortune: far from being a mere equivalent of plousios ‘wealthy’ (1.32.5–6), olbios applies especially to those who lived a righteous life and who are then rewarded with tîmē ‘honor’ after death (Tellos, 1.30.5; cf. Kleobis and Biton, 1.31.5).125 Here and elsewhere in Archaic Greek thought, olbios conveys the image of material security, but it tends to restrict this image—in a way that

123 For this definition of ainos, see Ch. 6§4.
124 For example, Solon F 6.3W and F 34.2W; cf. Hesiod Works and Days 637 (where olbos is used synonymously with ploutos ‘wealth’ and aphenos ‘riches’) and Theogony 974 (Ploutos, son of Demeter, gives olbos).
125 On the use of time in Herodotus and elsewhere to specify the ‘honor’ that a hero receives in cult after death, see N 1979.118§1n2.
plousios ‘rich’ does not—to ulterior contexts of bliss in an afterlife (it would not be inappropriate to translate olbios in such contexts as ‘blissful’). In other words, if we juxtapose plousios and olbios, we find that the second is the marked member in that it can specify concepts not specified by the first. On the terminology of marked and unmarked, see Introduction §12.

I cite here a striking example from Pindar:

ὄλβιος ὡστις ἰδὼν εἶσ’ ὑπὸ χθόν’, | οἶδε μὲν βίου τελευτάν, | οἶδεν δὲ διόσδοτον ἀρχάν.

Pindar F 137 SM

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126 In other words, if we juxtapose plousios and olbios, we find that the second is the marked member in that it can specify concepts not specified by the first. On the terminology of marked and unmarked, see Introduction §12. For a survey of traditional Greek poetic designations for the concept of immortalization by way of images conveying the material security of wealth, see N 1981, especially with reference to the words aiōn ‘vital force’ and aphthito- ‘unfailing, unwilting, inexhaustible’. Cf. also Risch 1987. The article N 1981 was written in response to that of Floyd 1980, who argues that the Indo-European heritage of the epithet aphthito- is semantically restricted to the notion of material wealth. There is a similar argument offered by Finkelberg 1986 (who cites Floyd 1980 but not N 1981). At p. 5 she asserts that the application of aphthito- to an “incorporeal entity” is a “semantic innovation”; at p. 4 she argues that, on the grounds that aphthito- applies mostly to “material objects,” the “concrete associations of the term must have been the original ones.” I question such a weighing of statistical predominance in determining what is “original.” And I point out a salient feature, not noted by Finkelberg, in the contexts where aphthito- applies to “material objects”: the concrete associations are otherworldly ones. In response to Finkelberg’s argument that kleos aphthiton as used at iliad IX 413 is not a “self-contained unit,” I point to the discussion in N 1974.104–109, where the relationships that link the phrase types κλέος ἀφθιτον ἔσται (as at iliad IX 413), κλέος ἔσται (as at iliad VII 458), and κλέος ἀφθιτον (as at Sappho F 44.4 V) are explored from the perspective of a less narrow understanding of formula. I agree with Finkelberg that κλέος ἀφθιτον ἔσται at iliad IX 413 is coefficient with κλέος ὀὐσία ὀλείται as at II 325. I can also accept the possibility that κλέος ὀὐσία ὀλείται does not occur at iliad IX 413 because ὀλέτοι is already present at the beginning of the line. But I disagree with her inference that the presence of κλέος ἀφθιτον ἔσται instead of κλέος ὀὐσία ὀλείται at IX 413 is an innovation; it could be an archaism that survives precisely for the stylistic purpose of avoiding word duplication. As a general approach to poetics, I suggest that allowance should always be made for the possibility that more archaic forms can be activated in situations where the more innovative device is inappropriate. For an illuminating discussion of the usage of relatively older and newer forms in poetics, see Meillet 1920. For another critique of Finkelberg’s argumentation, see Edwards 1988.

127 This Pindaric passage is quoted by Clement of Alexandria (Stromateis 3.3.17), who says that it concerns the Eleusinian Mysteries. Whether or not this specific ascription may stand, the language is in any case mystical. The poem is apparently from a thrēnos ‘lament’ for Hippokrates (scholia to Pindar Pythian 7.18a). On the affinities of this genre of lamentation called thrēnos with mystical themes of immortalization, see N 1979.170–177.
Blissful [olbios] is he who goes beneath the earth after having seen those things;\textsuperscript{128} he knows the fulfillment [teleutē, = literally ‘end’]\textsuperscript{129} \{245|246\} of life, and he knows its Zeus-given beginning.

When Herakles is immortalized on Olympus after performing his Labors, he too is described as olbios (Hesiod \textit{Theogony} 954; cf. Pindar \textit{Nemean} 1.71).\textsuperscript{130} We may note too the following passage, where we find an analogous theme, with a twist in the sequence of events:

\begin{verbatim}
α μάκαρ εὖδαίμων τε καὶ ἀλβιος, ὡστις ἀπειρὸς
ἀθλῶν εἰς Αἴδου δῶμα μέλαν κατέβη...
\end{verbatim}

Theognis 1013–1014

\textsuperscript{128} Compare \textit{Homeric Hymn to Demeter} 480: ἀλβιος δὲς τάδ’ ὑπωπεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων ‘blissful [olbios] is he who has seen these things [=the Eleusinian Mysteries]’; later the olbios man who is favored by Demeter and Persephone (\textit{Hymn to Demeter} 486) is described as getting the gift of \textit{Ploutos} ‘Wealth’ personified (488–489). Again we see that material wealth is but a physical manifestation of transcendent bliss.

\textsuperscript{129} In light of Solon’s point that Tellos is most olbios of men (Herodotus 1.30), it is worth noting that this name Tellos seems to be a hypocoristic shortening of any one of a set of names built from the noun \textit{telos} ‘end, fulfillment, achievement’, such as Telesiphron (on the morphology, see Immerwahr 1966.156–157n21). Whether or not Tellos was a historical figure (for bibliography, see Immerwahr ibid.), it is clear that the name has a bearing on the narrative of Herodotus, as we see from the profusion of \textit{teleutē/teleutaō} in this Herodotean passage: this noun/verb is related to \textit{telos} and means ‘end, fulfill[ment]’ (in the case of Tellos, \textit{τελευτή} 1.30.4; in the case of Kleobis and Biton, \textit{τελευτή} 1.31.3; in the case of Croesus, \textit{τελευτήσαντα} and \textit{τελευτήσα} 1.32.5; \textit{τελευτήσαι} and \textit{τελευτήσῃ} 1.32.7; \textit{τελευτήσῃ} and \textit{τελευτήν} 1.32.9; \textit{τελευτήν} 1.33; \textit{τελευτήσει} and \textit{τελευτήσῃ} \textit{bis} 1.39.2). (This interpretation of the significance attached to the name of Tellos has a bearing on the expression πάντα παραμείναντα at Herodotus 1.30.4, which I translate as ‘all his possessions having lasted’ in light of the parallel use of \textit{paramenō} ‘last, endure’ at 3.57.3.) The form \textit{telos} itself is used in the expression ἐν τέλει τούτῳ ἔσχοντο ‘they were held fast in this \textit{telos}’, which refers to the mystically dead state of Kleobis and Biton after they had performed their labors for the goddess Hera and had fallen asleep, never to be awakened again to this world (1.31.5). (On the use of ἔσχοντο ‘were held fast’ here in the sense of a ritualized pose, as in a dance, see Ch. 1839.) I interpret \textit{telos} here (pace Powell 1938.353: ‘death’) in the sense of ‘service to a god’ (LSJ, p. 1773 s.v. \textit{tέλος} 1.6). This same word in the plural is regularly applied to the Eleusinian Mysteries (LSJ ibid.); the derivative of \textit{telos}, \textit{telē} (cf. \textit{genos} and \textit{genetē}), means primarily ‘initiation [into the mysteries of a god]’, for example, at Herodotus 4.79.1/2.

\textsuperscript{130} On the use of the word \textit{aethlos} in designating the Labors of Herakles, see Ch. 553. In this connection we may note the word \textit{aethlophoroi} ‘prize-winners’ describing Kleobis and Biton at Herodotus 1.31.2.
Ah, blessed [makar], fortunate [eudaimōn = ‘having a good daimōn’], and blissful [olbios] is he who goes down to the dark house of Hades without having experienced labors [āthloi = aethloi]...131

§47. Herodotus goes on to tell how the teachings of Solon fall on deaf ears and how Croesus is then marked for nemesis ‘retribution’ (1.34.1) precisely because he thought that he was the most olbios of men (ibid.). In Solon’s teachings the word atē had come up twice in the context of describing how disastrous it is when it afflicts someone who is rich but an-olbos, that is, ‘not olbios’ (1.32.6). In all of Herodotus the noun atē occurs only here.132 The nemesis ‘retribution’ against Croesus takes the immediate form of the accidental death of his son, whose name happens to be Atus.133 And the man who killed him accidentally with a spear happens to be called Adrāstos, where the morphology of the adjectival a-drāstos suggests the interpretation ‘he from whom one cannot run away’.134 This interpretation is supported by the attestation of Adrāsteia as the epithet of the goddess Nemesis (Aeschylus Prometheus 936). Adrāstos is then told by the grieving Croesus:

εἶς δὲ οὐ σὺ μοι τοῦδε τοῦ κακοῦ αἴτιος, εἰ μὴ ὡσον ἀέκων ἔξερ[246|247]γάσαο,
ἀλλὰ θεῶν κοῦ τις, ὃς μοι καὶ πάλαι προεσήμαινε τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι

Herodotus 1.45.2


132 The accepted reading is ἅγη not ἅτη at Herodotus 6.61.1.

133 That this name is used in Herodotus as an evocation of atē: Immerwahr 1966.157–158.

134 Cf. Immerwahr, p. 158n25.
You are not responsible \( \text{aitios} \) to me for this great disaster, except insofar as you were the unwilling agent, but someone of the gods is, who long ago indicated \( \text{verb sēmainō} \) to me in advance what was going to happen.

Croesus is referring to a dream that had ‘indicated’ to him—and again the verb in question is \( \text{sēmainō} \)—that his son would die by the spear (1.34.2).\(^{135}\) This pattern of accusing a god as \( \text{aitios} \) ‘responsible’ for a misfortune only proves that the accuser is the one who is \( \text{aitios} \). In the course of his later and ultimate misfortune, the loss of his empire, Croesus again accuses a god—this time Apollo directly—as \( \text{aitios} \), who in turn makes clear that Croesus was really \( \text{aitios} \) (Herodotus 1.91.4).\(^{136}\) In this connection we may note the teaching of Hesiod in the \textit{Works and Days}: \( \text{olbios} \) ‘blissful’ is the man who acts in a ritually and morally correct manner (\( \text{ὁλβιος ὅς τάδε πάντα | εἰδώς ἐργάζηται 826–827} \))\(^{137}\) and who is therefore \( \text{an-aitios} \) ‘not \( \text{aitios} \)’ to the gods (\( \text{ἀναίτιος ἀθανάτοισιν 827} \)).

\( §48. \) In both misfortunes of Croesus, which are linked by the narrative, we have seen the Odyssean theme of \textit{how} a man pays for a wrong. In the story of the first misfortune, how the king lost his son, we may also recognize the Iliadic theme of \textit{why} a man commits a wrong in the first place: it is because of the derangement of Croesus, explicit in the use of the word \textit{atē} in Solon’s speech to him and implicit in the names \textit{Atus} and \textit{Adrāstos}. This derangement, as realized in his faulty perception of himself as the most \( \text{olbios} \) ‘blissful’ of men, provokes a pattern of divine retribution against Croesus in the form of two successive misfortunes, the death of his son and the loss of his empire. In both cases Croesus manifestly reveals himself as

\[^{135}\text{The message is of course ambiguous, in that the notion of ‘spear’ would suggest primarily a context of war, not hunting.}\]

\[^{136}\text{The wording is quoted at Ch. 8§39.}\]

\[^{137}\text{On the parallelism established in the \textit{Works and Days} between ritually and morally correct behavior, see N 1982.61.}\]
aitios by making the additional mistake, both times, of accusing the god who had forewarned him with signs.\(^{138}\)

§49. Besides the teachings of Solon as dramatized by Herodotus, we get parallel insights about atē from the Sage’s teachings in the actual poetry that is ascribed to him. We learn from this poetry that atē ‘derangement’ happens when a mortal seeks ploutos ‘wealth’ by espousing hubris ‘outrage’ and \{247|248\} rejecting dikē ‘justice’ (Solon F 13.11-13 W); then Zeus punishes that mortal for his hubris (13.16–18).\(^{139}\) In contrast Solon defines the transcendent concept of olbos ‘bliss’ (13.3) figuratively as the kind of ploutos ‘wealth’ that is given by the gods and is attended by dikē ‘justice’ (13.3–8).\(^{140}\)

§50. In the actual poetry of Solon, then, the teaching of the Sage about this topic is direct: hubris is a cause of atē. In the narrative of Herodotus, on the other hand, Solon’s teaching about hubris is indirect. The attitude of Croesus at the time of his encounter with Solon is surely symptomatic of atē, but what the Lydian tyrant has actually done in attacking the

\(^{138}\) A related topical convention: when men are afflicted by misfortune, they may say that the cause is the anger of a god, and the word for ‘cause’ in such contexts is, appropriately, aition in an aetiological sense. A striking example is Herodotus 9.93.4.

\(^{139}\) In that atē inevitably leads to retribution, it can be synonymous with retribution itself (cf. Solon F 13.75–76 W). For the semantics, see n120.

\(^{140}\) In other words, marked olbos is equivalent to unmarked ploutos plus divine sanction and dikē ‘justice’.

Previously at Ch. 8§45, we have seen an optional unmarked/marked opposition between plousios and olbios, where the latter is marked as a transcendent image of material security, in terms of afterlife. I say optional because the marked/unmarked opposition is not activated in every context: in some contexts ploutos and olbos are synonymous: see Ch. 8§45. In the present passage from Solon, we see the transcendence of olbos in terms of life in the here and now, not in the afterlife. For other instances where olbos, instead of being synonymous with ploutos ‘wealth’ (see Ch. 8§45), is restricted to convey the ethical notion of material security granted or taken away by the gods as a reward or punishment for righteous or unrighteous behavior, see Hesiod Works and Days 281, 321, 326. In the Odyssey the struggle of the righteous Odysseus against the unrighteous suitors is played out with many references to olbos and how it is dispensed by the gods (the perspective of Odysseus on this matter is the “correct” one: see, for example, Odyssey xviii 19). For the timeless image of material security as prevailing under the rule of a righteous king, see Odyssey xix 109–114 (cf. Hesiod Works and Days 225–237). On dikē as ‘justice’ or ‘righteousness’ long-range and ‘judgment’ short-range, see N 1982.58–60.
Persian Empire is surely an act of hubris: Croesus is being irresistibly drawn into a pattern of unlimited expansion that will ultimately ruin him and set Hellas and Persia on a collision course. Still, the ἄτε and hubris of Croesus are not confronted directly by Solon in the encounter dramatized by Herodotus. In his own poetry, Solon can speak in his juridical role as lawmaker. In his encounter with a tyrant, however, he is more diplomatic. The juridical point that Croesus is guilty, that is to say aitiōs ‘responsible’ for his misfortunes (Herodotus 1.91.4), is established not by Solon directly but by the turn of events that bring to fulfillment the words of Solon. Without the narration of Herodotus, neither the guilt of Croesus the tyrant nor the meaning of Solon the sage could be manifest. The words of the Sage have been ambiguously spoken in the mode of an ainos, the true meaning of which can only be brought out by the turn of events as narrated by Herodotus. The narration itself underlines the universal applicability of its lesson at a later point, as we see Croesus, now a captive of the Persians and about to be burned to death on a funeral pyre, reminiscing about the wise words that Solon had once addressed to him and declaring his present realization that Solon had at that time been speaking not so much to him as to the whole human race, especially ‘to those who think that they are fortunate [olbioi]’ (οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐς ἑωυτὸν λέγων ἢ ἢς ἀπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι αὐτοῖσι ὡς δοκέοντας εἶναι Herodotus 1.86.5). I see in this detail from Herodotus an explicit formulation of a Classical ideal concerning the function of the ainos. On the surface the ainos is predicated on the reality of uncertainties in interaction between performer and audience; underneath the surface, however, it is predicated on the ideology of an ideal audience, listening to an ideal performance of an ideal composition, the message of which applies to all humanity.  

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141 The wording is quoted at Ch. 8§39.
142 Cf. Ch. 6§4.
The Authority of *Historiā* and the Sign of the Hero

§1. The juridical aspect of Herodotean narrative—that it can establish who is *aitios* ‘responsible’ for the ultimate struggle between Hellenes and Persians—is articulated already in the prooemium of the *Histories*, in that the purpose of the entire narrative is said to be an inquiry into the *aitiā* ‘cause’ of that struggle. Moreover, the word for ‘inquiry’ in the prooemium, *historiā*, is a juridical concept, semantically distinct from later uses of the word and from the current use of *history*. As we can see clearly from Bruno Snell’s doctoral dissertation, *historiā* is connected with the juridical words *histōr* ‘witness, arbitrator’ and *historeō* ‘witness; inquire; conduct an inquiry’. The noun *histōr*, derived from the verb represented by the aorist *uid- of idein ‘see’ and the perfect *u̯eid-/*u̯oid- of *eidenai/*oida ‘know’ (= “I have seen: therefore I know”), is still attested in the sense of ‘witness’ {250|251} in some contexts, but in others the word has undergone semantic specialization, acquiring the

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1 See Ch. 8§17 and following, with commentary on the relationship between *aitiā* ‘cause’ in the prooemium and *aitioi* ‘responsible, guilty’ in 1.1.1 of Herodotus.
2 See Ch. 883.
3 Snell 1924.59–71. On the word *histōr* see also Dewald 1987, especially p. 153n18, with further bibliography.
4 For the semantics of *histōr* as ‘he who knows’, Snell, p. 60n3, cites *eidotes* ‘they who know’ in the sense of ‘witnesses’ at Demosthenes 55.9, 11ff, 35, and at Isocrates 17.44. He also adduces (ibid.) the rare and apparently Solonian word *idūos/eidūos*, cited by Eustathius as a synonym of *histōr* in the context of *Iliad* XVIII 501. As an agent noun, *histōr* is not to be linked with *eidenai* ‘know’ only, to the exclusion of *idein* ‘see’: see Snell, p. 61, on the expression Ἡρακλῆς ἐπιστορεύεται ἐργαντὸν Ἐρήμων ‘Heracles, the one who experienced deeds of enormity’ at *Odyssey* xxi 26, where *epi-histōr* ‘he who experiences’ is to be derived from *ep-idein* (not *ep-eidenai*), as in κακὰ πόλλα ἐπιδόντα ‘having experienced many evil happenings’ at *Iliad* XXII 61. Cf. Ch. 8§23.
5 In Boeotian inscriptions *histōr* seems to be used in contexts where other dialects would feature *martās* ‘witness’ (e.g., DGE 491.18, 492.7, 503a.28, 511.7, 512.6, 523.64). In line with such oath-expressions as ἵστω νῦν Ζεὺς ‘may Zeus now be witness’ (e.g., *Iliad* X 329), we may note that the gods are called upon as *histores* ‘witnesses’ and as *sun-(h)istores* in the sworn declaration quoted by Thucydides 2.74.3.
sense of ‘arbiter’. A similar semantic specialization takes place in the Latin word *arbiter* ‘arbiter’.

§2. Snell draws our attention to one particular example of *histōr* in this sense of ‘arbiter’: it occurs at *Iliad* XVIII 501, in the context of the description of the Shield of Achilles. On the Shield is depicted a scene of litigation (XVIII 497–508), specifically a *neikos* ‘conflict’ (νεῖκος 497, ἐνείκεον 498) over a *poinē* ‘penalty, fine’ (498) to be paid as compensation for the death of an anonymous man (499). Our first impression is that the penalty is the equivalent of the Anglo-Saxon *wergild*, a fine paid by the kinsmen of the manslayer to the kinsmen of the slain (cf. the uses of *poinē* at *Iliad* IX 633, 636; XIII 659; XIV 483). But there is more to it. The anonymous defendant ‘was making a claim’ (*eukhetoi* 499) that he paid the fine in full (*pant’* apodounai 499), but the anonymous plaintiff ‘was refusing to accept anything’ (ho d’ anaineto apodounai 499), but the anonymous plaintiff ‘was refusing to accept anything’ (ho d’ anaineto apodounai 499).
mēden helesthai 500). This case can be contrasted {251|252} with the pattern in a speech addressed by Ajax to Achilles (Iliad IX 632–636), where a defendant, charged with killing a plaintiff’s brother or son, tries to assuage the plaintiff and offers a poine ‘fine’ (IX 633, 636) that is then accepted by the assuaged plaintiff. Thus the litigation depicted on the Shield is inconclusive, and we find both parties in the process of submitting the case to arbitration:

\[ \text{ἄμφω δ’ ἱέσθην ἐπὶ ἱστορὶ πεῖραρ ἐλέσθαι} \]

*Iliad* XVIII 501

... and both were striving to come to terms in the presence of an arbitrator *[histór]*.

The process of arbitration is presented as a contest among a group of elders, where each takes his turn in offering, with skēptron ‘scepter’ in hand (XVIII 506), a formula for resolution of the litigation (502–506); whoever pronounces the most equitable formula is to be awarded a given measure of gold (507–508).

§3. The pertinence of the *neikos* ‘conflict’ depicted on the Shield of Achilles goes far beyond the juridical issues of the litigation and subsequent arbitration narrated by the artifact. The narration has a dramatic as well as juridical dimension, and as such it has a bearing on the *Iliad*.

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11 Here I am following the interpretation of Muellner 1976.105–106 (‘but he said that he would accept nothing’), who notes the modal implication of negative *mēden* as opposed to *ouden*.

12 This passage figures prominently in the discussion that follows. Note the expression *καὶ ῥ’ ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ πόλλ’ ἀποτείχας ‘and he stays in the dēmos, making a big payment’ here at *Iliad* IX 634, in light of the discussion at Ch. 9§1.

13 Another sign that it is inconclusive: the defendant rather than the plaintiff is represented as speaking first.

14 For a parallel collocation of *skēptron* with the verb *aïssô*, see *Iliad* III 216.

15 The process whereby a formula is offered for resolution is designated by the verb *dikazô* ‘render judgment’ (Δικαζων XVIII 506); the notion of pronouncing the most equitable formula is equated with pronouncing *dikē* ‘judgment’ in the most correct way, that is, ‘in the straightest manner’ (δις μετὰ τοῖς δίκην ἰθύνατο εἶποι 508).
as a whole.\textsuperscript{16} The refusal of the plaintiff to accept compensation is parallel to the refusal of Achilles to accept compensation (called \textit{apoina}\textsuperscript{17} at \textit{Iliad} IX 20) from Agamemnon for the grievances that he suffered.\textsuperscript{18} When Agamemnon, through his ambassadors, announces to Achilles an offer of compensation, one of these ambassadors, Ajax, actually contrasts the refusal on the part of Achilles with the acceptance on the part of a hypothetical plaintiff who is being offered \{252\{253\} compensation, \textit{poinē}, for the death of his brother or son (\textit{Iliad} IX 632–636).\textsuperscript{19}

§4. The point made by Ajax is that the heart of a man can be assuaged by compensation even if he has lost someone as close as a brother or father, whereas Achilles is supposedly heartless in refusing compensation for the loss of someone who is surely far less close, the girl Briseis (\textit{Iliad} IX 636–638).\textsuperscript{20} Ajax is in effect accusing Achilles of ranking Briseis ahead of his own \textit{hetairoi} ‘comrades-in-arms’ by failing to be swayed by the comrades’ \textit{philōtēs}—the mutual state of being \textit{philoi} ‘near and dear’ to each other (IX 628–632).\textsuperscript{21} From the vantage point of the ambassadors, they as comrades-in-arms of Achilles should be closest to him—that is, most \textit{philoi} ‘near and dear’ to him (so says Phoenix at IX 522).\textsuperscript{22} From the superior vantage point of the overall narrative, however, someone is more \textit{philos} ‘near and dear’ to Achilles than Briseis

\textsuperscript{16} Muellner 1976.101, following the grammatical analysis of \textit{Iliad} XVIII 500 by Corlu 1966.331–336, remarks that the interpretation of \textit{ἀναίνετο μηδὲν ἐλέσθαι} as ‘he [= the plaintiff] said that he would accept nothing’ makes the conflict “dramatic.”

\textsuperscript{17} On the formulaic parallelism of \textit{apoina} and \textit{poinē}, see Muellner, p. 102n11.

\textsuperscript{18} See Muellner, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{19} See Ch. 982.

\textsuperscript{20} On the definition of the identity of a person by way of identifying with others, that is, by way of measuring the relative closeness of this person to others in a group, where the notion of closeness is expressed by way of the word \textit{philos} ‘near and dear’, see N 1979.102–111.

\textsuperscript{21} This argument is undercut by the \textit{par-ainēsis} of Phoenix (on which see p. 196), as understood by Achilles: see N pp. 105–111.

\textsuperscript{22} The argument of Phoenix is in turn undercut by his own story: see ibid.
or the *hetairoi*—someone who is in fact so close to him as to be his other self, Patroklos. For Achilles, Patroklos is πολὺ φίλτατος ... ἑταῖρος—the 'hetairos who is the most philos by far' (*Iliad* XVII 411, 655). When Achilles gets the news that Patroklos has been killed, he mourns him as the *philos hetairos* whom he ranked above all other *hetairoi* (XVIII 80–81). For a man other than Achilles, as the god Apollo remarks, a brother or a son would be more *philos* than a comrade-in-arms (XXIV 46–49). For a man other than Achilles, then, the compensation for the death of a brother or a son would have to be greater than any compensation for the death of a comrade-in-arms, and yet even such a man comes to terms with death, whereas Achilles does not (ibid.). Apollo makes this remark in the context of blaming the heartlessness of Achilles (XXIV 39–45). Earlier, in the same context of blaming the heartlessness of Achilles (IX 628–632), we have seen that Ajax had contrasted the willingness of a hypothetical plaintiff to accept compensation for the death of someone who is even as close as a brother or a son (IX 632–636). In the first case the paradigm of accepting compensation is being applied to the hero’s refusal of compensation offered by Agamemnon for the taking of Briseis; in the second case it is being applied to his refusal of any compensation offered by Priam for returning the corpse of Hektor (witness the use of *apoĩna* ‘compensation’ at XXII 349). Thus in neither case is anyone intending compensation for the death of Patroklos. Yet the paradigms applied to the hero’s refusal of compensation indicate that, from the superior vantage point of the overall narrative, what is really at stake for Achilles is coming to terms with his own death by accepting compensation for the death of someone who is more *philos* ‘near and dear’ to him than anyone else—his other self, Patroklos.

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23 The topic of Patroklos as the ritual substitute and thereby the other self of Achilles has been examined extensively in N 1979.32–34, 292–294; also Sinos 1980 and Lowenstam 1981.

24 Cf. also *Iliad* XXIV 137, 139, 276, 502, 555, 579, 594, 686.
§5. Which brings us back to the litigation depicted on the Shield of Achilles, a scene that reflects in microcosm the vantage point of the overall narrative.\(^{25}\) By the time this scene is unveiled, Patroklos is already dead and Achilles has just been mourned by his mother as if he too were dead (at XVIII 54–60).\(^{26}\) The anonymous little plaintiff pictured on the Shield is frozen in his inflexible position of refusing compensation for the death of a victim—a victim who is none other than the plaintiff himself from the overarching standpoint of the *Iliad*.\(^{27}\) Soon after this scene, however, Achilles in the end accepts compensation from Agamemnon, who declares publicly that he was not *aitios* ‘responsible’ for causing the anger of Achilles—that it was really Zeus who inflicted *atē* ‘aberration, derangement’ (*Iliad* XIX 86–88, 134–136).\(^{28}\) If Agamemnon really was *aitios*, of course, he would also be *aitios* for the death of Patroklos, which had resulted from the withdrawal of Achilles from his comrades-in-arms on account of his anger. But the situation is more complicated. Achilles too had incurred *atē* by refusing the entreaties of those who were near and dear to him.\(^{29}\) As a reflection then of \{254|255\} the *neikos* between

\(^{25}\) In this connection I draw attention to the use of the word *sēma* to denote the device on a shield, that is, the images on a warrior’s shield that convey his identity: see Euripides *Electra* 456, with reference to the Shield of Achilles. On the various *sēmata* in the *Seven against Thebes* of Aeschylus (e.g., 643), see Zeitlin 1982.

\(^{26}\) See N 1979.113, 183.


\(^{28}\) See Ch. 8§41. That the dishonoring of Achilles by Agamemnon is a matter of Agamemnon’s *atē* is already indicated by Achilles at *Iliad* 1412. That this *atē* was inflicted by Zeus is admitted by Achilles at XIX 270–274. In this same passage it is also made clear that the *atē* of Agamemnon caused the anger of Achilles.

\(^{29}\) The *atē* that is to befall Achilles is indicated at *Iliad* IX 502–512, where Phoenix tells of the *atē* that is to befall those who reject the *Litai*, goddesses of supplication personified (502–512). See Ch. 8§41. The *Litai* are said to heal the *atē* committed by wrongdoers when these wrongdoers offer compensation for such *atē* (502–507)—a reference to the *atē* that Agamemnon admits having committed and for which he stands ready to offer *apoina* ‘compensation’ (115–120, *apoina* at 120). In rejecting the *Litai*, one is rejecting the process whereby compensation can be awarded for damage suffered—and the word for ‘damage’ here is *Atē* personified (504, 505); compare the juridical attestations of *atē* in this sense, as discussed at Ch. 8§43. The punishment for such refusal is another round of *atē*—this time suffered by the one who rejects the *Litai* (510–512). For Achilles, this *atē* would be the death of Patroklos, who personally experiences *atē*, at the moment of his death, in the form of an aberration of the senses (XVI 685–687; 804–806; *atē* at 805). At XIX 270–274, Achilles seems to realize that both he and Agamemnon
Achilles and Agamemnon, the *neikos* between the anonymous plaintiff and the anonymous defendant on the Shield of Achilles presents the ultimate juridical problem. Who in the end is *aitios* ‘responsible’: is it one of the two heroes, or both, or, as one of them claims, the god himself, who is explicitly accused of inflicting *atē*?

§6. The *Iliad* does not address such a problem directly; instead it refers the case to a *histōr* ‘arbitrator’ (XVIII 501). In the separate world of the Shield of Achilles, a group of arbitrators must compete with each other in rendering justice, until one winning solution can at last be found. Such a winning solution is also needed for the *Iliad* as a whole, which does not formally take a position on who is *aitios* in its narrative. The question is left up to a figure who is beyond the *Iliad*, that is, to the *histōr*, whose function it is to render *dikē* ‘judgment’.

§7. At this juncture we may shift our emphasis from a preoccupation with the Homeric stance of Herodotus. It is time to consider his Hesiodic stance, as reflected in the concept of *historiā*. As one who pronounces *dikē* ‘judgment’, the *histōr* ‘arbitrator’ of the Shield of Achilles fits a pattern that is clearly visible in the portrait of the ideal king in the Hesiodic *Theogony* (80–93). The ideal king is one who has the moral authority to arbitrate and thus bring to an end ‘even a great *neikos* [= *conflict*]’ (ἀἳψα τε καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσεν *Theogony* 87). The ideal king stops the *neikos* ‘conflict’ in the setting of an *agorā* ‘public assembly’ (ἀγορεύων/ἀγορῆφι/ἀγρομένοισιν *Theogony* 86/89/92), which is also the setting for the *neikos*

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30 *Iliad* XVIII 506: ἄμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον ‘they took turns in rendering *dikē* [= *judgment*]; the prize is to go to the one among them who pronounces *dikē* in the straightest way’ (508).

31 The ideal king is described as ‘sorting out the divine laws [= *themis* in the plural]’ (διακρίνοντα δέμιοσ *Theogony* 85) by way of his ‘straight judgments [dikē in the plural]’ (ἰθείησι δίκην. *Theogony* 86). We may compare the depiction of the ideal *histōr* ‘arbitrator’ on the Shield of Achilles as ‘the one among them who pronounces *dikē* in the straightest way’ (*Iliad* XVIII 508); see n30.
that is to be stopped by the *histór* (both words *neikos* and *agorā* at *Iliad* XVIII 497). To be able to arbitrate, Hesiod explains, kings must be *ekhephrones* ‘sound of mind’ (*Theogony* 88). This quality is the same one that is required of the kings who are to understand the *ainos*—here we may translate the word as ‘fable’—told by Hesiod in the *Works and Days*: {255|256}

\[
νῦν δ’ αἰνόν βασιλεύσιν ἐρέω\] 34 ὕφονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς

Hesiod *Works and Days* 202

Now I will tell the kings a *fable* [*ainos*]—sound of mind [*phroneontes*] as they are.

Hesiod’s presupposition of the kings’ soundness of mind is really a condition here: if the kings do not understand the *ainos*, then they are not sound of mind. These same kings have so far in the *Works and Days* displayed just the opposite of soundness, in that they have earlier been described as ready to pronounce a *dikē* ‘judgment’ that is unsound (*οἱ τήνδε δίκην ἐθέλουσι δικάσσαι* *Works and Days* 39). This unsound *dikē* was pronounced by the kings in the context of their arbitrating a *neikos* ‘conflict’ between Hesiod and his brother Perses (*Works and Days* 35); it is in this light that Hesiod seeks to instruct them, by way of his *ainos* (202) of “The Hawk and the Nightingale,” in how to pronounce a sound *dikē*. If the kings understand the *ainos*, then

32 See Ch. 9§1.
33 Note the wording of *Theogony* 88–90: τοῦνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆς ἔχεφρονες, οὗνεκα λαοῖς | βλαπτομένοις ἀγορήφι
μετάτροπα ἐργα τελεύσαι | ῥηδίως, μαλακοί|παραβάςείν ἐπέέσσοιν ‘It is for this reason that there are kings, sound of mind, namely, because they can easily turn right around the [wrong] things | that are done to people who are wronged in the public assembly [*agorā*], | They can do it by persuasion, using soft words’.
34 I have not followed the reading βασιλεύσι’ ἐρέω of West 1978.205.
36 This unsound *dikē* at *Works and Days* 39, pronounced by kings who are described as *dōrophagoi* ‘those who devour gifts’ (ibid.; also 9§20), is mentioned again at *Works and Days* 249 and 269 (cf. also 264); cf. N 1982.58–60.
37 The *ainos* ‘fable’ of “The Hawk and the Nightingale” is told at *Works and Days* 202–212. The hawk seizes the nightingale, described as an *aoidos* ‘singer’ (that is, ‘poet’: see *Works and Days* 208), on the premise that might
they will have learned the lesson that dikē, in its ultimate sense of ‘justice’, is superior to its opposite, hubris ‘outrage’; if they do not understand, however, then their very raison d’être, which is to pronounce dikē ‘judgment’, is undermined, and they are left without any authority.

§8. In fact the Works and Days claims an authority of its own, not dependent on that of any earthly king. It is founded on the higher authority of Zeus as a model for kings. When a king pronounces dikē ‘judgment’ (as at Theogony 86), he is in effect ‘sorting out’ (= verb dia-krīnō: διακρίνοντα Theogony {256|257} 85) what is themis ‘divine law’ and what is not (that is, διακρίνοντα θέμιστας ibid.). Still, as we see from the Works and Days, the dikē ‘judgment’ of a king may not always be the same thing as ‘justice’. For the equation of ‘judgment’ and ‘justice’, the model of Zeus must come into play: at the beginning of the Works and Days, Hesiod invokes Zeus to keep themis [plural] ‘divine laws’ straight by way of his divine dikē—where the ‘judgment’ of Zeus is tantamount to the ‘justice’ of Zeus. This action of Zeus, the pronouncing of dikē, is explicitly made parallel to the words of Hesiod as he speaks to Perses (Works and Days 10), and we must keep in mind that the words of Hesiod as addressed to Perses are in fact the Works and Days as a poem. Thus the justice of Zeus and the Works and Days are treated as

makes right (I paraphrase 206, 207, 210), and he boasts of having the ultimate power of either releasing or devouring his victim (209). On the importance of this ainos, as a bird omen, in the overall structure of the Works and Days, see §27.

38 The “moral” of the fable becomes clear at Works and Days 274–285: Perses is urged to espouse dikē in the ultimate sense of ‘justice’ (275, 278, 279, 283), for those without it will devour each other like wild beasts (276–278). The parallel with the hawk, whose stance of might makes right corresponds to the stance of kings (n37), imposes itself. As for dikē in the ultimate sense of ‘justice’, I argue in N 1982.57–61 that dikē is ‘judgment’ in an immediate sense, as at Works and Days 39, 249, 269 (n36), and that this ‘judgment’ becomes ‘justice’ (personified as the goddess Dikē, Works and Days 256) only with the passage of time, under the supervision of the gods (Works and Days 217–218; cf. Solon F 4.14–16 W). Further, I argue (ibid.) that the Works and Days dramatizes the actual passage of time required for the workings of Dikē to take effect, so that the faulty ‘judgment’ of the kings (dikē at Works and Days 39, 249, 269) may be transformed eventually into the ‘justice’ of Zeus (dikē at Works and Days 256,275, etc.).

39 See Ch. 9§7.
40 N 1982.58.
41 N, pp. 58–60.
coefficients in the context of a neikos ‘conflict’ that Hesiod and Perses must ‘sort out’ for themselves (again, = verb dia-krīnō: διακρινώμεθα νεῖκος ‘let us sort out for ourselves this neikos’ Works and Days 35).42 Since Hesiod is here saying that he and Perses should resolve their conflict themselves, it is clear that their neikos—and the whole poem for that matter—will not in the end require the authority of a king as arbitrator. In fact after the last admonition of Hesiod to the kings, at Works and Days 263–264, the kings are never to be heard of again in the poem. From a dramatic point of view, it is as if the poem were eliminating the authority of kings while maintaining the ultimate authority of Zeus as king; I interpret this state of affairs as a poetic reflex of the historical fact that the institution of kingship was obsolescent in most Greek cities by the time of the Archaic period.43

§9. Thus the Works and Days of Hesiod, a poem founded on the authority of Zeus as king, can teach the citizens of cities that are no longer ruled by kings. In fact it can teach all citizens of all cities. The structure of the poem, which a comparative study can relate to the cognate juridical traditions of India as embedded in the body of wise sayings known as the Law Code of Manu, reflects a moral authority that could in theory serve as foundation for a law code.44 But the laws of Greek cities in the Archaic and Classical periods are a local affair, with each law code reflecting the idiosyncratic history and politics of each city. Thus the Works and Days, by stopping short of formulating laws, can communicate a Panhellenic authority for the diverse law codes of all cities—whether the city’s government be an oligarchy, a tyranny, or even a democracy. Even in a democracy, the ideological basis of authority is the dikē ‘justice’ of Zeus, just as it is elaborated in the Works and Days: thus, for example, the laws of

42 This time the verb dia-krīnō is in the middle voice, whence the translation ‘let us sort out for ourselves’; contrast the active voice of dia-krīnō at Theogony 85 (διακρίνοντα θέμιστας), where the agent is the ideal king.
43 Cf. N. p. 60; this view differs from that of West 1978.151, who tentatively retrojects to the life and times of Hesiod the testimony of Diodorus Siculus 4.29.4 about the rulers of Thespiai.
44 On the correlation of ritual and ethical correctness, see N. p. 61.
Athens, as the poetry of the city’s lawgiver Solon proclaims, are founded on the authority of Zeus as king (Solon F 31W).  

§10. The juridical authority of earthly kings is eliminated not only in the Works and Days. Even in the Iliad, an epic about warriors who are simultaneously represented as kings, the scene of litigation on the Shield of Achilles leaves out any mention of kings; the group of men taking turns at standing with skēptron ‘scepter’ in hand and arbitrating the litigation by pronouncing dikē (XVIII 503–508) are described not as kings, but merely as gerontes ‘elders’ (503). This omission is remarkable in view of the fact that the skētron is the visible sign of a king’s authority in the Iliad (e.g., IX 97–99). Another such omission in the Hesiodic Theogony is even more remarkable in view of the fact that a theogony is by nature a formal confirmation of royal authority. In the Theogony we find a significant omission in the detailed portrait of the ideal king (80–93), that man who can arbitrate the ultimate neikos ‘conflict’ (87): the ideal king is not pictured as wielding a skēptron. Instead the man who is given a skēptron is Hesiod himself, who gets it from the Muses (Theogony 30). Thus the man who tells the ainos in the Works and Days is the same man who holds the symbol of ultimate juridical authority in the Theogony.

§11. Let us try to sum up what we know about the histōr ‘arbitrator’. From the comparative evidence to be found in Homeric and Hesiodic poetry, we see that a histōr is a man who has the authority, derived from the kingship of Zeus, to solve conflicts, even by deciding who is aitios

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45 N, p. 60. For a comparative study of the theme of “ruler’s truth,” see Watkins 1979; cf. also Martin 1984.
47 Further details in N 1982.52–53.
48 This point about the nature of any theogony is argued in N, p. 56. A survey of theogonic traditions native to diverse societies of the world reveals that a basic function of a theogony is to confirm the authority that regulates a given social group. The authority figure of the king symbolically incorporates society in that the king embodies the community through his status as the very incarnation of the body politic. Cf. Ch. 6§23.
‘responsible’ for what. His mode of discourse, based on privileged information, is that of the ainos.

§12. In the mode of a histōr, the historiā ‘inquiry’ of Herodotus likewise takes a position on who is aitios. When Croesus, like Agamemnon, declares publicly that a god was aitios for the misfortunes that have been narrated, the historiā represents the god Apollo as having the last word: Croesus himself is manifestly aitios (Herodotus 1.91.4).\(^{50}\) Moreover, the man who conducts the historiā, Herodotus, publicly takes the same position, and the word that \(\{258|259\}\) he uses in this context to designate his privileged mode of communication is sēmainō (1.5.3)\(^{51}\)—a word that is characteristic of the discourse of the ainos.\(^{52}\)

§13. By now we see more clearly how the historiā of Herodotus, in seeking to establish who was responsible for the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, is analogous to the task of the histōr depicted on the Shield of Achilles. In the microcosm of the Shield, an ideal histōr must seek the most equitable solution of a conflict between two litigants; in the macrocosm of the Iliad this same conflict recapitulates the ultimate conflict that leads off the entire narrative, the neikos of Achilles and Agamemnon.

§14. But the question still remains: what is the semantic relationship of the word histōr in the sense of ‘arbitrator’ with the verb historeō ‘inquire, conduct an inquiry’ and the noun historiā ‘inquiry’ as used in Herodotus? The derivation of histōr from oida (‘I have seen: therefore I know’)?\(^{53}\)\(^{54}\) and its primary sense of ‘witness’ can be misleading as we examine the usages of historeō and historiā: although the process of inquiry conveyed by these two words is

\(^{50}\) Cf. Ch. 8§39.
\(^{51}\) Cf. Ch. 8§20, 8§25, and following.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
\(^{53}\) Cf. Ch. 9§1.
\(^{54}\) Ibid.
primarily on the level of seeing (e.g., Herodotus 2.99.1), it can also be on the level of hearing but not seeing (e.g., 2.29.1). So also with the word oida itself: after all, knowledge may at times be founded on hearing only (cf., e.g., Herodotus 1.5). The semantic evolution of histōr from ‘one who sees’ = ‘eyewitness’ to something like ‘he who sees beyond what others see’ (where the vision may be figurative as well as real) is comparable to what we find in the French word voyant: literally this word means ‘one who is endowed with sight’, but the voyant is in fact endowed not with normal sight but “something that goes beyond it, ‘second sight’.” It seems to me no accident that the first word of the first oracle directly quoted by Herodotus, where the voice of Apollo declares that it knows the number of every grain of sand and the full dimensions of the sea, is oida ‘I know’ (1.47.3).

§15. In this light we may also consider the semantic specialization of Latin arbiter. From the survey by Emile Benveniste of this word’s usage in the diction of Plautus, it becomes clear that the arbiter, unlike the testis, is a ‘witness’ only in a special sense: whereas the testis is known to the parties in a given case or situation, the arbiter may or may not be known and may or may not even be seen:

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55 The wording of Herodotus 2.99.1 is worth scrutiny: μέχρι μὲν τοῦτον ὅψις τε ἔμη καὶ γνώμη καὶ ἱστορίη ταῦτα λέγουσα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτο διεπιστήσον ἐρχομαι λόγους ἐρέων κατὰ τὰ ἑκουσον· προσέται δὲ τι αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ὅψιος ἕως τοῦτο up to this point it is my opsis [= seeing] and gnōmē [= judgment] and historiā that is saying these things, but from this point onward I am going to tell the Egyptian accounts according to what I heard; to which will be added a portion that will be my own opsis'.

56 Note again the wording of this passage, Herodotus 2.29.1: ἄλλου δὲ οὐδὲνος οὐδὲν ἐδυνάμην πυθέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε μὲν ἄλλο εἰ παρατότων ἐπιθύμην, μέχρι μὲν ἑλεφαντίνης πόλις αὐτοπτῆς ἐλθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτο ἀκοῆ ἤδη ἱστορέων ἵπτομαι I was unable to ascertain anything from any other person [except the aforementioned], having gone as autoptēs [= eyewitness] as far as the polis of Elephantine, but from there on conducting the historiā by way of akoē [= hearing]. Cf. Herodotus 2.123.1.

57 Cf. Ch. 981 and following.

58 Benveniste 1973.527 = 1969 II 278; this example is cited in the context of Benveniste’s discussion of Latin superstes as a witness “who has his being beyond,” one “who stands over the matter” (p. 526 = 1969 II 276).

secede huc nunciam si videtur, procul,
ne arbitri dicta nostra arbitari queant

Plautus Captivi 219–220

Come over here, please, a way off,
so that arbitri may not arbitrari what we say.

eamus intro, non utibilest hie locus factis tuis
dum memoramus, arbitri ut sint qui praetereant per vias

Plautus Mercator 1005–1006

Let’s go inside. This is not a suitable place for us to talk about what you’ve done.
Those who pass by on the streets may be arbitri.

miquidem iam arbitri vicini sunt, meae quid fiat domi,
ita per impluvium intro spectant

Plautus Miles 158–159

The neighbors are now arbitri of whatever happens in my house:
they peer through the impluvium.

In explaining how such a “clandestine witness” as an arbiter evolves into an arbitrator, a judge,
Benveniste adduces the semantics of iūdex:60 {260|261}

60 Benveniste, pp. 397–398 = 1969 II 121–122. See also Benveniste, pp. 389–392 = 1969 II 111–113 on this same word
iūdex, a compound built from iūs in the sense of ‘juridical formula’ and from the root *deik-/*dik- as in dīcō ‘say’
(note the collocation iūs dīcere) or in the dic- of dicis causā ‘for the sake of proper form’. I should draw special
We must recall that in the most ancient sense of the word the name *iūdex* was given to every authoritative person charged with passing judgment in a disputed case. In principle it was the king, the consul, the holder of all powers. But for practical reasons this power was delegated to a private judge who, according to the nature of the cases, was called *iūdex* or *iūdex privātus*, or *iūdex selectus* or *arbiter*. The last was empowered to decide in all cases which were not foreseen by the law. [...] In effect, the *arbiter* makes his decision not according to formulae and the laws but by a personal assessment and in the name of equity. The *arbiter* is in fact a *iūdex* who acts as an *arbiter*, he judges by coming between the two parties from outside like someone who has been present at the affair without being seen, who can therefore give judgment on the facts freely and with authority, regardless of all precedent in the light of the circumstances.

Although Benveniste does not directly adduce *histōr* or *historiā* in this connection, we can see that his working definition of *arbiter* is pertinent to the meanings of both these Greek words.\(^61\) The *histōr*, whose authority is derived from Zeus as king, can be understood as thereby having the privileged vantage point of the gods themselves, who can see without being seen.\(^62\) The same goes for the *historiā* ‘inquiry’ of Herodotus: when he *sēmainei* ‘indicates’ that Croesus is *aitios* ‘responsible’ for the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and barbarians (Herodotus

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\(^{61}\) The pertinence of *arbiter* to *histōr* is brought up at a later point in Benveniste’s discussion, 1973.442 = 1969 II 174–175, in another connection.

\(^{62}\) I have in mind the oath expressions cited at n5 above. We may also compare the invisible *phulakes* ‘guardians’ of *Dikē* ‘justice’ at Hesiod *Works and Days* 124–126, as discussed in N 1979.153; also the theme of the Eye of Zeus at *Works and Days* 267–269, as discussed in N 1983.42–43.
he is in effect speaking from a privileged vantage point similar to that of the god Apollo himself, who σῆμαινεi ‘indicates’ by way of his Oracle (Heraclitus 22 B 93 DK)—and who likewise declares that Croesus is aἰτίος (Herodotus 1.91.4).

§16. In this connection, now that we are reaching the end of our inquiry into both the Homeric and the Hesiodic stances of Herodotus, it is fitting to reiterate what Herodotus had said about the Panhellenic contributions of Homer and Hesiod: these are the poets ‘who indicated the visible forms [eidos plural] of the gods’. Again the word translated by ‘indicate’ here is {261|262} σῆμαινo (εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες Herodotus 2.53.2). In other words Homer and Hesiod are represented by Herodotus as communicating in the same mode in which Herodotus himself communicates. We have seen that this is in fact not so, that the discourse of Herodotus in fact makes the sort of judgments that are avoided in a poem like the Iliad. Still the discourse of Herodotus, by implicitly claiming identity with the discourse of Homer, is appropriating it. Similarly we have seen that the discourse of Pindar, distinct as it is from the discourse of Homer, nonetheless claims identity with it and thus appropriates it, possesses it. Such parallelism of appropriation is yet another indication that the discourse of Herodotus has close connections with the aῖνος, which is the essence of Pindar’s lyric poetry in contexts of appropriating epic.

§17. Such parallelism between Herodotus and Pindar has been our concern since the beginning of Chapter 8, with the assertion that the historiā ‘inquiry’ of Herodotus, like the aῖνος

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63 Cf. Ch. 8§20, 8§25 and following.
64 See Ch. 8§27.
65 Cf. Ch. 8§39.
66 The derivation of eidos ‘visible form’ from the verb represented by the aorist *yid- of idein ‘see’ is pertinent to the semantics of historiā as discussed at Ch. 9§1 and following.
67 The passage is quoted at Ch. 8§2. Note again the etymological pertinence of Latin in-dicāre, as discussed at Ch. 9§58.
68 Ch. 6, Ch.7.
of epinician poets like Pindar, is a form of discourse that claims the authority to possess and control the epic of heroes.²⁹ I had then proposed to support this assertion by arguing that the traditions underlying the ἱστοριαί are akin to those underlying the ἀῖνος of epinician lyric poetry. It is time to take stock of all that we have observed so far about the ἱστοριαί of Herodotus.

§18. The very word ἱστοριαί, as used by Herodotus in his prooemium, indicates the juridical aspect of what Herodotus has to say. In finding Croesus guilty or aitios ‘responsible’ for the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, Herodotus is taking a stance similar to that of the ἱστορ on the Shield of Achilles. Earlier we saw that Croesus proves himself to be guilty even by way of his behavior, which the narrative of Herodotus represents as a paradigm of ἄτῆ ‘derangement’. This representation is achieved in a quasi-juridical framework insofar as ἄτη is defined through the teachings of the lawgiver Solon. But the ἄτη of Croesus, as we have noticed, is not confronted directly by Solon in the encounter dramatized by Herodotus.³⁰ Moreover, Solon in Herodotus’ Histories does not tell Croesus directly what we find him teaching in his own poetry, that ἄτη is brought about by ὑβρις.³¹ This indirectness is not just a matter of diplomacy on Solon’s part. Rather it can best be explained by considering the medium of Herodotus, ἱστοριαί. With his privileged position of knowledge, the master of ἱστοριαί is implicitly narrating divine actions as he explicitly narrates human actions.³² {262|263} The divine pattern of ἄτη as brought about by ὑβρις is for Herodotus an implicit message as he σῆμαινει ‘indicates’ that Croesus was in the wrong. The task still at hand is to show how the implicitness

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²⁹ Cf. Ch. §§1 and following.
³⁰ Cf. Ch. §§49.
³¹ Ibid.
³² Cf. Ch. §§34 and following.
of Herodotus, and even his dramatization of Solon as a sage who formulates implicit messages about the dangers of *hubris* and *atē*, is akin to the communication of Pindar through the *ainos*.

§19. The implicit *hubris* of Croesus the Lydian is indicated by the context of the story of Croesus and Solon in the *Histories* of Herodotus. This story makes it clear that the Persians acquired the characteristic of being *habroi* 'luxuriant', which as we shall see is a basic feature of *hubris*, from the Lydians, whom they had conquered: before the conquest, in the words of Herodotus, the Persians had nothing that was *habron* 'luxuriant' (ἦν οὔτε ἁβρὸν οὔτε ἁγαθὸν οὐδέν 1.71.4; cf. also the context of οὐκ ἄλλο ἁγαθὸν οὐδέν at 1.70.3). Before the Lydians, the story goes, the Persians had a 'harsh' life, living in a 'harsh' country.

§20. In order to understand the traditional theme that being *habros* 'luxuriant' is a basic feature of *hubris*, let us turn to the traditions about the *ktisis* 'foundation' of the Greek city of Colophon, as reported by Phylarchus: in the beginning the colonizers of Colophon led a harsh life (Phylarchus FGH 81 F 66 in Athenaeus 526a), but eventually they turned to *truphē* 'luxuriance' when they came into contact with the Lydians (ibid.). At this point

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73 That the Lydians are characterized by what is *habron* ‘luxuriant’ is a theme also reflected in the epithet pod-*habros* 'with a footstep that is luxuriant [*habros*]' applied to Croesus the Lydian in the oracular pronouncement at Delphi as quoted at Herodotus 1.55.2 (ποδαβρέ). I suggest that the notion of foot in this epithet can refer not only to a graceful step but even to its corresponding mimesis, a graceful dance-step, as conveyed, for example, by the use of ἁβροβάται in Aeschylus *Persians* 1073 (for the diction, cf. ἁβρόν βαίνουσα παλλεύκῳ ποδί in Euripides *Medea* 1164; cf. also 830). For a possible reference to an ungraceful dance-step, as a mimesis of *hubris*, cf. Sophocles *Oedipus Tyrannus* 878.

74 To quote from Herodotus 1.71.2: χώρην ἔχοντες τρηχέαν ‘having a harsh country’. On the detail of the leather clothing worn by the Persians before they became contaminated by the Lydians, at 1.71.2, cf. Ch. 13§16.

75 Phylarchus uses the expression εἰς τρυφήν ἐξώκειλαν ‘they [= the Colophonians] ran aground on *truphē* [= luxuriance]’ (FGH 81 F 66). Elsewhere he uses the expression ἐξοκείλαντες εἰς τρυφήν ‘running aground on *truphē*’ in describing the luxuriance of the people of Sybaris (Phylarchus 81 F 45 in Athenaeus 521c). After this description Phylarchus uses the expression ἐξοκείλαντες εἰς ὕβριν ‘running aground on *hubris*’ in describing the savage behavior of the people of Sybaris (81 F 45 in Athenaeus 521d): they had murdered the ambassadors of the people of Croton and cast out their corpses to be devoured by wild animals. That was the beginning of the misfortunes of Sybaris, reports Phylarchus, μηνίσαντος τοῦ δαίμονιου ‘because of the anger [= *mēnis*] of the *daimonion* [= power of the *daimōn*]’ (ibid.); the anger is manifested by portents: the statue of Hera vomits bile and a fountain of blood.
Phylarchus (F 66 in Athenaeus 526a-b) quotes the following words of Xenophanes about the Colophonians:

άβροσύνας δὲ μαθόντες ἀνωφελέας παρὰ Λυδῶν,

δόρρα τυραννίς ἦσαν ἄνευ στυγερῆς ...

Xenophanes F 3.1–2 W = 21 B 3 DK

Learning the useless ways of luxuriance [= being habros] from the Lydians,
while they [= the Colophonians] were still free of hateful tyranny ...\(^{76}\)

The Colophonians are ultimately ruined by their own hubris:

ὑβρίς καὶ Μάγνητας ἀπώλεσε καὶ Κολοφῶνα
καὶ Σμύρνην· πάντως Κύρνη καὶ ὑμὶ’ ἀπολεῖ

Theognis 1103–1104

Hubris ruined the Magnesians, and Colophon
and Smyrna; and it will assuredly ruin you [plural] too, Kymos!

The expression Κολοφωνία ὑβρίς ‘Colophonian hubris’ is in fact proverbial (Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum I p. 266.6–7).\(^ {77}\)

\(^{76}\) The whole passage of Xenophanes as quoted by Phylarchus FGH 81 F 66 should be compared with a passage about the luxuriance of the Samians, ascribed to Asius and quoted by Duris of Samos FGH 76 F 60 in Athenaeus 525e-f.

\(^{77}\) That this theme is linked ultimately with the ktisis ‘foundation’/’colonization’ of Colophon is suggested by another text, Mimnermus F 9.3–4 W, where the actual colonizers of Colophon, the speaker included, are
§21. In the passage just quoted from Xenophanes, the ruin of Colophon is linked with *turannīē* ‘tyranny’, and we get further thematic details from Theopompus (FGH 115 F 117 in Athenaeus 526c): the luxuriance of the Colophonians resulted in *turannis* ‘tyranny’ and *stasis* [plural] ‘discord’, so that the city and its people were ‘destroyed’. In this case ‘tyranny’ is probably to be understood as some form of political domination by Lydia: Herodotus, for example, refers to the capture of the lower city of Colophon by Gyges the Lydian (1.14.4), parallel to the capture of Smyrna by Alyattes, the great-grandson of Gyges (1.16.2). But the point of this traditional story about Colophon seems to be that the misfortune of tyranny was caused primarily from within, not from without: the luxuriance of the Colophonians brought about their defeat at the hands of their external enemies. A parallel {264|265} point is made in the story about the ruin of the Magnesians, whose luxuriance brought about their defeat at the hands of the Ephesians (Callinus F 3 W; Archilochus F 20 W; cf. Theognis 603–604). The ruin of the Magnesians is mentioned alongside that of the Colophonians and that of the Smymaeans in the poem of Theognis quoted above (1103–1104).

characterized as βίην ὑπέροπλον ἔχοντες ‘men of overweening violence [biē]’ and ὑβριζός ἡγεμόνες ‘leaders of hubris’. Further discussion in N 1985.52–53.

78 On the eventual domination of Colophon and Smyrna by Lydia, see Jeffery 1976.224–225. In his own narrative Herodotus chooses not to present these instances of the domination of Hellenes by previous tyrants of Lydia as equivalent to the later domination by Croesus. The effect is to sharpen the parallelism between the Lydian Empire of Croesus and the Athenian Empire, on which theme see Ch. 8§20, 10§49 and following.

79 The sources that make this story explicit are Strabo 14.1.40 C647 and Athenaeus 525c. The disasters befalling Magnesia are compounded: apparently after their capture by the Ephesians, Magnesia was destroyed by the invading Cimmerians (Strabo ibid.). On the grounds that Callinus (F 3 W) mentions the Magnesians as still flourishing while Archilochus (F 20 W) refers to their misfortunes at the hands of their enemies, Strabo (ibid.) and Clement (*Stromateis* 1.131.7–8) reason that Callinus is an earlier poet than Archilochus. Such reasoning, perpetuated in later-day scholarship on the Greek lyric poets, should be subject to doubt in view of the poetic device where the poet is presented as foreseeing a disaster that is yet to befall a community (on this theme see, for example, Solon F 9 W and the commentary in N 1985.45; also Theognis 39–52 and 1081–1082b, to be discussed immediately below).
§22. For Theognis, such stories are made applicable to the *hubris* that the poet finds in his own city of Megara (ibid.; also Theognis 603–604). In another poem, Theognis 1081–1082b, the voice of the poet goes so far as to say that Megara is pregnant with a future tyrant, a man of *hubris*.\(^{80}\) From this image of the pregnant city we see most clearly that tyranny can be generated from within. That the man of *hubris* in this poem is indeed a tyrant becomes evident from another poem, Theognis 39–52, a variant in which the emphasis shifts from the *hubris* represented by the future tyrant to the *hubris* that could bring forth the tyrant in the first place. Again the poet says that his city is pregnant (Theognis 39), but this time he fears that it will give birth to a man who will be ‘a corrector of our base *hubris*’ (ἐὐθυντῆρα κακῆς ὑβρίος ἰμετέρης Theognis 40).\(^{81}\) He goes on to say that the unjust behavior of his city’s élite leads to *stasis* [plural] ‘discord’, intrasocietal *phonos* [plural] ‘killings’, and *monarkhoi* ‘monarchs’ (Theognis 51–52).\(^{82}\) This triad of misfortunes matches closely the one found in the celebrated Herodotean passage known as the Debate about the Constitutions,\(^{83}\) where the Persian king Darius is dramatized as praising tyranny and blaming oligarchy: in an oligarchy, says Darius, the behavior of the élite leads to *stasis* [plural], from which arises *phonos* ‘killing’, from which arises *monarkhiā* ‘monarchy’—so that monarchy, he reasons, *must* be superior to oligarchy (Herodotus 3.83.3).\(^{84}\)

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\(^{80}\) An important variant, Theognis 39–52, is taken up in the discussion that immediately follows.

\(^{81}\) On *euthun*ō ‘straighten, correct’ in the sense of ‘check the growth of a plant, prune’ as a metaphor for *dikē* ‘justice’, see N 1985.61; cf. Michelini 1978.

\(^{82}\) See Ch. 6§62, 6§64; 12§55.

\(^{83}\) Ibid.

\(^{84}\) The élite behave as follows: each of them strives eagerly for *aretē* ‘excellence’, and great hatreds break out as a result (again Herodotus 3.83.3). Compare Theognis 401–406: the man who is too eager for *aretē* and seeks *kerdōs* ‘personal gain’ commits a grave error: his divine punishment is that he thinks that *kaka* ‘bad things’ are *agatha* ‘good’ and the other way around. On *kerdōs* as a potential aspect of *hubris*, see Theognis 46 and 50; also 835, discussed at Ch. 10§3.
‘monarch’ is the attenuated equivalent of *turannos* ‘tyrant’ (Herodotus 3.80.2 in conjunction with 3.80.4).

§23. The point of this traditional topic is that whether tyranny afflicts a community from without or from within, its causes are from within. Granted, the Hellenes apparently learned the word *turannos* from the Lydians, as we may infer from its early attestation, applied to Gyges the Lydian, in Archilochus F 19 W (cf. Hippias of Elis FGH 6 F 6). Still the experience of tyranny and of its causes is a native Hellenic tradition. While it is a matter of history that Colophon was culturally influenced and then politically subjugated by the Lydians, it is a matter of myth making that the stories of what happened in Colophon and elsewhere became paradigms for analogous patterns of happenings in other Hellenic city-states. The analogies vary considerably, but the language that expresses the analogous patterns follows closely the language of the paradigms. For example, whatever happened in Colophon or Smyrna or Magnesia is surely different from the ongoing events in mainland Megara, seemingly far beyond the reach of luxuriant Lydians or savage Cimmerians. And yet, for Theognis, the same *hubris* that destroyed those three luxuriating cities from within ‘now’ threatens to destroy

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85 See Ch. 6§62 and following.
86 Cf. the testimonia collected at Archilochus F 19 W, most notably *Etymologicum Gudianum* s.v. τύραννος, where we learn that the word *turannos* is derived from an epithet of Gyges as King of Lydia—a piece of information inferred apparently from the actual poetry of Archilochus. Also, I draw attention to the use of the word *turannos* for the title of Croesus as King of the Lydian Empire (e.g., Herodotus 1.6.1; cf. especially the use of *turannis* in the context of 1.14.1). As we shall see in detail later at Ch. 10§3 and following, the supreme generosity of Croesus in his public display of material offerings to Apollo at Delphi (Herodotus 1.50.1–1.53–2) is a traditional theme in the epinician lyric poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides, directly compared to the generosity of Hieron as Tyrant of Syracuse. It is in this context that we can understand the non-pejorative application of the word *turannos* to Hieron, as in Pindar *Pythian* 3.85, discussed in Ch. 6§55 and following. It is also in this context that we can understand the naming of an otherwise unknown Athenian as *Kroisos* = Croesus, memorialized in an inscription at the base of a *kouros*-statue, on which see Ch. 6§22.
87 I say *seemingly* because we have to reckon with the political relations of Megara as mother city with its daughter cities, on which subject see Ch. 2§37n96.
Megara as well (Theognis 1103–1104; cf. 603–604). This kind of warning by the figure of Theognis is typical of the mode of discourse that we have already identified as the *ainos*.\(^88\)

§24. In the Croesus story of Herodotus, a similar warning is ostensibly being made—not about any Hellenic city but about the Lydians themselves. Their ultimate luxuriance, manifested in the material over-acquisitiveness of their king Croesus as he tries to conquer the Persian Empire, leads to their own \{266|267\} defeat. In this case, however, the conquerors learn the ways of luxuriance from the defeated, and not the other way around: the Persians, who had previously led a harsh life, acquire the quality of being *habros* ‘luxuriant’ from the Lydians (Herodotus 1.71.2).\(^89\) Ominously, however, the harsh life of the Persians before Croesus is different from that of men like the early settlers of Colophon. As the captured king Croesus observes, in reaction to the sight of Persians looting the captured Lydian city of Sardis, the Persians are ‘by nature men of *hubris*’ (Πέρσαι φύσιν ἐόντες ὑβρισταί ... Herodotus 1.89.2). As we are about to see, *hubris* can have an aspect other than luxuriance, the aspect of savagery.\(^90\)

§25. The two aspects of *hubris*, luxuriance and savagery, tend to alternate in poetic treatments. In the poetry of Theognis, for example, the *hubris* that threatens to destroy Megara is *either* the same *hubris* that destroyed the luxuriant Hellenes, as we have read in the passages cited, *or* the same *hubris* that destroyed the Centaurs, ‘eaters of raw flesh’ (Theognis 541–542; ὀμοφάγους at 542).\(^91\) The eventual destruction of Megara can be visualized as happening *either* from the inside, with the degeneration of the élite (again Theognis 39–52)\(^92\) or from the outside.

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\(^88\) In the context of Theognis 681–682: Ch. 6§4 and following; also 6§62, 6§65, and following.

\(^89\) Cf. Ch. 9§18.

\(^90\) This other aspect has already emerged in the discussion at Ch. 9§18 of Phylarchus 81 F 45, where the savagery of the people of Sybaris is parallel to their luxuriance.

\(^91\) Cf. Apollodorus 2.5.4 (Pholos the Centaur eats his own portions of meat raw) and the comments at N 1985.51§39n2.

\(^92\) Cf. Ch. 9§22 above.
with the influx and subsequent ascendency of savages (Theognis 53–68), who are described as ‘formerly’ living outside the city like grazing deer, wearing the hides of goats for clothing (54–56). There is a similar description of the Persians in Herodotus, before they conquered the Lydians: as an advisor points out to Croesus, the Persians still wear leather for their trousers and indeed for all their clothing (οἱ σκυτίνας μὲν ἄναξυρίδας, σκυτίνην δὲ τὴν ἄλλην ἔσθητα φορέουσι 1.71.2). Once they taste of our good things’, says this Lydian advisor, ‘they will cling to them and we will be unable to push them away’ (γευσάμενοι γὰρ τῶν ἕμετέρων ἄγαθῶν περιέξονται οὐδὲ ἀπωστοί ἔσονται 1.71.3). Thus the Persians of Herodotus are a combination of the worst: already savage, they then become luxuriant as well.\(^94\)

§26. For Herodotus, the ultimate exponent of the luxuriance and savagery of hubris is Xerxes, the Great King of the Persians, leader of the “Asian” hordes massed against Hellas. Even more interesting for my present purposes, however, is another Persian exponent of hubris, whose story pointedly brings to a close the Histories of Herodotus. He is Artauktes, descendant of a man who had advised Cyrus, founder of the Persian Empire, to move from the ‘harsh’ land of Persia (γῆν ... τρηχέαν Herodotus 9.122.2) to some milder place (ibid.). Cyrus had rejected this advice on the grounds that men become ‘soft’ and slave-like when they live in ‘soft’ places (φιλέειν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι Herodotus 9.122.3). With this thought, along with the observation that the Persians at that former time had heeded the advice of Cyrus, Herodotus ends his narrative in the last sentence of the Histories. Obviously the Persians of later times, under the kingship of Xerxes, failed to heed the

\(^{93}\) This image of savages seems to be a reflex of poetic traditions describing colonization, where the polis of transplanted Hellenes is surrounded by local barbarians: see Ch. 2§37n96. In Theognis 53–68, the equation of ethically inferior citizens with sociopolitically inferior savages who threaten the polis from the outside (cf. N 1985.44§29n4, 51§39n2, 54) may convey a colonial point of view adopted from a daughter city on the coast of the Black Sea: see Figueira 1985.129.

\(^{94}\) The luxuriance of the Persians is a dominant theme in the Persians of Aeschylus; cf. the use of habros and its derivatives at lines 41, 135, 1072.
advice of Cyrus as they sought to occupy a new European homeland in the wake of Xerxes’ invasion of Hellas. From the standpoint of the Histories, the Persians had already been corrupted by the Lydians; they had acquired from these fellow Asians the characteristic of being habroi ‘luxuriant’ (1.71.4), abandoning the harsh life that went hand in hand with living in a harsh country (1.71.2).95 The topic of corruption is picked up again at the end of the Histories, where Cyrus is seen arguing against the advice given by the ancestor of Artauktes, who had argued that the Persians should move from the harsh land of Persia (9.122.2). With this background we come to the story of Artauktes—a story that realizes the advice given by his ancestor and that serves as a negative paradigm for the advice given by Cyrus.

§27. Described as an underling of Xerxes, Artauktes was put in charge of administering a region on the “Greek” side of the Hellespont, which he ruled in the style of a turannos ‘tyrant’ (ἐτυράννευε Herodotus 9.116.1). The story has it that Artauktes was a dreadful and atasthalos ‘wanton’ man (9.116.1)—and the word atasthalos in Archaic Greek poetry regularly characterizes a man of hubris96—who contrived to occupy as his own property the oikos ‘house’ of ‘a Greek man’ (ἔστι οἶκος ἄνδρος Ἑλληνος ἐνθαῦτα 9.116.3). At least Xerxes was led to believe that Artauktes was to occupy the house of ‘a Greek man’. The story is actually being told by Herodotus in a mode analogous to that of an ainōs, in that double meanings abound.97 To begin with, the ‘house’ of the ‘Greek man’ is really the sacred precinct of the hero Protesilaos, a cult center filled with riches supplied by the hero’s worshippers (9.116.2).98 Lusting to possess these riches, Artauktes {268|269} had deceived Xerxes by asking the king to

95 Cf. Ch. 9§18.
96 A survey of passages in N 1979:163. Cf. also, for example, Herodotus 3.80.4.
97 On the ainōs as a discourse with one code that bears at least two messages: Ch. 6§4.
98 For a detailed discussion of the hero cult of Protesilaos, see Boedeker 1988; some of her conclusions, reached independently, concerning the deployment of the Protesilaos story in the narrative of Herodotus coincide with those presented in N 1987c; the main points of the latter article are recast in what follows.
grant him the ownership of an oikos ‘house’ of ‘a Greek man’ who had died while attacking the land of Xerxes:

δέσποτα, ἔστι οἶκος ἀνδρὸς Ἑλληνος ἐνθαῦτα, ὡς ἐπὶ γῆν τὴν σὴν στρατευσάμενος δίκης κυρήσας ἀπέθανε, τούτου μοι δὸς τὸν οἶκον, ἵνα καὶ τις μάθῃ ἐπὶ γῆν τὴν σὴν μὴ στρατεύεσθαι.

Herodotus 9.116.3

Master, there is here a house [οἰκός] belonging to a Greek man who had made war against your land. Getting his just deserts, he had died. Give me this man’s house [οἰκός], so that everyone may learn not to make war against your land.

What Artaukte had said actually conveys an ulterior meaning: in Greek epic tradition Protesilaos was the first Achaean to die fighting the Trojans (Iliad II 698–702). Moreover, oikos is a word that can designate the sacred precinct of a hero (e.g., Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 627).99 For Xerxes, the oikos requested by Artaukte is the ‘house’ of a Greek; for Artaukte, it is the precinct of Protesilaos. Once he is granted ownership of the precinct, Artaukte proceeds to rob it of its riches, to which the narrative refers as the khrēmata of Protesilaos (9.116.1, 3; 9.120.3). The personalized tone reminds us of the same word khrēmata in a poem of Theognis (667, 677), describing the loss of possessions on the part of a figure who is presented as an exponent of dikē ‘righteousness’ and who speaks in the mode of the ainos (ἡνίχθω 681).100 Artaukte commits the further outrage of farming the lands of the precinct for his own profit

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99 See N 1985.76–77, 81879n1, especially with reference to the riddle in Theognis 1209–1210; see also Edmunds 1981, especially p. 223n8, with reference to Sophocles Oedipus at Colonus 627 and other related passages involving oikos and its derivatives.

and having sexual intercourse with women within the shrine (9.116.3). From a Hellenic standpoint Artauktes is clearly an exponent of *hubris*.

§28. Sometime after the Greek victories over the Persians at Salamis and Plataea, Artauktes is captured by the advancing Greeks as they push the Persians back to Asia, and a miracle supposedly happens just as Artauktes is about to be executed in retribution for the wrongs that he had committed. As one of his Greek captors is roasting *tarīkhoi* ‘preserved fish’ for a meal (Herodotus 9.120.1), the dead fish suddenly come alive. Artauktes reacts as follows: {269|270}

> ξεῖνε Ἀθηναίε, μηδὲν φοβέο τὸ τέρας τοῦτο. οὐ γάρ σοι πέφηνε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ σημαίνει ὅ ἐν Ἑλαίοντι Πρωτεσίλεως ὁτι καὶ τάριχος ἐὼν δύναμιν πρὸς θεῶν ἔχει τὸν ἀδικέοντα τίνεσθαι.

Herodotus 9.120.2

Athenian stranger, do not be frightened of this portent. For it was manifested not for you. Rather, the Protesilaos who abides in Elaious is indicating [= verb *sēmainō*] to me that, even though he is dead—and a *tarīkhos*—he has the power from the gods to exact retribution from the one who commits wrongdoing [= does deeds without *dikē*].

§29. The word *tarīkhos*, possibly of Anatolian provenience, has two meanings: either ‘preserved fish’, as from the standpoint of the man who was roasting the preserved fish, or

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101 I translate *tarīkhoi* generally as ‘preserved’ rather than specifically as ‘dried’, ‘smoked’, ‘salted’, or ‘pickled’; that brine or salt is used for the process of *tarikheusis* ‘preservation’ is evident from Herodotus 4.53.3 (also 2.77.4).

102 Chantraine DELG 1094 s.v. *tarīkhoi* allows for the possibility that this word is connected with *tarkhuō*. At p. 1095 s.v. *tarkhuō*, where he follows the evidence presented by Laroche 1958.98–99 and Heubeck 1959.32–35, Chantraine concedes that *tarkhuō* was a borrowing from an Indo-European language of Anatolia—whether that language be Hittite, Luvian, or Lycian. But here (p. 1095) he goes on to deny the connection that he mentioned as a possibility at p. 1094. On the meaning of *tarkhuō*, see N 1983b and Schein 1984.48. Cf. also Boedeker 1988.40–41.
‘mummy’, as from the standpoint of Herodotus in describing the funerary practices of the Egyptians.\textsuperscript{103} What the two meanings seem to have in common is the idea of preservation. In an everyday sense, rotting is negated by preservation through the drying or salting of fish; in a hieratic sense, rotting and death itself are negated by preservation through mummification, which is from the standpoint of Egyptian religion the ritual phase of the mystical process of immortalization.\textsuperscript{104}

§30. In the Egyptian ritual of mummification, the ideology of immortalization is evident in the relationship between the corpse and the wt ‘bandager’, which is made analogous to the relationship between Osiris, the first person to be mummified, and Anubis, the inventor of mummification. It has been observed that “each ritual was a re-enactment of the prototype, the deceased, as throughout the cult, being regarded as Osiris while the wt could be addressed as Anubis, take his epithets and occasionally, from the New Kingdom onwards, even wear the Anubis-mask.”\textsuperscript{105} When Herodotus discusses the most expensive procedure of mummification, he remarks ostentatiously that he does not wish to give away the name of the procedure (2.86.2), and \{270|271\} his stance here is typical of his general stance toward mysteries.\textsuperscript{106}

§31. In the image of a dead fish that mystically comes back to life, we see a convergence of the everyday and the hieratic senses of preservation. This image in the story of Herodotus, where Protesilaos sēmainei ‘indicates’ (9.120.2) the power that he has from the gods to exact retribution from the wrongdoer, amounts to a sēma or ‘sign’ of the revenant, the spirit that

\textsuperscript{103} For tarikhs/tarikheō as ‘mummy/mummify’, see especially Herodotus 2.85–2.89, with a detailed description of the process of mummification. Cf. also Plato Phaedo 80c.

\textsuperscript{104} We may compare the everyday and the hieratic or mystical sense of olbios, as discussed at Ch. 8§45–46.

\textsuperscript{105} Lloyd 1976.354–355.

\textsuperscript{106} Lloyd, p. 18, cites Herodotus 2.61, 2.86, 2.132, 2.170, and 2.171. It seems that this mystical procedure was named after Osiris, the prototype of immortalization (ibid.).
returns from the dead. The hero Protesilaos himself is represented as giving the sēma, the ‘sign’ of his power as a revenant from the heroic past.

§32. This theme recurs in the anonymous Alexander Romance, conventionally dated to the third century A.D. After conquering the Persian Empire, Alexander pushes on further east till he reaches the edge of the world (τὸ τέλος τῆς γῆς 2.39.4), and he finds himself in the Land of the Makares ‘Blessed’ (2.39.1). There his mageiros ‘cook’ discovers a spring of immortalizing water when he washes a tarīkhos ‘preserved fish’ in the spring and the dead fish ἐψυχώθη ‘recovered its psūkhe’, that is, came back to life (2.39.12). Alexander is not told of this water, and he fails to drink of it. Later, when he comes to a place that is described as ‘where the gods dwell’ (3.24.1), a place where he has visions of lightning (ibid.), he asks the apparition of the kosmokratōr Sesonchosis, who now dwells in this realm, this question: how long will I live (3.24.2-3)? The apparition refuses to answer this question, which implicitly acknowledges Alexander’s mortality, and indicates instead that the city founded by Alexander, Alexandria, is suitable compensation for mortality (3.24.3–4). The apparition even implies that Alexander will not really be dead, in that his corpse will have Alexandria as its oikos ‘abode’: οἰκήσεις δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ θανὼν καὶ μὴ θανὼν. τάφον γὰρ αὐτήν ἐξεις ἦν κτίζεις πόλιν ‘you will have it [= Alexandria] as your oikos both as one who is dead and yet also as one who is undead, for you will have as your tomb the very city that you founded’ (3.24.4). What Alexander is being told at the edge of the world corresponds closely to what he had read inscribed in the shrine of Sarapis, back home in Alexandria, before he had begun his expedition to the East; the text here reads: σὺ δὲ ἀποθεωθεὶς προσκυνηθῇς νεκρὸς καὶ δώρα λήψῃ ἐκ πολλῶν βασιλέων πάντοτε, οἰκήσεις δὲ αὐτήν καὶ θανὼν καὶ μὴ θανὼν. τάφον γὰρ ἐξεις αὐτήν ἦν κτίζεις πόλιν ‘you will

107 For more on this theme, see N 1985.68–81; also 1983.54n55. Again we may compare the everyday and the mystical meanings of ὀλbios as discussed at Ch. 8§45.
108 I follow the edition of van Thiel 1974. In using this source, I have benefited from the advice of M. N. Nagler.
become a god and you will be worshipped, as a corpse, receiving gifts from many kings for all
time, and you will have it [= Alexandria] as your oikos both as one who is dead and yet also as
one who is undead, for you will have as your tomb the very city that you founded’ (1.33.9). It
has been argued that {271|272} the enigmatic description of Alexander as dead and yet not
dead refers to his status as founder and cult hero of Alexandria. In becoming the cult hero of
Alexandria, Alexander’s corpse was to be transformed from a thing of nature into a thing of
culture—a mummy. The paradox of Alexander’s being both dead and immortalized is
comparable to the ideology of Archaic Greek hero cults, where the hero’s abode is visualized
simultaneously as (1) a cult place where his corpse is buried and (2) a paradise-like setting at
the edge of the world, where he has been immortalized. The names for the two kinds of abode
may even converge, as in the case of Ἐλυσίων ‘Elysium’ and the Νῆσοι Μακαρῶν ‘Islands of the
Blessed’: both names designate either a cult place or a paradisiacal setting.

§33. Let us return to the story of Herodotus. The hapless Artauktes attempts to offer
compensation for the wrongs that he had committed (9.120.3), but his offer is refused by his
captors; he is executed at a spot near the place, as Herodotus emphasizes, where Xerxes had
committed the ultimate outrage of bridging the Hellespont (9.120.4). On the surface Artauktes
is paying retribution that is being exacted by human agency, that is, by his Athenian captors.
Under the surface, however, retribution is being exacted by divine agency, through the hero
Protesilaos.

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110 On the mummy of Alexander, see Pfister II 422n33; also I 178, 192, 296; II 434–436, and 584. The tomb of
Alexander at Alexandria was officially known as the Sēma ‘Tomb’: Strabo 17.1.8 C794. Also as Sōma ‘Body’:
Alexander Romance 3.34.5. On the relationship of sēma ‘tomb’ and sōma ‘body’ in the context of Alexander’s place of
entombment in Alexandria, see van Thiel 1974.195.

111 See N 1979.189–192 for documentation; note too that both of these names are associated with the mystical
theme of being struck by lightning. On the association, at Hesiod Works and Days 172, of the word olbioi with the
heroes who inhabit the Islands of the Blessed, see N 1979.170§30n2.
§34. The role of Protesilaos is significant. By virtue of being the first Achaean to die in the Trojan War (*Iliad* II 698–702), he is described by Artauktes as a prominent Hellene who dared to attack Asians (again Herodotus 9.116.3). The narrative makes a point of drawing attention to the Persian assumption that underlies this description: the Persians take it for granted that all Asia belongs to them (9.116.3). With this theme the *historiā* of Herodotus comes full circle in that the same assumption is cited at the beginning of the narrative (1.4.4) in the context of explaining why the *logioi* of the Persians find the Hellenes *aitioi* ‘responsible’ for the ultimate conflict (1.4.1): that the Hellenes were in the wrong when they attacked Troy (ibid.). Even if this Persian assumption—that all Asia is theirs—were valid, the Persians would have been in the wrong when Xerxes bridged the Hellespont separating Asia from Europe in that even the assumption of the Persians implicitly cedes Europe to the Hellenes. Besides, the *historiā* of Herodotus {272|273} had already established at the beginning who is *aitios* for the present conflict as Herodotus *sēmainei* ‘indicates’ that Croesus had initiated the wrongdoing (1.5.3). Now, at the end of the *historiā*, the first of the Hellenes whom the Persians hold responsible for the present conflict is vindicated: he is really the party wronged by the Persians, just as all Hellenes are wronged when the Persians cross over to Europe, and it is he who exacts retribution from the offending Persians. As he does so, he *sēmainei* ‘indicates’ his power, which is equated here with the efficacy of the gods (again Herodotus 9.120.2).

§35. Protesilaos is thus giving a *sēma* ‘sign’. The ‘sign’ is intended not only for Artauktes but also for those to whom Herodotus is offering his narrative. At the same time that the hero Protesilaos *sēmainei* ‘indicates’ to Artauktes the power of the divine apparatus in bringing about justice (Herodotus 9.120.2), the narrative of Herodotus is conveying the same message, a message that is saying to the Hellenes that they were in the right. Thus not only Protesilaos gives a *sēma* here. So too does Herodotus, the narrator of this *sēma*, who at the beginning of his
historiā ‘indicates’, sēmaineι, that the Asians started it all (again Herodotus 1.5.3). When Herodotus ‘indicates’, sēmaineι, he is indirectly narrating the actions of the gods by directly narrating the actions of men. The most powerful ‘indication’ is the sēma of the hero, whose message is also his medium, the tomb. The double meaning of sēma as both ‘tomb’ and ‘indication, sign’ is itself a monument to the power of the ideology inherent in the ancient Greek institution of hero cults—an ideology that appropriated the very concept of meaning to the tomb of the hero. Moreover, this ideology is inherent in the poetic form that can both celebrate the institution of hero cults and make it apply to a given situation in the present. That poetic form is the ainos. {273|274}

112 Yet even if the Hellenes were in the right, the way in which the Asians were in the wrong corresponds to the way in which the Athenian Empire was in the wrong: on this point see Ch. 10§49 and following.
113 For more on this double meaning, see Sinos 1980:48–49 on Iliad XXIII 326/331; also N 1983:45–48.
114 For the intervention of the hero into the present, through the medium of the ainos, see Ch. 6§87 and following.
10

The Charms of Tyranny: Pindar and Herodotus II

§1. The paradigm of the tyrant in Herodotus is clearly a negative concept, serving as a foil for the moral message of \textit{historiā}. Yet in the case of the archetypal tyrant figure, Croesus the Lydian, the perspective is not exclusively negative. There are positive sides to the traditional concept of Croesus the Tyrant, and the balancing of his negative and positive sides in the \textit{historiā} of Herodotus has a striking parallel in the \textit{ainos} of Pindar and Bacchylides. The parallel treatment of tyranny in \textit{ainos} and \textit{historiā} illuminates the comparison of these two forms of discourse.

§2. Let us review the negative side. In the \textit{historiā} of Herodotus the \textit{hubris} of Croesus the Lydian is implied even by his being the prototype of the Persians in wronging the Hellenes. Moreover, the luxuriance exhibited by Persians like Artauktes is supposed to be clearly a consequence of the Lydian heritage, and the testimony of Archaic Greek poetry and song leaves no doubt that luxuriance is an aspect of \textit{hubris}.

§3. But we have also seen that luxuriance does not by itself constitute \textit{hubris}. True \textit{hubris} is also marked by savagery,\textsuperscript{1} as is clearly evident in the behavior of the Persians.\textsuperscript{2} Here we can pause to consider a point in defense of Croesus: at least he is not characterized in the \textit{Histories} as an exponent of savagery. Croesus and his Lydians are characterized by Herodotus as indeed luxuriant but not necessarily savage. Moreover, Croesus is nowhere in Herodotus described directly as a man of \textit{hubris}, although the Lydian blames the god Apollo as \textit{aitios} ‘responsible’ for his own calamities (1.87.3) in a manner \{274|275\} that is characteristic of someone who has

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Ch. 9§18, 9§24, and following.

\textsuperscript{2} Cf. Ch. 9§24 and following.
indeed committed deeds of *hubris*. So too in the poetry of Theognis, men of *hubris* are apt to blame some god as *aitios* for the calamities they suffer, and the poet has to point out their error:

\[
\text{πάντα τάδ’ ἐν κοράκεσσι καὶ ἐν φθόρῳ οὐδὲ τις ἦμιν}
\text{αἴτιος ἀθανάτων Κύρνε θεῶν μακάρων,}
\text{ἄλλ’ ἀνδρῶν τε βίη καὶ κέρδεα δειλὰ καὶ ὑβρὶς}
\text{πολλῶν ἓξ ἁγαθῶν ἐς κακότητι’ ἐβάλεν}
\]

Theognis 833–836

Everything here has gone to the ravens and perdition. And not one of the immortal and blessed gods is responsible [*aitios*] to us for this, Kymos,

but the violence [*biē*] of men and their baneful personal gains [*kerdos* plural] and their *hubris* have plummeted them from their many good things into debasement.

§4. Such a poetic teaching, with its tragic ring, is surely appropriate to Croesus. In fact the Croesus story of Herodotus has often been compared with actual tragedy. In this light the

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3 Cf. Ch. 8§39 and following.

4 Note the diminishing tricolon (cf. Mimnermus F 1.3 W), ending with the general category of *hubris*. The aspects of *hubris* that I have been calling luxuriance and savagery are conveyed by the words *kerdos* and *biē* respectively. For more on *kerdos*, see Ch. 9§21. On *biē* as a symptom of *hubris*, in Hesiod Works and Days 143–155 and elsewhere, see N 1979.156–157.

5 The ‘good things’ are both wealth and nobility, while ‘debasement’ is both poverty and degeneration. On the semantic shift from the socioeconomic to the purely ethical sense of *agathos* ‘noble’ and its synonyms, cf. N 1985.51–60; also p. 44§29n4 and p. 45§30n1.

absence of any explicit characterization of Croesus as a man of *hubris* may remind us of the prerequisite formulated by Aristotle for an appropriate figure in tragedy as someone who is “intermediate” in a field of conflict between *dikaiosunē* ‘righteousness’ and its opposite (*Poetics* 1453a7–12).

§5. But there is yet another reason for the attenuation of any charge of *hubris* in the case of Croesus. The *historiā* of Herodotus is following a pattern of indirectness that is strikingly parallel to the pattern found in the *ainos*, as exemplified by the epinician songs of Pindar and Bacchylides. We see already from the internal evidence of Herodotus’ *Histories* a motivation for the indirectness in conveying the *hubris* of Croesus. With his untold wealth, Croesus is not only the most luxuriant of men: he is also the most generous. Specifically he outdoes everyone in his public display of material offerings to Apollo at Delphi (Herodotus 1.50.1–1.53–2); he reminds the god of this generosity when he is about to be incinerated by the flames of a funeral pyre that he had mounted for his public execution by the Persians (1.87.1). Then, as Croesus invokes the god, a sudden storm extinguishes the flames, and his captor Cyrus, recognizing that this prisoner is a man *agathos* ‘noble’ and *philos* ‘dear’ to the gods, spares his life (1.87.2).

§6. We have arrived at a specific point of thematic contact between the *historiā* of Herodotus and the *ainos* of epinician poets like Pindar and Bacchylides. The generosity of Croesus is a traditional theme of epinician song, worthy of direct comparison with the generosity of the given patron who has commissioned the given epinician poem and who is destined to be praised in that poem. In *Epinician* 3 of Bacchylides,7 for example, where the tyrant Hieron of Syracuse, the *olbios* ‘blissful’ son of Deinomenes (3.8),8 is being praised as

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7 For an evaluation of this poem, see Carson 1984; also Burnett 1985.61–76, who disagrees with previous works that stress the “pessimism” of the ode.

8 On the transcendent semantics of *olbios*, see Ch. 8§43 and following.
winner in the chariot race at the Olympic Games of 468 B.C., a special point is made about praising Hieron as *tris-eu-daimōn* ‘thrice-fortunate’ (3.10) for knowing how to display his wealth, which is greater than that of any other Hellene (3.10–14). There follows a description of lavish offerings of gold made by Hieron to Apollo at Delphi (3.15–21), concluding with the following thought:

\[\text{θεὸν θεόν τις | ἀγαλαζέω γὰρ ἄριστος ὁλβῶν}\\
\]

Bacchylides 3.21–22

It is the god, yes, the god that everyone should glorify, for he is the best bliss

[olbos] of them all.

The transcendence of the god is being applied to a man’s material wealth, making it transcendent as well: hence my translation of *olbos* here as ‘bliss’ rather than ‘wealth’.

Immediately following this thought, the conjunction έπεί ‘since’ abruptly introduces the story of Croesus as if to validate the thought that *olbos* is indeed transcendent: Apollo is the very essence of *olbos*, the poem says, and the reason given is simply that once upon a time Apollo saved Croesus (έπεί ποτε καὶ Λυδίας ἄρχαγέταν ... φύλαξ Αpolloν Bacchylides 3.23–28).

§7. What follows is a detailed narrative that closely parallels that of Herodotus—up to a point. As in the narrative of Herodotus, the poem of Bacchylides likewise has Croesus about to

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9 For pertinent contexts of *eudaimoniā* ‘good fortune’, see Ch. 8§36.

10 The wording λάμπει ... ὁ χρυσὸς ‘the gold [khrūsos] gleams’ at Bacchylides Epinician 3.17 here is crucial for understanding the poetic equation of *khrūsos* and *euphrosunē* ‘merriment’, to be discussed at Ch. 10§7.

11 On the transcendence of *olbos* as well-being that is material from the outside and mystical from the inside, see Ch. 8§43 and following.

12 The phrase φύλαξ Αpolloν ‘Apollo saved ... ’ is syntactically carried over from stanza Β´ and emphatically begins stanza Γ´.
be incinerated by the flames of the \{276|277\} funeral pyre (3.29–35, 48–51).\(^{13}\) Here too Croesus invokes Apollo (3.35–48), reminding him of his offerings at Delphi (3.38, in conjunction with 3.61–61).\(^{14}\) Here too a sudden storm extinguishes the flames (3.53–56; in this version Zeus himself is pictured as sending the storm). After the rescue, however, we find an important additional theme in Bacchylides: Apollo \(katenasse\) ‘transported’ Croesus, daughters and all, to the Land of the Hyperboreans (3.58–60).\(^{15}\) This transporting of Croesus by Apollo formalizes the transcendence of \(olbos\) from the ‘wealth’ of this life to the ‘bliss’ of a timeless existence beyond death. In support of this interpretation, let us consider a striking analogue: when Zeus \(katenasse\) ‘transported’ the warriors who fought in the Theban and the Trojan War (Hesiod \textit{Works and Days} 168), he took them to the Islands of the Blessed (170–173), to be immortalized there as \(olbioi\ hērōes\ ‘blissful heroes’ (172).\(^{16}\)

§8. The reward of Croesus, in being transported to the Land of the Hyperboreans, is on account of his \(eusebeia\ ‘piety’ (Bacchylides 3.61)\(^{17}\) in that he gave the greatest offerings of all mankind to the Temple of Apollo at Delphi (3.61-62). The stage is set for the juxtaposition with

\(^{13}\) There is also an attested iconographical variation on the story, a Red Figure amphora dated around 500 B.C. (Beazley 1963.238 no. 1) showing Croesus calmly seated on the pyre while an attendant labeled \textit{Euthumos} is apparently getting ready to set fire to it.

\(^{14}\) At Bacchylides 3.38, the expected reciprocity of the gods in return for all the generosity of Croesus is expressed as \textit{kharis}; cf. Herodotus 1.90.4.

\(^{15}\) On the Land of the Hyperboreans as a multiform analogous to Elysium, the Islands of the Blessed, the White Island, and so forth, cf. Hesiod F 150.21 MW, \textit{Epigonoi} F 3 Kinkel, scholia to Pindar \textit{Pythian} 3.28, and so on.

\(^{16}\) See N 1979.164. My understanding of Hesiod \textit{Works and Days} 158–168 is that the heroes of the Theban as well as the Trojan War are eligible for immortalization. I take the \(μέν\) at \textit{Works and Days} 166 as parallel to the instances of \(μέν\) at 122, 137, 141, 161 (pace West 1978.192): in other words, I argue that this \(μέν\) at 166, like the others here listed, is continuing, and that it does not set up a contrast with the \(δέ\) of 167. In line with this interpretation, the heroes who are transported by Zeus had to die before they could be transported to a state of immortalization. Compare the transportation of the dead Achilles from the funeral pyre to the White Island, where he is immortalized: \textit{Aithiopis}/Proclus p. 106.14–15 Allen.

\(^{17}\) Compare Herodotus 1.86.2: Cyrus makes Croesus ascend the pyre for various possible reasons, one of which is to find out if any \textit{daimōn} ‘supernatural force’ would save a man so \textit{theosebēs} ‘pious’.
Hieron: this tyrant in turn has given the most gold of all Hellenes to the Temple of Apollo at Delphi (3.63–66). Already in the initial description of Hieron’s offerings at Delphi, the focus had been on the gleam of gold (3.17), and it was this description that led directly to the thought that Apollo himself is the best olbos ‘bliss’ of them all (again 3.21–22).

§9. Later, gold is equated with the poetic celebration of Hieron’s victory, as designated by the programmatic word euphrosunē ‘mirth’ (εὐφροσύνα δ’ ὁ {277|278} χρυσός 3.87). Gold is the visible sign of Hieron’s own olbos (3.92), which is displayed in public by way of his consecrated offerings and by way of the poetic celebration (3.88–98). The piety of consecrating gold offerings to the god makes the wealth of Hieron a transcendent thing, olbos ‘bliss’, raising hopes that he will be immortalized like Croesus. Gold, as an imperishable substance, is an ideal symbol for olbos as immortalization.

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18 Cf. Ch. 10§5.
19 Cf. ibid.
20 For more on the programmatic function of the word euphrosunē ‘mirth’, see Ch. 6§92.
21 But the juxtaposition of Hieron and Croesus raises fears...
as well. At the moment when Hieron is called *megainētos* ‘he who receives great *ainenos*’ (3.64) in the context of being praised for giving more gold to Apollo than any other Hellene (3.63–66), we may be reminded that the poetic medium of the *ainenos* has the power to convey implicit as well as explicit messages. The juxtaposition with Croesus, who is being praised for giving more riches to Apollo than any other human in general (3.61–62), seems to warn implicitly as well as to praise explicitly. We have learned from Herodotus that the *olbos* ‘wealth’ of Croesus, meant to be consecrated by way of magnificent offerings to Apollo, was instead destroyed because of the tyrant’s implicit *hubris*. This part of the story is left unspoken in Bacchylides.

§10. We learn from Bacchylides on the other hand that the *olbos* of Croesus was indeed ultimately consecrated by an act of Apollo, but that this *olbos* was not material wealth: instead it took the form of the tyrant’s being saved from the funeral pyre and being transported by Apollo to the Land of the Hyperboreans. The latter part of the story is in turn left unspoken in Herodotus: the good fortune of Croesus does not go beyond his being saved from the funeral pyre. Such an attenuated salvation of Croesus is still enough to vindicate him after all his sufferings as at least a man who is *agathos* ‘good’ and *philos* ‘dear’ to the gods (again Herodotus 1.87.2), but it is not enough to confer upon him the epithet of *olbios* in the transcendent sense of ‘blissful’. For Herodotus, Solon’s injunction—that one may call no one *olbios* until he is dead (1.32.7; 1.86.3)—deprives Croesus of the title altogether: since he has lost all his wealth and since his salvation from the pyre does not transcend his mortal life, he is represented in the *Histories* as a man who is *olbios* ‘wealthy’/’blissful’ in neither the material nor the transcendent

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22 Cf. Ch. 6§4 and following.

23 On the *ainenos* as an instrument of social criticism that can warn as well as praise, see Ch. 6§62 and following.
sense. This is as it should be in the narrative of Herodotus, who ‘indicates’ (= verb σημαίνω: 1.5.3), in the mode of an ainos that Croesus was the first barbarian, within the span of knowledge ostensibly achieved by Herodotus, to have committed wrongdoing against Hellenes (1.5.3 in conjunction with 1.6.1–3).

§11. Conversely it is also as it should be that wherever Croesus is mentioned in the praise song of Bacchylides and Pindar—praise that is called ainos by the song—the stress is on the Lydian tyrant’s positive side whenever he is being directly compared with the given patrons of the praise song. For example, when Bacchylides praises the tyrant Hieron of Syracuse, we hear of the aretē ‘achievement’ of Croesus (Bacchylides 3.90) in the context of that earlier tyrant’s olbos (3.92). So also in Pindar’s praise of Hieron, the aretē of Croesus is given due emphasis:

\[
\text{ὀπιθόμβροτον αὐχήμα δόξας | οἶον ἀποιχομένων ἀνδρῶν δίαιταν μανύει | καὶ λογίως καὶ ἀοιδοῖς, οὐ φθίνει Κροίσου φιλόφρων ἀρετά.}
\]

Pindar Pythian 1.92–94

The proud declaration of glory that comes in the future is the only thing that reveals, both for logioi and for singers [aoidoi] the life of men {279|280} who are now departed; the philos-minded achievement [aretē] of Croesus fails [= root phthi-] not.

24 Note the frequent use of olbos/olbios as a term that is specifically inapplicable to Croesus: Herodotus 1.86.3, 5 (two times), 6; note also the use of an-olbos ‘without olbos’ in the response of the Delphic Oracle to Croesus (1.85.2).

25 See Ch. 8§20, 8§25, and following.

26 On the apodeixis ‘public display’ of aretē ‘achievement’ by way of logioi and aoidoi, masters of oral tradition in prose and song respectively, see Ch. 8§9 and following.

27 The description of the aretē of Croesus as ‘unfailing’, by way of the root phthi-, draws the theme of the tyrant’s generosity into a symbolic parallelism with imperishable substances like gold, which is also the symbol for the medium of poetry and song that glorifies such generosity and which is associated with the quality of being aphthito- ‘unfailing, imperishable’: see Ch. 10§9. The ‘unfailing’ aretē of Croesus at Pindar Pythian 1.94 is then
Still the very suppression of the obviously well-known negative aspect of Croesus is in itself a sign or signal, an implicit warning of what can happen when olbos is perverted.

§12. Not only for Croesus but even for the very concept of turannos ‘tyrant’, praise song can stress the positive aspects whenever the song is actually praising a tyrant. In Pindar’s Pythian 3, for example, the poem has this to say to Hieron, Tyrant of Syracuse:

\[\text{τίν δὲ μοῖρ’ εὐδαιμονίας ἔπεται. | λαγέταν γάρ τοι τύραννον δέρκεται, | εἰ τιν’ ἀνθρώπων, ὁ μέγας πότμος.}\]

Pindar Pythian 3.84–86

A portion of good fortune [eudaimonia] is attracted to [=verb hepomai] you. Great destiny looks at the turannos, if at any man, as the leader of the people [lāos].

Yet the very next thought is negative: even heroes like Peleus and Kadmos, who had the ultimate olbos in the immediate sense of ‘material prosperity’ (ὁλβον ὑπέρτατον 3.89), could not achieve an aiōn in the immediate sense of ‘lifetime’ that was asphalēs ‘secure’ (3.86–87).  28

After a quick glimpse of these heroes’ subsequent misfortunes (3.88–105), there follows another implicit warning of what can happen when olbos, in the sense of ‘material prosperity’, is perverted:

\[\text{ὁλβος {δ’} σῶκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνθρώπων ἔρχεται | σάος, πολὺς εὖτ’ ἄν ἐπὶβρίσας ἔπηται}\]

Pindar Pythian 3.105–106

contrasted with the savagery of the tyrant Phalaris of Akragas, who was reputed to roast his victims alive within the brazen simulacrum of a bull (Pythian 1.95–96).

28 Besides the immediate sense of olbos as ‘material prosperity’ and of aiōn as ‘lifetime’, there is an ulterior sense built into both words: on olbos in the ulterior sense of ‘bliss’, see Ch. 8§43 and following; on aiōn in the ulterior sense of ‘vital force’, see N 1981.
The prosperity \([\textit{olbos}]\) of humans does not go ahead, safe and sound, for a very long time, when it gets attracted [= verb \(\textit{hepomai}\)] to them, with its full weight \([\textit{ἐπιβρίσαις}]\).

§13. In this context of material possessions, we must pay special attention to \{280\|281\} the last word of this passage, \(\textit{ἐπιβρίσαις}\) from the verb \(\textit{epi-\textit{brīthō}}\) ‘weigh heavily’. This verb is semantically parallel to the noun \textit{hubris}, the etymology of which is recapitulated in these quoted words of Pindar concerning material prosperity, \textit{olbos}, described as coming down with its full weight upon its owner: in the standard etymological dictionary\(^{29}\) \textit{hubris} is segmented etymologically as \(\textit{hu-}/\textit{u-} (\textit{ū-}/\textit{ũ-})\) in the sense of \(\textit{epi-} (\textit{ἐπί-})\) ‘on, on top of’\(^{30}\) plus root \(\textit{bri-} (\textit{βρι-})\) as in \textit{briaros} (\textit{βριαρός}) ‘heavy, massive, solid, strong’\(^{31}\). The built-in connotations of \textit{hubris} in this quoted Pindaric passage are reinforced by the following two parallels:

\[
\text{τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ώβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὀλβος ἐπηταί}
\]
\[
\text{ἀνθρώπως ὀπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦ}
\]

Solon F 6.3–4 W

For \textit{insatiability} [\textit{koros}] gives birth to \textit{hubris} when much \textit{prosperity} [\textit{olbos}] gets attracted [= verb \(\textit{hepomai}\)] to men whose intent [\textit{noos}] is not fit.\(^{32}\)

\[
\text{τίκτει τοι κόρος ώβριν, ὅταν κακῷ ὀλβος ἐπηταί}
\]

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\(^{29}\) Chantraine DELG 1150.

\(^{30}\) For documentation of \(\textit{hu-}/\textit{u-} (\textit{ũ-}/\textit{ū-})\) in the sense of \(\textit{epi-} (\textit{ἐπί-}),\) see Perpillou 1987.


ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἢ

Theognis 153–154

Insatiability [koros] gives birth to hubris when prosperity [olbos] gets attracted [= verb hepomai] to a man who is base [kakos] and whose intent [noos] is not fit.  

§14. The implicit warning about hubris in Pythian 3 conveys the negative potential of any tyrant. But the use of the word turannos in this poem is clearly not negative, only ambivalent. In the poetic medium of Pindar, the word turannos is like the figure of Croesus, conveying overt positive aspects as well as latent negative ones.  

§15. The positive aspects of turannos, as with the Lydian Croesus, have to do with the material security that allows the tyrant to be a paragon of generosity. But this material security, as we have seen, is at the same time an ambivalent {281|282} conceit, conveyed by words like habros/habrotēs 'luxuriant'/'luxuriance'. These words certainly apply to Croesus, who is actually called pod-(h)abros 'with luxuriant [= adjective habros] footsteps' by the Oracle of Apollo in the context of the god's implicitly foretelling the tyrant's doom (Herodotus 1.55.2).  

We have already noted some other implicitly negative contexts of habros and its

33 Again, commentary at N 1985.48–49, 60–61. Cf. Pindar Olympian 13.10, where the relationship is expressed in reverse: hubris gives birth to koros. Gildersleeve 1899.229–230 observes about the reverse order in Solon and Theognis: “but that makes little difference, as, according to Greek custom, grandmother and granddaughter often bore the same name. It is a mere matter of Hubris – Koros – Hubris.”

34 On the use of the word turannos 'tyranny' at Pindar Pythian 11.53, see Ch. 10§20.

35 Cf. Ch. 9§18 and following.

36 Cf. Ch. 9§18, with a discussion of the possibility that pod-(h)abros 'with a footstep that is luxuriant [habros]' at Herodotus 1.55.2 connotes specifically dancing steps. Cf. also Bacchylides 3.48, where the funeral pyre that Croesus voluntarily ascends is called a habro-batēs domos (ἀβροβάτην δόμον) 'construction for luxuriant [habros] footsteps'. I interpret this expression to refer to the luxuriant manner in which Croesus walked up the constructed pyre,
derivatives, but we have yet to examine how these words too, like the themes of Croesus in particular and turannos in general, have an explicitly positive aspect as well. Turning back to Pindar’s Pythian 3, we note the following example in a passage that immediately follows the warning, quoted just now, about the perversion of olbos:

σμικρὸς ἐν σμικροῖς, μέγας ἐν μεγάλοις | ἔσσομαι, τὸν δ’ ἀμφέποντ’ αἰεὶ φρασίν |
δαίμον’ ἀσκήσω κατ’ ἐμὰν θεραπεύων μαχανάν. | εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεός ἀβρὸν
ὁρέξαι, | ἐλπίδ’ ἔχω κλέος εὑρέσθαι κεν ύψηλὸν πρόσω

Pindar Pythian 3.107–111

I will be small among the small, great among the great.38 I shall practice my craft on the daimon that occupies my mind, tending it in accordance with my abilities. And if the god should give me wealth [ploutos] that is luxuriant [habros], then I have the hope [elpis] of finding lofty kleos in the future.

Here then is yet another variation on a theme that we have already witnessed many times before: the song of the poem is making the admittedly pleasurable material security of the tyrant into a transcendent thing. There follows a quick glance at epic heroes like Nestor and Sarpedon, made famous by song (3.112–114), and then a coda about the transcendence of aretē ‘achievement’ through the efficacy of the poem:

ἁ δ’ ἀρετᾶ κλειναῖς ἀοιδαῖς | χρονία τελέθει

Pindar Pythian 3.114–115

headed for certain doom (pace SM, apparatus ad loc.). For a different interpretation, where ἄβροβάταν is read as Habrobatas, the name of a page, see, for example, Burnett 1985.180.

37 Cf. Ch. 9818 and following.
38 On the theme of variations in human fortunes from mighty to slight, slight to mighty, cf. Herodotus 1.5.3–4 and the discussion at Ch. 8837–39.
And achievement [aretē] becomes enduring through songs of kleos. {282|283}

§16. In epinician song the word habros and its derivatives can in fact be so positive as to characterize the luxuriance that a victor earns and deserves as the fruit of his struggles, either in athletics or in war. It is in such a context that the kūdos ‘emblem of victory’ won by the victor is described as habron ‘luxuriant’:

δς δ’ ἀμφ’ ἀέθλοις ἰ πολεμίζων ἀρηται κόδος ἀβρόν ...

Pindar Isthmian 1.50

... but whoever, engaged in struggles for athletic prizes [aethloi] or fighting in a war, strives for and achieves [= verb ar-numai]39 an emblem of victory [= kūdos] that is luxuriant [habron] ... 40

Also, habros applies to the garland of myrtle won by the athlete Kleandros (Pindar Isthmian 8.66). The words of praise spoken about victors who are already dead qualify for the same sort of description:

τιμὰ δὲ γίνεται | ὅν θεός ἀβρόν αὔξει λόγον τεθνακότων

Pindar Nemean 7.31–32

Honor [tīmē] comes into the possession of those about whom the god magnifies the word [logos] of repute, so as to be habros, on the occasion of their death.

As for the living, we have just seen that the luxuriance deserved by the victor is manifested as ploutos, material security, which is likewise described as habros (again Pindar Pythian 3.110) and

39 The traditional themes associated with the verb ar-numai ‘strive to achieve’ here correspond to those of the noun aretē ‘achievement’, which is in fact etymologically derived from it: see Francis 1983.82–87.

40 Cf. Pindar Olympian 5.7.
which is to be followed up by *kleos*, fame by way of song, in the future (3.111)—even after death, as in the case of heroes (3.112–115). It is specifically the *elpis* ‘aspiration’ of the victor that he will gain *kleos* on the basis of *ploutos* that is *habros* (3.110–111). Thus the luxuriance conveyed by *habros* can apply not only to the victor’s *ploutos*, which is transient, but also to the praise that he gets from song, which is transcendent. In the context of such transcendent luxuriance, *elpis* ‘aspiration’ makes the victor’s thoughts soar beyond mere *ploutos*:

> ὁ δὲ καλὸν τι νέον λαχῶν | ἄβροτατος ἐπι μεγάλας | ἐξ ἐλπίδος πέταται | ὑποπτέρως ἀνορέας, ἔχων | κρέσσονα πλούτου μέριμναν, ἐν δ’ ὀλίγῳ βροτῶν, | τὸ τερπνὸν αὔξεται· οὕτω δὲ καὶ πίτνει χαμά | σεσεισμένον

Pindar *Pythian* 8.88–94

But if one gets as his lot some beautiful new thing, in this time of great luxuriance [*habrotēs*],\(^{41}\) he soars at the impulse of aspiration [*elpis*], lifted high in the air by his acts of manliness, with his ambition [*merimna*] beyond material luxuriance.

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\(^{41}\) I interpret ἄβροτατος ἐπι μεγάλας ‘in [this] time of great *habrotēs*’ as referring to the time after, not before or during, the victory (*pace* Gildersleeve 1899.333, who interprets *habrotēs* here as the luxuriance that tempts the athlete in the austere period of his training).
The pleasure that mortals get waxes in a short space of time. And, just as quickly, it falls to the ground, shaken by adverse opinion. In other words ploutos ‘wealth’ becomes a transcendent thing when it is enhanced by the luxuriance earned through victory at the Games:

;;;;;;

Embellished with achievements, wealth gives scope for actions of every kind supporting an ambition that is more luxuriant. It [= the ploutos ‘wealth’] is a preeminent star, the most genuine light for man.

§17. A quality inherent in the concept of habros ‘luxuriant’ that makes it transcend mere ploutos ‘wealth’ is that of sensuality. We see it in the application of habros to the beautiful body of Iamos (Pindar Olympian 6.55) or to the seductive Hippolyta (Nemean 5.26), who is

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42 Compare Bacchylides Encomium 20B.8-16: Κύπριδος ἐλπίς ‘aspiration [elpis] for Aphrodite’ (line 8), in the context of intoxication at a symposium, seems to be the subject of ἄνδρας δ’ ὑψωτάτω πέμπει μερίμνας | αὐτικά μὲν πολίων κράδεμνα λύει, | πᾶσι δ’ ἀνθρώποις μοναρχήσειν δοκεῖ ‘sends ambitions [merimna plural] to the uppermost heights for men; straightaway it undoes the protective headbands of cities, and it thinks that it will be monarch over all mortals’ (lines 10–13). On monarkhos ‘monarch’ as the attenuated synonym of turannos ‘tyrant’, see Ch 6§64, 6§67. This passage, Bacchylides Encomium 20B.8–16, is treated at greater length below, at Ch. 10§19 and following.

43 This second clause, where the theme concerns soaring and falling, contrasts with the first clause, where the theme concerns soaring only.

44 I accept this emendation of the manuscript reading ἄγροτέραν, deemed corrupt in the edition of SM.

45 So Nisetich 1980.89.

46 Compare πλοῦτος ... ὕπέχων μέριμναν ἄγροτέραν here with ἔχων κρέσσονα πλούτου μέριμναν at Pythian 8.91–92, quoted immediately above. Note too that merimna ‘concern’ has been interpreted here throughout in the sense of ‘ambition’ rather than ‘worry’; cf. Slater 1969.329.
described by this adjective in the specific context of a “Potiphar’s Wife” story (having tried and failed to seduce Peleus, she then slanders him to her husband: 5.26–36; cf. Nemean 4.54–65). We may even note a trace of this quality in the application of habros to the garland of myrtle blossoms won by the athlete Kleandros (Isthmian 8.66). 47

§18. This inherent sensuality, even eroticism, of habros and its derivatives is most vividly attested in the compositions of Sappho. For Sappho, the adjective habros is the epithet of Adonis (F 140.1 V) 48 and of the attendants of Aphrodite, the Kharites (F 128 V), 49 while the adverb (h)abrōs describes the scene as Aphrodite is requested to pour nectar (F 2.13–16 V). For Sappho, (h)abrosunā ‘luxuriance’ is a theme connected with ‘lust for the sun’:

έγω δὲ φίλημμ’ ἀβροσύνα, [ ... ] τοῦτο, καί μοι
τὸ λάμπρον ἔρως ἀελίω καὶ τὸ κάλον λέλογχε

Sappho F 58.25–26 V

But I love luxuriance [(h)abrosunā]. ... this,

and lust for the sun has won me brightness and beauty. 51

47 Cf. Ch. 10§16.

48 There is an implicit danger in the application of this epithet habros to Adonis: we may note that the luxuriant Adonis is an exponent of hubris in a botanical sense, on which see the full discussion in N 1985.60–63.

49 Compare Sappho F 194 V for the image of Aphrodite riding on the chariot of the Kharites.

50 Cf. Hamm 1957 §241.

51 Cf. Pindar Pythian 11.50, as discussed at Ch. 10§20. This interpretation of the Sappho passage differs from that of, for example, Campbell 1982.101, who reads τῶελίω (τὸ ἀελίω), agreeing with τὸ λάμπρον. Even if we were to accept the reading τῶελίω, we could theoretically interpret the crasis along the lines of τῶ ἀελίω = τῶελίω (cf. e.g. πῶ ἔσλον = πῶσλον at Alcaeus 69.5 V; cf. Hamm, p. §91e). The theme of ‘lust for the sun’ is to be connected with that of Sappho’s love of Phaon/Adonis: cf. N 1973.177 in connection with the theme of crossing the strait with Phaon.
Sappho’s theme of luxuriance is also connected with the concept of Lydia as a touchstone of sensuality. Contemplating the beauty of the girl Kleis, Sappho says that she would not exchange her even for all of Lydia (F 132.3 V). Of another girl she says that she would rather contemplate the sight of her lovely footsteps and her radiant face than the magnificence of the Lydian army in full array (F 16.17–20 V). The attractiveness of yet another girl, now turned woman, stands out amidst a bevy of Lydian women, much as the moon stands out amid surrounding stars (F 96.6–9 V).\(^52\) {285|286}

§19. The Lydian connection brings us back to the negative theme: the quality of being habros, for all its attractiveness, has its built-in dangers. We have seen this negative theme in the story of the Colophonians: these men, in the words of Xenophanes, learned habrosunē ‘luxuriance’ from the Lydians (F 3.1–2 W),\(^53\) and the misfortune of the turanniā ‘tyranny’ that befell them was because of this (ibid.).\(^54\) The luxuriance of the Colophonians, as we have also seen, was a manifestation of their hubris, which led to their utter ruin (Theognis 1103–1104),\(^55\) as was also the case with such other formerly great cities as Magnesia and Smyrna (ibid.).\(^56\) Even for Sappho, who declares that she loves (h)abrosunē ‘luxuriance’ (F 58.25–26 V), the attractions of sensuality are not only foreign, as typified by the Lydians, but also dangerous: the Lydian army in full array may be a beautiful thing to behold, but it is also a threat—more

\(^{52}\) On the reference to women as distinct from girls here, cf. Rissman 1983.95.

\(^{53}\) Cf. Ch. 9§18 and following. The Lydians are characterized as habro-diaitoi ‘living luxuriantly’ in Aeschylus Persians 41; cf. the context of the same epithet in Thucydides 1.6.3, as applied to the “Ionian” style among old-fashioned aristocratic Athenians.

\(^{54}\) The evidence for this theme is supplemented by the testimony of Theopompus FGH 115 F 117 in Athenaeus 526c. See Ch. 9§20. Cf. also the Sybaris theme as discussed at Ch. 9§18.

\(^{55}\) The passage is quoted at Ch. 9§20. The evidence for this corollary theme is supplemented by the testimony of Phylarchus FGH 81 F 66 in Athenaeus 526a. See Ch. 9§18 and following.

\(^{56}\) Cf. Ch. 9§20. On the theme of variations in human fortunes from mighty to slight, slight to mighty, cf. Herodotus 1.5.3–4 and the discussion at Ch. 8§36.
overtly so than the lovely footsteps and radiant face of a pretty girl (F 16.17 V).\textsuperscript{57} As recently argued,\textsuperscript{58} the theme of luxuriance and its dangers must have figured in the lost final stanza of the celebrated ode by Sappho describing her reactions to a girl whose attention is being held by a godlike young man (F 31 V), and this theme is still to be found in the final stanza of the version by Catullus:

\begin{verbatim}
otium, Catulle, tibi molestum est,
otio exsultas nimiumque gestis,
otium et reges prius et beatas
perdidit urbes
\end{verbatim}

Catullus 51.13–16

Luxuriance,\textsuperscript{59} Catullus, is distressing to you.
In luxuriance you exult and are elated to excess.
It is luxuriance that in times past caused the ruin
of kings and wealthy cities.\textsuperscript{60} \{286\|287\}

The dangers of luxuriance apply also to that quintessentially sensuous center-piece of the Sapphic repertoire, the (h)abros Adonis (for the epithet, see again Sappho F 140.1 V). In the

\textsuperscript{57} Cf. perhaps Archilochus F 23.17–20 W.
\textsuperscript{58} Knox 1984.
\textsuperscript{59} Fraenkel 1957.211–213 notes that Latin \textit{otium} is used to convey the traditional Greek topic of \textit{truphē} 'luxuriance' as resulting in the ruin of cities; see Knox 1984.98n5 for a sample of passages. This is not to say that \textit{otium} is the exact equivalent of \textit{truphē}.
\textsuperscript{60} Cf. also Lattimore 1944, who adduces Theognis 1103–1104, quoted above at Ch. 9§20.
ideology of his cult the botanical luxuriance of Adonis leads to his own sterility and even doom.\textsuperscript{61}

§20. Dangerous as it is, however, luxuriance is a thing appreciated and celebrated by the transcending medium of song—even if the luxuriance makes a man’s thoughts turn to tyranny. This theme is evident in \textit{Encomium} 20B (SM) of Bacchylides, where the voice of the poet declares that no mortal has ever had access to complete \textit{olbos} ‘bliss’ in his lifetime (20B.23–24).\textsuperscript{62} With this thought in mind, the poet visualizes in the same poem the intoxicated lightheartedness of a symposium at the very moment when the singing and dancing get under way; it is in this setting that the poet’s thoughts can converge on wealth, sensuality, and tyranny:

\begin{verbatim}
\textit{Lyre, do not stay hanging on the peg, holding back your resonant seven-stringed sound. Come into my hands as I ponder what to send from the Muses to}
\end{verbatim}

\textit{Bacchylides Encomium} 20B 1–16 SM

\textsuperscript{61} On the theme of the luxuriant Adonis as an exponent of hubris in a botanical sense, I cite again the full discussion in \textsc{N} 1985.60–63.

\textsuperscript{62} See the apparatus of SM, 3831, for Snell’s tentative reconstruction: \textit{δλβ[ον ϝ̄ ρσ ρς παντα ος] ως ρμαινει ρκρ}. 
Alexander—something golden and winged—an adornment for symposia, in the last ten days of the month, when the sweet compulsion of jostling drinking-cups warms the heart of the young and makes it delicate, and when the aspiration for Aphrodite rushes through one’s inner feelings, mixed with the gifts of Dionysus. It sends ambitions [merimnai plural] to the uppermost heights for men; straightaway it undoes the protective headbands of cities, and it thinks that it will be monarch [monarkhos] over all mortals. Buildings gleam with gold and ivory, and throughout the shining sea there are wheat-bearing ships carrying the greatest wealth [ploutos] from Egypt. Such things it is that the heart of the drinking man ponders.

Elsewhere too thoughts of sensuality and tyranny converge. Let us consider the following words of Simonides, in light of the well-known verse of Mimnermus in praise of sensuality, quoted immediately thereafter:

τίς γὰρ ἁδονᾶς ἄτερ θνατῶν βίος ποθεινὸς ἢ ποία τυραννίς | ταῦτα ἄτερ οὐδὲ θεῶν ζηλωτὰς αἰῶν

Simonides PMG 584

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63 At Pindar F 124(ab).5 SM (on this poem cf. p. 288), merimnai is more easily translated in the general sense of ‘concerns’.

64 Cf. n42 above.

65 Note the ring composition achieved with the placement of ὀρμαίνω/ὁρμάινει ‘ponder(s)’ at lines 3/16. See van Groningen 1960.100–101 for a word-by-word comparison of Bacchylides F 20B 1–16 SM with Pindar F 124ab SM. The striking parallelisms lead van Groningen to worry about which of the two poems was imitated by the other.
What life of mortals, or what tyranny [*turannis*], is to be yearned for, if it is to be without pleasure [*hēdone*]? Without it, even the lifetime [*aiōn*] of the gods is not to be envied.⁶⁶

τίς θεῖος, τίς γε τερπνόν ἀτερ χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης

Mimnermus F 1.1 W

What is life, what is pleasurable, without golden Aphrodite?

In the poetry of Archilochus we can detect an analogous theme: luxuriance and sensuality are attributes of not just any tyranny but Lydian tyranny in particular. The poet quotes a speaker as saying:

οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει,

οὔδ’ εἴλε πω με ζήλος, οὔδ’ ἀγαίομαι

θεῶν έργα, μεγάλης δ’ οὐκ ἔρεω *turannidos*:

ἀπόπροθεν γάρ ἐστίν ὁφθαλμῶν ἐμῶν

Archilochus F 19 W

I do not care about the possessions of Gyges rich in gold.

Envy has not yet taken hold of me. And I am not indignant about what the gods do. Nor do I lust after great tyranny [*turannis*].

For it is far away from my eyes.⁶⁷ {288|289}

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⁶⁶ Cf. the use of *terpnos aiōn* ‘pleasurable lifetime’ at Pindar F 126 SM, words addressed to Hieron, Tyrant of Syracuse, as quoted by Heraclides Ponticus F 55 Wehrli by way of Athenaeus 512d; this quotation from Pindar comes immediately after the quotation in Athenaeus 512c of the present passage from Simonides. Cf. Young 1968.
In connection with Gyges, Tyrant of Lydia, Herodotus in fact testifies that Archilochus ‘continued the memory [= root \(mnē\)-]’ of a story told about Gyges (ἐπεμνήσθη 1.12.2)—presumably the same story that is narrated with such sensual gusto in the Histories of Herodotus: how Gyges acquired the basileia ‘kingship’ of Lydia by winning the sexual favors of the Queen of Lydia (1.8.1–1.12.2). This poetic theme, the memory of which is continued by Archilochus and, after him, by Herodotus, is made directly pertinent to the story of Croesus’ misfortunes, which as we have seen is central to the Histories of Herodotus: the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi says that the usurpation committed by Gyges, that is, his political acquisition of the Lydian Empire and his sexual acquisition of the Lydian queen, calls for a tisis ‘retribution’ that will befall the fifth tyrant in the dynasty started by Gyges (1.13.1–2). This fifth tyrant turns out to be Croesus (1.15.1–1.16.1; 1.26.1). For Herodotus, the continuity from Gyges to Croesus is a matter of thematic development, not just genealogy, in that Gyges serves to prefigure Croesus. This earlier Tyrant of Lydia, like Croesus, makes generous offerings to Apollo at Delphi (1.14.1–2); moreover, he too attacks the cities of the Hellenes in Asia Minor—in this case Miletus,

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67 The last part of this statement, spoken by a character identified as Charon the Carpenter in Aristotle Rhetoric 1418b30, is analogous to a theme in the Gyges story as retold in Herodotus 1.7.2: the king of the Lydian Empire, Kandaules, tries to persuade his trusted bodyguard Gyges, who was later to become king himself by overthrowing Kandaules, to view the queen naked, on the grounds that the queen’s beauty can be witnessed by the eyes more reliably than by the ears. The answer given by Gyges to Kandaules at Herodotus 1.7.3-4 (on which see Benardete 1969.11-12) resembles in tone the quoted statement of Charon the Carpenter in Archilochus F 19 W.

68 On the semantic overlap of basileus ‘king’/monarkhos ‘sole ruler’/turannos ‘tyrant’, see Ch. 6853, 6864, 6867.

69 That the mention of Archilochus in Herodotus 1.12.2 refers to an integral narrative about Gyges and the Queen in the poetry of Archilochus, not just to the naming of Gyges as Tyrant of the Lydians, is argued by Clay 1986.11-12, who also raises the possibility that Archilochus F 23 W contains a dialogue between Gyges and the Queen.

70 On the symbolism of the number 5 in conveying the notion of coming full circle, see N 1979.169.

71 In fact Herodotus asserts that Gyges was the first barbarian to make offerings to Apollo at Delphi, except for Midas of Phrygia (1.14.2–3).
Smyrna, and Colophon (1.14.4).\textsuperscript{72} Most important of all, the story of Gyges, like that of Croesus, manifests signs of *hubris* that set the theme for the overall narrative of the *Histories*. In the story of the tyrant Gyges, the *hubris* is manifested in an unrestrained sensuality that goes hand in hand with unrestrained political power. To repeat the essence of the tale: Kandaules, the tyrant whose queen and empire Gyges acquired, had a lust so great—ostensibly for the queen—that thinking her to be the most beautiful of all women, he was seized by a compulsion to reveal her naked to his trusted bodyguard, Gyges (1.8.1). Such is the legacy of tyrants, usurped by Gyges. It should come as no surprise then that the word *erōs* is used in the *Histories* of Herodotus only in two senses: sexual desire \{289|290\} and the desire for tyranny.\textsuperscript{73} Tyranny, as the daughter of the tyrant Periandros of Corinth observes in the *Histories*, has many *erastai* ‘lovers’ (3.53.4).\textsuperscript{74}

§21. Having seen that epinician song has the capacity both to appreciate the sensuality of the wealth inherent in victory and to warn against its perversion, we should not be surprised that, in the one attested Pindaric instance where the song explicitly warns against tyranny, it does so while all along promoting the ideals of moderation in a language that clearly espouses sensuality:

\[
\text{θεόθεν ἐραίμαν καλῶν, | δυνατά μαγόμενος ἐν ἀλικίᾳ, τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν}
\]
\[
\text{ἐὑρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρῳ | {σὺν} ὀλβῳ τεθαλότα, μέμφομ' αἶσαν}
\]
\[
\text{τυραννίδων | ξυναίσι δ' ἀμφ' ἀρεταῖς τέταμαι: ( ... )\textsuperscript{75} εἴ τις ἄκρον ἐλῶν ἠσυχά τε}
\]

\textsuperscript{72} The distinction that Herodotus makes between the aggression of Croesus against the Hellenes on the one hand and that of this tyrant’s predecessors on the other is made clear at 1.5.3, in conjunction with 1.6.1–3, on which passages see Ch. 8§20 and following.

\textsuperscript{73} Documentation in Benardete 1969.137.

\textsuperscript{74} For a most useful survey of this theme, see Hartog 1980.335–336. Note especially the expression ἔρασθείς τυραννίδος ‘lusting after tyranny [μυράνις]’ at Herodotus 1.96.2.

\textsuperscript{75} I omit here a stretch of the text where the testimony of the manuscripts is garbled.
νεμόμενος αἰνὰν ὁμοίως ἄφεφυγεν, μέλανος {δ}' ἄν ἐσχατίαν καλλίονα θανάτου
<στείχοι> γλυκύτατα γενεὰ | εὐώνυμον κτεάνων κρατίσταν χάριν πορών

Pindar Pythian 11.50–58

May I lust for beauty that comes from the gods,76 as I seek out in my own age
that which is possible. As I search throughout the city, I find that the middle
way flourishes with bliss [olbos], which is far more lasting than anything else. I
find fault with the lot of tyrannies [turannis plural]. Instead, I exert myself by
aiming for achievements [aretē plural] that are for the common benefit. (…) 
Whoever attains the highest point and abides serenely, escaping terrible
outrage [hubris], such a man attains an ultimate goal that surpasses black death
with its beauty, leaving behind for his beloved descendants a gratification
[kharis] that confers a good name—a kharis that is the most precious of
possessions.77

I may add in passing that this same poem of Pindar makes a fleeting mention of Troy, in the
context of its ultimate doom, with words that convey the sensuality of both the city and the
woman on whose account it was destroyed:

ἐπεὶ ἀμφ' Ἐλένα πυρωθέντας | Τρώων ἐλυσε δόμους ἄβρωτας

Pindar Pythian 11.33–34

76 Cf. ἔρως τώελιο at Sappho F 58.26, which I interpret as ‘lust for the sun’ at Ch. 10§17.
77 So the kharis transcends the material possessions [kteana] that were won in the contest. On kharis as a ‘beautiful
and pleasurable compensation, through song or poetry, for a deed deserving of glory’, see Ch. 2§28n72. More on
Pindar Pythian 11 in Young 1968.
... after he [= Agamemnon] destroyed Troy’s edifice of luxuriance [habrotēs], incinerated because of Helen.78 {290|291}

Figures of myth, such as Helen of Troy, provide unambiguously negative paradigms for warning against the perversity of olbos ‘bliss’. Let us take the specific example of Ixion:

ἔμαθε δὲ σαφές, εὐμενέσσι γὰρ παρὰ Κρονίδαις | γλυκὺν ἑλὼν βίοτον, μακρὸν
οὖχ ὑπέμεινεν ὅλβον, μανιμέναις φρακίν | Ἡρας ὅτ’ ἐράσσατο, τὰν Διὸς εὖναι
λάχον | πολυγαθέες ἀλλὰ νιν ὅβις εἰς ἀνάταν ὑπεράφανον | ὥρσεν τάχα δὲ
παθὼν ἐοικότ’ ἄνηρ | ἐξαίρετον ἐλεῖ μόχθον

Pindar Pythian 2.25–29

He [= Ixion] learned his lesson, and a clear one it was. For, receiving a life of pleasure from the kindly disposed children of Kronos [= Zeus and his siblings], he did not, in his crazed mind, await expectantly his great bliss [olbos], as he conceived a lustful passion for Hera, whose bed of delights was for Zeus alone to share. But outrage [hubris] propelled him into conspicuous derangement [atē].

The man quickly got his just deserts, suffering exceptional distress.

78 Compare Iliad XIII 631–639, a passage with a parallel theme—but with a martial twist. Menelaos is blaming the Trojans as hubristai ‘perpetrators of outrage [hubris]’ (633), with a menos ‘disposition’ that is atasthalon ‘reckless’ (634). In this context the Trojans are described as insatiable in war (634–635), with the notion of satiety expressed by the verb kor-ennumi (κορέσασθαι 635). Menelaos goes on to say that all pleasures reach a point of satiety, koros (πάντων μὲν κόρος ἐστί 636)—namely, the pleasures of sleep, sex, song, dance (636–637)—and that he would expect a man to take his fill of these pleasures, not of war (638–639). But, he concludes, the Trojans are akorētoi ‘insatiable’ in war (639). As C. Cowherd points out to me, Menelaos does not mention the pleasures of food and drink, though the expression εξ ἑρὸν εἶναι ‘take one’s fill’ (638: noun eros!) is conventionally applied to satiety in food and drink.
In this case man’s perversion of olbos is manifested in sensual extravagance, the violation of sexual norms. For an analogous case of crime and punishment, we may compare the example of Tantalos:

εἰ δὲ δὴ τῖν ἀνδρα θνατὸν Ὀλύμπου σκοποὶ ἔτιμασαν, ἦν Τάνταλος οὗτος ἀλλὰ γὰρ καταπέψαι μέγαν ὀλβὸν οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρῳ δ’ ἔλεν ἕλεν, τὸν αἰεὶ μενοῖν κεφαλᾶς βαλεῖν εὐφροσύνας ἀλάται. ἔχει δ’ ἀπάλαμον βίον τοῦτον ἐμπεδόμοχθον

Pindar Olympian 1.54–59

If ever there was a mortal man who was honored by the guardians of Olympus [= Zeus and his gods], it was this one, Tantalos. But he was not able to digest his great bliss [olbos], and, with his insatiability [koros], he got an overwhelming derangement [atê],\(^\text{79}\) which the {291|292} Father hung over his head in the form of an unyielding rock, which he [= Tantalos] forever seeks to dodge, as he keeps missing out on mirth [euphrosune].\(^\text{80}\) And he has this irremediable life of everlasting distress.

Having given the general reason for the punishment of Tantalos, his failure ‘to digest his great bliss [olbos]’, the poem proceeds to give the specific reasons: Tantalos stole and distributed to the other members of his symposium the nectar and ambrosia that the gods had given to him alone (Pindar Olympian 1.60–64). Earlier the poem had entertained and then denied another possible version, according to which Tantalos had given the unsuspecting gods the flesh of his

\(^{79}\) On atê ‘derangement’ as punishment (consequence) as well as crime (cause), see Ch. 8§43.

\(^{80}\) In the words of Bacchylides gold as the symbol of good and genuine olbos ‘bliss’ is the same thing as euphrosune (ἐὐφροσύνα δ’ ὁ χρυσός 3.87); whoever perverts olbos, as Tantalos did, is punished by a failure ever again to achieve euphrosune.
own son, Pelops, to eat (47–53). The expression καταπέψαι μέγαν ὀλβον οὐκ ἐδύνασθη 'he was not able to digest his great olbos' (55) covers both versions in that the perversion of olbos by Tantalos entails in either case a violation of dietary norms, just as the perversion of olbos by Ixion entails a violation of sexual norms (again Pythian 2.26–29).

§22. The story of Tantalos, attested already in such early traditions as the Cycle (e.g., Nostoi F 10 Allen in Athenaeus 281b), is especially important for this entire presentation because it helps us understand how the story of Croesus, as applied both in epinician song and in the Histories of Herodotus, is closer to home than we may at first have imagined. The initial impression of Croesus the Lydian as the quintessential foreigner, an oriental potentate who is supposedly the antithesis of what it means to be a Hellene, comes into question as we begin to consider in more detail the myth of Tantalos, the earliest Lydian of them all. Son of the god Zeus himself and of a mortal woman called Ploutō, wealth incarnate (Pausanias 2.22.3), Tantalos ruled over a land rich in gold, stretching from Lydia to Phrygia and the Troad (Aeschylus Niobe TGF 158, 162, 163). The Lydian dynasty of Tantalos was short-lived, however: his son, Pelops, was deposed and driven out by ‘Ilōs the Phrygian’ (Pausanias 2.22.3). This Ilos, son of Tros and brother of Ganymede, had gone to Phrygia and founded Ilion—that is, Troy—at a spot known as the Hill of Atē (Apollodorus 3.12.2–3); he is the same Ilos reported to be worshipped by the Trojans as their cult hero in the Iliad (e.g., X 415). As for Pelops,
Herodotus has the Persian king Xerxes referring to him as a mere vassal of the mighty empire inherited by the Persians, and Xerxes even calls him ‘Pelops the Phrygian’ (Πέλοπος τοῦ Φρυγός Herodotus 7.8γ.1, Πέλοψ ὁ Φρύξ 7.11.4). From the Persian point of view, then, Pelops is an antecedent of such figures as Midas the Phrygian (named, for example, in Herodotus 1.14.2)—not to mention Croesus the Lydian.

§23. But Xerxes also takes note that this same Pelops, this ‘slave’ of the predecessors of Xerxes (δοῦλος Herodotus 7.11.4), had conquered the Peloponnesus, which was named after him (again 7.11.4). Moreover, the Persian king’s arrogant appropriation of Pelops and hence of the Peloponnesus is actually based on a Hellenic myth to the effect that Pelops was indeed a Lydian (Λυδός Πέλοπος, Pindar Olympian 1.24, Λυδὸς ἦρως Πέλοψ, Olympian 9.9), who was ousted from his homeland and emigrated to the Peloponnesus (in Pindar’s words the Peloponnesus is the apoikia ‘colony’ of Pelops: Olympian 1.24).86 This myth, from the vantage point of the Histories of Herodotus, is particularly suited to Sparta, the Hellenic city-state that came to dominate the Peloponnesus and was the foremost of all Hellenic states on the Mainland to establish an alliance with Lydia. As Herodotus observes, most of the Peloponnesus was under the domination of Sparta at the time when Croesus sought the alliance of this city-state (ἡδὴ δὲ ὧν καὶ ἡ πολλὴ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἦν κατεστραμμένη 1.68.6), and in fact the narrative of Herodotus attributes the alliance to the premise, accepted by Croesus, that Sparta was decidedly the foremost city of all Hellas (1.69.2 and 1.70.1).87 Whether or not we may view

86 Cf. Ch. 4§20.
87 Elsewhere in Herodotus, Sparta and Athens are presented as sharing in the honor of being the foremost city-states of Hellas, to be sought out by Croesus as allies (1.56.2–3, following up on 1.53.1). The inclusion of Athens, however, is more by hindsight: it sets the stage for the central roles to be played by Sparta and Athens in the rest of the Histories, and it provides an opportunity for a brief sketch, at the outset of the narrative, of the importance of both cities (Athens: 1.56.3–1.64.3; Sparta: 1.65.1–1.68.6). We may note that from the ostensible standpoint of Croesus the initial importance of Athens is viewed almost exclusively in terms of the achievements of the tyrant Peisistratos (1.59–1.64.3).
this premise as a historical fact, it is certainly presented as such in the *Histories* of Herodotus. In any case, it is indeed a {293|294} historical given that the Lydian connection was formalized politically in the alliance between Sparta and Lydia (as also in earlier contacts: Herodotus 1.69.3–4). Moreover, the same Lydian connection was formalized ideologically in the myth about the colonization of the Peloponnesus by Pelops the Lydian.

§24. This is not to say that the myth about a Lydian founder of the Peloponnesus was invented out of nothing by the Spartans in order to justify their Lydian policy. The alien—that is to say, Lydian—identity of Pelops was a theme appropriated by the Spartans as validation of their Lydian contacts: if Sparta’s self-image is to be glorious, then its Lydian contacts are also glorious. But the actual theme of a Lydian Pelops was not invented ad hoc for the Lydian policy of Sparta: rather it was inherited from an earlier phase of Hellenic history and myth making—the era of the colonization of Asia Minor and the transplanting of native myths and rituals from the Mainland.89

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88 Let us consider again the ostensible standpoint of Croesus: the importance of Sparta is viewed in terms of its military successes in dominating the Peloponnesus, but there is also mention of the city’s political successes in developing an outstanding constitution, thanks to the achievements of the lawgiver Lycurgus (1.65.2–1.66.1). Note the vegetal imagery inherent in the expression ἀνά τε ἑδραμον ... καὶ εὐθενήθησαν ‘they shot up and flourished’ (1.66.1), applied to the Spartans in their state of *eunomia* ‘good government’ (μετέβαινον δὲ ὅδε ἐς εὐνομίαν 1.65.2; οὗτοι μὲν μεταβαλόντες εὐνομήθησαν 1.66.1). For parallel uses of the verb *ana-trekhō* ‘shoot up’ in describing the growth of plantlife, see *Iliad* XVIII 56, 437; also Herodotus 7.156.2, 8.55; for a parallel use of *eutheneo* ‘flourish’ in the context of *eunomia* ‘good government’, see Herodotus 2.124.1. Note too the vegetal imagery in Solon F 4.32–35 W: *eunomia* (personified) ‘withers the burgeoning blossoms of derangement [ατέ]’ (αὐαίνει δ’ ἅτης ἄνθεα φυόμενα).

89 On the reflexes of such patterns of transplanting in the *ktisis* (‘foundation, colonization’) poetic traditions of various city-states, see N 1979.8§14n1 (with cross-references) and especially 585, 588; also N 1982.63–64 and 1985.51§38n1 and 63§51n2. I stress that these patterns are a reflex not of colonization itself but rather of the poetic traditions about colonization.
§25. From the standpoint of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, the tomb of Tantalos is on Mount Sipylos, overlooking the city of Smyrna (Pausanias 2.22.3; cf. 5.13.7, 7.24.13, 8.17.3).  

Already in the *Iliad*, the realm of Tantalos is visualized in the environs of Mount Sipylos, as we see from the details of the reference to his daughter Niobe (XXIV 615). Yet other evidence suggests that these figures of Tantalos and his family were originally native to the Peloponnesus; one version, for example, locates his place of origin as Argos (Hyginus *Fables* 124). There was a tradition native to the city of Argos, a tradition reported but not accepted by Pausanias, to the effect that the bones of Tantalos were actually kept in Argos (2.22.2). The Argives had another tradition, again reported but not accepted by Pausanias, that not all the children of Niobe died at the hands of Apollo and Artemis: two of them, Chloris and Amyklas, had been saved by Leto, and the statue of Chloris was housed in the sanctuary of Leto at Argos (2.21.9–10). It seems that from the Argive point of view Tantalos and his family

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90 The testimony of Pausanias associating Tantalos with the region of Mount Sipylos is particularly valuable in light of this author’s background. As Habicht 1985.13-15 has convincingly argued, Pausanias is probably native to the Sipylos region (“everything points to Magnesia on the Sipylos as his place of origin”: p. 14). Habicht, p. 15n66, draws attention to ten passages where Pausanias gives revealing specific details about this region, one of which concerns an epichoric dance (6.22.1). On the unrelenting emphasis given by Pausanias to the perspectives of the Archaic and Classical periods of Greece, to the disadvantage of the Hellenistic and later periods, see Habicht, pp. 23, 134, 149.

91 The river Akhelōios, mentioned at *Iliad* XXIV 616 as a landmark in the same environs as Mount Sipylos, is thought by Pausanias to be distinct from the river of the same name that flows through Acamania and Aetolia (8.28.9–10) or the one in Arcadia (8.28.10).

92 Survey in Sakellariou 1958.227n2 of versions indicating the Peloponnesian provenience of Tantalos; see in general Chs. 13§54 and 8§16–10§7 on the transplanting of the Tantalos figure from regions of the Mainland to the region of Smyrna in Asia Minor. Sakellariou also surveys the evidence for maintaining that Greeks were established in the region of Smyrna before the Lydians (Ch. 13§53, 13§54; cf. also 13§19–13§21).

93 Pausanias accepts a version that makes this Tantalos prosopographically distinct (2.22.3). The main reason for the rejection of the Argive version by Pausanias has to do with his own close ties to the region of Sipylos, as discussed at Ch. 10§23. Pausanias is openly hostile to Argive versions: 2.23.6.

94 Pausanias 2.21.9–10 accepts the Homeric version, which does not draw attention to any local variation: according to the *Iliad* all the children of Niobe were killed (XXIV 609). In the tradition of Argos the first man and first king is Phoroneus (Acusilaus FGH 2 F 23)—a version followed by Plato *Timaeus* 22a4-b3, who mentions Niobe.
never left the Peloponnesus. Since the location of a hero’s bones was the ultimate test of his authentic affinities to any given place, this native Argive tradition, in claiming the bones of Tantalos, father of Pelops, was in effect asserting the right of Argos to dominion over the Peloponnesus. Thus the Spartan adoption of an alternative tradition, appropriate to the Hellenic colonizations of Asia Minor, serves a dual purpose. First, the localization of Tantalos and his tomb at Sipylos, a region associated with the Lydian Empire, would negate any direct Argive claim to dominion over the Peloponnesus, which would have been based on the notion that Tantalos as father of Pelops is the symbolic progenitor of political power, of dynasty itself, in the Peloponnesus. Second, such a localization serves the interests of Sparta, the rival of Argos, in drawing attention to the alliance of the Lydian Empire with Sparta.

§26. The fact remains, however, that Lydia is a foreign concept to all Hellenes, and that the founder of the Peloponnesus, Pelops, is also conceived as foreign. This aspect of the myth of Pelops, that he is a foreigner, serves to illustrate an important lesson of myth: it is the paradox that whatever is alien is also native. The message of such a paradox is at the same time reassuring and disquieting. Let us consider the positive aspect first. It is surely reassuring to think that whatever is threatening, alien, can really be understood as familiar, native. To be ethnocentric is to explain, rationalize, and motivate the alien or the Other in terms of the native or the Self, and the ethnocentrism of the Hellenes is no exception to this

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95 Note too the prominent mention of Tantalos in the prologue of the Orestes of Euripides (1–10), the setting of which is Argos. The punishment of Tantalos is the same in the Orestes (5–7) as in Pindar’s Olympian 1 (57–60). The crime of Tantalos is described, obliquely, at Orestes 8–10.

96 See Ch. 6§57.

97 See Ch. 10§22.
general anthropological pattern. When Hellenes come into contact with cultures that appear more prestigious by reason of greater antiquity or greater achievement, a typical response of their Hellenocentrism is to establish links with such cultures genealogically. Thus the city-state of Argos, for example, claims as its founder an “Egyptian” named Danaos, twin brother of Aiguptos, who emigrated from Egypt on the first ship ever built (Apollodorus 2.1.4; Hesiod F 129 MW; cf. Aeschylus Suppliants 318 and following; also Herodotus 2.91.5). Also, the city-state of Thebes claims as its founder a “Phoenician” named Kadmos, brother of Phoinix and of Europa (Apollodorus 3.1.1; cf. Herodotus 2.49.3, 5.57.1). In both these cases the prestige of civilizations that are considered by the Hellenes to be older and superior is being appropriated by city-states in rivalry with each other for the sake of their own self-advancement and self-reassurance. In these particular cases the myths of Argos and Thebes can be contrasted with the claim of Athens that its population is so ancient as to be autochthonous (e.g., Euripides Ion 20–21, 29–30; Plato Menexenus 245d; cf. Herodotus 1.56.3). We may compare the claim, compatible with Sparta, that Pelops, founder of the Peloponnesus, migrated there from Lydia (e.g., Pindar Olympian 1.24) or from Phrygia (Herodotus 7.8.1, 7.11.4). So much for the positive side of the equation “alien is native.” On the negative side, however, this equation raises anxieties about whatever is native, familiar, just as it lowers them about whatever is

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98. This insight is thoroughly examined and illustrated by Hartog 1980; cf. also Redfield 1985.
100. Overview of the genealogy in West 1985.78.
103. Cf. Ch. 10§22.
104. Cf. Ch. 10§22.
alien. The threats that come from without can, according to this equation, really come from within.

§27. The negative lesson inherent in the equation “alien is native” is illustrated by the Dionysus myth, as dramatized in the Bacchae of Euripides. In this myth the newcomer Dionysus is perceived by the Hellenic citizens of Thebes as if he were the ultimate foreigner, and yet he turns out to be a native son: he is on his mother’s side a grandson of Kadmos, founder of Thebes. As the myth of Dionysus evolves through the ages, it keeps attracting features that characterize what is perceived as foreign to each passing age of Hellenism; what remains a constant is simply the foreignness of the figure, and it is this foreignness that is paradoxically native to him. Moreover, it is an old theme that he is always new: the structure keeps asserting that it is very new, when it is in reality very old. When the foreign is negative, it is perceived as very new; when the foreign is positive, it is recognized as very old. Since the myth of Dionysus keeps stressing the god’s newness, experts in the history of Greek religion were used to thinking of him as a new import—until the name of Dionysus was discovered on a Linear B tablet dating back to the second millennium. The delusions about the god go all the way back to Pentheus himself, a grandson of Kadmos on his father’s side: this hero commits the ultimate mistake in not recognizing a fundamental message of the myth, that whatever he thought was alien to himself was really part of himself. Dionysus seems to be new, not old, but he is in fact both old and new from the standpoint of the myth; similarly he seems to be alien, not native, but he is in fact both native and alien from the standpoint of the myth.

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107 Boedeker ibid.
§28. Wine, a primary feature of Dionysus, brings together the outsider and the insider. As we have just read in a poem of Bacchylides (Encomium 20B.1–16), the intoxication of symposiasts—which is the gift of Dionysus—induces an elpis ‘aspiration’ for Aphrodite that sends the mind soaring with sensual reveries of tyranny, of gold and ivory, of ships sailing home with all manner of riches from foreign lands (in this case from Egypt).

§29. Another example of the negative lesson inherent in the equation “alien is native” is to be found in the myth of Adonis. The name itself, a Semitic borrowing, has encouraged historians of Greek religion to think of the entire myth of Adonis as a borrowing—a transformation of the myths of the Phoenician Eshmun, the Syrian Tammuz, and the Sumerian Dumuzi. Yet the myths of these related figures do not correspond closely to the Greek myth of Adonis, and Marcel Detienne has made a good case for the proposition that the structure of the Greek story is in fact autonomous. It is simply that the story requires for its central character a figure who counts as an outsider. Thus the role of the outsider, a role that is really inside the tradition, attracts genuinely foreign features to reinforce itself. It even absorbs a foreign name to highlight its “foreign” identity. I cite the formulation of Detienne in his attempt to grasp the essence of Adonis:

His quality of being oriental is linked to the way in which the Greeks represented the Orient—an Orient so close and yet so far away. Here was a world

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108 Cf. Ch. 10§16, 10§19.
109 Cf. ibid.
110 Chantraine DELG 21.
112 Ibid.
113 On one of the “native” names of Adonis, Ἄωος (Hesychius s.v., Etymologicum Magnum s.v.), see Boedeker, p. 67.
114 Detienne, pp. 237–238. The translation is mine. For “god” I substitute daimōn, to accommodate ‘hero’ as well as ‘god’.
where the refinements of civilization and the enjoyment of the most dissolute pleasures promoted a style of life characterized by softness and sensuality. To take on the role of seducer and effeminate lover, to bring to life the persona of a young boy whom the search for pleasure ultimately condemned to a premature old age, what was needed was a daimōn whose traits were vague enough to get lost in this image of the Orient which the Greeks had made for themselves. Besides, only a foreign daimōn could represent the Other so overtly within the Greek system of thought. Only an oriental force-field could assume, to such an extent, a radical negation of the values represented by Demeter on both the religious and the political levels.

§30. Let us sum up then the impact of the message “alien is native” in the myth of Pelops. A threatening connection with Lydians, with the Other, is really not so threatening at all for Sparta, since the first Lydian sired Pelops, founder of the homeland, who in turn was paternal grandfather of Menelaos, local hero of Sparta. On the other hand the threat itself is not neutralized: the converse of “alien is native” is that the reassurance to be found in things native can lead to self-deception since the threats associated with things foreign, such as luxuriance, can in fact come from within.

§31. This two-way Spartan view of Lydia extends to other aspects of their institutions. A prominent example can be found in the traditions of singing and dancing at Sparta, as represented by the poet Alcman. The compositions attributed to such a figure are integral to the ritual complex of Spartan festivals. The tradition specifies, in the case of Alcman, that this poet’s provenience is Lydia (PMG 13a; also PMG 1 Scholion B; Velleius Paterculus 1.18.2; Aelian Varia Historia 12.50), and this detail can be correlated with the fact that there were

115 Cf. Ch. 12§14 and following; Calame 1977 II 34–35.
Spartan rituals that centered on Lydian themes, such as the event known as τῶν Λυδῶν πομπή ‘Procession of the Lydians’ in connection with the cult of Artemis Orthia (Plutarch Life of Aristides 17.10). We may compare an event known as the ‘Dance of the Lydian Maidens’ at a festival of Artemis at Ephesus (Autocrates F 1 Kock, KA, by way of Aelian De natura animalium 12.9; Aristophanes Clouds 599–600). In this case, it seems clear that the term ‘Lydian Maidens’ designates a ritual role played by the local girls of Ephesus. To return to the subject of Alcman: the pattern “alien is native” operates not only in terms of the official Spartan characterization of Alcman as a Lydian but also within his songs: luxuriance, for example, is represented by the songs of Alcman as a characteristically Lydian thing. Indeed the songs themselves are well known for their characteristic luxuriance. We may apply here what we already know from other attestations that we have just surveyed: the luxuriance typified by the Lydians is an implicit threat from within, not just an explicit threat from without.

§32. Which leads us to a question: was the theme of affinity between Hellenes and Lydians initiated by the Hellenes of Asia Minor as an ideological justification of their Lydian contacts or by the Lydians to legitimize their eventual hegemony over the Hellenes of Asia Minor and their alliance with other Hellenes, especially the Spartans? The answer cuts both ways.

§33. To begin, let us take one more look at the story of Herodotus about Croesus the Lydian: we have already noted that this foreigner is in fact part of a Hellenic story pattern, bearing an implicit message of admonition for all Hellenes. We have also noted that for the Hellenic audience of Herodotus the affinities of Pelops the Founder with the Lydians make Croesus a figure as familiar as he is foreign.

117 For more on ritual role-playing, see Ch. 12.
118 Cf., for example, Ch. 12§20n47.
§34. In the *Histories* of Herodotus, however, we can see the pattern of familiarity extended even further to include the Persians themselves. To understand how this is done, let us consider the genealogical background. Tradition has it that the dynasty of Pelops was preceded by the dynasty of Perseus, father of Alkaios, grandfather of Amphitryon, and thus nominally great-grandfather of Herakles (e.g., Apollodorus 2.4.5). Since Alkaios had married a daughter of Pelops (Hesiod F 190.6-8 MW), this genealogy has Herakles as great-grandson of both Perseus and Pelops. Perseus was also father of Sthenelos, grandfather of Eurystheus (F 190.11–12); the dynasty of Perseus ended with this Eurystheus, the infamous figure who stood in the way of any eventual kingship for Herakles (*Iliad* XIX 95–133). After Eurystheus, the dynasty of Perseus is replaced by the dynasty of Pelops, father of Atreus and Thyestes, grandfather of Agamemnon and Menelaos. In the actual sequence of ruling kings, the rule of Eurystheus is followed by that of Atreus and Thyestes (e.g., Apollodorus *Epitome* 2.11). The dynasty of Pelops is in turn replaced by the Ἕρακλειδαι ‘sons of Herakles’, who represent the ancestors of the Dorian dynasties who took over the major political centers of the Peloponnesus in the Dark Age (Tyrtaeus 2.12–15W; Pindar *Pythian* 1.61–66, 5.69–72; *Isthmian* 9.1–3; cf. Herodotus 9.26, 27.1–2). The two most prominent Ἕρακλειδαι, great-grandsons of Hyllus, the son of Herakles who killed Eurystheus (e.g., Apollodorus 2.8.1), are Temenos, founder of the royal dynasty of Argos (Theopompus FGH 115 F 393), and Aristodemos, whose two sons Eurysthenes and Prokles are co-founders of the dual royal dynasty of Sparta (Herodotus 6.52.1, Pausanias 2.18.7). Eurysthenes is the forefather of the royal line of the

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119 Like Alkaios, Sthenelos too married a daughter of Pelops (Hesiod F 190.9 and following).
120 On the theme of Herakles as kingmaker but never king, see Davidson 1980.
121 Further details and commentary in West 1985.159n75. In the *Iliad*, however, the field of vision is restricted to the sequence of Pelopida: the scepter goes from Pelops to Atreus to Thyestes to Agamemnon (II 101–108).
122 Variations in Apollodorus 2.8.2 and following; convenient summary in West 1985.113. Another brother of Temenos and Aristodemos is Kresphontes, founder of the dynasty of Messenia (Pausanias 4.3.3–4).
Agiadai (Herodotus 4.147, 6.52, 7.204; Pausanias 3.1.7), while his twin Prokles is the forefather of the royal line of the Eurypontidai (Herodotus 6.52.1, 8.131.2). Thus in the case of Sparta a historical figure like King Leonidas can trace his genealogy all the way back to Herakles: he is thirteen generations removed from Agis, son of Eurythemenes, son of Aristodemos, great-grandson of Hyllos, son of Herakles (Herodotus 7.204). Likewise in the case of Argos, the dynasty of the Hērakleidai was still a concept to be reckoned with in the early fifth century, at the time of the Persian War, as we see from an explicit comparison in Herodotus 7.149.2 of the two kings of Sparta with the one king of Argos. From the standpoint of either Sparta or Argos, then, the Hērakleidai or “Sons of Herakles” represent a reestablishment of the dynasty of Perseus. In other words both Sparta and Argos have legitimate genealogical claims to dominion over the Peloponnnesus by way of their respective dynasties in that both cities can trace their kings back to Hyllos, son of Herakles and descendant of the House of Perseus.

§35. With this genealogical background we come finally to the myth of a Persian affinity with Hellenes. In seeking the cooperation of the city-state of Argos, the Persian king Xerxes sends the Argives a messenger promising to treat them as superior to all others and claiming as the basis of the Persians’ offered friendship the common ancestry of Argives and Persians: they both can trace themselves all the way back to Perseus, he claims, in that Perseus had yet another son, named Perses, who was ancestor of all Persians (Herodotus 7.150.1–2 in

123 Pausanias 2.19.2 reports that the royal authority of Medon, the grandson of Temenos the Heraclid, was already in that era checked by the polis of Argos so that the political power of the descendants of Medon was diminished; also that Meltas, the tenth descendant of Medon, was deposed altogether. The testimony of Pausanias about the removal of Meltas need not be interpreted to mean that kingship was abolished altogether. Meltas was the descendant of King Pheidon of Argos, who is described as a 
turannos ‘tyrant’ in Herodotus 6.127.3 (on his genealogy, see Theopompus FGH 115 F 393; cf. Jeffery 1976.135–136 on the political ideology of the “Heritage” of Temenos, as pursued by King Pheidon). How and Wells 1928 n 189 remark that Pheidon’s reassertion of royal power was an exceptional phase, analogous to a tyranny, and that “presumably the monarch only retained the old royal right to priesthood and other formal honours, perhaps presidency of the Boule.” On the problems of dating the genealogical sequence of the Argive dynasty, see Kelly 1976.105–111.
conjunction with 7.61.3). The Persians could have said the same thing to the Spartans in that Sparta, just like Argos, preserved a dynasty of Hērakleidai, but the enmity of Persia and Sparta was at this point already set, even serving as the actual premise for the Persian overture to Argos.

§36. The Lydians, under the dynasty that preceded the reign of Gyges, might have said something very similar to what the Persians are saying here to the Argives: from the standpoint of their foreign relations with Hellenes, the dynasty of Kandaules, Tyrant of Lydia, was a dynasty of Hērakleidai 'Heraclids' (Ἡρακλειδέων Herodotus 1.7.1) in that Kandaules claimed to be the descendant of one Alkaios, son of Herakles (Herodotus 1.7.2).124 This dynasty of Hērakleidai was overthrown later by Gyges, ancestor of Croesus (Herodotus 1.7.2–1.14.4).

§37. It would be simplistic to suppose that such a genealogy was invented in a vacuum. Instead it would make more sense to infer that the Lydians were in this case drawing upon the ethnocentric thought patterns of their Hellenic neighbors. This is not to say that the Lydians could not or did not effect changes, even radical ones, in contemporary Greek thought patterns. In that myth making is a social phenomenon, the domination of a given society by, say, Lydian dynasts can be expected to have an effect on the myths of that society. The process of reshaping myths must take place in terms of the myths themselves.

§38. To pursue the argument that the Lydian dynasts, by way of calling themselves Hērakleidai, were drawing upon the ethnocentric thought patterns of their Hellenic neighbors, let us consider a myth ascribed by Herodotus to the Greeks who settled the regions of the Pontos (Ἠλλήνων ... οἱ τὸν Πόντον οἰκέοντες 4.8.1): according to this myth the barbarian

124 This particular model of Alkaios the Heraclid may be attested indirectly at least in the native Greek context of the Lesbian traditions about Alkaios = Alcaeus, if we accept the argument that the Alcaeus figure, as contrasted with Pittakos in the poetry of Alcaeus, is thematically parallel to the Kymos figure, as contrasted with Theognis in the poetry of Theognis: see Ch. 6§70. On the possibility that the Kyrnos of Theognis represents a Heraclid prince, see Ch. 6§66.
natives of these regions, the Scythians, can be traced back genealogically to the sexual union of Herakles himself with a half-woman, half-snake (4.8–10). No doubt this myth contains native Scythian elements, but it has been appropriated and reshaped by and for Hellenes. It need not matter whether or not we know which side initiated the appropriation, the Hellenes or the Scythians. After all, myth is a matter of communication, and it is more important to recognize that we are dealing with a dialogue between two distinct societies than to ascertain which society initiated the dialogue. Moreover, if a given myth serves as dialogue between two distinct societies, it can speak to both even when it is expressed from the standpoint of one. For a Scythian to accept the Hellenic standpoint of the myth under consideration is the same thing as accepting—or offering—a token of some level of relationship with Hellenes. In this case we cannot be specific about the nature of the relationship. In the case of the Lydians, however, the situation is more clear. The Lydians, in asserting their hegemony over neighboring Hellenes, adopt a Hellenocentric viewpoint to establish this relationship. The earlier dynasty of Lydia does this by claiming descent from Herakles, thus appropriating a prestige that is commensurate with that of dynasties of the Peloponnesus that are direct heirs to the heroic age of Hellas. As for the Lydian dynasty after the Hērakleidai, starting with Gyges and ending with Croesus, it seems to have taken an ethnocentric stance in its own right by claiming as the very first king of Lydia the figure of Tantalos, who is seemingly native to Argos. This appropriation of Tantalos as a Lydian serves the purposes of the Lydians in that Tantalos is the father of Pelops, revered by Hellenes as founder of the Olympics and as an emblem of the political power implicit in the concept of the Peloponnesus, the “Island of Pelops.” This appropriation also serves the purposes of the Spartans in their rivalry with

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125 How and Wells 1928 I 305. On Herodotus 4.5–7, see Dumézil 1978.171 and following.  
126 Cf. Ch. 10§24–25 above.
Argos, if indeed the Argives considered Tantalos their own native son. Thus the Lydian version of the Tantalos myth affords a dialogue, so to speak, between Lydia and Sparta at the ideological and political expense of Argos.

§39. This theme brings us back to the Persian overtures to Argos, expressed in terms of a myth that tells how Perseus was the father of Perses, ancestor of the Persians (again Herodotus 7.150.1–2). In this case the Persian version of the Perseus myth affords a dialogue between Persia and Argos in the context of Persia’s ostensible support for the hegemony of Argos over the Peloponnesus. This theme in turn brings us back to the subject of the rivalry of Argos and Sparta. At the time of the Persian invasion, when Persia was making overtures to Argos, the contest seemed to have been already won by Sparta. The Argives had been decisively defeated by the Spartans at Sepeia in 494 B.C. (Herodotus 6.76–83, 92)—a defeat that can be described as “the logical culmination of events that began more than a half a century earlier with the Spartan conquest of and alliance with Tegea and the subsequent victory over Argos in the Battle of Champions [546 B.C.].” Even in the context of this earlier period, when Sparta defeated Tegea and overtures were being made to the Spartans by Croesus the Lydian,

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127 Cf. Ch. 10§24–25 above.
128 Although this “dialogue,” from the Persian point of view, is at the political expense of Sparta, there is nothing in the myth of Perses, son of Perseus, that would directly undercut the Spartan kingship’s genealogical derivation from Perseus. Herodotus elsewhere records another aspect of the myth, this one clearly congenial to the Persians from their ethnocentric point of view and just as clearly less appropriate for any overture to Argos: according to the Persians, Herodotus says, Perseus was originally an Assyrian who, unlike his ancestors, became a Hellene (6.54). Besides, continues Herodotus, both Persians and Hellenes agree that Perseus was an Egyptian on his mother’s side (ibid.). Herodotus says that he chooses to say no more about the Egyptian connection on the grounds that the subject has already been treated by others (6.55; note the implication of textuality in this statement). The mother of Perseus is Danae—who represents a point that is as far back as the general Hellenic vision of the genealogy of Dorian kings goes, according to Herodotus (6.53.1). But we know that the genealogy can in fact be taken further back in the Argive version of the myth: Danae was the daughter of Akrisios, who was son of Abas, who was son of Hypermestra, who was daughter of Danaos, the founder of Argos (Apollodorus 2.1.4; Hesiod F 129 MW; cf. Aeschylus Suppliants 318 and following; also Herodotus 2.91.5). Cf. West 1985.78.
Herodotus observes that much of the Peloponnesus was already under Spartan domination (1.68.6).

§40. It seems then that the preeminence assigned by Herodotus to Sparta at the time of the overtures made by Croesus the Lydian is at least in part a matter of hindsight on the part of the Histories. From the hindsight of the Spartan victories over Argos in 546 B.C. and in 494 B.C., both predating the overtures of Croesus, Sparta did indeed become the preeminent power in the Peloponnesus. The hindsight extends further: it can be argued that the preeminence assigned by Herodotus to the two states of Athens and Sparta at the dramatic juncture of Croesus’ overtures, as also throughout the Histories, is a direct function of the successes achieved by these two particular states in the War with the Persians.

§41. This is not to say that in the Histories the motive for dramatizing the theme that Athens and Sparta were the preeminent city-states of Hellas was a bias on the part of Herodotus in favor of these states. True, it has often been claimed that Herodotus takes sides, especially in favor of the Athenians, but in fact the various statements in the Histories that work to the advantage or disadvantage of any city-state cannot be understood without first coming to terms with the traditional stance of Herodotus. As one who conducts a historiā ‘inquiry’, he is assuming an overarching position of authority that entails emphasizing the point of view that he deems the most just. At least in theory he must not associate himself with the interests of any one city-state. He will not even associate himself consistently with the Greeks in that the Hellenes are for him sometimes “we,” sometimes “they.” From such a

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130 See Ch. 10§22.
131 From the standpoint of Herodotus 1.82–83, Sardis was already being besieged by the Persians when the Spartans were preoccupied with the events culminating in the Battle of the Champions.
132 For example, How and Wells 1928 I 37–43.
133 How and Wells 141–143.
privileged position, he proceeds to narrate and thereby to adjudicate the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and Persians; the fact that the Hellenes are treated partially is motivated by the principle that the Persians in particular and the Asiatics in general are found to be guilty, in the wrong, by way of the narrative itself. It is as if Herodotus merely must have a good sense of judgment in his narration so that the patterns of divine justice could implicitly work their way through this narration.

§42. Yet since the principle “alien is native” is so ingrained in the traditions of the Greek city-states, the voice of historiā has much to teach the Hellenes by way of a grand juxtaposition of the foreign with the native in the narrative of Herodotus. Whenever Greeks and barbarians interact in the overall conflict recorded by the Histories, the barbarian point of view becomes an intellectual exercise in Hellenic introspection through the overarching perspective of historiā.

§43. This intellectual exercise can perhaps be seen most clearly in the so-called Debate of the Constitutions (Herodotus 3.80–87), where the leaders of the Persian Empire are represented as debating the relative merits of three possible forms of government: democracy, oligarchy, and ‘monarchy’ (3.82.3). While this debate is, of course, an absurdity from the standpoint of our own notions of history—and Herodotus is defensive about the lack of verisimilitude in this part of his narrative—it nevertheless serves as an ideal focus for the entire narrative from the standpoint of historiā. These three forms of government correspond to the three protagonists of the Histories: the democracy of Athens, the oligarchy of Sparta, and the ‘monarchy’ of Persia. At first blush the ‘monarchy’ of Persia seems an institution foreign to the Greeks, but the word monarkhos ‘monarch’ is ostentatiously equated in the Debate passage with turannos ‘tyrant’ (Herodotus 3.80.2/4)—the same word that the Histories of Herodotus and

135 Cf. Ch. 6§64. On the Indo-Iranian themes disguised underneath these Greek categories of democracy, oligarchy, and ‘monarchy’, see Dumézil 1985.246–253.
all Archaic Greek poetry and song consistently associate with both the attractions and the pitfalls of the wealth and the power that goes with tyranny. The pitfalls, moreover, as manifested in *hubris*, are not confined to tyranny. As the Debate passage makes clear, *hubris* proves to be the negative trait of men in a democracy as well (Herodotus 3.81.1–2); as for an oligarchy, the three symptoms of its shift toward ‘monarchy’ in the Debate passage (3.82.2) correspond to the three symptoms of *hubris* that lead from aristocracy to tyranny in the poetic traditions that warn against tyranny (Theognis 51–52; *hubris* at 40, 44). 

The Persian king-to-be argues not only that oligarchies evolve into ‘monarchy’ (again Herodotus 3.82.3); so do democracies (3.82.4). Such patterns are supposed to prove the supremacy of tyranny (3.82.4–5). Thus the threat of tyranny is {304|305} in fact posed not just from without, by the Great King of the Persians, but also from within, by the wrongdoings of the Hellenes themselves.

§44. In this regard it is important to keep in mind the historical context—and I am using *historical* here in the conventional sense of the word in our own time—for the composition of the *Histories* of Herodotus. It is a well-known fact that the *Histories* were composed at a time when the Peloponnesian War, the two main antagonists of which were the democracy of Athens and the oligarchy of Sparta, was under way. That even the narrative of Herodotus can be perceived as functionally a prelude to the Peloponnesian War is clear from the narrative strategy of Thucydides (cf., e.g., 1.89.1–2), whose account of the events leading to the Peloponnesian War starts where Herodotus’ account of the Persian War left off.

§45. Given such a historical context for the composition of Herodotus’ *Histories*, and that Herodotus “is interpreting the past by the present,” we may ask ourselves what the message

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137 Opinions differ about *termini post quern* for the final text fixation of the *Histories*. For a balanced discussion of evidence for a late dating, possibly even as late as 415 B.C., see Raaflaub 1987.236–237 (cf. also Fornara 1971b).

138 So Fornara 1971.88.
of his narrative might have been for the Hellenes of his time. In terms of the Debate passage the outward subject of the *Histories* is the struggle of Hellenes—primarily the democracy of Athens and the oligarchy of Sparta—against the tyranny of the Persians; the inward subject, however, is the struggle of the Hellenes against each other or, to put it another way, against themselves. In terms of the Peloponnesian War it can be said that this struggle takes the external form of the overall Hellenic conflict between the democracy of Athens and the oligarchy of Sparta; in terms of the Peloponnesian War the third main character of the *Histories*, that ultimate exponent of *hubris*, the Great King of the Persians, is in the background. In terms of the *Histories*, on the other hand, he is in the foreground. The intention of the *Histories* is to narrate the conflict of the Great King, exponent of *hubris*, with the Hellenes—and thereby to render a judgment about who was in the right and who was in the wrong. Such is the juridical function of *historiā*: to speak as a *histōr* ‘arbiter’.

§46. Which brings to mind a suggestion: perhaps the implicit intention of the *historiā* of Herodotus is to “arbitrate” the ongoing conflict between the democracy of Athens and the oligarchy of Sparta—corresponding to the explicit intention of “arbitrating” the past conflict between tyrannical and anti-tyrannical ways of life.” In support of this suggestion, we may look to the traditions about the life of Herodotus: he is said to have settled, died, and been buried in Thourioi (Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. Ὁθουρίοι), a city {305|306} founded ostensibly as a Panhellenic venture, with the involvement of both Athens and Sparta (Diodorus 12.10–11). The city of Thourioi, founded in 444/3 B.C., was built at a site where once stood the [139](#) For details about the traditions of international (that is, inter-polis) arbitration, see Ch. 11.

[140](#) Commenting on the testimony of Duris of Samos FGH 76 F 64 and others to the effect that Herodotus is the Ὁθουρίος ‘the man from Thourioi’, How and Wells 1928 I 3 remark: “It is difficult to understand the prevalence of the name [Θουριος] unless Herodotus died and was buried there.”

[141](#) A brief survey of known facts about the foundation of Thourioi in Graham 1983.35–37.

[142](#) See Graham, p. 36.
city of Sybaris, that ultimate symbol of luxuriance and the hubris that goes with it.\textsuperscript{143} The setting of Thourioi as a reborn and reformed Sybaris would have been an ideal context for a reaffirmation of the values that bind Hellenes together in an ultimate conflict against hubris. The \textit{historiā} of Herodotus would have been an apt realization of such a Panhellenic goal. While I do not insist that the city of Thourioi was the actual setting for the composition of the \textit{Histories} of Herodotus, I at least reaffirm the possibility.\textsuperscript{144} Moreover, the \textit{stasis} ‘conflict’ between Ionians and Dorians that reportedly developed in the city of Thourioi in the year 434/3, ten years after its foundation (Diodorus 12.35.2),\textsuperscript{145} may well have appeared to Herodotus as a smaller-scale prefiguration of the larger-scale misfortune of the Peloponnesian War itself.\textsuperscript{146}

§47. It seems clear in any case that Herodotus thought of the Peloponnesian War as a misfortune for all Hellenes. In commenting on the earthquake that shook Delos in 490 B.C., Herodotus has this to say:

\begin{quote}
καὶ τοῦτο μὲν κού τερας ἀνθρώποις τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι κακῶν ἔφηνε ὁ θεός, ἐπὶ γὰρ Δαρείου τοῦ Ἰστάσπεος καὶ Ξερξεὶ τοῦ Δαρείου καὶ Ἀρτοξέρξεω τοῦ Ξερξεὶ, τριῶν τούτων ἐπεξής γενεέων, ἐγένετο πλέω κακὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἢ ἐπὶ εἴκοσι ἄλλας γενεὰς τὰς πρὸ Δαρείου γενομένας, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Περσέων αὐτῆ γενόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν κορυφαίων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς πολεμεόντων.
\end{quote}

\textit{Herodotus} 6.98.2

And this was, I suppose, a portent whereby the god revealed to men the misfortunes that were to be. For in the reigns of Darius son of Hystaspes, Xerxes

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{143} On the Sybaris theme, see Ch. 9\textsuperscript{20n75}.
\textsuperscript{144} Discussion in Stambler 1982.226.
\textsuperscript{145} Graham, pp. 36–37.
\textsuperscript{146} Cf. Stambler 1982.226.
\end{flushleft}
son of Darius, and Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, in the space of these three successive generations, more misfortunes befell Hellas than in the twenty generations before Darius. These misfortunes befell Hellas in part from the Persians, in part from its leading figures [koruphaioi] as they fought each other for supremacy.

Mention of the rule of Artaxerxes indicates that the era before and during the Peloponnesian War is meant as one chronological extreme; as for the other extreme, “twenty generations before the accession of Darius, at Herodotus’ normal equivalence of three generations to the century, is 1189 B.C., the period of the Trojan War.” Thus the historiā of Herodotus associates its narrative, extending into the Peloponnesian War, with an epic theme, “the beginning of misfortunes,” from the vantage point of the Trojan War.

§48. Even the ending of the Histories seems to indicate—albeit indirectly—an association that stretches all the way from the Trojan War to the Peloponnesian War. The man who refused the compensation offered by the Persian Artauktes in return for wronging Protesilaos, the first “Hellene” to die in the Trojan War, was Xanthippos, father of Pericles of Athens (Herodotus 9.120.3–4). At this point the Athenians led by Xanthippos were already acting on their own at the Hellespont, no longer assisted by their Hellenic allies from the Peloponnesus.

147 On the significance of this word koruphaioi ‘leading figures’: Ch. 12§56.
149 For another important attestation of this theme in Herodotus, see 5.97.3: the ships sent by Athens to aid the Ionian Revolt are described as the arkhē kakōn ‘beginning of misfortunes’ for Hellenes and barbarians alike (at this point Athens is described as the most powerful of Hellenic city-states with the exception of Sparta: 5.97.1). Compare the epithet arkhekakoi ‘beginners of misfortune’ at Iliad V 63, describing the ships used by Paris for the abduction of Helen—the act that precipitated the Trojan War. Compare also the expression kakou ... arkhē ‘beginning of misfortune’ at XI 604, marking the beginning of Patroklos’ fatal involvement as ritual substitute for Achilles (commentary in N 1979.33–34, 88§34n). 150
150 The word used in the sense of ‘compensation’ here at Herodotus 9.120.3 is apoina, and the word for the ‘possessions’ of the hero Protesilaos in his hero shrine is khrēmata (ibid.).
who had earlier fought on their side against the Persians and who had by now gone back home (Herodotus 9.114.2). Moreover, the behavior of the Athenian leader Xanthippos in executing Artaktes by crucifixion (Herodotus 9.120.4) stands in pointed contrast with that of the Spartan king Pausanias, who had rejected the suggestion that he impale the body of the Persian general Mardonios, in return for the Persians’ having mutilated the body of the Spartan king Leonidas: Pausanias says simply that the mutilation of the enemy’s corpse would be a deed that suits barbarians, not Hellenes (Herodotus 9.79.1). This characterization of Pausanias by Herodotus undercuts the position taken by the Athenians, that this Spartan king was a man of *hubris* (Herodotus 8.3.2). The Athenians took this position, as Herodotus pointedly observes, in order to gain for themselves sole hegemony over the Hellenic alliance against Persia (8.3.2).

§49. At an earlier time, as Herodotus observes in the same context, the Athenians had renounced sole hegemony, thereby avoiding *stasis emphulos* ‘intrasocietal conflict’ that would have destroyed Hellas (8.3.2). The word *em-phil-os*, which I translate here as ‘intrasocietal’, is clearly being used by Herodotus in the sense of ‘Hellene against Hellene’. We find in a poem of Theognis a parallel use of the word *stasis* ‘conflict’ in a Panhellenic sense: contemplating the Persian threat to his city (Theognis 773–779, 781–782), the poet declares that he fears the heedlessness and *stasis* of the Hellenes (781)—a *stasis* that destroys the *laos* ‘people’ (ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ γε δέδοικ ἀφραδίην ἐσορῶν | καὶ στάσιν Ἑλλήνων λαοφθόρον 780–781). As in Herodotus, the external threat is represented here as meshing with the internal one. In another poem of Theognis is a parallel use of the word *em-phil-os* ‘intrasocietal’, this time in the specific sense of ‘citizen against citizen’: in declaring his fear that a tyrant is about to emerge in his city, the voice of the poet blames the situation on the *hubris* of the city’s leaders

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151 At Herodotus 9.79.2, Pausanias goes on to say that Leonidas is getting adequate compensation through the deaths of all those who were killed at Plataea.
(39–50, ὑβρις/ὑβρίζειν at 40/44), the three symptoms of which are stasis [plural] ‘conflict’, emphūloi phonoi andrōn ‘intrasocietal killings of men’, and monarkhoi ‘monarchs’ (51–51).

The same three misfortunes figure in the Debate of the Constitutions, where the Persian king Darius describes an oligarchy as a situation where everyone vies to be the koruphaios ‘leading figure’ and where this rivalry results in stasis [plural] ‘conflicts’, the stasis results in phonos ‘killing’, and the phonos results in monarkhiā ‘monarchy’—which Darius himself equates with ‘tyranny’. The same word koruphaios ‘leading figure’ was used by Herodotus in describing the Athenians and the Spartans ‘as they fought each other for supremacy’.  

§50. When the Athenians had at first renounced sole hegemony of the Hellenic states allied against Persia, Herodotus says, they avoided stasis emphūlos ‘intrasocietal conflict’ that would have destroyed all Hellas (8.3.2). Herodotus is at least implying, then, that the Athenians then caused precisely such a disaster by seizing sole hegemony later, with the emergence of the Athenian Empire. In this light the final action of the Histories, an implicitly barbaric deed committed by the father of Pericles in the context of an Athenian initiative taken without the acquiescence of the Peloponnesian allies, signals for the Athenians the threat of hubris from within, not from without. In this light even the initial guilty act of the Histories, the aggression of the Lydian “tyrant” Croesus against Hellenic cities, figures as an implicit warning to the Athenians. What made the aggression of Croesus distinct from that of his barbarian predecessors, as Herodotus makes clear, is that he was the first barbarian to reduce Hellenic cities to the status of tributaries: {308|309}

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152 Cf. Loraux 1987c.8–11.
153 See Chs. 6§64, 9§22, 12§56.
154 Cf. ibid.
155 Cf. Ch. 10§47 above.
This Croesus was the first barbarian ever, within our knowledge, to reduce some Hellenes to the status of paying tribute ...  

Reducing Hellenic cities to the status of tributaries is also what the Athenians themselves did in the context of the Athenian Empire. To be a tributary, for Herodotus, is to be no longer _eleutheros_ ‘free’, as we see from what he adds pointedly after his observation that Croesus the _turannos_ ‘tyrant’ (1.6.1) was the first barbarian to make tributaries out of Hellenic cities:

πρὸ δὲ τῆς Κροίσου ἀρχῆς πάντες Ἐλληνες ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι

Before the rule of Croesus, all Hellenes were still _free_ [eleutheroi].

The theme of Croesus the Tyrant is formulated in the mode of an _ainos_, which applies to Athens with its Athenian Empire, the heir to the Persian Empire, in turn the heir to the Lydian Empire. That the Athenian Empire is a _turannis_ ‘tyranny’ is acknowledged by none other than the figure of Pericles of Athens in his last oration (Thucydides 2.63.2).  

§51. All this is not to say that Herodotus in his _historiā_ took sides against the Athenians. He takes pains to give credit where credit is due, even allowing that Hellas would never have

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156 See Ch. 8§22.
157 Cf. ibid.
158 On the theme of Athens as _polis turannos_, “familiar to all Greeks since roughly the middle of the [fifth] century,” see Raaflaub 1987.224. On the pertinence of the characterization of Oedipus as _turannos_ ‘tyrant’ in the _Oedipus Tyrannus_ of Sophocles, see Knox 1954.
remained *eleutherā* ‘free’ without the initiative of Athens (7.139.5 in the context of 7.139.2–6). He goes so far as to say that the Athenians became *sōtēres* ‘saviors’ of Hellas by successfully resisting the Great King of Persia (7.139.5).¹⁵⁹ This judgment of Herodotus, however, that Athenians are *sōtēres* ‘saviors’ of Hellas,¹⁶⁰ is expressed against the backdrop of the Athenian Empire, which had obviously made the Athenians unpopular among the Hellenes: {309|310}

> ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων, ὡμος δὲ, τῇ γε μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθὲς, οὐκ ἐπισχῆσω

Herodotus 7.139.1

And here I am constrained by necessity to make public [= make an *apodeixis* of] an opinion [*gnōmē*] that is invidious from the standpoint of most men. Still, inasmuch as it seems to me at least to be true [*alēthēs*], I shall not hold back. The hesitation of Herodotus is motivated by the ambiguity that is being set up by his *historiā*: the city that once freed the Greeks from tyranny now threatens to enslave them. The city that became great by overthrowing the tyranny of the Peisistratidai (Herodotus 5.78) stands to lose all by imposing tyranny on other Hellenes. The contrast is made all the more effective in that the continuous narrative of the *Histories* stops at 479 B.C.—just before the Athenian Empire begins to take shape.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ It is added that it was μετὰ γε θεοῦς ‘next in order to the gods’ that the Athenians drove back the Great King (Herodotus 7.139.5). In other words the gods must be given a major share in the credit.

¹⁶⁰ In light of the reference above, we may take note of the epithet *sōtēr* ‘savior’ as applied to Oedipus in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles (e.g., 48).

¹⁶¹ If Herodotus were to have continued narrating the Persian Wars to their formal end at 448 B.C. or thereabouts, with the Peace of Kallias, the contrast between the old Athens as liberator of Hellas from the Persians and the new Athens as the supreme power of a new empire would have been blurred.
§52. The power of the *historiā* of Herodotus to instruct, even to warn, is analogous to what we find in a specialized aspect of the *ainos*, the *par-ain-esis*. At times, moreover, the stories of Herodotus take on not only the function of a *paraineis* but also the actual form of an *ainos*. There is, for example, the story of Agariste, granddaughter of Kleisthenes the Athenian: she dreamed that she gave birth to a lion, and a few days later she gave birth to a son, Pericles (6.131.2). Besides the obviously positive associations of this image, there are negative ones. In the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus (717–736) is a similar story that has long been recognized as an *ainos*: it is about a lion cub that was raised in a household to become the bane of its inhabitants. In Herodotus as well, there is a parallel to this sinister image (310–311) of a lion cub that became the ‘priest of Derangement [Atē]’ for the household that had raised him (Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 735–736): in describing the gestation of lions, Herodotus says that the embryonic lion cub claws away at the insides of its mother so that the womb is destroyed by the time of the cub’s birth (3.108.4). Herodotus offers this description in the context of arguing that limited fertility is the compensation paid by predatory animals for their predatory nature (3.108.1–3).

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162 Cf. Ch. 687, 688. For an ideal example of a represented *paraineis* in Herodotus, I cite 1.59.3, where the wise words of Khilon of Sparta, one of the Seven Sages, who is warning the father of Peisistratos of Athens, are designated by *paraineō*.

163 On this passage see Fornara 1971.53; also Raaffaeb 1987.225n10. The theme of a woman’s giving birth to a lion in parodied in Aristophanes *Knights* 1037–1040 in the form of a quoted oracular utterance emanating from Bakis (on this figure, see Ch. 6849); this mock oracle is strikingly similar to the oracular utterance quoted at Herodotus 5.92β.3 concerning the birth of Kypselos, future tyrant of Corinth (on which see Ch. 6867–68).

164 See Fraenkel 1950 II 338–339, who collects valuable parallels for the two formal characteristics of the *ainos* in this passage from the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus, namely, the usage of ἀνήρ at line 719 and of οὔτως at 718. For a parallel usage of οὐτως at *Iliad* IX 524, in the *ainos* addressed by Phoenix to Achilles, see Ch. 6889n215. For an interpretation of the *ainos* at *Agamemnon* 717–736 in the context of the entire Oresteia trilogy, see Knox 1952, who interprets the lion cub as a symbol of the new hubris that grows out of the old (φιλέι δὲ τίκτειν ὑβρινς μὲν παλαιά νεάξισαν ἐν κακοὶ βροτῶν ὑβριν Ἀγαμέμνον 764–766). As Knox points out, the lion cub of this *ainos* refers not just to Paris but also to Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, even Orestes. Cf. also Goldhill 1984.63.
§53. This kind of reasoning illustrates the affinity of Herodotus’ *historiā* with the traditions of what we know as natural history, that is, *historiā* ‘inquiry’ into the *phusis* ‘nature’ of the universe.\(^{165}\) Natural history can equate the principles that operate in the realm of human events with those in the realm of natural phenomena, as we see from a celebrated observation of Anaximander about natural change:

\[\varepsilon\xi \ δε \ η \ γένεσις \ εστι \ τοις \ οδη, \ και \ την \ φθοραν \ εις \ ταυτα \ γινεσθαι \ κατα \ το \ χρεων \ διδοναι \ γαρ \ αυτα \ δικην \ και \ τας \ αλληλοις \ της \ αδικιας \ κατα \ την \ τοι \ χρονου \ ταξιν\]

Anaximander 12 B 1 DK

And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens, in accordance with necessity; for they pay penalty [*dikē*] and retribution [*_tisis*_] to each other for their wrongdoing [*a-dik-iā*]\(^{166}\) in accordance with the assessment of time.\(^{167}\)

The underlying assumption in such examples of natural history is that the course of human events follows a cosmic order, with the emergence of *dikē* ‘justice’ in the due course of time.\(^{168}\)

The same sort of assumption operates in the *Works and Days* of Hesiod, where it is also made

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\(^{165}\) Stambler 1982.221–222, following Snell 1924.

\(^{166}\) Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983.120 make note of the “legalistic” metaphor, adding: “The prevalence of one substance at the expense of its contrary is ‘injustice’ [= *a-dik-iā*], and a reaction takes place through the infliction of punishment by the restoration of equality—of more than equality, since the wrong-doer is deprived of his original substance, too. This is given to the victim in addition to what was his own, and in turn leads (it might be inferred) to *koros*, surfeit, on the part of the former victim, who now commits injustice on the former aggressor.”

\(^{167}\) This translation is based on Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983.118. On *taxis* as ‘assessment’, they write (p. 120) that the word “suggests the ordaining of punishment by a judge or, more aptly, the assessment of tribute as in the Athenian tribute-lists.”

\(^{168}\) Cf. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, pp. 120–121, with reference to a comparable text in Solon (F 36 W).
clear that the cosmic order is an expression of the divine apparatus. The workings of the divine \{311|312\} apparatus emerge also from the historiā of Herodotus, as we have seen. For Herodotus too, “natural history” and “moral history” overlap: assuming that natural phenomena and the course of human events do indeed follow the same cosmic order, he can make such pronouncements as we see in the case at hand, that lions pay compensation for their savage and predatory nature by way of their limited fertility. Conversely, natural phenomena can be correlated with human events in the grand old tradition that we see in Hesiod when the voice of the poet says that the city of dikē ‘justice’ will be fertile while the city of its opposite, hubris ‘outrage’, will be sterile (Works and Days 225–247). In making such an implicit equation between the course of human events and natural phenomena, Herodotus too is following the thought patterns of the ainos as ‘fable’. We may compare the ainos of the Hawk and the Nightingale in the Works and Days of Hesiod (202–212; ainos at 202), where the predatory nature of the hawk is an exemplum of the ways of hubris as opposed to the ways of dikē. By associating the birth of Pericles with that of the lion cub, Herodotus has exploited the ambiguity of the ainos as a form of discourse: the child Pericles will become either the savior or the predator, the destroyer, of the Hellenic community at large that will raise him.

§54. This is not to say that Pericles is being subjected to blame. The ainos is simply an edifying discourse that bears implicit warnings of potential blame built into it. I see a similar sort of message in the ainos of the lion cub at Aeschylus Agamemnon 717–736. In the symbol of

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169 Cf. Ch. 9§7 and following.
170 Cf. Ch. 8§36 on Herodotus 2.120.5: the power of a daimôn preordained the destruction of Troy in order to teach humans about the patterns of divine retribution for a-dik-ēmata ‘wrongdoings, injustice’. This interpretation is expressed as the gnōmē ‘judgment’ of Herodotus (ibid.).
172 The “moral” of the fable becomes clear at Works and Days 274–285: see Ch. 9§7n38.
173 On οὗτος at Agamemnon 718 as a performative marker of ainos, see Ch. 10§52 above.
the lion cub who is brought home to a palace and raised as a pet, as if he were native to human society, only to grow into an alien menace, bent on carnage, on destroying the very benefactors who had treated him as their own, we see a reference that extends not only to various characters of the *Oresteia* but even to the audience itself as the embodiment of the Athenian Empire. The *Oresteia* was produced in 458 B.C.; already in 472 B.C., the *khorēgos* for the *Persians* of Aeschylus was none other than Pericles. All this is not to imply that Athens in general or Pericles in particular was being subjected to blame. Rather it is to say only that the *ainos*, true to its moral purpose, instructs as it implicitly warns. We may compare the characterization of Oedipus in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, which can be interpreted as an implicit characterization of the city of Athens in its role as leader of the Athenian Empire. The Empire is *turannos*, in the dramatized words of Pericles (Thucydides 2.63), and the notion of an Athenian Empire is already presupposed in the *Histories* of Herodotus (e.g., 5.97). For Herodotus too, the Empire is *turannos*. In this sense the theme of “alien is native,” with a focus on the concept of *turannos*, is a mark not only of the *ainos* but of the very master plan of Herodotean narrative.

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174 Ibid.

175 Knox 1954.
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The Ainos as Song or Speech: Pindar and Herodotus III

§1. On the level of content, we have seen some striking similarities between Pindaric song and Herodotean prose in conveying a moral message about the realities of wealth, power, and prestige. The actual tradition of such a moral message can be summed up in one word, ainos, a premier term of self-reference in the epinician medium of Pindar. Though we find no attestations of this term in the Histories of Herodotus, it is by now clear that this work is shaped by the principles of the ainos. Moreover, these principles are cognate with those of historiā ‘inquiry’, the medium of Herodotus. The authority of Herodotus is based on the traditional thought patterns of historiā, just as the authority of Pindar is based on those of the ainos. This relationship of historiā and ainos can best be seen wherever the prose of Herodotus, in order to demonstrate its authority, makes direct use of song, poetry, and other kinds of prose.

§2. I begin with an example where Herodotus deploys an actual ainos, in the specific sense of ‘fable’. We find it in Herodotus’ narrative of the overtures made by Persia to Argos, a passage that we have already considered in connection with the Persian manipulation of an Argive myth that would entitle Argos to hegemony over the Peloponnesus (7.150.1–2).1 In this narrative Herodotus leaves open the possibility that Argos, in its ambition to achieve hegemony and gain the upper hand over its rival, Sparta, cooperated with the Persians and thus betrayed the Hellenes allied against Persia. After giving \{314|315\} the Argive version of what really happened (7.148.2–149.3), Herodotus reports three opposing versions.

§3. The first and least damaging of these versions is that Argos, in order to remain neutral toward Persia, deliberately set impossible terms for cooperation with Sparta (7.150.3). Second, Herodotus reports a version derived from Athenian sources, to the effect that the Persian king

1 Cf. Ch. 10§34.
Artaxerxes, around the time of the Peace of Kallias, declared that no city was more dear to him than Argos (Herodotus 7.151). Then, after declaring that he is not certain whether these two versions are true, he exculpates the Argives by saying that even if these reports were true, the Argives would not thereby be guilty of the very worst deeds imaginable. In support of this thought Herodotus now speaks in a mode of ainos that is characteristic of Aesop’s Fables:² if all men, he says, were to bring to one place all their kaka ‘evils’, they would surely, upon seeing what the other man has, take back home whatever they had brought (Herodotus 7.152.2).³ This formulation is strikingly similar to the attested fable of Aesop known as “The Two Packs,” likewise concerning the topic of one man’s perception of another man’s kaka ‘evils’ (Aesop Fable 266 Perry, Πῆραι δύο). Immediately after speaking in the mode of an ainos, Herodotus continues in the mode of one who conducts a historiā:

ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφεῖλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαι γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω, καὶ μοι τούτο τὸ ἔχων ἔχετω ἐς πάντα λόγον

Herodotus 7.152.3

I owe [opheilō] it to tell what is being told, but I by no means owe [opheilō] it to believe it, and what I say here should go for everything I say.

It is only after exculpating the Argives in the mode of an ainos and after making this all-inclusive statement about his procedures in historiā that Herodotus gets around to the third and final negative version about the Argives: that they themselves, in their rivalry with the Spartans, had invited the Persians to invade Hellas (7.152.3).

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² On ainos as a ‘fable’ of Aesop: sources in N 1979.239§18n2.
³ For the juridical implications, see Detienne 1973.88–89.
§4. Having thus cushioned his negative reports about Argos, Herodotus assumes the stance of a fair and impartial arbitrator. This stance is obviously no longer evident to Greeks of later times, as when Plutarch, in his essay *On the Malice of Herodotus*, singles out this particular passage of Herodotus about Argos as a prime example of the author’s malicious disposition (Plutarch *On the Malice of Herodotus* 863b–864a). The equitable but always diplomatic approach of Herodotus to the varied interests and prejudices of the city-states in the period after the Persian Wars is lost on Plutarch, who {315|316} fails to observe the juridical dimension of what Herodotus has to say in the capacity of conducting a *historiā* ‘inquiry’. In order to appreciate this dimension, we would do well to compare the surviving Greek texts of international, that is, inter-polis arbitration.

§5. Let us consider, for example, an inscription recording the arbitration by King Lysimachus of Thrace, shortly before 281 B.C., of a territorial dispute between the states of Samos and Priene.\(^4\) We may note in particular the phraseology that describes how the people of Priene presented their arguments:

\[
\text{oí mēn ou̱n Πριηνεῖς tēn mēn ē̊ξ āρχῆς γεγενημένην a[ύ]τ[οίς] | [κτήσι]ν τῆς Βατινήτιδος χώρας ἐπεδείκνυον ἕκ τε τῶν ἱστοριῶν κ[αί] | [τῶν ἄλ]λων μαρτυριῶν καὶ δικαιωμάτων [με]τὰ τῶν ἔξετῶν [σπον]δῶ[ν]}
\]

*Inschriften von Priene* no. 500.11–13\(^5\)

The people of Priene were seeking to demonstrate [= make an *epideixis*] that the territory called Batinetis belonged to them on the basis of inquiries [*historiai*],\(^6\) other evidence [*marturiai*], and documents, including\(^7\) the six-year truce.

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\(^4\) Hiller von Gaertringen 1906 no. 500. Also Piccirilli 1973.17, no. 4. On the dating, see Tod 1931.41.

\(^5\) Hiller von Gaetringen ibid.
We may compare the phraseology used by Herodotus in describing a conflict of claims between the people of Sybaris and the people of Kroton:

\[
\text{μαρτύρια δὲ τούτων ἐκάτεροι ἀποδεικνύουσι τάδε: ( ... ) ταῦτα μὲν νυν ἐκάτεροι αὐτῶν \text{martúria} \text{apo}-\text{deixis} \text{martúria} \text{apo}-\text{phainon} \text{martúria} \text{martúria} \text{martúria} \text{martúria}
\]

Both parties make a public display [= verb of apo-deixis] of evidence [marturia] for their claims, as follows: [...] The above, then, are the evidence [marturia] that each of the two parties makes public [= verb apo-phainomai]. It is possible to agree with whichever side one believes.

In this case, as in his account of the policies of Argos at the time of the Persian Wars, Herodotus goes so far in his impartiality as not even to express his own opinion. It suffices for him merely to conduct his historiai ‘inquiry’. Technically the historiai of Herodotus corresponds to the process of arbitration, not to the actual outcome.

§6. Even in actual cases of juridical arbitration, the procedures do not necessarily lead to a juridical outcome: the given dispute may in the end be settled out of court if the arbitrator finds a successful formula for mediation, that is, if he can induce the two parties to agree

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6 In what follows, I shall attempt to demonstrate why the juridical sense of ‘inquiries’ is more appropriate here for the word historiai than the literary sense of ‘histories’.

7 I am following here in the interpretation of Piccirilli ibid.

8 On the semantics of apo-deixis: Ch. 8§3 and following.

9 Cf. Ch. 8§5, 8§34.

10 For a dramatic example of a case where Herodotus does indeed express his own opinion, I cite the case of Croesus, as discussed at Ch. 8§20 and following.
mutually to an out-of-court settlement. Otherwise the arbitrator must resort to a juridical verdict as he pronounces a final assessment or award. As one expert puts it, “An arbitrator may mediate, but a mediator as such has no arbitral authority, and in the cases before us, where a solution could not be reached by mutual agreement, the court had the right and the duty of pronouncing an award which was binding upon both parties.” In the dispute between Priene and Samos the verdict of the arbitrator, King Lysimachus, has aptly been described as follows:

Note, first, the time and trouble devoted to the settlement of this difference by the ruler of a wide empire, the fair and dispassionate tone which characterizes his rescript, and his evident desire to justify his award to the reason and the conscience of the states directly concerned and of the world at large. And, in the second place, note that, so far as our knowledge goes, this arbitration of Lysimachus closed forever a dispute which had lasted, in varying degrees of intensity, for four centuries at least.

§7. The status of the arbitrator may vary considerably, as we see from this description of a verdict rendered in yet another dispute between Priene and Samos:

This time it is no powerful monarch who arbitrates, nor yet a large popular tribunal, embodying the democratic ideal of justice, like that court of six hundred Milesians who ... adjudicated on the Spartan and Messenian claims to

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11 For such cases, see Tod 1913.123–127.
12 Tod 1913.127.
13 Tod 1932.56.
14 For the inscription, see Hiller von Gaertringen 1906, Inschriften von Priene no. 37. See Tod 1913.41 (early second century B.C.).
the ager Dentheliates. The matter is referred to the Rhodian state, and from its members a panel of five arbitrators is selected, a small body of men chosen, we may assume, for their character and ability. At the close of their proceedings, they drew up a report upon the whole case, and this reflects credit upon the clarity of their thought and expression, the thoroughness with which they carried out the task entrusted to them and the equitable nature of their final judgement.\(^{15}\)

§8. The evidence used by the arbitrator also varies. In the case of the latter dispute between Priene and Samos, the records show that the arbitrators heard testimony in neutral territory, as also at the disputed territory,\(^{16}\) whereupon, as they declare, ‘we arrived at our decision in accordance with what we have seen’ (ἐποιησάμεθα τὰ γνώμην κατὰ τὰ ύφερ’ | [άμων ἐφ] οραμένα).\(^{17}\) This figurative sense of ‘seeing’, clearly attested here in its juridical context of ‘knowing’, corresponds closely to the etymology of oida ‘know’ as ‘have seen’ and of histór ‘witness, arbitrator’ as ‘he who has seen’.\(^{18}\) The arbitrator is a superwitness who builds an all-encompassing knowledge of a situation by bringing together the knowledge of all those who bear witness, no matter what their status may be. The crucial factor is the witness’s knowledge of the facts, as we see strikingly illustrated in an inscription recording the arbitration of a dispute between Condaea and an unknown state,\(^{19}\) where we are fortunate enough to have the actual deposition of an elderly shepherd who has known the disputed territory from boyhood:

\(^{15}\) Tod 1932.56–57.
\(^{16}\) Inschriften von Priene no. 37.20–24.
\(^{17}\) Inschriften von Priene no. 37.24–25.
\(^{19}\) IG 9.2.521, early third century B.C., found at Larisa.
καὶ Λάδικος ὁ Ἀσκυριεύς ἐμαρτυρίαν τήνδε: μαρτυρίαν λαβὼν ἔκλειψε τὰ διά τῆς χώρας, ἴσως καὶ παρὼν ἐνεφάνιζον τοῖς κριταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς κορυφῆς τοῦ Νυσίου κατὰ τὸν ἑώρημεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῇ κοινῇ μαρτυρίᾳ. Ἐπικράτησεν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησάσθεν ὁ Κονδαῖς ἑκοτικάς καὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γνώσει καὶ ἔλεη τῷ παραγώγῳ τῆς χώρας.

And Ladikos of Askryris testified as follows: “Ladikos, son of Harmo-dios, of Askryris, bears witness [= is a martus] to the Condaeans. I know [= verb epistamai] the land, which I also showed to the judges as I came down from the summit of Nyseion, the place nearer to us, as far as the defile, which the Condaeans too pointed out [= verb of epideixis] to the judges; and I used to hear from the older men that at this spot the land belongs to the Condaeans; and I know [= verb epistamai] of myself that I have been pasturing my flocks in the territory for a considerable time and that the Condaeans keep the passage-duty at this spot.”

§9. The juridical sense of ‘seeing’/‘knowing’ as the foundation of evidence in the process of inquiry must be kept in mind as we consider references to the use of historiā as evidence in inscriptions recording arbitrations. In some cases such historiāi can be identified as known

Translation after Tod 1913.148–149. See also lines 19–38 of the same inscription, IG 9.2.521, for similar depositions given by local fishermen.
literary works, such as the *Histories* of Duris of Samos. Even here, however, the juridical heritage of the word *historiā* comes through: in the eyes of the law, *historiā* as ‘inquiry’—even if it also happens to be a literary achievement—is a juridical process. This is as it should be, if indeed the concept of *historiā* is derived from the juridical concept of arbitration, as still reflected in the noun *histōr* ‘witness, arbitrator’. This legal point of view, that *historiā* even as “history” is still a juridical process, can best be seen in the phraseological combination of *apodeixis* ‘public display’ with *historiographoi* ‘writers of histories’ in an inscription recording admissible evidence for an arbitration. We are reminded that the *historiā* of Herodotus is technically the *apodeixis* of his *historiā* (Herodotus *proemium*). As for the inscription that we are now considering, there is more to the interesting phraseological combination of *apodeixis* ‘public display’ with *historiographoi* ‘writers of histories’: besides ‘writers of history’, we see *poiētai* ‘poets’ also mentioned in the same context, so that the *apodeixis* of historians is parallel to that of poets in the eyes of the law.

§10. In this context we may recall the explicit association of the concept of *apodeixis* with both *logioi* ‘masters of speech’ and *aoidoi* ‘masters of song’ in the traditional phraseology of Pindar. For another interesting illustration of such parallelism, I cite the report of Tacitus on the arbitration of a territorial dispute between Sparta and Messenia by the Roman Senate in A.D. 25: the envoys of the Spartans had used as evidence the *annalium memoria vatumque carmina* ‘records of annals and the songs of poets’ (*Annals* 4.43), while the Messenians countered by pointing to the presence of certain ancient statues as evidence for the division of the Peloponnesus among the Herakleidai, the Sons of Herakles (ibid.), and added that *si vatum,*

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23 Cf. Ch. 8§8 and following, especially Ch. 8§11.
annalium ad testimonia vocentur, plures sibi ac locupletiores esse ‘if they were to cite the evidence of poets and annals, they would have at their disposal more and richer sources’ (ibid.).

§11. It is clear that the juridical value of historiā, as something parallel to poetry, is not confined to the furnishing of factual evidence in our narrowest sense of the word: the admissible evidence to be used in the process of arbitration can include traditional myths as attested by both historiā and poetry. So also in the Oratio Deliaca of Hyperides, a speech delivered on behalf of Athens’ claim to the administration of the Delian Sanctuary in a case of international (again in the sense of inter-polis) arbitration: here the author’s copious treatment of myths about the wanderings of Leto and the birth of Apollo and Artemis can be connected with the remark of Maximus Planudes to the effect that Hyperides, ‘desirous of proving that the Delian sanctuaries belonged of old time to the Athenians, has made great use of mythology’ (Maximus Planudes ad h.l.t. V, p. 481 Walz, = Oratores Attici ii, p. 392 ed. Didot).

§12. For further examples of the use of myths as evidence in cases of arbitration, we have not only the testimony of inscriptions (e.g., SIG 665.35–36) but also such specific anecdotes as the one about Solon’s citing two verses from the Homeric Catalogue of Ships (Iliad II 557–558) to the Spartan arbitrators of a territorial dispute between Athens and Megara over the island of Salamis in 519/518 B.C. (Plutarch Life of Solon 10). 24 In Plutarch’s account the specific word that designates Solon’s actual citing of the given verses is apo-deik-numai, the verb of apo-deixis ‘public display’ (Solon 10.3). Again we see that poetry, the voice of myth, is a source of authority compatible with the juridical process of arbitration.

§13. There is even an instance where the poetic voice can become the vehicle of arbitration. Thucydides reports that the Corcyraeans, in their dispute with the Corinthians,

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24 The testimony of Plutarch is to be supplemented by Strabo 9.1.10 C394; cf. Aristotle Rhetoric 1375b and Quintilian Institutio oratoria 5.11.40. Cf. Tod 1913.134n2; also Piccirilli 1973.46–56.
were willing to submit this dispute to arbitration by the Delphic Oracle (1.28). The choice of the Delphic Oracle as an arbitrator was entertained as a course of action only by the Corcyraeans, not by the Corinthians, and the Corcyraeans did so only as a last resort, so that the choice was in fact unusual. This distinctness of the Delphic Oracle as arbitrator is a function of its poetic mode of communication. In a standard book that surveys the attestations of arbitrations, we find only one instance where the Delphic Oracle actually served as arbitrator, in a dispute between Klazomenai and Kyme over the territory of Leuke, and we can see immediately the distinctness of the situation: “no board of judges is appointed, no inquiry is held, no witnesses are heard.” Instead the Oracle simply issues a poetic utterance: in the paraphrase of Diodorus, the Oracle says that it awards Leuke to ‘whichever state is the first to sacrifice at Leuke, but each must start out from their own territory at sunrise on the same day, which should be fixed by common agreement’ (15.18.2). The utterance left considerable room for interpretation: the citizens of Klazomenai quickly founded a settlement that was closer to Leuke and thereby gained the necessary head start to arrive at this destination before the citizens of Kyme (Diodorus 15.18.3).

§14. Despite its authority, then, the utterance of the Delphic Oracle is ambiguous even in cases of arbitration: like the ainōs, the spoken word of the Oracle here again functions as a code containing at least two messages, as the citizens of Kyme must have discovered to their

25 For a commentary on this passage of Thucydides, see Piccirilli 1973.112–116.
26 Tod 1913.95.
27 Tod ibid. This instance is recorded by Diodorus 15.18 (date: sometime after 383 B.C.). See also Piccirilli 1973.164–165; also I§25, I§31, I§35, I§38, I§40, citing one other exceptional instance where the Delphic Oracle reportedly served as arbitrator, in this case the dispute concerned the possession of a golden tripod fished from the sea.
28 Tod ibid.
distress. The ambiguity of the Oracle may account for its apparently limited use as a court of last resort, but it diminishes in no way its actual authority in upholding the process and even the ideology of arbitration: in fact the sanctuary of the Delphic Oracle was a traditional site for inscribing the records of awards in cases of inter-polis arbitration.

§15. I have gone into all this detail in considering the Hellenic institution of inter-polis arbitration because its juridical procedures match so closely the methods used by Herodotus in conducting his historiā ‘inquiry’. As in a case of arbitration, he consistently records divergent as well as convergent testimony and declares his duty to report whatever is being said. A particularly striking illustration is the stance that he takes in considering charges of collaboration between Argos and Persia. As in a typical case of arbitration, moreover, Herodotus too admits as evidence the testimony of historians and poets. We see him, for example, critically examining the findings of his predecessor, Hecataeus of Miletus (e.g., Herodotus 2.143.1, 6.137.1). Also, we see him frequently referring to poetry and song: besides Homer (2.23, 2.53.2; 2.116, etc.) and Hesiod (2.53.2, 3; 4.32), he manages to mention in one context or another such figures as Archilochus (1.12.2), Anacreon (3.121.1), Sappho (2.135), Alcaeus (5.95), Simonides (5.102.3, 7.228.4), Pindar (3.38.4)—whom he explicitly paraphrases (= Pindar F 169.1 SM)—and Aeschylus (2.156.6). Even more frequently Herodotus refers to and quotes the poetic utterances of oracles, especially of the Delphic Oracle.

§16. In view of the established authority of the Delphic Oracle as the repository for recording awards in actual cases of arbitration, it is important to note again the function of the

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29 As for the winners, the people of Klazomenai established a festival, called the prophthasia ‘anticipation’, to commemorate their victory (Diodorus 15.18.3).
30 For an inventory of inscriptions recording awards in cases of inter-polis arbitration, see Tod 1913.95n2.
31 Cf. Ch. 11§1; cf. also the earlier discussion at Ch. 10§43.
32 Survey of Herodotean references to Hecataeus in How and Wells 19281 24-25. On Hecataeus as logopoios ‘artisan of speech’, see Ch. 8§11.
Oracle in the *Histories* of Herodotus as the ultimate authority in assessing who was *aitios* ‘responsible, guilty’ in the ultimate conflict that he narrates. The guilt of the tyrant Croesus is determined immediately by the authority of Herodotus, who ‘indicates’ (verb *sēmainō*) who is guilty as he conducts a *historiā* ‘inquiry’, and ultimately by the authority of Apollo, who is described by Heraclitus as ‘indicating’ (again, verb *sēmainō*) his messages through his ambiguous but authoritative Oracle, and whose true message becomes in the end manifest through the narration of Herodotus. In the end the ambiguous code of Apollo arbitrates the conflict between Europeans and Asiatics through the *historiā* of Herodotus.

§17. Though Plutarch does not recognize the juridical stance inherent in the narrative of Herodotus, he does observe condescendingly that this narrative is delivered in a mode that resembles that of Aesop’s fables. Moreover, Plutarch is making this specific observation in the context of condemning what he deems to be the malice of Herodotus in his use of the utterances of the Delphic Oracle. After quoting a passage in the *Histories* where Herodotus is paraphrasing an utterance of the Oracle in favor of the Aeginetans and at the expense of the Athenians (Herodotus 8.122–123), Plutarch goes on to say:

> οὐκέτι Σκύθαις οὐδὲ Πέρσαις οὐδ’ Αἰγυπτίοις τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ λόγους ἀνατίθησι πλάττων, ὥσπερ Αἴσωπος κόραξι καὶ πιθήκοις, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοῦ Πυθίου προσώπῳ χρώμενος ἀπωθεῖ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι πρωτείων τὰς Ἀθήνας

*Plutarch On the Malice of Herodotus 871d*

He [=Herodotus] no longer assigns his words, as he makes them up, to Scythians or Persians or Egyptians, in the way that Aesop assigns his to ravens and

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33 Cf. Ch. 8§36 and following.
34 Cf. Ch. 11§2.
monkeys, but he uses the persona of the Pythian god [= Apollo at Delphi] in order to prevent the Athenians from receiving the first prize at Salamis.\(^{35}\)

This observation about Herodotus, pejorative though it is, hits the mark in calling our attention to an affinity between his form of discourse and that of Aesop. Technically a fable of Aesop is an \textit{ainos},\(^ {36}\) and the \textit{Life of Aesop} tradition shows that fables of Aesop, as he is said to have told them, were \{322|323\} delivered in the ambiguous manner of the \textit{ainos}, where whatever he says has both an explicit and an implicit meaning—the implication to be derived from the context in which he speaks.\(^ {37}\)

§18. For example, Aesop tells his fable of “The Wolves, the Dogs, and the Sheep”\(^ {38}\) to the citizens of Samos, with the implicit meaning that the Lydian king Croesus is like the wolves, that he is like the dogs, and that the Samians are like the sheep.\(^ {39}\) At the moment Croesus is demanding that the Samians extradite Aesop, who had saved them as a dog saves sheep from the wolf, by having already told them another fable, “The Path of Freedom and the Path of

\(^{35}\) Plutarch is taking Herodotus to task for what he deems to be malice against Themistokles and the Athenians. Herodotus reports that the Delphic Oracle had pronounced Aegina and not Athens as worthy of the first prize for valor publicly displayed at the Battle of Salamis. We know that according to local Athenian traditions as reflected by Isocrates (\textit{Panegyric} 72), Athens supposedly got the first prize. It surely seems ironic to us, at least, that Herodotus’ account here, especially in the subsequent section that is neither quoted nor even mentioned by Plutarch (Herodotus 8.124.1), is in fact diplomatically complimentary to Themistokles.

\(^{36}\) Sources in N 1979.239§18n2.

\(^{37}\) For an introduction to the \textit{Life of Aesop} tradition, see N, pp. 279–316. The implicit meaning of a fable may also be derived from the context in which one \textit{does} something: see Karadagli 1981.75–76 on Herodotus 5.92.

\(^{38}\) \textit{Life of Aesop} 97 and \textit{Aesop Fable} no. 153 Perry.

\(^{39}\) Aesop wants the Samians to inscribe this fable on a \textit{mnēma} ‘monument’ that is to be dedicated to him after his death (\textit{Life of Aesop} G 96). See N 1979.286n1: “This narrative device of a self-fulfilling prophecy implies that the \textit{Life of Aesop} tradition had once been suitable for an inscription in a precinct of Aesop as cult-hero.” Note the reference in \textit{Life of Aesop} W 100 to a \textit{temenos} ‘precinct’ set aside in honor of Aesop by the citizens of Samos; at G 100, this precinct is called the \textit{Aisôpeion}. For further discussion, including a comparison with the cult precinct of Archilochus at Paros known as the \textit{Arkhilokheion}, see N, pp. 285–286n1.
Slavery.” In this fable the path of freedom is harsh at the beginning and pleasant at the end, while the path of slavery is the opposite. The path of slavery is characterized specifically by its initial trūphē ‘luxuriance’, to be followed later by harshness. In response to this fable the Samians had decided to accept the path of freedom and had rejected the earlier demand of Croesus that they pay him tribute. We are reminded of the lessons to be learned from the Croesus story of Herodotus, who authoritatively accuses the Lydian tyrant of being aitios ‘responsible’ for the ultimate conflict between Hellenes and Asiatics (1.5.3 in the context of 1.1.1, 1.2.1, and 1.3.4) precisely because he was the first barbarian, according to Herodotus, who reduced Hellenic cities to the status of tributaries (1.6.2).

§19. Later on in the same Life of Aesop narrative, Aesop voluntarily visits the court of Croesus and warns the king not to kill him, on account of the blame that would be incurred through such a deed; he reinforces this warning by telling the Lydian tyrant the fable of “The Poor Man and the Cicada”: a poor man, who resorts to eating locusts in order to stay alive, happens to catch a cicada, who pleads for his life on the grounds that he does not harm {323|324} men by robbing them of their possessions, as locusts do, but instead benefits them through his song, ‘and you will find nothing more in me than my voice’. The last phrase amounts to a warning: in a fragment of an earlier master of the ainos, Archilochus, we see

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40 Life of Aesop 94 and Aesop Fable no. 383 Perry.
41 In Life of Aesop 94, the word for ‘harsh’ (path) is trākheia, the same word used in a comparable context by Herodotus 9.122.2. See Ch. 9§26.
42 Life of Aesop G 94.
43 Life of Aesop 95.
44 For the wording about the tribute, see Life of Aesop 92.
45 Cf. Ch. 10§49.
46 Life of Aesop 99 and Aesop Fable no. 387 Perry.
47 Life of Aesop W 99; in version G 99 the distinction between locust (akris) and cicada (tettix) is garbled.
48 On self-references in Archilochean poetry to ainos (e.g., F 174 W), see N 1979.283.
that the cicada is a master of blame whenever he is wronged (F 223 W).\(^{49}\) Croesus responds to the warning by sparing the life of Aesop and offering to grant him a favor; Aesop then asks for and is granted a peaceful settlement between the Lydians and the Samians.\(^{50}\)

§20. In this way further meaning comes to light from the σήμειον ‘sign’\(^{51}\) that Aesop had partially interpreted at the beginning of his dealings with the citizens of Samos.\(^{52}\) At a meeting of the Samian assembly, an eagle had seized and flown away with a ring to be worn by whoever was to be newly elected as ‘guardian’ of the city’s laws.\(^{53}\) Then the eagle had returned and dropped the ring in the lap of a slave. At the beginning Aesop had interpreted the σήμειον ‘sign’\(^{54}\) by drawing a parallel connecting the eagle with Croesus and the transfer of the ring to the slave with the shift from autonomy to tributary status for Samos.\(^{55}\) As a reward for his interpretation, however, Aesop demands and is granted emancipation from his own status as slave.\(^{56}\) In the end, then, the chain of events leads to the further interpretation that Aesop himself has effectively become the true guardian of the laws of the Samians. This quasi-juridical stance of Aesop should be kept in mind as we approach the topic of parallelisms between Aesop and Solon in the stories of their encounters with Croesus of Lydia.\(^{57}\)

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\(^{50}\) Life of Aesop 100.

\(^{51}\) The word is related to σῆμα ‘sign’, as discussed at Ch. 8§20, 8§25, and following.

\(^{52}\) Life of Aesop 81.

\(^{53}\) Life of Aesop G 81. Aesop refers to this ring as στρατηγικός ‘belonging to the στρατηγός’ (G 91). Since the word στρατηγός ‘general’ designates ‘lawgiver’ at Aesop Fable 348 Perry, a story that reveals striking parallels with the Samian story of Maiandrios, successor to the tyrant Polykrates (Herodotus 3.142–143; see n58), it may be pertinent also to compare the story of the Ring of Polykrates (Herodotus 3.41–42).

\(^{54}\) Again Life of Aesop 81.

\(^{55}\) Life of Aesop 91.

\(^{56}\) Life of Aesop 90.

\(^{57}\) Cf. Ch. 11§30 and following. Note too the preoccupation of Aesopic fables with the juridical theme of guilt (as expressed by αἰτία ‘responsibility’ and its derivatives): survey by Karadagli 1981.108–109.
§21. With these examples of Aesop’s fables in mind, we return to the proposition that Plutarch’s pejorative comparison of Herodotus with Aesop is apt. Herodotus too, as we have seen, can speak in the manner of the aινος, occasionally even telling an outright fable⁵⁸ and frequently manipulating the Hellenic perspective, as Plutarch charges, by applying to Scythians, Persians, or Egyptians what really applies to Hellenes (On the Malice of Herodotus 871d).⁵⁹ In fact the language of Herodotus himself provides testimony that his own tradition of discourse and that of Aesop are related: in an incidental mention of Aesop, Herodotus refers to him as a λογοποῖος ‘artisan of speech’ (Αἰσώπου τοῦ λογοποιοῦ Herodotus 2.134.3).⁶⁰ This word λογοποῖος is used by Herodotus to refer to his own predecessor, Hecataeus of Miletus (e.g., Ἐκαταίῳ τῶ λογοποιῷ Herodotus 2.143.1).⁶¹ Moreover, in the same context where Herodotus incidentally mentions Aesop as a λογοποῖος ‘artisan of speech’, he mentions the poet Sappho as a

⁵⁸ See also Ch. 11§2. For a survey of instances where Herodotus tells fables, see Karadagli 1981 on Herodotus 1.25 (p. 77), 1.41 (pp. 23, 65), 1.158–159 (pp. 78–79), 3.46 (pp. 84–85), 4.131–132 (p. 91), 5.92 (pp. 75–76), 6.86 (pp. 35–37). Note too the close correspondence between the story of Maiandrios of Samos, Herodotus 3.142–143, and the fable of “The Wolf as Lawgiver and the Ass,” Aesop Fable no. 348 Perry, as discussed by Detienne and Svenbro 1979.218–221. In this Aesopic fable the title of στρατηγὸς ‘general’ is applied to the status of a lawgiver.

⁵⁹ Cf. Ch. 11§16. Note, for example, the fable of “The Aulos-Player and the Fish,” as told by the Persian king Cyrus (Herodotus 1.141). This kind of manipulation is not limited to fables in the strict sense of the word. I cite the celebrated passage known as the Debate of the Constitutions, Herodotus 3.80–88. I cite also the distinction, made by the scholia to Aristophanes Birds 471, between Aesopic and ‘Sybaritic’ fables: the latter supposedly concentrate on humans while the former concentrate on animals. Compare the reference in Aristophanes Wasps 1258–1260 to two kinds of discourse appropriate for learned merriment, the Aesopic and the ‘Sybaritic’ (Subaritikoi), both of which are to be learned at the symposium.

⁶⁰ Aesop gets the same title in Aristotle Constitution of the Samians, F 573 Rose. The context of Herodotus’ mention of Aesop suggests that he was aware of the narrative traditions about Aesop in Samos, as attested in the passages of the Life of Aesop (81–95; see Ch. 11§20 above). Herodotus says that both a Thracian woman called Rhodopis and Aesop himself (also referred to as a Thracian in, e.g., Aristotle Constitution of the Samians, F 573 Rose) were slaves of one Iadmon, and that Rhodopis was taken to Egypt by ‘Xanthes the Samian’, from where she was later ransomed by the brother of Sappho (Herodotus 2.134–135). In the Life of Aesop, a Samian called Xanthos is the last of three masters who own Aesop as slave; in the end Xanthos frees Aesop (90). The first of the three masters, who is not named in the Life, may very well be the same character as the ‘Iadmon’ of Herodotus. (It should be clear from my choice of the word character that I think of sameness here not in terms of prosopography but rather in terms of story types.)

⁶¹ Cf. Ch. 11§13.
mousopoios ‘artisan of song’ (Σαπφούς τῆς μουσοποιοῦ Herodotus 2.135.1), and the juxtaposition here of logopoios/mousopoios in the language of Herodotus seems perfectly parallel to the juxtaposition of logios/aoidos ‘master of speech/song’ in the language of Pindar. In fact we have seen that Herodotus is by implication a logios, a ‘master of speech’ whose function is parallel to that of a Pindar as aoidos, a ‘master of song’.

§22. Mention of this juxtaposition not only brings us back to the starting point of our discussion, where we had considered the comparative evidence of Pindar’s language in investigating the essence of Herodotus’ historiā. It also brings us to a confrontation with a crucial difference between Aesop and Herodotus, Plutarch notwithstanding: whereas the ainos of Aesop the slave, in line with Aesop’s own social position, is lowly, that of Herodotus is elevated. As such, the implicit ainos of Herodotus as logios has more in common with the ainos of a figure like Pindar, whose epinician lyric poetry overtly refers to itself as ainos. Though Plutarch may begrudge Herodotus the quoting of oracles as a way of conveying a message (again On the Malice of Herodotus 871d), such a procedure seems perfectly in keeping with the lofty stance of a man who himself semainei ‘indicates’ from a superior position of knowledge akin to that of the oracles. In fact the prose of Herodotus can combine with the poetry of oracles to convey the same sort of message that is conveyed by the uninterrupted lyric poetry of Pindar.

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62 Cf. Ch. 8§11.
63 Ibid.
64 For a striking illustration of this social perspective, consider the image of Aesop in Plutarch Banquet of the Seven Sages 150a: at the banquet Aesop is given a place next to Solon, but he sits on a diphros ‘low chair’ (it is in this context that Aesop tells the fable of “The Lydian Mule”). We may note the parallelism between Aesop and Solon as sages who visit the court of Croesus the Lydian: Life of Aesop 99 and Herodotus 1.29.1 (Ch. 8§44–45).
65 Cf. Ch. 6§2 and following.
66 Cf. Ch. 8§20, 8§25, and following.
§23. I close this part of the presentation with an illustration of this principle, where we juxtapose a given Herodotean passage with a corresponding Pindaric one. It seems fitting that the message of both the Herodotean and the Pindaric passages about to be quoted concerns an admonition about the evils of *hubris*. First, let us look at the passage taken from Herodotus, where the sequence of thought runs through a stretch of prose/poetry/back to prose:

χρησμοῖσι δὲ οὐκ ἔχω ἀντιλέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ ἄληθες, οὐ βουλόμενος ἐναργῶς λέγοντας πειράσθαι καταβάλλειν, ἐς τοιάδε πρήγματα ἐσβλέψας ἀλλ’ ὅταν Ἀρτέμιδος χρυσαόρου ἱερόν ἀκτὴν ἐς τοιάδε πρήγματα ἐσβλέψας, διὰ Δίκη οἰκεῖσθαι κρατεροῖς Ἀθήνας, διεινόν μαίμωντα, δοκεύντ’ ἀνὰ πάντα πίεσθαι.67

χαλκὸς γὰρ χαλκῷ συμμίξεται, αἵματι δ’ Ἀρης πόντον φοινίξει. τότ’ ἐλεύθερον Ἑλλάδος ἥμαρ εὐρύσκω Κρονίδης ἐπάγει καὶ πότνια Νίκη.

ἐς τοιάτα μὲν καὶ οὕτω ἐναργῶς λέγοντι Βάκιδι ἄντιλογίας Χρησμῶν περὶ οὕτε αὐτὸς λέγειν τολμῶν οὐτε παρ’ ἄλλων ἐνδέκομαι

Herodotus 8.77

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67 An emendation for the manuscript reading πιθέσθαι: discussion in Powell 1939.117. Retaining the manuscript reading, Fontenrose 1978.185 translates δοκεῦντ’ ἀνὰ πάντα πιθέσθαι as ‘thinking to subdue the world’.
I cannot speak against the oracles, claiming that they are not true [alēthees]. I do not wish to try to discredit them, when they speak manifestly, as when I consider what follows:

When they bridge the sea from the sacred headland of golden-sworded Artemis, with ships, all the way to seaside Kynosoura, with frenzied ambition [elpis], after having destroyed shining Athens, then shall bright Justice [Dikē] quench powerful Insatiability [Koros], son of Outrage [Hubris],

who rages terribly, thinking to swallow up the world.

Bronze shall mingle with bronze, and with blood shall Ares make red the sea. Then will the day of freedom that belongs to Greece be brought about by wide-seeing Zeus and Lady Nikē [Victory].

So, looking at what precedes, I do not have the daring [= verb of tolma] to say things that would contradict what Bakis says so manifestly.68 And I would not stand for it if anyone else would say anything contradictory either.

Now let us examine the analogous passage taken from Pindar, where the sequence of thought runs through a stretch of uninterrupted lyric poetry:

ἐν τῇ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει κασιγνήτα τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές, | Δίκα καὶ ὀμότροφος Εἰρήνα, τάμι’ ἀνδρασί πλούτου, | χρύσαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος. |

ἐθέλοντι δ’ ἄλεξειν | Ὑβριν, Κόρου ματέρα θρασύμυθον. | εἶχο γυνα τε φράσαι, τόλμα τέ μοι | εὐθεία γλώσσαν ορνύει λέγειν

68 On the figure of Bakis, see Ch. 6§48.
Pindar Olympian 13.6–12

There [=in Corinth], Eunomiā,\(^\text{69}\) sure foundation-stone of cities, dwells with Justice \(\text{Dikē}\) and Peace, dispenser of wealth to man, her sisters, golden daughters of Lawfulness \(\text{Themis}\), lady of good counsel. They accede to warding off Outrage \(\text{Hubris}\), the one with the rash words \(\text{mūthoi}\), the mother of Insatiability \(\text{Koros}\). I have fair \(\{327\}328\) things to say, and straightforward daring \(\text{tolma}\) impels my tongue to speak.\(^\text{70}\)

§24. This juxtaposition of passages from Herodotus and Pindar, revealing important convergences in theme as well as divergences in style, leads to a fundamental observation about both the \(\text{logioi}\) ‘masters of speech’ and the \(\text{aoidoi}\) ‘masters of song’, who are both treated as conveyors of \(\text{kleos}\) ‘glory’ in the words of Pindar.\(^\text{71}\) We can see from these juxtaposed passages that the \(\text{logios}\) and the \(\text{aoidos}\) are parallel not only as masters of \(\text{kleos}\) but also in what they have to say, that is, in the message that they impart. As for the code of this message, it is explicitly designated as \(\text{ainos}\) in the diction of the \(\text{aoidos}\) ‘master of song’ as exemplified by Pindar.\(^\text{72}\) In the diction of the \(\text{logios}\) as exemplified by Herodotus, however, the corresponding designation is reserved for only one aspect of the code, and that is the poetry, not the prose. In the code of the \(\text{logios}\), the explicit message is in prose, while the implicit message is to be found in the poetry as bracketed or paraphrased by the prose. A positive example of this code, as presented by Herodotus, is the sum total of his own \(\text{Histories}\), which

\(^{69}\) On the metaphorical associations of Eunomiā, a word that conveys the notion of good government achieved through good laws, cf. N 1985.43.61.

\(^{70}\) In this passage the emphasis is on having the \(\text{tolma}\) ‘boldness’ to say good things, whereas in the previous passage the emphasis is on not having the \(\text{tolma}\) to say bad things. Cf. Hubbard 1986.37–38.

\(^{71}\) Cf. Ch. 8§9 and following.

\(^{72}\) Cf. Ch. 6§2 and following.
consistently bear out the messages of the Delphic Oracle and other such sources of authority. A typical negative example on the other hand is evident in the narrative of Herodotus about the collaboration of Onomakritos, singer of oracular utterances, with the Peisistratidai and Aleuadai, tyrants respectively of Athens and Thessaly: Onomakritos is pictured in the act of ‘singing oracular utterances [khrēsmoi]’ for the purpose of persuading the Great King of Persia (χρησμῳδέων 7.6.5), with the active support of the Peisistratidai and the Aleuadai, who reinforce what he sings by publicly presenting their own supporting judgment (γνώμας ἀποδεικνύμενοι ibid.).

The kind of poetry that is bracketed or paraphrased by the prose of the logios qualifies as ainigma, derivative of ainos, as we see in the use of ainissomai ‘utter riddles’ in the expression αἰνίσσεσθαι τάδε τὰ ἔπεα ‘to utter in a riddling way the following words’ at Herodotus 5.56.1, the end of a prose sequence introducing the quotation of an utterance, in dactylic hexameters, of an oracular dream. Once the poetry of the ainigma is {328|329} quoted, Herodotus can return to a mode of explicit communication; he therefore reverts to prose.

§25. Herodotus then is like Pindar not only in his self-professed intent to convey kleos. He is also like Pindar in his mastery of the ainos, though his medium is not ainos: rather, it contains ainos. For Herodotus, the heritage of ainos is to be found in the traditions of poetry and song-making as they are contained and applied in his Histories by way of quotation, paraphrase, or mere reference.

§26. Even if the medium of Herodotus cannot be called ainos in form, it is parallel to the ainos of a poet like Pindar in both function and content. Just as the songs of Pindar profess the

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73 See Ch. 6§27. Combined with the direct object gnōmēn/gnōmās ‘opinions, judgments’, the verb apo-deik-numai ‘make a public presentation of’ is used in contexts where someone is presenting his views in public, and the contexts include three specific instances of self-expression by Herodotus (2.146.1, 7.139.1, 8.8.3). See Ch. 8§5.
74 Cf. also the use of the same verb in Aristophanes Birds 970, where the subject is the oracular Bakis. On the figure of Bakis, see again Ch. 6§48.
75 Cf. Ch. 8§9 and following.
function of upholding kleos, bringing the values of the heroic past into the present, so too the Histories of Herodotus, as he declares in his prooemium.

§27. This observation about the function of the traditional forms represented by Pindar and Herodotus can be extended to the level of content as well: just as Pindaric song dwells on the mystical possession of the lyric moment by the epic past of heroes, so too the narrative of Herodotean inquiry falls under the spell of active interventions by the heroes of cult and epic. Let us begin with Pindar: in his songs the heroic past is at times represented as literally intervening into the present through the epiphany of a hero, as when the voice of the poet says that he “met” the hero Alkmaion on the way to Delphi (Pythian 8.56–60). In such a context the poet is possessed by the epiphany, in that the intent of his words is controlled by the spirit of the hero. Thus the subtitle of this book, The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past, cuts two ways: while lyric possesses epic as its property, as we have seen from the programmatic assertions of lyric authority to appropriate the content of epic, lyric is also mystically possessed by epic, in that the heroes of epic assert their will, which becomes the content of lyric. So too with Herodotus: the content of his Histories, the narrative, is allowed to be controlled, or at least affected, by the will of heroes. The outcome of a given narrative is frequently marked by an intervention, perceived by the characters within the narrative, of a hero who mystically manifests himself on the scene, as when Herodotus narrates the reports about an epiphany by the local heroes Phylakos and Autonoos in defense of Delphi from the invading Persians (8.34–39). At the very end of the Histories, the first hero who died in the

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76 Cf. Ch. 687, 6870–91, and following.
77 Cf. Ch. 888 and following.
78 See Ch. 6888.
79 Cf. Ch. 6883 and following. By extension, whatever private individual possesses the lyric performance as his property is thereby also possessing the heroic heritage.
80 Cf. Ch. 782.
primary epic setting of the Trojan War, Protesilaos, figuratively comes back from the dead to exact retribution \{329\} and gives meaning to the portent of the preserved fish that come back to life: with this portent the hero Protesilaos literally \(\text{sēmaine}i\) ‘indicates’ the power of the divine apparatus in bringing about an ultimately just outcome (Herodotus 9.120.2). Meanwhile, the narrative of Herodotus is conveying the same message, that the Hellenes were in the right when they struggled with the common enemy in the Persian War: thus not only the hero gives a \(\text{sēma}\) ‘sign’ here, but Herodotus too, as the narrator of this \(\text{sēma}\), who already at the very beginning of his inquiry \(\text{sēmaine}i\) or ‘indicates’ that the Asians started it all (again Herodotus 1.5.3).

§28. Although Herodotus veils the divine apparatus that is at work in his narrative, habitually distancing himself from expressing his own adherence to a world view that is predicated on the gods and heroes of the Hellenes, he nevertheless allows that divine apparatus to work its will in the narrative so that the program of themes in his \textit{Histories} matches what we find in actual poetry and song. Thus, for example, in his narrative of the sea battle at Artemisium, Herodotus notes that the wind that scattered the Persian fleet before the battle was known to the local Greek population as the \(\text{Hellen}\text{sponti}e\) ‘the one from the Hellespont’ (1.188.2), a detail that conjures up the idea that the divine apparatus was at work in this event. This idea can be reconstructed from two interconnected themes. First, from the standpoint of epic, the Hellespont is associated with Achilles, whose tomb is prominently located there (e.g., \textit{Odyssey} xxiv 80–84; called \(\text{sēma}\) at \textit{Iliad} XXIII 257). Second, the Persians react to this detail of the name \(\text{Hellen}sponti}e\) by associating it with Achilles, by way of his mother Thetis: after the naval disaster they supplicated Thetis for fear that they had angered

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81 See Ch. 9§34.

her since Thetis had been abducted by Peleus—and thus Achilles had been conceived—near the very locale where their fleet had been scattered by the wind (7.191.2).³³ The linking of the wind that scattered the Persian fleet before the sea battle at Artemisium with the divine apparatus of poetic traditions is reinforced by another detail reported by Herodotus, namely, that the Athenians on this occasion sacrificed and prayed to Boreas the North Wind and his consort Oreithyia to scatter the fleet of the Persians (7.189). This detail in the narrative program of Herodotus links it with the narrative program of a composition by Simonides, *The Sea Battle of Artemisium* (PMG 532–535), which seems to have featured prominently the theme of the divine intervention of Boreas and Oreithyia in the Battle of Artemisium (cf. PMG 534).³⁴

§29. The similarities between Herodotus and a master of choral lyric like Simonides extend beyond such parallel treatments of themes linked with the divine apparatus of gods and heroes: even the modes of treating these themes are parallel. As in the songs of figures like Simonides and Pindar, we can see in the prose of Herodotus an approach to myth that shades over local features while it highlights the Panhellenic ones. Even on the level of diction, we have already noted the common pattern of avoidance, in both Pindar and Herodotus, of the word *mūthos* ‘myth’ with its connotations of surviving links between local myth and local ritual.³⁵ In dismissing the authority of a tradition that happens to have been accepted by his predecessor, Hecataeus of Miletus, Herodotus refers to this particular tradition as a *mūthos* (2.23.1).³⁶ Just as Hecataeus asserts the Panhellenism of his own discourse by simultaneously claiming control of *alēthea* ‘truth’ and dismissing the reports of his predecessors as localized

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³³ Cf. Ch. 6§85; also N, pp. 344–345.
³⁵ Cf. Ch. 2§28.
myths tied to localized rituals (FGH 1 F 1), so also Herodotus aims at an ever higher degree of universalism by undermining his own predecessor, Hecataeus.\textsuperscript{87}

§30. Like Pindar, Herodotus not only dissociates himself from mūthos: he also consistently highlights the more Panhellenic aspects of the Greek mythmaking traditions, while shading over the more localized ones. For example, he mentions at 5.94.2–95.2 a conflict between Athens and Mytilene over a disputed territory in the region of Troy, where the focal points are the “Trojan” Sigeion (cf. Herodotus 4.38.2), an outpost of Athenian power, and the Akhilleion, a rival outpost controlled by Mytilene (Herodotus 5.94.1–2), but he avoids in this context a local narrative tradition, native to Lesbos, concerning a victory of Mytilene over Athens in the form of a duel to the death between Phrynon of Athens, an Olympic winner, and Pittakos of Mytilene, tyrant and lawgiver, as recorded in Diogenes Laertius 1.74 and Strabo 13.1.38 C599–600, where Pittakos succeeded in slaying Phrynon (cf. Plutarch \textit{On the Malice of Herodotus} 858ab). In their reports of the tradition, Diogenes Laertius and Strabo agree that the Mytileneans won in this particular conflict, only to lose later in an arbitration undertaken by Periandros, Tyrant of Corinth (this aspect of the tradition is not omitted in Herodotus 5.95.2).\textsuperscript{88} While omitting the story about the victory of Pittakos, as a representative of Mytilene, over the Athenians, Herodotus includes a story that he says he knows from a poem of Alcaeus: the speaker of the poem declares that he has abandoned his armor when he fled after a battle between Mytilene and Athens, a battle won by the Athenians, and that this armor is now hanging as a trophy in the precinct of Athena at the Athenian outpost of {331|332} Sigeion (Herodotus 5.95.1–2; see Alcaeus F 401B V). Instead of using a story about the defeat of Athens by Pittakos of Mytilene, Herodotus chooses a story about the defeat of Mytilene by Athens, as

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{87} Ibid.
\footnote{88} Cf. Ch. 2§44.
\end{footnotes}
experienced by Alcaeus of Mytilene, who happens to be the self-declared enemy of Pittakos (e.g., Alcaeus F 70, 348, 429 V).

§31. In fact one aspect of the Panhellenic stance of Herodotus is the frequency of his cross references to poets who had become or were becoming canonical by the fifth century B.C. Besides Alcaeus (5.95), Herodotus also mentions Archilochus (1.12.2), Anacreon (3.121.1), Sappho (2.135), Simonides (5.102.3, 7.228.4), and even Pindar (3.38.4), whom he explicitly paraphrases (= Pindar F 169.1 SM). To this list we may add figures like Arion, master of the dithyramb at Corinth (1.23), and Aeschylus, master of the medium of tragedy at Athens (2.156.6). The Histories also include cross-references to Homer (2.23, 2.53.2, 3; 2.116) and Hesiod (2.53.2, 3; 4.32).

§32. Besides the numerous cross references to canonical poets, we have observed another Panhellenic trend in Herodotus, that is, the even more numerous cross references to the poetry of oracles, especially the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi. The oracular poetry that is bracketed or paraphrased by the Histories of Herodotus qualifies as ainigma, derivative of ainos: we have seen this in the use of ainissomai ‘utter riddles’ in the expression αἰνίσσομαι τάδε τὰ ἔπεα ‘to utter in a riddling way the following words’ at Herodotus 5.56.1, the end of a prose sequence that introduces the quotation of an utterance, in dactylic hexameters, of an oracular dream. To repeat: once the poetry of the ainigma is quoted, Herodotus can return to a mode of

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89 Cf. Ch. 10§20.
90 Note the context of Herodotus 3.121.1: the tyrant Polycrates of Samos is pictured as reclining in the men’s quarters in the company of Anacreon of Teos.
91 Of the nine canonical poets of lyric poetry proper (cf. Ch. 3§1), only four are missing in Herodotus: Alcman, Stesichorus, Ibycus, and Bacchylides.
92 Herodotus 1.24.1 draws attention to the association of Arion with Periandros, Tyrant of Corinth.
93 Cf. Ch. 11§13.
94 Cf. Ch. 11§16 and following.
95 Cf. also Ch. 11§23.
explicit communication, and he therefore reverts to prose. Alternatively Herodotus may stay within the medium of prose as he paraphrases the messages that can elsewhere be found in poetic wisdom, as we see in his central story of the encounter between Solon the Sage and Croesus the Tyrant. Even in such situations, however, the direct quotations of Solon as he addresses Croesus, though in prose, function as the equivalent of the direct quotations of Solon in the poetic tradition that is attributed to him.

§33. The use of traditions in oracular poetry and wisdom poetry in the Histories of Herodotus, where the form of prose coexists and interacts with forms of poetry, is analogous to such forms of expression as represented by the Lives of the Seven Sages tradition. The traditions about Solon, described as the wisest of the Seven Sages in Plato (Timaeus 20d), follow this pattern of ad hoc poetry bracketed by prose that situates the supposedly historical contexts of the Sage’s advice, as reflected for example in Diogenes Laertius 1.49, with the reworked prose narrative bracketing the poetry of Solon F 10 W.

§34. The Panhellenic character of the very concept of the Seven Sages is reflected not only by their canonical status but even by the collectivization of their sayings: as we know from the

96 Cf. Ch. 8§49.
97 Cf. ibid.
98 Cf. the discussion of chantefable at Ch. 1§54.
99 On this tradition, see Snell 1966 [1954], especially p. 118. On the canonical membership of the grouping known as the Seven Sages, see Ch. 8§44n122. See especially Diogenes Laertius 1.35, 71, 78, 85, 91, quoting poetry attributed respectively to Thales, Solon, Khilon, Pittakos, Bias, Kleoboulos (missing here from the group of seven is any repertoire for Periandros); the meter and diction of this poetry point to the fifth century B.C. or earlier (cf. Snell, p. 118).
100 Cf. Ch. 8§16.
101 Cf. also Plutarch Life of Solon 25.6, bracketing Solon F 7 W, and the commentary in N 1985.31, comparing Solon F 7 with Theognis 24. Besides the format of poetry bracketed by prose, there is also evidence for the format of poetry bracketed by poetry, such as PSI IX no. 1093, where the sayings of Khilon of Sparta are introduced by a hexameter narrative. The sayings include μηδὲν ἄγαν ‘nothing in excess’ (lines 21–22) and ἐγγύα, πάρα δ’ ἄτα ‘a pledge, and already there is perdition’ (line 22); cf. Plato Charmides 165a and Protagoras 343a-b. Commentary by Snell 1966 [1955] 117–118.
testimony of Plato, it was believed that they were collectively responsible for such sayings as γνῶθι σεαυτόν ‘know yourself’ and μηδὲν ἄγαν ‘nothing in excess’, which were inscribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi (Protagoras 343a-b). In light of such Panhellenism inherent in the Seven Sages theme, it is worthy of note that the cross references in Herodotus to figures eligible for inclusion in the canonical grouping of the Seven Sages are even more frequent than his cross references to the canonical grouping of lyric poets.\textsuperscript{102}

- Thales of Miletus: 1.74.2, 75.3, 170.3
- Solon of Athens: 1.29.1, 30.1, 31.1, 32.1, 34.1, 86.3, 5; 2.177.2; 5.113.2
- Khilon of Sparta: 1.59.2, 3 (as warner about Peisistratos the Tyrant), 7.235.2
- Pittakos, Tyrant of Mytilene: 1.27.2 (as foil for Solon)
- Bias of Priene: 1.27.2 (as foil for Solon), 170.1, 3
- Anacharsis the Thracian: 4.46.1, 76.1–6 (γῆν πολλὴν θεωρήσας καὶ \{333|334\} ἀποδεξάμενος κατ’ αὐτὴν σοφίην πολλὴν ἐκομίζετο ἐς ἥθεα τὰ Σκυθέων ‘having made a theōria\textsuperscript{103} over many lands and having publicly presented [= verb apo-deik-numai] throughout these lands much skill in discourse [= sophiā], he brought it back [i.e., the sophiā] to the tribes of the Scythians’ 1.76.2)\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{102} The listing that I give here corresponds closely to the canonical membership of the Seven Sages as discussed in Ch. 8\textsuperscript{44}n122. We have already noted in that discussion that such figures as Pythagoras of Samos/Kroton are also eligible for inclusion as variants. There are cross-references to him as well in Herodotus (2.81.2; 4.95.1,2; 96).

\textsuperscript{103} On the semantics of theōros as ‘he who sees [root hor-] a vision [theā]’, see Ch. 6\$35. On Solon as theōros, see Herodotus 1.30.2; also 1.29.1 and the commentary at Ch. 6\$42n93.

\textsuperscript{104} Cf. “Plato” Hipparchus 228b: καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο ‘[Hipparkhos] presented publicly the beautiful accomplishments connected with his understanding of poetry [sophiā], with commentary at Ch. 6\$30–31.
• Periandros, Tyrant of Corinth: 5.95.2 (as arbitrator between Athens and Mytilene; omission, in this context, of Pittakos, Tyrant of Mytilene); also 1.20, 23, 24.1, 24.7; 3.48.2, 49.1, 50.1, 50.3, 51.1–3, 52.1, 3, 6, 7, 53.1, 2, 6, 7; 5.92ζ1, 2, 3; η1, 2, 3, 95.2.

§35. The close association of the sayings of the Seven Sages with the sayings of the Delphic Oracle, as emphasized in Plato’s Protagoras (again 343a-b), is parallel to the association of Solon’s message with the message of the Oracle in the Croesus narrative of Herodotus. The warnings of Solon the Sage to Croesus the Tyrant combine with the warnings of the Oracle of Apollo in conveying the overall ethical message of the Croesus story in Herodotus, which is encoded in the mode of an ainos. The use of oracular poetry in the prose of Herodotus was condemned by Plutarch as akin to the fable making of Aesop (On the Malice of Herodotus 871d), and in fact the utterances of Aesop as framed by the Life of Aesop tradition function in the mode of ainos. Plutarch’s pejorative comparison of Herodotus with Aesop is justified to the extent that Herodotus too can speak in the manner of the ainos, occasionally even telling an outright fable. In this connection I cite again the distinction, made by the scholia to Aristophanes Birds 471, between Aesopic and ‘Sybaritic’ fables: whereas the Aesopic discourse concentrates on animals, the ‘Sybaritic’ concentrates on humans. Inasmuch as Herodotus is said to have settled, died, and been buried in Thourioi (Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. Θούριοι), a polis founded ostensibly as a Panhellenic venture, with the involvement of both Athens and Sparta (Diodorus 12.10–11), at a site where once stood the city of Sybaris, that ultimate symbol of

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105 Cf. Ch. 11§43 and following, especially Ch. 11§47.
106 Cf. Ch. 11§16.
107 Cf. Ch. 11§17 and following.
108 Cf. Ch. 11§19.
109 Cf. Ch. 11§21.
luxuriance and the *hubris* that goes with it,\textsuperscript{110} I have argued that the setting of Thourioi as a reborn and reformed Sybaris would have been an ideal context for a reaffirmation of the values that bind Hellenes together in an ultimate \{334|335\} conflict against *hubris*.*\textsuperscript{111} In this kind of context, the composition of ‘Sybaritic’ discourse could serve the purpose of ethical instruction for the body politic in an exalted sense of including all Hellenes, and we may note again that the reference in Aristophanes *Wasps* 1258–1260 to two kinds of discourse appropriate for learned merriment, the Aesopic and the ‘Sybaritic’ (*Subaritikoi*), includes the specific point that both kinds are to be learned at the symposium.\textsuperscript{112}

§36. The language of Herodotus provides indirect testimony that his own tradition of discourse and that of Aesop are related: in an incidental mention of Aesop, Herodotus refers to him as a *logopoios* ‘artisan of speech’ (Αἰσώπου τοῦ λογοποιοῦ Herodotus 2.134.3), and this same word *logopoios* is used by Herodotus to refer to his own predecessor, Hecataeus of Miletus (e.g., Έκαταίῳ τῷ λογοποιοῦ Herodotus 2.143.1).\textsuperscript{113} Moreover, in the same context where Herodotus mentions Aesop as a *logopoios* ‘artisan of speech’, he mentions the poet Sappho as a *mousopoios* ‘artisan of song’ (Σαπφοῦς τῆς μουσοποιοῦ Herodotus 2.135.1), and this juxtaposition parallels that of *logios/aoidos* ‘master of speech/song’ in the language of Pindar.\textsuperscript{114}

§37. The parallelisms between the discourse of Herodotus and that of such masters of *ainos* as Aesop on one extreme and Pindar on the other bring to mind yet another example of the Herodotean use of *ainos*, that is, the frequent references throughout the *Histories* to the symbol of the *hēmionos* ‘mule’, as introduced in an oracular utterance of Apollo, addressed to the

\textsuperscript{110} On the Sybaris theme, see Ch. 9§20n75.
\textsuperscript{111} Cf. Ch. 10§43.
\textsuperscript{112} Cf. Ch. 11§21.
\textsuperscript{113} Cf. Ch. 11§21.
\textsuperscript{114} Cf. Ch. 11§19.
tyrant Croesus of Lydia, concerning the birth of Cyrus, the once and future founder of the Persian Empire: like a mule—born of a socially superior mother, the horse, and of an inferior father, the donkey—so also Cyrus is born of a mother who is a Mede and a father who is a Persian (Herodotus 1.55.2, 1.91.5).

§38. I have saved for last this particular example of aínos-making in Herodotus because it resonates simultaneously with the social loftiness of Pindar and the lowliness of Aesop. Let us consider Aesop as he is represented in Plutarch’s Banquet of the Seven Sages (150a): at the banquet held in the banquet hall of the Tyrant-Sage Periandros of Corinth, Aesop is given a place next to Solon, but he is seated on a diphros ‘low chair’; it is in this context that Aesop tells the fable of “The Lydian Mule”: a mule, seeing his own image reflected in a river, is struck with self-admiration and starts galloping like a horse, proudly tossing his mane, but then, suddenly realizing that he is the son of an ass, he stops running, and his spirit is broken for good (ibid.).

§39. The symbol of the mule in Greek traditions of myth and ritual serves to define, as a negative foil, the very essence of political power and legitimacy. Let us consider again the ideology of the Olympic Games, that ultimate symbol of power and sovereignty. In line with this ideology, it is tabu to breed mules within the territory that serves as the setting for the Games, the region of Elis, and in fact it is said to be impossible to do so (Herodotus 4.30.1); for that reason, during the season when the female horses of that region are in heat, they are herded outside Elis to be mated with male donkeys (4.30.2; Pausanias 5.5.2; Plutarch Greek

\[\text{Cf. Ch. 11§22. In this context, Plutarch Banquet of the Seven Sages 150a, it is made explicit that Aesop has been sent by Croesus of Lydia as an emissary both to Periandros and to the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi.} \]

\[\text{Cf. Ch. 4§10 and following on the aetiological centering of the Olympics on the hero Pelops; also Ch. 4§20 on Pelops as the inaugurator of a kingship that serves as the model of political power and sovereignty in the Peloponnesus. In the narrative at Herodotus 1.59.1 concerning the portent of the boiling cauldron, presaging the birth of the tyrant Peisistratos of Athens, there is an implied ideological equation of the fire of Olympic victory with the essence of political power: Ch. 4§11.} \]
Questions 52, 303b). The breeding of mules outside Elis, setting for the Olympics, is a foil for the implied breeding of thoroughbred horses inside Elis, as conveyed by the name of Hippodameia, containing the theme of horses and their taming or domination. The marriage of this figure Hippodameia to Pelops constitutes the archetype of political domination in the Peloponnesus.\textsuperscript{117} By extension, the symbol of the mule as applied to Cyrus, founder of the Persian Empire and archetypal threat to Greek civilization, serves as a foil for the purebred legitimacy of Pelops as the dynastic prototype of the Hellenes and, in that capacity, as the preeminent hero of the Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{118}

§40. Such a foil of illegitimacy does not have to be foreign: the symbol of the mule is a traditional theme for testing the essence of sovereignty in Hellenic myths native to the Peloponnesus. There is, for example, a story native to Elis about one Oxylos, described as the driver of a mule, whose advice to the Herakleidai was the key to their occupation of the Peloponnesus (Pausanias 5.3.5–6). In return for his advice Oxylos was awarded possession of Elis (ibid.), which is the setting of the Olympic Games. This same Oxylos is credited with the invention of the astrabē ‘mule saddle’ (scholia to Pindar Pythian 5.10b Drachmann). In view of the Spartan connections of Oxylos (Pausanias 5.4.1–2), we may note the riddling story in Herodotus 6.67–69 about the Spartan hero Astrabakos, whose name means something like ‘the one with the mule saddle’.\textsuperscript{119} In this complex story as reported by Herodotus, {336|337} the hero Astrabakos took the place of King Ariston of Sparta in impregnating the queen, begetting King Demaratos, according to the story within a story told to Demaratos by his mother (6.69.1–

\textsuperscript{117} On the dynasty of Pelops as the model of political power and sovereignty in the Peloponnesus, see again Ch. 4§20.

\textsuperscript{118} Cf. Ch. 4§10 and following. I disagree with the view that the myth of Pelops and Hippodameia may have conveyed some sort of aetiological analogy to the breeding of mules outside of Elis, where the Elian Hippodameia is to a horse as the non-Elian Pelops is to a donkey (bibliography in Calame 1977 1 418–419). In this connection I stress that the Pelopion ’Precinct of Pelops’ anchors this figure to Olympia in Elis (Ch. 4§10).

\textsuperscript{119} Burkert 1965.173n23.
5); according to the detractors of King Demaratos of Sparta, in contrast, he was begotten not by Ariston, nor by the hero Astrabakos, but by some onophorbos, a 'stableboy who tends donkeys' (6.68.2, 69.5). Now hēmionoi ‘mules’ are known to be sterile, and they are said to give birth only by miracle (e.g., Herodotus 3.151.2–153.2). Moreover, before King Ariston married the queen who gave birth to Demaratos, he had two previous wives with whom he had failed to produce children (Herodotus 6.61.1–2). It seems then that the theme of the stable boy who tends donkeys is linked with the meaning of ‘mule’ implicit in the name of Astrabakos. There is an air of illegitimacy conjured up by this name. There is also an air of illegitimacy about Demaratos, which seems connected with the themes of his formal disqualification as king (Herodotus 6.65.3–67.3), his subsequent escape from Sparta (6.70.1–2), and, most important, his role as a prominent advisor of Xerxes when the Persians invade Hellas (e.g., 7.101–104). There is room for speculation that had Xerxes succeeded in conquering the Greeks, Demaratos would have been installed by the Persians as an unconstitutional tyrant of the Peloponnesus. Since Astrabakos belongs to the royal patriliny of the Agiadai (Pausanias 3.16.9), while Ariston stems from the Euiypontidai, it has even been suggested that “a Eurypontid king with an Agiad divine father would seem ideally suited for replacing the Spartan dual kingship by a monarchy.” In this connection we may note the remark of Herodotus that Demaratos was the only Spartan king up to that time ever to have won in the chariot races at the Olympic

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120 We may note that astrabikon is the name of a type of bucolic song supposedly initiated at Karyai by rustic folk as a displacement, after the devastation of the Persian War, of choral performances by aristocratic girls (Probus by way of Servius 3.2, p. 324.8ff Thilo-Hagen; cf. Calame 1977 I 267n182 and 274n194, where further references are given; the pertinent texts are quoted in Nilsson 1906.198n1). On the traditional theme of rustic outsiders, formerly excluded from the city as illegitimate, whose institutions become subsequently included and thereby legitimated, see Ch. 13816 and following.


122 Burkert, p. 175n30, with bibliography.

123 Seeberg 1966.74.
Games (6.70.5). Such a feat promotes the kind of legitimation that is sought by tyrants. While giving such feats their due, the narrative of Herodotus, consistently inimical as it is to the institution of tyranny, undercuts the legitimation that goes with it.

§41. This theme brings us finally to the glorification of such legitimation, as conferred by the epinician themes inherited through the songmaking traditions of Pindar. Just as Herodotus parallels the lowly Aesop with themes of *ainos* reminiscent of the fable, so also he parallels the lofty Pindar, again {337|338} with themes of *ainos*, this time reminiscent of the epinician ode. But these themes are used by Herodotus not to promote the legitimation of those who seek or already possess power. Rather they are there to undercut such legitimation; thus the themes are consistently historicized and therefore demystified. Let us take, for example, the exalted theme of *phuē* ‘nature’, which is contrasted with the foil of artificial glorification in order to convey “a natural and spontaneous enthusiasm that is divinely inspired” in epinician songmaking (as in Pindar *Olympian* 2.86, *Nemean* 1.25). In contrast, the concept of *phuē* in Herodotus is presented in an ambiguous context, where the resources of culture, of artifice, are being used by the tyrant in order to manipulate nature. In a celebrated story of Herodotus about the seizure of political power by Peisistratos of Athens, *Phuē* is the name of a stunningly beautiful woman, three finger-lengths short of four cubits in stature, whom Peisistratos dresses up in full armor and with whom he then rides from the countryside into the city of Athens (1.60.4). Heralds have prepared the way, announcing the news that Athena herself is installing Peisistratos as the supreme power; the populace, when they see *Phuē* on the chariot, recognize her as Athena and accept the domination of Peisistratos (1.60.5). The natural

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124 Cf. Ch. 6§20 and following.
126 For a valuable analysis of this episode, with important comparative observations concerning the politics of festivals and festive events in general, see Connor 1987.
endowments of a beautiful woman have been manipulated by the artifice of a tyrant—an artifice comparable to the strategies of epinician ainos. In his public presentation of Phuē, Peisistratos has brought to life a central metaphor of the epinician tradition.\(^{127}\) In the ideology of epinician songmaking, phuē ‘nature’ represents those spontaneous occasions when “the subject must speak for itself.”\(^{128}\) In the ideology of Herodotean ainos, such a spontaneous occasion is in fact an illusion created through artistry, through the artifice of the tyrant.\(^{129}\)

\(^{127}\) Cf. Slater 1984.260–263.
