READING HERODOTUS

A Study of the logoi in Book 5 of Herodotus' Histories

EDITED BY

ELIZABETH IRWIN
Columbia University

and

EMILY GREENWOOD
University of St Andrews

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CHAPTER I

‘What’s in a name?’ and exploring the comparable: onomastics, ethnography, and kratos in Thrace, (5.1–2 and 3–10)

Elizabeth Irwin

INTRODUCTION

What we now call Herodotus’ ‘Book 5’ begins with a historical anecdote about the Paeonian defeat of the Perinthians (5.1–2), followed by a description of Thracian customs (5.3–10). The two logoi are seemingly inconsequential, aside from the fact that they share a focus on Thrace and that they both seem, in the opinion of most people, to make a rather unpromising contribution to their respective genres of history and ethnography. However, this cursory evaluation may prove misleading: the prominent position of these logoi in the wider narrative and the geopolitical significance of the Thracian coast – the location they narrate – in Herodotus’ time, recommend a closer look. In the analysis that follows, I will be concerned with four general aspects of the logoi that are at the same time central to Herodotean studies:

1. the textual and conceptual interplay between these seemingly disparate logoi;
2. the function of these chapters in the Histories as a transition to a narrative of Persian engagement with mainland Greeks in Books 5–9 and as a prelude to Herodotus’ account of the Ionian Revolt;
3. the possibility that they provide programmatic reading strategies in miniature for the ensuing (and preceding) narrative; and
4. the implications that interpretation of these logoi has for the meaning of the Histories in their wider contemporary (political) context.

I adopt two premises in what follows: namely that it is meaningful to consider these stories as the beginning of Book 5 and also to discuss them together. The first is not difficult to defend: despite our concerns about whether the book divisions of the Histories are Herodotus’ own, without a doubt chapter one of Book 5 provides a marked break from the preceding extended narrative of Libyan affairs (4.145–205) and resumes the
account, only summarily introduced in 4.144, of Megabazus' conquest of the Hellespontine Greeks. More questionable is the assumption that the two initial logoi of Book 5 (represented by chapters 1–2 and 3–10) can and should be treated together in one discussion, not least because the wider narrative to which these chapters belong suggests other ways of grouping them. The anecdote about the Paeanian defeat of the Perinthians (5.1–2) provides the introduction of the Paeanians who will almost immediately become the subject of their own logos in 11–17, and whose appearances will punctuate the events of Book 5 (5.23.1, 5.98). As for the Thracian ethnography (5.3–10), the general of the Thracian conquest, Megabazus, will continue to be a presence in the narrative until chapter 26, when he hands over command to Otanes and Herodotus begins the slow start-up to the Ionian Revolt.

Those other ways of viewing the narrative units acknowledged, there are surface reasons for pausing at the end of chapter 10. The dramatic entrance of Darius at chapter 11, as he returns from Herodotus' Scythian logos, marks a new phase in the narrative. At the same time, chapters 1–10 display their own internal unity: they both belong to the Persian conquest of τὰ παραθαλάσσια of Thrace, the region adjoining Asia and Europe; hence they are Thracian logos. There is a marked progression from 5.1.1 to 5.2.2 that comes to a (temporary) rest in 5.10, as the first stage of Thracian conquest is completed:

οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ τῶν Περσέων καταλειφθέντες ὑπὸ Δαρείου, τῶν δὲ Μεγάβαζος ἠρχε, πρῶτοι μὲν Περινθίους ἔλληπτοντίνων σο οὐ βουλομένους ὑπηκόους εἶναι Δαρείου καταστρέψαντο.

Those of the Persians left behind by Darius in Europe, whom Megabazus led, subdued first of the Hellespontines the Perinthians who refused to be made subjects of Darius. (5.1.1)

ὡς δὲ ἔχειρόθθη ἡ Περινθίῳ, ἡλαυντε ὁ στρατὸν ὁ Μεγάβαζος διὰ τῆς Θρησκῆς, πάσαν πόλιν καὶ πάν ἰδίον τῶν ταύτης οἰκιμένων ἑμευρούμενον βασιλέα· ταύτα γὰρ οἱ ἐνετέταλτο ἐκ Δαρείου, Θρησκήν καταστρέφεσθαι.

In this way Perinthus was subdued; Megabazus drove his army through Thrace subjugating to the king every city and tribe that inhabited it; for this is what had been commanded by Darius: conquer Thrace. (5.2.2)

ταύτα μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς χώρας ταύτης πέρι λέγεται, τὰ παραθαλάσσια δὲ ὡν αὐτῆς Μεγάβαζος Περσέων κατήκοια ἐποίησε.

This then is what's said about this land, and it's the coastal region of it that Megabazus was in the process of making subject to the Persians. (5.10)

1 See Introduction, pp. 13–21.
2 On Darius' entrance as a new beginning see Osborne, pp. 88–9 below.
Perinthus is the first Hellespontine and the first Thracian city to be conquered: geographic divisions contend with ethnic ones, while ultimately such ethnic and geographic divisions will be suborned to political ones, as Darius' imperial agenda subsumes πᾶσα πόλις (Hellenic) and πᾶν ἑθνος (non-Hellenic) alike (5.2). Here Herodotus juxtaposes the geographic, ethnic and political divisions of the space between Europe and Asia, between Greek and barbarian, between autonomous Greeks and Persian empire, all significant dichotomies in Book 5, even as the narrative to come will challenge the security of these stark oppositions. Text and geography likewise merge in these logoi: the space where the Paonians from Strymon cross to overpower the Perinthians will be precisely that crossed by Megabazus in subjecting the parathalassia of Thrace, but in reverse. But this is not all: it is similarly the imaginative space that Greek mainland readers must cross to meet Darius (crossing the Hellespont) and arrive with him in Sardis (ch. 11) to meet a new group of Paonians who have once again crossed that selfsame distance: narrative is configured as topography, a trope that places the audience of the text in a position analogous to, if also differing from, that of its characters.

And yet the relationship between the two logoi may be more complex than this. The Thracian ethnography pulls back to Book 4, while the Perinthus/Paonian logoi looks forward to the historical narrative of Book 5. Together they construct a bridge between the two halves of the Histories, the overwhelmingly ethnographical and the predominantly historical, through a structure at once described as an alternation of these differing narrative modes, and as chiasmus, where logoi of diminutive size are flanked by the more extensive historic and ethnographic narratives that ensue and precede. Diminutive, insignificant, yet pivotally positioned, these logoi seem as unnaturally situated within Herodotus' narrative as those man-made structures contrived by his characters to cross natural boundaries. What kind of crossing will audiences make to the narrative ahead? And how will the manner in which they make this crossing affect what they find on the other side?

An important reason for taking these logoi together is the possibility that at this midpoint of the Histories at the exchange of the largely ethnographic for the predominantly historic, we may come to understand better the perfect unity of these two aims, and a key to the end to which they were

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1 See Macan (1993) i.154.  
4 See Introduction, pp. 12, 19.  
5 I am indebted to Emily Greenwood's contribution below (Ch. 4) for making me more sensitive to the textual geography of Herodotus' Thracian logoi.
At the same time, we may obtain a deeper appreciation of the degree to which Herodotus has created meaning through the structuring of his *logoi*, realizing the truth in Immerwahr’s claim, ‘The study of how Herodotus organizes must be the main basis in answering the many other questions which may be put to the work, such as its general purpose, the audience for which it was written, its sources, its reliability as a source, or the historiographic and philosophic principles embodied in it.’

In what follows, I will examine how the historical and ethnographical are joined by the injunction the text lays on the reader to construct their own bridges across time and across cultures, to survey the different events, cultural practices, and even language on display and from these to make inferences, συμβάλλσθει. The injunction is, however, implicit, only to be heard by those audiences who can make inferences from the prominence of the position given to these seemingly inconsequential *logoi*. But for those who pay close heed to their disparate and selective details, a sophisticated study emerges on three dominant fifth-century intellectual preoccupations and their discourses, and on the interrelationship between them: onomastics and linguistic theory; comparativism and ethnography; and, pervading both, κράτος.

**PART I: HISTORY – THE PERINTHIAN LOGOS (5.1–2)**

Chapter 1 resumes the main historical narrative by bringing to the fore the players and themes necessary for what is to come in the narrative of Book 5 and beyond, and it does so, paradoxically, by introducing a seemingly tangential, if not irrelevant, narrative of apparently only local interest, or at best a banal demonstration of history repeating itself: while Perinthians might have been the *first* (πρώτοις) of the Hellespontines made subject to the Persians, a similar sort of thing actually happened to them before (πρώτερον). The strong statement of what is first is moderated by the comparative adverb, in a manoeuvre that demonstrates how a framing of the past in absolute terms may always be rendered relative: ‘Of the Hellespontines, the Persians subdued the Perinthians first, who were unwilling to be subject to Darius’; on a previous occasion they had been treated badly by the Paeonians,’ and off the narrative goes. At some indefinite time in

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6 On the unity of these aims, see Munson (2001b).
7 Immerwahr (1957) 312, (1966); see already Jacoby REA Suppl. II,80.
9 Here, by comparison with Herodotus’ text one might observe how a reader’s (my) autopy invariably corrupts its discourse, transmitting it as *sekhe*, on this process, see Introduction, pp. 5–9. The language of the oracle will be examined in more depth below.
the past, as it seems, the Paeonians from Strymon received an oracle pertaining to a campaign against the Perinthians. The oracle provides what seem simple alternatives: the Paeonians are to attack if the Perinthians call on them 'by name' (δόνομαιτι), but are not to if the Perinthians do not. During what is apparently the resulting absence of military engagement, the armies divert themselves by a monomachia of men, horses and dogs. Having won in two contests, the Perinthians sing a paeron in joy, whereupon the Paeonians consider, συνεβάλευσαν (more on this verb below), that this singing is itself the oracle (κρηστήριον αυτό τούτο ἐνεμι). They say (it seems – κού) to one another, 'Now the oracle could be fulfilled, now the deed is ours (νῦν ἡμέτερον τὸ ἔργον)!' And on this basis they attack the 'paeonizing' Perinthians (Περινθίοι παεονίζοσαν) and vastly overpower them (πολλόν ἐκράτησαν). This is what happened to them πρῶτεν. But τότε Megabazus conquered the Perinthians (ἐπεκράτησαν) by sheer numerical force.

Like so many of Herodotus' logoi this one could vanish without great consequence to the Histories if their subject is narrowly (and erroneously) defined as the Persian Wars; but to account for its inclusion by evoking the observable habits of Herodotean style is to confuse description with explanation. The effectiveness of Herodotus' casual style is borne out by the degree to which secondary literature has almost uniformly ignored this story. The seemingly superficial transition, 'a similar thing happened before', masks perfectly the literary artifice by which Herodotus introduces elements that his ensuing narrative will exploit, the most immediate being the introduction of the Paeonians who will dominate the next historical logos and punctuate the narrative of Book 5 as they are transplanted and returned in its course (5.98). The apparently otiose nature of the logos could engender two responses to it: literalist, that is, this is just an event that Herodotus may or may not be right to think had happened, but one providing a convenient introduction to his next logos; or analogical, the recognition that Herodotus' words may yield more meaning than first appears. The choice is the audience's, but as the Paeonian capacity to interpret on another level brought them knatos, so the potential for other, greater, interpretations lies in Herodotus' narrative for those who choose to engage with it.

On closer examination, this apparently simple logos emerges as studiously vague. Questions arise for which there are no ready answers. On the Paeonian side: why are the Paeonians from Strymon attacking Perinthians in the Hellespont? Did the oracle tell them to conduct this campaign, or merely advise them on a decision already undertaken? Did the oracle actually mean what the Paeonians take it to mean? The answers are perhaps all too obvious
from the perspective of *Realpolitik* and that of the Paeonians: the correctness of the interpretation is an imputation based on the Paeonians' desire and confirmed, to them at least, by their success. On the Perinthian side, one is left asking: what were the terms of the contest (did they cheer at their overall victory, two out of three, or were their cries premature), or — more literally — which contests did they win? A cultured audience may infer that the Perinthians' optimism was based on upset victories in those contests in which the Paeonians — famous for their dogs and horses — should excel, an irony that must hover at the level of urbane inference, but one that must point to the decisive contest as being that between men.

A victory in that contest, however, may be for different reasons: the Persians gained *kratos* over the Perinthians by their numbers (πληθεί), but for the Paeonians it all seems to have depended on being able to see a pun, or, less flippantly, on their ability to manipulate language and to recognize a less obvious meaning inherent in the oracle's words. The Paeonians' response may be understood in more traditional, religious terms as a response to a *kledeon* ('numinous utterance'), or more in line with contemporary fifth-century linguistic theorizing about the inherent meaning of *onomata*, particular proper nouns. Either way (and Herodotus leaves this vague, κακό), the Paeonians respond by considering (συνεβάλοντο) the singing of the *paean* 'to be itself the oracle' (τῷ χρυστήριον αὐτῷ τότε ἐστι). Their response and its success points to the Perinthian *logos* function as foreshadowing another unifying, but implicit, feature of Book 5, the prevalence of paronomasia and the significance of names.

Herodotus exploits names throughout his *Histories*, but nowhere is it more pervasive than in Book 5. I simply list some examples: the meaningful renaming of the Sicyan tribes by Kleisthenes (5.68); the contrast between the Isagoras the Spartans intend to impose on Athens, and its

10 Paeonian dogs. Pollux 5.46, 47; horses. Mimm. 17.
11 Battle is of course the contest of men *par excellence*. See Osborne, p. 89 below.
12 These choices are hardly exclusive, with figures like Heraclitus hovering between religious and philosophic conceptualizations of language (see Stanford (1972) 117–19), and such linguistic theorizing often focused on religious matters, such as the gods' names: see Baxter (1992) 107–63. On kledeon see Perdrizet (1956), Cameron (1970) and Steiner (1994) 13. For discussion of *orthoepeia* and *archēes onomasia* among the sophists, see Kerferd (1981) ch. 7; and see also de Romilly (1986). For the contemporary importance of, and ironic observations on, the subject see Plato's *Crito* with Woodhead (1928) and Sedley (2003).
13 I follow O'Hara (1996) (cf. Woodhead (1928) 36, 72) in treating the several varieties of wordplay as related: 'tremendous efforts to distinguish or separate . . . are not useful, and probably not true' to practice. On the varieties of wordplay in Herodotus, see Powell (1937); Immerwahr (1966) s.v. etymologies; Fowler (1996) 72–3, and now Lateiner (2005) whose accounts are overly primitivizing; in Greek literature more generally, see Woodhead (1928) and O'Hara (1994) 7–18, with bibliography.
14 See Gray, Ch. 8 below.
new-found ἰσογορία, the result of the time when one Cleisthenes ‘imitated
Cleisthenes of the same name’ (τὸν ὀμόνωμον Κλεισθένα ἐμίμησός τον, 5.69.1); Cleomenes failing to observe the κλεῖδον (τῇ κλεῖδον οὐδὲν χρεώ-
μενος (5.72.4) when he asserts to the priestess of the Acropolis, ἀλλὰ οὐ
Δωριέως εἶμι (I am not Dorian/Dorieus); Cypselus, whose father Ἡτίων
ὁ Ἐχεκράτειος (Ection, son of Echecrates) from a deme called Πετρὲ (‘Rock’)
received an oracle, αἰτεῖτο ἐν πέτρησι κύει . . . (An eagle is pregnant among
the rocks’, 92B.3) ultimately and apparently about how his son would –
true to his grandfather’s name – ‘hold κρατώ’, because of which the rulers
of Corinth ‘sought (αἰτεῖον) the child of Ection (Ἡτίωνος) (5.92.γ.2),
whom his mother hid in a κυψήλη (chest, 5.926.1), whereby he derived
his name (ἐπωνυμία).’ At the same time, the bold advice of Thrasybulus
can lurk in his actions, ἐκδίκεσε αἰτεῖ ὅσοι τινὰ ἤδοι τῶν ἄσταχτων ὑπερ-
χώντα (‘he was continually docking any of the ears of corn he saw hold-
ing itself above the others’, 92.ζ.2), unintelligible to some, but clear to
another tyrant: ὅς οἱ ὑπετίθετο Θρασύβουλος τοὺς ὑπερχώτως τῶν ἄστατων
δονείῳ (‘in this way Thrasybulus was advising him to murder
those outstanding among the citizens’, 92.η.1). And to return to where
Book 5 begins, the ἀναστάσιοι (‘deported’, 12.1) Paonians ἀναστάτων
ἐποίησαντο (‘are delighted’, 98.3) at the prospect of being returned home,
that is, rendered ‘not’ ἀναστάτως.16

Once recognized, one might account for the pervasive wordplay of Book 5
as yet another narrative device providing a stylistic unity across the disparate
logoi of Book 5; and this it certainly does. Yet such a casual reading does
no justice to the function of the logos that introduces this unity, and the
implicit advice that it gives to its audiences (particularly contemporary
audiences) on how they will need to engage with the ensuing narrative.
For the demoument of the story, Paonian victory, depends on an inter-
pretative act, συμβολαλεσθαι, whose power is able to overturn the results

15 In this story other puns abound: e.g. Ἐδωκε φίλους ἡ λάβα, τῶν λαβόντα . . . (92.γ.3).
16 See also Macan (1893) 1.256, Munson and Henderson, Chs. 5 and 12 below, on Histiaeus’ promise
of Sardos for Sardis in i.106.6. The most flagged play on words in all of Book 5, however, must be
in 5.97, when Athenian ships (ἀξίων ἢ οἰς νῆσι) are said to know the ἀρχή κακῶν (‘beginning of
ills’ or ‘empire of evils’) for both Greeks and barbarians. Whether Herodotus’ audiences would have
appreciated this play on words would likely have depended on their orientation in relation to that
arché, and their own understanding of history. For the pun elsewhere see esp. loc. 4.119 but also loc.
3.28, 8.118 and 5.61. One might also consider the meaning of the cult statue Axiestis which Athens in
the 490s attempts to wrest from her then naval superior, Aegina (θελασσοκράτορες, 5.83.2). As with
so many of Book 5’s aspects – themes, characters, style – wordplay continues throughout Book 6
(see Introduction, pp. 15–18). With all the accumulated meaning from its earlier use: see the more
explicit instances in 6.90 and esp. 6.98 when Herodotus ‘translates’ the names of the Persian kings.
of threefold monomachia. What the Paeonians 'reckoned', 'considered', 'conjectured', literally, 'threw together for themselves' (συμβάλλων), outdoes what each side brought against the other when the Perinthians and Paeonians 'matched' (συμβάλλον) dogs, horses and men. συμβάλλω in the middle as 'consider', 'conjecture', is marked as rare outside of Herodotus, not appearing in other historians and attested prior to Herodotus only in Heraclitus. As Hohti notes, 'The συμβάλλοντα conclusion is based on the recognition that two existing parts belong together' — such as, but not limited to, an oracle and a real situation. And according to Herodotean usage, these parts, these facts, 'can be similar, identical, symmetrical, analogous, or supplementary'. The Paeonians bring together the Perinthians' singing of the paeon with the oracle's condition that they be called on by name (δυνατότε) to draw a conclusion, attack and successfully overpower the Perinthians.

συμβάλλοντα conclusions are not, however, confined to the characters within Herodotus' narrative. It is a word that Herodotus uses frequently of his own activities in composing his Histories; that is, Herodotean usage makes no formal distinction between the activities of the text's narrator and those of his characters. In turn, the extradietyonic usage of the term implies that the audience of the narration, its 'we', can also make samballethai conclusions. Indeed, the audience's role in the process is fostered by the logic of the Perithian logos itself. The Paeonians engage with the situation at hand on another level than that of its other participants, and, by considering a less obvious relationship between an onoma and reality, they gain kratos. The possibility arises that in the context of a book teeming with wordplay, homophony, shared names, puns — Herodotus may be enjoining his readers (or at least those who want a different kind of kratos, mastery of the text) to do the same. Indeed, the very modalities of the logos' narration facilitate

17 On the recognition of the importance of this word in Herodotus, see Hohti (1977) and Munson (2000b) 83–4. Cf. Immerwahr (1966) 5 n. 11.
18 As Hohti (1977) 5 notes, LSJ provide only a single other case of this use of συμβάλλω in the middle, Heraclitus DK 47: μὴ ἐξή περὶ τῶν μεγάλων συμβαλλόμεθα (let us not draw conclusions randomly about the greatest matters). If this verb is enough to posit Heraclitan allusion, it would likely function as an implicit warning to the reader about the interpretations they might put together (συμβαλλόμεθα) when reading this tale about μεγάλα, war. For Heraclitus' own oracular style see Stanford (1972) 117–19. Heraclitus is also relevant in this discussion as 'le père de l'étymologie populaire' (Collart (1914) 338–62).
19 Hohti (1977) 12. He comments, as the συμβαλλον consists of two complementary parts, so the conclusion with συμβάλλοντα is formed on the basis of two existing complementary parts whose combination results in an intelligible whole which has a significance of its own and is more than the total of its parts'.
this conclusion: in contrast to the oracle told in indirect speech, the Paeonians’ solution is given in direct speech. The tentativeness expressed by the word κατευθον marks their words as authorial creation, its presentation entirely a function of authorial choice. While within the narrative, the contrast emphasizes the role of the interpretative community, allowing it to vie with the oracular pronouncement over responsibility for the ἔργον, the first-person utterance draws the audience into the interpretative community: ‘Now the task is ours’ (ὐν ἡμέτερον τὸ ἔργον) signals to an alert audience that there is a task in front of us, too, now: it will be ours to determine (or fail to determine) what we are to bring to the onomata of the narrative to come, and what we are to conclude (συμβάλλονται).

The Perinthian logos anticipates future invitations to draw συμβάλλονται conclusions in Book 5 which cannot be dealt with here in detail: will an audience hear the story of Cleisthenes bringing the demos into his hetaireia, and rejoice in the birth of democracy, or will they consider precisely what might be in a name, and see the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes as a tyrannical inheritance from his grandfather of the same name? Will they see beneath the pun of Isagoras and isègoriē to find at the level of meta-narrative an opportunity to reflect on competing conceptions of political equality, Spartan and Athenian, or, broadly speaking, oligarchic and democratic? The identical onomata of the Cleistheneses, on the one hand, and adnominatio of isègoriē/Isagoras, on the other, might lead, for example, to considering whether there is a tyrannical element to Athenian democracy, or how it may have been born out of the conflict of competing conceptions of isègoriē. The elements are there to be brought together, but the decision to do so, and the conclusions that they understand as following, are the audience’s own.

But this is to dwell on only one aspect of the logos’ function in the wider narrative of Book 5. In Herodotus’ narrative of chapters 1 and 2, the Paeonians are given alternative courses of action predicated upon whether they hear themselves called on, and can recognize the potential to equate the paeon of the Perinthians with themselves; in Herodotus’ meta-narrative,

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22 See Munson (2000b) 52–7, Irwin (2006a). And will the reader go farther and see disdain for the Ionians (5.69.2) as a constituent element of Athens’ democracy, and draw any conclusions for the present?
23 1.78 provides the single use of isègoriē in Herodotus; for the general recognition of the apparent non sequitur of its occurrence here (as opposed to e.g. ionomia) see Yoshio (1988). On this passage, see Gray, Ch. 8 below.
24 See Munson (2000b) 98; Ehrenberg (1946) 99.
25 But there is of course textual encouragement to draw conclusions, as when Herodotus brings together the reactions to Aristagoras of the one Spartan King and the Athenian assembly (5.97, and see Hornblower, Ch. 6 below).
where the analogue of the apparently straightforward oracular utterance is the apparently straightforward logos, an audience will choose whether and how they hear themselves called upon by ἡμέτερον (our'), the first-person utterance facilitating a connection between intra- and extradiegetic audiences. If the paean could be equated by a part of its audience with calling on the Paeonians, the audience of this logos may be invoked to make their own equation from Herodotus' evocation of the Paeonians at this juncture in his Histories and in this manner. The potential is open for the extradiegetic audience to read Herodotus' words as an oracle, and to find in it new meaning should they consider the logos in the light of the circumstances they find themselves in (συμβάλλοις). The logic of the oracular logos cannot be contained within the bounds of the logos any more than the Paeonian interpretation could be circumscribed by a literal response to the circumstances in which they found themselves. The question then arises, with whom or what will an audience be induced to equate the Paeonians, that is, to make a Paeonian-like conjecture? Several types of evidence will point to a single identification, that is, of Athenians with Paeonians.

The logos is itself almost oracular; its peculiar events (a contest pitting dog against dog, horse against horse, man against man) and the tendentiousness of its presence in the narrative (the shared subject of conquered Perinthians) merely underscore the lack of explicit motivation for its inclusion; its presence, no less than the oracle, poses an interpretative challenge. Yet, like an oracle, how the significance of this logos is construed will interpret its reader. To describe the Perinthians as 'dying bravely for their freedom' (ἀγοράν περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας γινομένων), and to have them defeated by Persian numbers (ἐπεκράττησαν πλήθει) could elicit opposing responses: on the one hand, some may be more sympathetically disposed to the Perinthians, keeping the Perithian defeats as distinct as Herodotus' text does, and even identify with the valiant attempt of the Perinthians to maintain autonomy and die for their freedom, just as their own forebears may have done; on the other hand, some may be inclined less generously to see instead in such apparent historical repetition something distinctive about Perinthians — perhaps even qua Ionians — and feel confirmed in their own difference and superiority as belonging to a collective who did withstand the Persian πλῆθος; and perhaps (some of) this group will also be the ones who

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15 A timely subject given that (i) one of the last points made in Book 4.142 before breaking for the Libyan ογοραί is the Scythian evaluation of Ionians as slavish, (2) the story we are about to embark on is of the botched Ionian Revolt, and (3), closer to (one audience's) home, Herodotus will assert in the chapters to come that disdain for the Ionians was an inherent feature of the birth of Athenian ἰερεία (5.69); see Introduction, pp. 19–25.
particularly pride themselves on being like the Paeonians, knowing how to interpret an oracle to their own advantage, a story which they are primed to anticipate as Herodotus’ narrative drives ever onwards (7.142–4). To take this view of the events of the logos, and its Perinthians, is to adopt a Paeonian perspective; and I would maintain it is a perspective that (some) Athenians might be more inclined to adopt than others.

The potential association of the Paeonians with an Athenian audience is appropriately also fostered via wordplay. In chapters 11–13, the attempt of two Paeonians at tyranny through a deceptive ploy with a tall, beautiful girl (μεγάλην τε καὶ εὐέιδην, 5.12.1) might lead one to recall a similar tyrannical story from Athens, and consider (συμβολίσθησι) how it involved a big, beautiful girl from Paeania: ‘a women in the deme of Paeania, whose name was Phye, in height three fingers short of four cubits and indeed altogether beautiful’ (ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Παιανίῳ ἡ γυνή, τῇ οὖν νυμφῇ, μέγας τις ὀρισκόν πήχεων ἀπολείποντα τρεῖς δακτύλους καὶ ἄλλος εὐειδῆς, 1.60.4). And these Paeonians emerge – individually – as shifty solicitors of Persian tyranny and – collectively – as a group who take to the sea intending to abandon their city in the face of the Persians.28

It is far more significant when, later in the context of Book 5 (and nowhere else), a second Paeonia appears in the Histories, this time located firmly in Athens in a gloss Herodotus provides for the stronghold which the Alcaeonids took when they failed to make Athens ‘free’: Λειψύδριον τὸ ἄνω τοῦ Παιανίτης τειχίσαντες (fortifying Leipsydron which is up beyond Paeonia’, 62.2). It can hardly be coincidence for there is in fact no deme called Paeonia, only Paeonidae, and a passage of the Ath. Pol. (19.3), otherwise highly derivative from Herodotus, provides a correction of Parnes for Paeonia (τειχίσαντες ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ Λειψύδριον τὸ ἄνω Πάρνηθος). To say Herodotus has made a mistake – ‘has given the deme name in an incorrect form (which a non-Athenian might have done)’ – overlooks the widespread use of wordplay in Herodotus’ narrative: Herodotus chooses to place a Paeonia in Athens, framed by references to Thracian Paeonians, an ‘error’ especially noticeable to (at least) an Athenian audience. If Herodotus causes the name Paeonia to denote two different places, Thracian and Athenian, will his Paeonians correspondingly denote these two peoples? And if audiences can bring these elements together to mean more than

27 Hdt. 7.142–4.
28 For the Athenian connotations of these Paeonians see Osborne, p. 92 below; cf. Thuc. 1.18.2
29 This single appearance of an Attic Paeonia is matched by the single use of παυάζω in the entire History.
Herodotean error, what might they conclude? As Heraclitus advised, ‘let us not draw conclusions (συμβαλλόμεθα) randomly about the greatest of matters’: to answer that one must go back to the oracular element of the story and its foreshadowing of another oracular logos of Book 5.

The Paeonian decision to read the Perinthians’ paean as an invocation of themselves imputes ambiguity to the oracle’s meaning even as it promises its solution. νῦν ἄν εἴη ὁ χρήσιμος ἐπιτελέσμος ἡμῖν, νῦν ἡμέτερον τὸ ἔργον (‘Now the oracle would be fulfilled for us, now it is ours to act’): the dative of reference with the optative marks this solution to be tentative and interested, finalized by the assertion of agency in the declaration that the deed is ‘ours’, all amounting to retrospective religious endorsement based on proactive interpretation. Herodotus’ choice to give the oracle in indirect speech and its interpretation in direct speech stresses the human agency—it is most certainly their choice to act on the conclusion they have made.

This strategy of using indirect and direct speech in an oracular logos anticipates that employed with more elaboration in the Theban logos later in Book 5 (5.79–81): both stress the role of an interpretative community (‘they said to one another’, 5.1.3; ‘they called an assembly’, 5.79.2), who simultaneously create and resolve ambiguity from an otherwise clearly stated oracle (δόντας τῷ βοῶσαντι, ‘calling on them by name’, 5.1.2; ἡγείσατο, ‘nearest’, 5.79.2); the tentativeness of interpretation (νῦν ἄν εἴη ὁ χρήσιμος ἐπιτελεσμένος ἡμῖν, 5.1.3; καὶ οὐ γὰρ τις ταύτης ὁμοίως γνώμη ἔδωκεν φαίνεσθαι, and since no interpretation was considered to be better than this’, 5.80.2); and play on words (ἐποιώνυζον as singing the paean and calling on the Paeonians; ‘nearest’ as geographical proximity and as mythological kinship, 5.79.2–80.1, Aeacidae as cult statues and men, 5.80.2–81.1).13

But further parallels in the denouement of the ‘Theban’ interpretative act impact on how the earlier story is to be understood and render the Perinthian logos itself an oracle that attains its full meaning as an act of our interpretation (ἡμέτερον ἔργον), if we bring these logos together (συμβάλλωσιν) to find an ὄμειν αὐτόμη (‘better interpretation’) for why what we have read appears in Herodotus’ narrative.

And since no interpretation seemed to appear better than this, straightway they sent a request to the Aeginetans, calling on them to help as allies in accordance with the oracle (ἐποικελεωμένοι κατὰ τὸ χρηστηρίον ὁρ. Βοιήθειν), because they were

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13 Of course, an obvious interpretation would have been the Plateans, who were ethnically among the nearest, geographically closer than Aegina, and not allies; but no Theban would then have found this interpretation ἄμεινον.

14 Cf. Cyrene’s response to the χρηστηρίαν of 92.6.1, called ἄμφοτέρως. See also Haubold, p. 128 below.
nearest (ὡς ἔντων ἀγγιστέων); and in answer to the request of the Thebans for military support, the Aeginetans said they were sending the Aeacidae. But when the Thebans attacked, acting on their alliance with the Aeacidae and were badly beaten by the Athenians (τρηχεός περιφεβέντων ὑπὸ τῶν Ἁθηναίων), in response they sent the Aeacidae back to Aegina and returned them, and asked for men instead.

Verbal repetition attends the thematic and structural parallelism between the two oracular logoi. The Athenian ‘rough handling’ of the Thebans (τρηχεός περιφεβέντων ὑπὸ τῶν Ἁθηναίων) repeats the formulation used of the Paeonians’ treatment of the Perinthians (περιφεβέντος πρότερον καὶ ὑπὸ Παιώνων τρηχεός, ‘earlier they had been roughly handled also by the Paeonians’), and may raise some qualms over the identity of the characters in that earlier story. At the same time, the repeated appearance of the verb ἐπικαλέομαι in the context of an oracle points to another way of understanding the clever interpretation of the apparently god-sanctioned Paeonians. A careless reading may have erroneously understood ἐπικαλέομαι in the oracle’s condition, ‘if when they are sitting opposite you they call on you’, as meaning an invitation to battle, a challenge, synonymous with πρόκλησις (‘call out to battle, challenge’). Unfortunately, this is a meaning ἐπικαλέομαι never has in extant literature. Herodotus seems to underscore the difference a prefix makes with the use of πρόκλησις (‘challenge’) a few lines later. The two most common meanings in Herodotus of the word are ‘to invoke’ a god, or to ‘summon’ allies, and indeed of the twelve appearances of this latter meaning, a full half are packed into Book 5.

The Theban passage, pointing back to the Perinthian logos thematically with its more critical examination of the process of oracular interpretation and verbally with its repetition of τρηχεός περιφεβέντων and ἐπικαλέομαι, may induce reconsideration of the oracle received by the Paeonians, a different act of συμβάλλεσθαι that will add a sinister tone to their interpretative act. For more accurately the transmitted oracle reads, ‘if they summon you [as allies], calling on you by name, attack them, if they don’t, do not.’ And as the events of the peculiar contests play out, the two meanings of ἐπικαλέομαι are simultaneously evoked — in singing the paeon, the

33 This phrase for the results of military conflict is used eight times in Herodotus, overwhelmingly at the hands of Persians (only one other time of Greeks, Phocians, 8.27.3).
34 See Creuser (1869), Stein (1874), Abbott (1893), and Nenci (1994) ad loc. The juxtaposition with πρόκλησις suggests underlying Prodician technique (DK 84A13 and Kerferd 1983) 70; cf. μνημόσυνον διωγμον of 5.23.3 with Greenwood, pp. 138–44 below).
35 Immerwahr’s single comment (1966) 243 n. 17 on this logos: ‘Trickery may develop into treachery, e.g. . . . the Paeonians at Perinthus (5.1.1–2).’
Perinthians ‘invoke’ the god, but in calling on the god to celebrate their victories, they summon the Paeonians as allies, or worse, call on their Paeonian allies; that is, they ‘paenize’, an act which leads to them becoming subject to Paeonian kratos (οι Παιονεσ και πολλον τε έκρατησαν, ‘the Paeonians greatly overpowered them’) and renders an equivalence between Paeonians and Persians (οι Πέρσαι τε και ο Μεγάβαζος επεκράτησαν πλήθει, ‘The Persians and Megabazus prevailed by their numbers’). Any who inferred at first reading that the Perinthian logos conveyed an inherent similarity between Perinthians at two different periods may be faced with the truth that what the story really conveyed was an inherent similarity between two other distinct peoples at different times, ‘Paeonians’ and Persians.

With this change of focus, the unanswered questions raised by the narrative become different from those asked above (p. 45): as they enjoyed their contests, did the Perinthians actually know that the Paeonians had come with intent to attack? were the two sides (for the Perinthians at least) sitting literally opposite, rather than opposed to, one another? Should an audience engage in the oracular logic performed within the logos (and by its Paeonians), stepping outside of the confines of the reading which on the surface the narrative seems to expect, they might wonder whether there was another time when a group of people (perhaps Athenians) sat opposite (ἀντικατοικίζειν) the Perinthians, and waited to be called on (for assistance, that is, when the Ionians called on Athens to replace Sparta as their leader) – a moment that coincided with the Perinthians (and all the other Greeks) celebrating their victories (over the Persians) – a singing of the paean that led to ‘Paeonian’ kratos over them (or Athenian archè)?

The Perinthians ‘Paeonized’ (Περινθίοις παειονίσασι) then, like so many others of the Ionian Greeks, and, like so many by the time of Herodotus’ audience, they had been treated roughly for it.

65 When the Paeonians become divided into two different groups in the next logos, the group evocative of Athenians will in fact move (temporally) to a location opposite Perinthus, in Phrygia (5.98). The question Darius will ask them – τίνες δι οι Παιονεσ ἀνθρωποι εἶσι καὶ κατοικίζουσιν (‘Who are these Paean men and where do they live’, 13.2 – the question is metareferential, just who are these Paeonians?) – is the very same question asked of the Athenians – τίνες δέν τινες ἀνθρωποι καὶ κατοικίζουσιν (7.1.2) – with identical phraseology used nowhere else in the Historia, in a similar context of attempting to ally with Persia, and in both cases backfiring.

66 This is a scenario described by Pher. Aris. 23.3–4, if only we knew where in the Propontis Aristides’ negotiations were carried out; opposite Perinthus? At any rate, Herodotus may be exploiting dialect affinities – Athenians have more in common with paean-singing Ionians than the paean-singing Spartans did. The exploitation of Athens’ Ionic ties is of course central to Book 5, see Aristophanes in 5.97.

67 On this reading Herodotus has exploited another meaning of πράττου, not prior in time, but rather prior in his narrative; he will tell of the Paeonians’ use of kratos before he narrates the Persian ones; no less that ἐμέττου, the vō of the direct speech would then activate a contemporary frame.
If this identification should be considered correct, one might then ask why should Paonians be chosen to stand for Athenians, to which there would be several kinds of answers, depending on whether one evokes the 'deep' meaning of the name that involves the paon, or a more ethnographic and historic explanation involving what the signifier more prosaically denotes, a tribe of Thracians. As for the former, although the paean has several associations, the logic of these stories narrows them down to two, a feature that belongs to both the start of military engagement and to its end in the celebration of victory. As such the Paonians' speaking name would reveal them as a people characterized as simultaneously warlike and victorious, while the collapsing of the distinct meanings belonging to the start and end of military ventures would itself be entirely consonant with Thucydides' characterizations of Athens. As to the latter, while it is of course useful that according to Thucydides (2.97) Paonians are autonomoi, a quality particularly valued in Athenian political discourse, the answer to why a Thracean people at all may be best explained by Athens' long-standing Thracian ties: on the one hand, the location of these Paonians vaguely ἐπὶ Στρυμονόν (from the river Strymon) may well evoke the place on the Strymon most familiar to audiences, the Athenian colony Amphipolis (and, more darkly, its predecessor Ennea Hodoi); on the other, not only did Athens have long-standing ties with Thrace (dating back to Peisistratus), but the granting of citizenship to the son of Sitalces in 431 BC from the point of view of detractors at least might have made the identification of these particular Greeks with those barbarians unproblematic and pointed, as might also Athenian use of Thracian mercenaries to fight other Greeks (cf. Aristoph. Achi. 133-73, esp. 167-72, and Thuc. 2.101.4).

But if an audience has been induced to consider whether the Thracians they encounter in the story are the Athenians of the present, there are a few subtle indications that the λάγος was tending this way. The first lies in the

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99 For the Athenians as a people who cause the multiple functions of the paean to collapse into one, assuming victory at the start of every undertaking, see Thuc. 1.70.7 and cf. 4.65.3. Paean-play in the historians is suggestively intertextual: the only time Athenians sing the paean in Thucydides occurs in an event for which Thucydides will engage in his own wordplay involving the dangers of a single term's multiple meanings: at the start of the Sicilian expedition the Athenians sing paens (τραγῳδοντες 6.32.1) that are later remembered with rue (7.75.7), as if they had sung a victory paean before they began; and doubly pointed given the consequences of their failure to understand what the Dorian paean of 7.44.6 actually meant. Certainly relevant here is Aristoph. Knights (1356-20) where an injunction to the theatre τραγῳδιον leads the chorus (otherwise unmotivated, cf. Sommerstein (1981) 215) to call on the sausage-seller/Athena in the capacity of ἐπιβουλων of the islands.

40 On the substantial Thracian presence, cultural and literal, in Athens of at least the 430s onwards, see Parker (1996) 170-5, esp. 174 and n. 74; Simms (1988); and see below. Cf. Thuc. 1.82 for anxiety about engaging barbarians as allies in war against Greeks.
classification of the Perinthians as belonging to the Hellepontine Greeks, an appellation that one has to understand 'in the wide sense', as How and Wells comment, given the Perinthians' location in the Propontis, but such an understanding is not at all difficult from an Athenian (imperial) perspective at least since this onoma is identical to that employed in the Athenian Tribute Lists: in using this 'naturalized' classification of Thracian geography here Herodotus may well allude to and activate a rather different historical narrative about the power of names to shape the world as well as the ability to name as a demonstration of power.\footnote{How and Wells (1912) ad 5.1 and Abbott (1893). On the usual correspondence of Herodotean usage with that familiar from the Tribute Lists see How and Wells (1912) ad 4.58. An innovation, these geographic categories in the Tribute Lists seem not to have appeared before List 12 (443/2 BC), see ATL. The heated ancient debates (e.g. Strabo vii fr. 98) on the application of the label of 'Hellepontine' to the Propontis may well find their origin here.}

More obviously, language points to another sign that this logos is not as straightforward as it might at first glance seem. The event that Herodotus has narrated presumes a shared language between Paeonians and Perinthians. As Asheri comments: ‘The amusing anecdote narrated in this chapter (VI) is entirely built around a pun (Παιονες-Παιονιζω) understandable of course only by Greeks, and hence a pure Greek fiction.’\footnote{Asheri (1990) 155.} But the fiction is also purely Herodotean, as is made clear to the alert reader by the κου attending his reported speech: the Paeonians are not presented as Thracians who have mistaken the singing of the Greek paean as invoking them by name, but rather as people from Strymon for whom the question of a different language is never raised. This is nothing other than Herodotus' dog that didn't bark in the night: has anyone in the audience been so carried along by the easy style as not to ask about the question of language? If they have been, what might their failure to notice serve to demonstrate; and if they did notice, what conclusion did they draw (συνεβόλοντο) from Thracians who have been presented in a manner that minimizes their differences from these 'Hellepontine' Greeks?

\textbf{PART II: ETHNOGRAPHY — THE THRACIAN ETHNOS (5.3–10)}

\textit{Introduction: bridging the logoi — extraneous narratives, relative κράτος and onomastics}

The ethnographic interlude of chs. 3–10 raises the same questions as that of its historical neighbour: why is it here and why in this form? Herodotus is
hardly compelled to describe these Thracians here: his own explicit reference to his earlier logos on the Getae — ἕφημ τοι μοι, 'I have said' (5.4.1) — draws attention to the choices he has exercised in the selection and placement of the content of his narrative. Moreover, the ethnography promises a historical logos that will in fact never be told. In 5.3 the wholesale conquest of Thrace hovers tantalizingly, a command by Darius 'to subdue Thrace' (Θρηκήν κατσωπρέφερθαι, 5.2.2), conditionally entertained ('if it should be ruled by one', έλ δ' ὑπ' ἕνος ἀξιοῦ, 5.3.1), and distant from what was in fact more modestly attained by Megabazus: the subjugation of the maritime regions (τὰ παρθεναλάσσα τὰ κατήκων, s.10). Finally, the ethnography is unique in its brevity. For how much ends up being known about the Thracians beyond their being all much of a muchness? One has to look instead to Thucydides for greater elaboration in his famous 'Herodotean' excursus on Thrace. Vague, brief and casually placed, Herodotus' Thracian logos stands in an ambiguous relationship to his ethnographies as the Paeonian defeat of the Perinthians does to the overarching historical narrative. The questions I wish to pose are these: how and why has Herodotus brought these Thracian narratives together (συμβάλλειν); and what should one conclude (συμβάλλεθαι) from that choice? But first, we must consider the more obvious bridges that Herodotus constructs between the logos and then the details of his Thracian account.

If the Perinthians were the 'first' in a historical series, the Thracians are the 'biggest' in an ethnographic frame — that is, both superlative, albeit each with some qualification: 'of the Hellespontians' (5.1.3); 'after the Indians' (5.3.1). And as the Perinthian logos was predicated upon comparison (of similar events, but at different times and with different agents), so too comparison functions at every level in this ethnographic logos, even extending to the very relationship the Thracian logos strikes with its Perinthian predecessor: for if the κράτος of Persians and Paeonians is implicitly (though inconclusively) compared by the similarity of the act they performed, mastery of Perinthus (ἐπικράτησαν), the κράτος of the Thracian ethnos is evaluated in the assertion that under certain circumstances they would (future time) be superlative on a more absolute scale (κράτιστον πάντων ἔθεων, 'of all peoples'), and as such (whether actual or potential) it vies with these preceding (historical and textual) demonstrations of strength. But how these κράτη compare now, under the present circumstances, what hierarchy might exist between these three groups, is left indeterminate — a

43 On which see Asheri (1990).
disappointment for any audience who may have wished history to provide some coordinates against which to measure Thracian strength of the present. As it is, Herodotus’ *Histories* never narrate an engagement between the Thracian *ethnos* and the Persians.

Herodotus creates a further bridge between these *logoi* of Thracian *krátos* in terms of structure: the conditional circumstances necessary for superlative Thracian *krátos* (ἐὶ δὲ... ἢ, 5.3.1) replays the conditional scenario of the oracular utterance involving Paeanian *krátos* (ἤν μὲν... ἢν δὲ μή, 5.1.2). Qualified as it is by the subjective opinion of the narrator (κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν, ‘in my judgement’), that evaluation of Thracian potential leaves itself open for interpretation by interested parties, no less than the oracle did. Of course, the stakes involved in Paeanian *krátos* are much higher: the potential inherent in future, πολλῷ *krátisi* πάντων ἔθνων (‘most powerful by far of all peoples’), would dwarf what is past and actual, πολλὸν τε ἐκράτησαν (‘they hugely overpowered them’), if, that is, it ever would happen.

Nor have onomastics been left behind. The subject of naming unites the narrative units of these ten chapters – ὄνομασί (‘by name’, 5.1.2), ὄνοματα (‘names’, 5.3.2), ὄνομα (‘name’, 5.9.1) – and each appearance introduces a study on the relationship of language to the world it denotes. While for the Paenians the capacity to manipulate *onomata*, to exploit the relationships that language can strike with reality, was a source of their *kratos*, the Thracian ethnography provides another kind of exploration of the relationship between language, reality and *krátos*. The Thracian *ethnos* would be strongest if they should find unity in leadership or thought, but that lack of unity finds its analogue in onomastics: for if they are a people divided in thought, they are also a people divided in name (‘they have many names, each taking their name from their lands, but they all use practically the same (παραπεριλαχοισει) customs in relation to everything’). While their individual names may derive meaning from their lands, a deeper, collective, ‘meaning’ may seem to lie elsewhere: having chosen to define themselves literally name themselves – by their different territories (χώραι) rather than by shared custom (νόμοι), this nearly homogeneous *ethnos* is found to be – at least, at present – ‘without strength’ (ἁλθενίς) – a result that is anything but nominal.

To judge from Thucydides, this sort of inference from names seems indeed topical, underlying as it does a central claim of his history. His war, he argues, is greater than all that have come before, even Troy, as one can tell from the strengthlessness (ἁλθενίς) of early Greeks, somehow epitomized by their lack of a collective name.
Also it is clear to me not least from what follows that the ancients had no strength (assthenia): for Greece does not yet seem to have undertaken anything in common before the Trojan war; and it seems to me that the whole of Hellas did not even have this name (onomata); on the contrary, before the time of Hellen son of Deucalion, the name (epileisis) itself did not even exist, but it went by the name (eponymia) of the different tribes, in particular of the Pelasgians. (Th. 1.3.1–2)

While Thucydides seems satisfied to draw such conclusions drawn from onomastics, for Herodotus, any causal connection between the absence of a collective Thracian name and overall capacity is, as between the Perinthian defeats, left at the level of inference. Thucydides or his audience may draw such a conclusion from these ‘facts’, but should a Herodotean audience? That question can only be answered once we examine what it means for Herodotus to narrate the existence of, without actually naming, these many Thracians, and consider the contemporary resonances of his Thracian logos.

But one final study of onomastics is carried out in chs. 9–10: in the first person, the narrator claims the ability to learn of only a single people beyond the Ister, knowledge that consists largely in knowing a single name: μούνοις δὲ δύναμι πιθέσα τικέντας πέρην τοῦ Ἰστροῦ ἀνθρώπους τοῖον οὖν ἐναι Σιγύννας (‘Only a single people living beyond the Ister have I been able to learn of; their name is the Sigynnae’, 5.9.1). He cites a single custom, their Median clothing, and their claim to be colonists of the Medes. Here is a case where name and geography provide no insight into these people; the only knowledge may come from a νόμος, a custom of clothing, that one might infer to be the basis of the descent they claim to have, though Herodotus neither makes such a claim explicit nor ascribes any evidential value to the clothing.45

Almost the only thing interesting about these Sigynnae seems to be their name: ‘The Ligurians who live above Massalia call retail merchants (κατηλόος) “sigynnae”, but the Cypriots use this word for spears (τὰ δόρικα).’ One onoma, so many meanings; ‘Sigynnae’ signifies three classes of nouns – a people, retailers, or spears. But what is meant by this display of meanings? A display of erudition, to be sure, but it also demonstrates a point about relativity: what σιγύνναι means is entirely dependent on where you happen to be, the very point that Aristotle uses the word to make when he singles out sigunon to demonstrate that the ‘same’ word can be both exotic (γλώττα) and common (κύριον), but not in relation to the same people: ‘For sigunon is a common word to the Cypriots, but to us it

45 On the intransiency of clothing as an indicator of ethnicity cf. 5.87.3–90. On the claims and use of colonial ties: Aristagoras at 5.97.2 with Macan (1895) 1.246. See below.
is exotic' (Poetics 21). Its appearance in Aristotle and Herodotus suggests that it was a stock example from language theory, the γλώττα. But if so, the addition of the Massalian traders – yet another meaning in yet another place – may point to a particular linguistic debate of the late fifth century: the juxtaposition of referents (συμβάλλειν) gestures towards a conclusion (συμβάλλωσις) about the inherent meaninglessness of onomata, that is, the arbitrariness of the sign.46

Names could be made to mean all too much in the Perinthian logos, but they seem to mean less and less through the trajectory of the Thracian logos: the unity of an ethnos can be belied by its many names; and knowing a name may not be knowing much when its meaning is entirely dependent upon the context in which it is used. Taken together Herodotus' onomastic narrative might induce a series of cursory inferences in his audience: one might infer from the Paeonians that a clever use of onomata will lead to the successful exercise of κράτος; from the Thracians that their polyonymous state stands in some inverse relationship to the unity that would give them superlative κράτος; from the Sigynnae the relativity of meanings, if not also the inherent meaninglessness of words. A spectrum of contemporary responses to language are on offer in these chapters, but if the Sigynnae demonstrate the importance of context for the meaning of words, we must examine the wider context in which Herodotus' onomastics operates. After journeying to the end of this 'digression', and to the extra-textual intertexts beyond – Sophocles, Aristophanes and above all Thucydides – we may be led to draw other conclusions about Herodotus' implicit excursus on the meaning of onomata and their relationship to kratos in the context of Thrace.

Ethnographic comparison

The ethnographic comparison of the logos must be the first concern. The Perinthian logos juxtaposed comparable historical situations, leaving the significance of the juxtaposition to be construed by its audience. Here in the ethnographic frame, comparison is an explicit feature in the presentation of the νόμοι of the Thracians. Nomoi of distinct groups of Thracians are compared against the norm which the collective ethnos constitutes as a single, yet polyonymous, entity, and against all other anthrôpoi and ethnea: and once again the meaning of this Thracian logos in context – textual, cultural, political – is left for the audience to construe, now doubly enjoined

to do so by the discourse of comparison inscribed within the ethnography of the Thracian logos itself and by the model of inference based on comparison (συμβάλλειθαι) established by the preceding logos.

The brevity of Herodotus' Thracian ethnography – unique among his ethnographic excursuses – belies its significance.47 In what follows an explanation for this minimalist treatment will be found to lie in contemporary discourse and politics surrounding Thrace. If brief, the ethnography is also deceptively simple. Its dynamics are constructed to assay repeatedly the distance between the subject of the ethnographic logos and its viewer. At the outset, the text configures the audience of this ethnography as belonging to the universalizing categories of all mankind, all peoples. That is, they are subsumed into categories that minimize their difference from others, among whom the Thracians emerge as not different in essence, but rather in quantitative terms – (almost) biggest and (potentially) strongest – that as such presuppose similarity in kind. This manoeuvre is the ethnorgraphic equivalent of the strategy of the Perinthian logos inviting the audience to engage with the logos' subject in terms that induce them to bring themselves into comparison with – even possibly identifying with – its Thracians, the Paonians. At the same time, the highly selective account of Thracian nomoi, organized through comparative terms – three exceptional nomoi, each practised uniquely by a single group of Thracians (5.3.2–5), and three nomoi common to the whole ethnos that are called epiphantesatai (5.6–8) – is designed to exploit the comparative frame it constructs in order to place the audience in an ambiguous relationship with the ethnography they are consuming.

This culturally uniform ethnos is introduced, paradoxically, by its exceptional tribes (νόμοι δὲ οὕτω παραπλησίοις πάντες χρέουσθαι κατὰ πάντα, πάλιν . . . 5.3.2). The choice to present the exceptional Thracian nomoi before the collective Thracian customs has consequences for an audience's reception of the former. The irregular sequencing creates a 'comparative vacuum': from what position will the audience view these Thracians, and against what are these exceptional nomoi to be compared? In the absence of explicit textual comparanda, the audience is forced to step in, either with what they 'know' about Thrace or, as is common with ethnographic engagement, with comparanda that include especially themselves.48 If these exceptional Thracians are defined negatively, as unlike their ἡλικία, it is left

48 These choices may amount to the same thing if the audience with the most 'knowledge' about Thrace is the one that from other Greek perspectives seems most Thracian by their policies and nomoi on Athens' relationship to Thrace in the fifth century see below.
open-ended whom they may be like: if my enemy’s enemy is my friend, is my other’s other me?

The practices that Herodotus highlights will raise precisely these questions, enjoining the reader to bring what they find comparable to the passage and to make inferences (συμβάλλοντες). Trausic joy (5.4) at funerals and sadness at births may at first seem peculiar:

The Trausi perform all other practices in the same way as other Thracians, but with respect to a birth among them or a death they do the following things. All the relations sit around the new-born and lament the many ills he will have to endure now that he is alive, recounting all the sufferings that are part and parcel of being a human. But at someone’s death, they rejoice and are happy burying him, giving as an explanation that since he is free from so much misery he is now in complete happiness. (ἐν πόση εὐδαιμονι). Modern commentators attest to the capacity of this passage to evoke two contrary responses, difference from and identity with the Greeks: while How and Wells contextualize the practice as Thracian, calling the belief in the afterlife ‘primitive’ and widespread’, they admit that ‘the pessimistic view of the present life (cf. Soph. Oed. Col. 1225; Theogn. 425) is in accord with one side of Hellenic sentiment . . . and with H.’s own oft-repeated opinion.’ Macan captures the balance the passage strikes, tempering his comparisons from anthropology with the recognition that ‘the pessimistic vein is, however, anything but un-Hellenic.’ While not acknowledging it as such, both scholars point to the choice that was likely to have faced contemporary audiences, namely to register extreme ‘otherness’ in this practice, or instead to recognize in it an exaggerated version of their own beliefs, albeit taken to their logical (ἐπιλέγοντες) conclusion – extreme alterity or similarity in the extreme. As Herodotus constructs the comparison, however, the choice is less clear-cut: if Trausic practice is exceptional among the Thracians, it indicates nothing about general Thracian belief, unless that the Thracian norm was a more moderate version; and if so, this would be nothing if not also Greek, with Athenian tragedy a dominant contemporary purveyor.

The exceptional practice of the Thracians north of Crestonia, polygamy, leads to a similar inference. As Macan notes, there is a ‘temptation to see the exceptional polygamy ascribed by this passage to certain Thracians as

49 See also Eur. Creph. fr. 449 N; on its relationship with Hdr. 5.4.2. see Browning (1961) and Harder (1985) 93–4.
50 Macan (1893) ad loc.: “This Trausic view of life as ‘not worth living’ is by no means uncommon, especially when a higher culture intrudes. Wholesale cases of voluntary extinction by barbarous nations are not unknown.”
implying monogamy to be the Thracian norm. Such an inference flies in the face of popular stereotypes of barbarians reflected on the Attic stage, and potentially renders the unspoken Thracian norm to be (similar to the) Greek. Closer to Book 5, the competitive practice in which the families of a man’s wives compete for the dubious honour of having their member die on her husband’s pyre, and celebrate her victory — a ‘barbaric’ custom — has apparently no Greek equivalent, but the ensuing chapters will reveal a Spartan King practising bigamy, and one of his wives, the one more loved, will have to give birth before an audience because of the invidia of the relations of the other wife (5.40.2), a competition that continues between their issue. It may be argued that Anaxandrides did οὐδεμίος Σπαρτιτικά (‘nothing at all Spartan’) in this, but neither do these exceptional Thracians do what is Θρημικά (‘Thracian’).

When the text turns from the exceptional nomoi of the Thracians to those shared (νόμοι τῶν ἄλλων Θρημίκων, 5.6.1), each example raises questions about its specificity or uniqueness to the Thracians. Herodotus presents three νόμοι that he concludes by calling ἐπιφανεστατοὶ (‘most notable’): (in reverse order) contempt for manual work, tattooing, and practices involving the exchange of children, particularly daughters, for money. Contempt for manual work (6.2) is by no means distinctly Thracian; it is a νόμος prevalent throughout the whole of Greece, as Asheri well notes, and already marked in the Histories as almost universal (2.167). In a different way, the νόμος that considers tattooing as elevated, its absence as coarse, is marked: it belongs to a ‘repertoire’ of ethnological examples illustrating the relativism of social conventions, apparent from the Dissoi Logoi: ‘It is cosmetic for the Thracians to tattoo their daughters, but for others tattoos are

15 Macan (1895) ad loc.
17 And sometimes ‘kings’, whether Spartan or Thracian, can be like a different tribe: of ὑπὸ βασιλέως συντόνων, πάροι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτιγγέων, στῆδονται . . . (‘Their kings, separate from the other citizens, worship . . .’, 5.7); the designation πολιτιγγέων facilitates cross-cultural comparison (‘curious’, Abbott (1895); ‘looks like a lapsus calami’, Macan (1895) 1156). On polygamy and Sparta see also 6.61; cf. 5.16.2–3 with Osborne, pp. 91–7 below.
18 Asheri (1990) 143–4. τὸ κύριον ἀπὸ πολέμου καὶ ληστῶν κάλλους (‘living from war and booty is the finest thing’) would in a Greek context even unite Spartans and Athenians, though their form of practising this νόμος would differ: the shared disdain for farming would be inferred from different practices — the use of helots, on the one hand, or the choice to abandon the countryside and live off the produce of others through naval archē, on the other.
19 τὸς δὲ Ἐθροῖς κόσμος τὸς κόρας στήνεσαι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις τιμωρία τὸ στήριγμα τοῖς ἀθέτοντι (DK 90 fr. 2.11). Asheri (1990) 145–6. Asheri points out that for the sake of paradox Herodotus puts on the same level ornamental and penal tattooing, exploiting the fact that in Greek these very different practices are denoted by the same verb, στίξων.
for criminals.' While illustrating the difference of Thracians in contrast to others (ἄλλοι), in contemporary theorizing tattooing was a stock example for illustrating what was – paradoxically – universal: the relativity of nomoi. Again, Greeks of Book 5 are foreshadowed by this νόμος: tattooing will emerge as a crucial feature in the instigation of the Ionian Revolt (5.35).46

More striking, and locally relevant, is perhaps the passage that introduces this section on the nomos of the other Thracians: 'They sell their children for export . . . they buy their wives from their parents for a lot of money' (πώλευε τὰ τέκνα ἐπὶ ἐξαγωγήν . . . ὄνειρον τᾶς γυναικὸς παρὰ τῶν γονέων χρημάτων μεγάλον, 5.6.1). The passage allows for ambiguity: is marrying daughters off for money a subset of the sale of children, or does it specify what was meant in the first statement? It cannot be told; but following the sale of children by references to marriage practice, the former practice (which may or may not be distinct from the second) is associated with the second, and capable of normalizing what at first is outlandish by evoking a practice far from alien to Greek audiences.47 This particular nomos may have further resonance closer to home and to Thrace. Sophocles’ Tereus, set in Thrace, stages such a cultural practice, but performed by Greeks, and more specifically by Athenians. The subject of Procthe’s lament (fr. 583) is precisely such sale and export:

�新 δὲ τὴν ἡμῶν ἐξικόμεθ᾽ ἐμφρόνησιν,

ἀφοῦσιμεθ᾽ ἔξω καὶ διεμπολόμεθα

θεῶν πατρῶν τῶν τε φυσάνων ἅπαν,

αἱ μὲν ἔννοια πρὸς ἄνδραν, αἱ δὲ ναυμάρθους.

When we come of age and reach maturity, we are pushed out away from paternal gods and the parents who begot us, and peddled to different buyers, some to strangers, and some to barbarians.

And this complaint finds itself couched not as a specific ethnic problem, but rather as a universal one, a consequence of γυναικεία φύσις (‘woman’s nature’).48 But if there is a general intertextuality between Herodotus’ and Sophocles logoi here, in the next section it will be considered whether it is significant that both authors situate these reflections in Thrace.

46 See Munson, Ch. 5 below.

47 The peddling of female relations (involving figures ambiguously ‘barbarian’) is a motif of the first logoi of Book 5: the Paionians (5.11–13) and Alexander (5.21.2), in both cases sisters. On contemporary resonances in Thrace, see Thuc. 2.101 and discussion below.

48 The universality of this female condition belongs to a wider theme of the play, the shared human condition: see the ἐν φύλλων αὐθρώπων of fr. 591; cf. the θυτή φύσις (‘mortal nature’) of fr. 590, and fr. 591.4, and as explored against the allerity of the Thracians, e.g. fr. 587. See also the bold comparison of Procthe’s and Tereus’ crimes in fr. 589. For a cogent discussion of the reconstruction of the play see Fitzpatrick (2001).
According to Herodotus, these three customs are ἐπιφανεστάτοι (5.6.2), but one might wonder what this onoma actually means, since it presupposes a comparative framework that is nevertheless left unspecified. What makes these nomoi 'most conspicuous'? Is it by comparison with Thracian nomoi or Greek? And if the latter, are they epiphanesstatoi because the narrator and the audience find them 'most recognizable' as Thracian — or rather 'most remarkable' because they are so like their own?99 It is a question that becomes more pressing as Herodotus continues by listing the gods that they worship by their Greek names (5.7) — Ares, Dionysus, Artemis, Hermes — and concludes by describing their elaborate funeral celebrations (5.8) in terms overwhelmingly evocative of the most famous of Greek funerals in that most Hellenic of texts, that of Patroclus.60

**Thracian logoi and Herodotus' audience**

Sophocles' Tereus suggests another comparandum for Herodotus’ Thracian logoi, that of contemporary logoi and experience of Thrace. Here the relationship between ethnography and onomastics in Herodotus’ opening chapters becomes salient. It is in the context of Thrace that Thucydides famously tries to prevent the inferences that might arise from paronomasia. His vehement claim that Tereus, the father of the Thracian king with whom Athens had dealings in 429/8, BC was no relation to Tereus, the mythic husband of Athenian Procris — they do not have the 'same name' and are not from the 'same Thrace' — 61 reveals not only the degree of influence of such wordplay (and by extension the purveyors of it) in contemporary

99 Herodotus' only other use of the superlative of ἐπιφανειας is to qualify Ἐβδομα (9.32.1) in a context that similarly elides the distinction between whether the peoples deployed by the Persians are worthy of note absolutely or rather because they are likely to be already known to the audience. Compare Thucydides' marked use of ἐπιφανειατά with the σημαῖα (1.21.1) that render a version of τὰ παλαιά in terms most familiar and recognizable to his own audience.

60 Artemis is particularly pointed as Athens is already likely to have started celebrating the Thracian Artemis, Bendis; the cult was officially recognized by 429/8 (IG I 1, 381, line 143).

61 See Petropoulou (1986–7); cf. Abbott (1893) 6. Homeric allusion may explain the awkwardness of κατὰ λόγον (variously taken, 'as is reasonable', 'in proportion to', 'according to the norms of single combat', 'on account of its importance', etc.; see Nenci (1994) 165 and Asheri (1990) 147 n. 21) as Herodotean double-meaning, simultaneously gesturing outside his logoi to its model: 'in accord with (Homeric's) logos', or 'as the story goes'. μοῦνοντος may also carry significance: it is a word used in Herodotus only in the Persianian logoi, supra, and in 6.92 about the successful Athenian monomachia Sophanes, who will later die fighting for Athenian possession of the goldmines in Thrace (9.75), usually identified with the Athenian disaster at Drabescus (Thuc. 1.100.3).

discourse, but also lets on that one simply cannot speak about Thrace without factoring in what an audience might import from elsewhere, no doubt from drama.53 Thucydides' reaction both provides a contemporary context through which to see Herodotus' own onomastics, and should remind us that such audience responses would have likewise registered with Herodotus when composing his own Thracian logos. In contrast to Thucydides, Herodotus seems likely to have favoured the anonymous source in seeing such conflations and what one might be led to conclude (συμβάλλοντα) from them as desired.64 And even if in this instance the contours of the appropriations and counter-appropriations of mythic Tereus in relation to the historic Teres elude us, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that such mythic ties (and their denial) would have been exploited in debates surrounding Athenian negotiations with Thrace.65

Beyond revealing the contemporary salience of Thracian onomastics—a context for our Paenonian logos—Thucydides proves instructive for reconstructing the expectations of Herodotus' audiences in further respects. Beneath the manifest intertextuality between the two authors, it is possible to construct a shared contemporary discourse of ethnic comparison in which they participate. Thucydides digresses from his historical narrative to describe the Odrysian archè with which Athens had dealings in 429/8 (2.96–101), and to include some comparative ethnography of his own:

For it is the greatest kingdom (ὅσπειρα) of those in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Black Sea in revenue (χρησάμενων προσέδω) and in other good fortune (τὴν ἀλήθευσιν), but in their battle strength and size of their army they are much the second (πολύ δεύτεροι) to the kingdom of the Scythians. It is not just that it is impossible for the nations of Europe to match strength against it, but even in Asia, nation (Ἡνοε) against nation, they would not be able to make a stand

63 It must have been so important to refute this view that he risked making known forever what he seems to have hoped to eradicate in the present; on this irony see Hornblower (1993) 288. The strength of Thucydides' refutation might suggest the proponent is sooner Sophocles (enforced by Aristophanes) than Helianicus. And, unless one believes Thucydides' fiction that the text we have is exactly contemporary with the events it describes, Sophocles' Tereus certainly predates Thucydides' text, and its Thracian setting is precisely what so vexed Thucydides (likely a Sophoclean innovation: Wilamowitz (1931) 51 n. 1; Parsons (1974) 46–50; Firbank (2001) 91; Zacharia (2001) 102). On the influence of Sophocles' play see Az. Birds with Dobrov (1993) esp. 214–15. For the abundance of audience 'knowledge' about Thrace, see Asher (1990) 153–8; for musing on the dynamics of Thracian 'knowledge' in the assembly, see Garland (1990) 85 n. 26, (1992) 113–14 and its comic portrayal in Az. Ach. 133–73.

64 For Thucydides' general antipathy towards exploiting the significance of names in contrast to Herodotus, see Hornblower (1996) 134–6.

65 For recognition of the manifest political import of a play concerned with Athenian–Thracian relations (albeit loosely defined), see Zacharia (2001). See also Marchant (1891) 163 and Rusten (1986) 133–4. On ambivalence among Athenians about negotiations with Thrace to wage their war (against Greeks) see Az. Ach. 133–73.
against the Scythians if they all acted in concert (Σκύθοις ὁμογενοῦσι πᾶσιν ὁμοτηταῖς). But in terms of the other good counsel (εὐδοκία) and intelligence (ἔνεσις) about the things that enrich one’s life they do not match up with other peoples. (1.97.5–6)

The similarities with Herodotus are striking. When Thucydides ranks the Thracians as second by far after the Scythians, commenting on the superlative strength of that latter group should they unite, it is hard not to perform our own comparison of Herodotus’ own evaluation that Thracians are indeed second, but after the Indians, and recognize a deeper similarity underlying their differing opinions about just which northern people would be superlative should they unite. In contrast to Thucydides’ objective style, Herodotus’ κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν (‘in my judgement’) makes explicit the contest of opinion in which the one he calls his own competes. Aristotle offers yet another view, demonstrating that even Greeks could be placed into the fray:

But the race of the Greeks, as they are geographically positioned in the middle, they share of both these qualities. For they are spirited and intelligent; and therefore they continue free, both being governed in the best fashion and able to rule all, if they could attain a single politia. (Politics 1327b27–33)

These competing assertions point to contemporary contexts of ethnic comparison, revealing particular tropes of the discourse (‘which people might be capable of ruling all?’, ‘what qualities, what circumstances, would make that (im)possible?’). But their juxtaposition likewise helps bring into relief the claim the Herodotean narrator marks as distinctly his. First, Aristotle’s description of the Greeks in terms akin to Herodotus’ Thracians may remind us now that the Histories begin to be dominated for the first time by Greeks of differing names but παραπληγάδοι νόμοι (‘customs that are very nearly the same’), the potential superlative strength of the Thracians εἰ δὲ ὑπ’ ἐνὸς δραχμοῦ ἢ φρονεῖ κατὰ τῶντο (‘if it should be ruled by one person, or it should become unanimous’) could just as easily describe the Greeks of Herodotus Book 5, some of whom will in the course of the Histories for the most fleeting of moments think κατὰ τῶντο. And it could just as easily describe his present-day audience. To describe Thracians in

66 Cf. Hdt. 3.94 and 98. Why should Herodotus and Thucydides differ on this point? The answer is likely to lie in an Athenian perspective that preferred to elevate (however backhandedly) a people the Persians did not subsume to avoid the implications of elevating a people that the Persian empire possessed, an explanation perhaps confirmed by Ctesias’ rare agreement with Herodotus (FGrH 688 F 452c: cf. Asheri (1990) 137).

67 The intertextuality with Hdt. 5 πάσα εὐδοκία (5.4.2) and εὐδοκίας of the Thracians (5.8) is also worth noting.
terms evocative of Greeks parallels the effect described above of Herodotus’ choice to present first and more prominently the Thracians with the exceptional *nomoi*: there articulation of internal differences between Thracians in the (temporary) absence of a Thracian norm (minimally described when it does finally come) facilitated positive comparison with Greeks. It also corresponds to the dynamic at play in the Perinthian *logos* where a specific group of Thracians (Paeonians) might also be read as a specific group of Greeks (Athenians).

One might also note, by comparison, that Herodotus’ text does not demonstrate the overt signs of the cultural supremacy of the Greeks implicit in Thucydides, and flagrant in Aristotle.\(^68\) In contrast to Thucydides’ negative appraisal of Scythian *ξύνεσις περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἐξ τῶν βίου* (‘intelligence about the things that enrich one’s life’), Herodotus elsewhere grants them superlative status precisely in what he calls the single matter most important in human life (*τὸ δὲ Σκυθικὸ γένει ἐν μὲν τὸ μεγίστον τῶν ἀνθρωποποιητῶν περιγράμματο ρηγομέτοι πάντων ἐξεύρητοι τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδωμεν, ‘the Scythian race have come up with the cleverest solution – better than any we know – to the single matter most important to human affairs’), while rendering his negative evaluation as one that is confessedly subjective (*τὰ μὲντι ἄλλα οὐκ ὁγὐσαί, ‘I don’t however admire them in other respects’, 4.46).\(^69\) Plutarch would call this Herodotus’ *philobarbarism* (the result of his own *συμβάλλεις*), but in the context of these chapters we might choose (for the moment) to forgo our own conclusions and rather flag such passages as an invitation for his audience to compare, an exercise in which Herodotus as narrator (unlike Thucydides and Aristotle) has explicitly implicated himself, and one that operates within a contemporary context where such ethnographic comparison is the currency.\(^70\)

Beyond the shared mode of comparison in Thucydides’ and Herodotus’ Thracian *logoi*, Thucydides’ excursus on Thrace has more generally seemed to demonstrate a distinctively ‘Herodotean’ quality.\(^71\) This quality is seen

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68 Macan (1895) 1.154 comments, ‘Aristotle leaves no obscurity about the implicit moral.’ See also Croiset (1886) 457. In fact, on the surface at least the Perinthian *logos* shows Thracians outwitting Greeks.

69 See Henderson, Ch. 11 below, n. 20.

70 The constraints of space force me to leave out the important dimension provided by the Hippocratic writers. On Herodotus’ polemical stance against several of their theses, see Thomas (2000).

71 See Hornblower (1991, 1997) 371 on for instance ἀνήρ ἀλόγος (‘a man travelling light’): a ‘Herodotean’ expression found in Thucydides only in 2.97.1–2. As Hornblower (2004) 310 now recognizes, the term need not be distinctly ‘Herodotean’, but rather ethnographic. See also Marchant (1891) 234 (ad 2.37.1) for Thucydides omission of the name of a river when ἡμῖν ἵστατο is inserted, a practice common in Herodotus but attested in Attic outside Thucydides only a single time (Isoc. 7.80).
to reside in the digressive detail of the passage: 'In this section the amount of information Thuc. gives perhaps goes a little beyond the needs of the narrative . . . nor is by any means all of the detail, valuable though it is to us, essential for the understanding of later episodes. These chapters are a shining exception to the rule that there is little ethnography in Thuc. for its own sake.'

More startling is that on Thrace Thucydides actually emerges as more 'Herodotean' than even Herodotus: his extensive list of tribe names and topography reveals Herodotus' excursus by comparison to be highly selective, idiosyncratic and disproportionately brief - Herodotus for instance provides few names here. A biographical explanation would suggest that Thucydides is elaborating on a gap left by his predecessor, exploiting his audience's knowledge that he, Thucydides (unlike, for instance, a Herodotus), should know about Thrace. Such a point is valid as far as it goes, but more may be had by looking beyond the narrow model of allusion, to the ethnographic genre and discourse presupposed by the two Thracian excursuses.

Herodotus and Thucydides on Thrace presuppose a discourse in which their ethnographies of Thrace participate, that of politics, or what, in the spirit of our Herodotus chapters, we might call relative κράτος. The details Thucydides chooses to focus on in his Thracean λόγοι speak volumes: the extent of Sitalces' ἀρχή (2.96.1, 96.3), the amount of phoros (2.97.3) and the particular Thracean νόμους of taking that resulted in its strength (ὡς τε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἡδεῖν ἱσχύος), rendering it 'greatest' (μεγίστη) in πρόσοδος χρημάτων and ἄλλη εὐθυμονον. If Herodotus' Thracean ethnography ended up seeming uncannily Greek, Thucydides' presents his Thracians in terms no less Greek, if not also specifically Athenian. His account reflects Athenian standards of evaluation and his own conception of historical causation, the importance of πρόσοδοι, χρήματα and the securing thereof (cf. 1.19; and πρόσοδοι 1.4, 1.13): this is what Thucydides thinks is important for his audience to know, and is no doubt in part a function of knowing his audience all too well. Thucydides demonstrates the degree to which the ethnographic 'other' emerges as a version of oneself, a function of the very language which one uses to describe them. The Thucydidean treatment of Thrace offers its (Athenian) audiences a host of its own (largely flattering)

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73 See Asheri (1990) esp. 135 and 161. Herodotus does eventually provide the names of 23 tribes, but his choice to integrate them so diffusely into the narrative is significant. See Nenci (1994) 138.
74 Even if this is in some sense true, the filling of a gap may not be a simply academic exercise.
75 On this view see Westlake (1969) 15; see also Hornblower (1996) 22–3 quoting 4.103.5 and 5.11.1.
76 See Kallet-Marx (1993).
implications. The first stresses difference: though the Odrysians possess, like Athens, archē, they were also markedly inferior: Thucydides/Athens supplies the standard of measure, phoros, and theirs was only 400 talents. The second lies in their similarity: in demonstrating something universal about the drive to possess archē, Thracian archē justifies Athenian archē, not barbarian (as some Greek critics of Athens may assert), but rather human.

But this Thucydidean ethnography not only demonstrates how the perspective and values of the viewer and audience are embedded in the ethnographic exercise; it points also to a source of the ethnographic impulse: Thucydides waxes ethnographic precisely in those contexts in which he treats subjects of Athenian imperial interest, Thrace and Sicily. Such material was no doubt topical for his narrative, but this does not entirely account for the extent of his detail. Here one might turn to the affective quality of ethnography, its capacity to stoke an audience's interest in what is far away: interest in and desire for all that is offered by distant lands spiral out of control as cause becomes effect, effect cause, particularly when the desire for knowledge of faraway places is met by the capacity to acquire both the knowledge and the places. Herodotus demonstrates throughout his narrative that the desire for knowledge and the desire to possess are never far from one another for an imperial power.

At the same time, Book 5 introduces another dynamic surrounding ethnographic knowledge: its use to further particular aims. Both Hecataeus and Aristagoras demonstrate in their own ways the fact that agenda may lie behind the promulgation of such knowledge. Hecataeus may originally have catalogued peoples and places for their own sake, but Herodotus casts him as performing this knowledge (‘cataloguing – καταλέγων – all the tribes which Darius ruled and the strength (δύναμιν) of him’, 5.36.2) for anything but disinterested reasons. Furthermore, this knowledge, once constituted as such, gains through writing an independence from its creator and becomes available for appropriation by others, not least as a means of persuasion to pursue their own ends. When Aristagoras describes the Persian nomoi and their extensive sources of wealth (5.49 and 97), the subtext is clear: they are rich and weak. It is significant that Herodotus explicitly notes – not leaving it to inference – just how well this kind of ethnography goes down in the context of the Athenian assembly. Thucydides’ ethnographies of

77 Interweaving ethnography with history, presenting ethnographic information at historically salient moments, is of course Herodotean, but, if distinctly so, Thucydides’ use of this convention in relation to Athens would place her in a very Persian light.

78 See Osborne, p. 93 below, on Darius’ curiosity: cf. 3.17–23 and 4.44 with Christ (1994).

79 On this logos see Pelling, Ch. 7 below.
Thrace and Sicily are often considered as motivated by a desire to fill in what Herodotus has left out, but from a Herodotean perspective it may be that Thucydides’ text indulges certain audiences, purveying those ethnographies of interest to contemporary Athenian imperial ambitions which were no doubt at home in the assembly; by contrast, the ethnographies that Herodotus provides, those of Egypt, India and Scythia, were safely in another league.

Here one might therefore challenge the notion expressed above of Thucydides providing ‘ethnography for ethnography’s sake’, and wonder whether this noble fiction was any more possible in the late fifth century than now. Thucydides’ Thracean ethnography serves important functions in his text: while the opportunities and events he describes may have passed by the time of his narration, his detailed narrative can re-create the moment when such material was current and eagerly consumed by audiences because of the promise of conquest that it seemed to offer. The interest in Thrace that his narrative generates in its audience serves an important explanatory function: if such ethnography succeeds in enamouring its reading audience of distant lands (and their subjection), it thereby furnishes an implicit historical explanation/justification for the events which transpired, explaining why it was entirely reasonable for the Athenians to pursue the relationship they did with the Odrysians, and ultimately why it was no reflection on them that this policy yielded no advantage to them (2.101.6).\footnote{The emphasis would be that the machinations of Seuthes were to blame, not Sitalkes, with whom the Athenians had their relationship.}

Thucydides’ handling of the Odrysians is, however, telling of greater tensions. He employs the comparative discourse to distinguish Odrysians in three distinctive ways: from other Thracians by virtue of their greater strength, size and wealth; from Persians by virtue of differing nomoi with respect to taking and giving; and from the Scythians, next to whom they are πολὺ δευτέρο (‘a clear second’). The first distinction serves as an implicit answer to the question of what could have induced Athens to have had dealings with Thracians given their past experiences (Drabescus) and in face of his audiences’ historical hindsight: on the one hand, their wealth made them desirable allies, and, on the other, not all Thracians are the same.\footnote{This differentiation implicitly invites an audience to bracket the events at Drabescus (Th. 1.100.3) and the slaughter at Mycale (Th. 7.29).}

The final distinction – against the numerous and warlike Scythians – might allay fears by dwarfing the Odrysian kingdom, implying that although powerful, it was nevertheless no threat, certainly not the one that was feared by Athens’ enemies (2.101.2–4). At the same time, and more cynically, the
The second distinction of these Thracians – from Persia – is more sophisticated in its aims. If both Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ Thracian ethnographies consist in contrasting exceptional Thracians against the collective _ethnos_, they also share in providing a minimal treatment of _nomoi_ common to all Thracians. Herodotus has been discussed above, but for Thucydides the single shared _nomos_ is that of taking rather than giving, which he emphasizes twice and compares, irrelevantly, to the opposite _nomos_ of the Persians, apparently a case of ethnographical detail for its own sake:

κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τούναυτὸν τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον, ὡντα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θραξί, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι (καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἦν αἰτηθῆναι μὴ δοθῇν ἢ αἰτηθῆναι μὴ τυχεῖν), δῶος δὲ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ έχρησαντο· οὗ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξιν οὐδὲν μὴ διδόντα δώρα. ὡστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἐλθὲν ἰσχύος.

For they have established for themselves a custom that is the opposite of that of the Persian monarchy, a custom that also exists for other Thracians, namely to take, rather than to give (indeed it was more shameful for a person asked not to give, than for one asking not to receive what he asked for), but nevertheless the Odrysians practised this custom more extensively in accord with their capacity to do so – for it was impossible to get anything done if one wasn’t prepared to give gifts. Consequently their kingdom reached a position of strength.

Is this ethnography for its own sake? Irrelevant for elucidating Thracian practice, the inclusion of this Persian custom does serve other purposes. First, it conveys a dual message: namely that (in) dealing with Thracians (it) is _not_ like (Athens was) dealing with the Persian _basileia_. Second, in adopting the comparativist manoeuvre, Thucydides implicitly asserts his expertise in making this claim – _he_ is in the position to compare – and such expertise will facilitate the persuasiveness of his account. Third, the focus on the Thracian custom itself, _of taking_, is significant. The logic of Thucydides’ argument is somewhat awkward here: in a context that will ultimately differentiate Odrysians as superlative among the other Thracians, he invokes as explanation – almost oxymoronically – a _common_ practice (τὸν νόμον, ὡντα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θραξί, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι, ‘the custom existing also among other Thracians of taking rather than giving’, 2.97.4), which in turn he is then forced to qualify in order to

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82 E.g. Thucydides’ ‘irrelevant’ comparison of the _nomoi_ of the Thracians with that of Persian monarchy (2.97.4). See below. For the label of ‘irrelevant’ see Westlake (1969).
explain how by using a custom common to Thracians Odrysians could attain a distinctive status (δυνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πράξαι οὐδὲν μὴ δίδοντα δῶρα. ὅστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἠλθείν λογίως, 'all the same they used the custom to a greater degree corresponding to their ability to do so. For it was impossible to get anywhere if one didn't give gifts. The result was that the kingdom attained great strength', 2.97.4–5). A question is of course begged as to whence their capacity to exploit the nomos so extensively arose; but, more importantly, as Thucydides makes the argument, nomos as such is insufficient to explain their superlative status: what emerges as more salient is their greater ability to practise it, κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον, their dunamis. The γάρ clause separating the two claims interrupts the sequence of thought and makes less apparent a claim that may ungenerously be read as 'they became strong because they were able'.

But why not then leave aside the nomos and just simply say they were strongest? Why invoke nomos at all? The answer is twofold. Thucydides admits here, but only at the level of inference, what is indeed confirmed later, δῶρα passed from Athens to Sitalces (2.101.1): in apparently elaborating on ἐπὶ πλέον qualifying the previous sentence, the γάρ clause in fact tacitly admits to a certain relationship between Athens and the Odrysians. But how should that relationship be characterized? Thucydides is at pains to make it seem nonchalant: he claims later that the Athenians never had any expectations from Sitalces, though the use of negation in the statement may itself belie the claim (ἀπεισότομεν αὐτῶν μὴ ἠξεί, 'placing no trust in the idea he would come' 2.101.1). Without Thucydides' invocation of nomos, and the framework that it provides of δῶρα, the relationship could easily be (and may have been) described as (and possibly was) payment for military service: monies passed from Athens to Sitalces for him to fulfil what Thucydides calls ὑποσχέσεις; and indeed if that was the relationship (with the aim being that understood by Athens' enemies, 2.101.4), then Athens was quite simply shafted, when in the end Sitalces fulfilled none of his promises and opted for a marriage deal with Macedon.

Thucydides' further elaboration of the Thracian custom would serve to diminish Athenian discomfit: καὶ σοφοὶ ἦν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἡ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχὲν ('indeed it was more shameful not to give if asked,

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8) Thucydides obscures the cause of their greatness, creating an ostentatious correlation with the nomos of gift-receipt, when the actual path of causation is dunamis. See Classen (1914) ad loc. 'infolge der größeren Macht... thron sie um so mehr diese Erpressungen'; Shilleto (1886) ad loc. comments on the 'obscurity' of κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι; for dunamis as a key concept in Thucydides see Kallet-Marx (1993) 3 with n. 6 and passim.
than, asking, not to meet with success') provides a way of seeing how Athens' avoided what was ὀφειχον in giving what they did as asked, and getting nothing in return for what they asked. The evocation of nomos allows Thucydides to control the framework through which Athens' negotiations with the Odrysians should be seen, that is as one of gift exchange (δῶρα 2.101.1, their nomos) rather than payment; and indeed by the time Thucydides explicitly admits to this transaction, his audience has already been primed to accept it in his ('Thracian') terms. A fortiori it becomes preposterous to subscribe to the logos of Athens' enemies regarding Athens' intentions in 'giving gifts' to the Odrysians (2.101.4; but cf. Ach. 159–60). This interpretation of course must remain conjecture, but adopting as it does Thucydides' own more typical and cynical mode of analysis, an explanation emerges for just what is at stake in his adopting an anomalous style: ethnography becomes a means of masking (and perhaps flagging for select readers) events both unflattering to Athens, and ones that in occurring too soon might upset the grand narrative of Athenian degeneration over time of which Thucydides' overall account attempts to persuade. But there is a cost to his strategy for the reader: it involves inducing his readers to see the events not as Greeks would, but rather as Thracians do (if Thucydides' account of their nomos is to be believed), to see Athens' actions through the eyes of Thracian nomos rather than Greek.

**Thracians and Athenians**

Thucydides' use of Thracian nomos shares another feature with Herodotus', selection and presentation of Thracian nomoi, namely the configuration of Thracians in familiar terms. For if nothing can be done in Thrace without giving, the same may be said of Athens. Or so it is characterized by the Old Oligarch whose bias, however, configures the nomos in those very terms Thucydides avoids, χαρηματα rather than δῶρα:

But some say, 'If someone with money approaches the boule or the demos, he gets his business done.' And I would agree with them that a lot can be accomplished in Athens with money (ἐπὶ χαρηματω), and even more could be accomplished,

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84 Cf. the μναθός δωρέν ('payment gift') of 5.23.1 with Greenwood, Ch. 4 below.
85 Did the Athenians' fleet not arrive because they ἁπεπιστούνως μὴ δαίμων, or did that rather reflect political tensions in Athens about this particular policy (an inference one might make from Aristophanes Acharnians, esp. 169–71)? Comedy may be a difficult historical source, but, unlike Thucydides, it was almost exactly contemporary with the events it parodies and aware that some 20,000 contemporary viewers would moderate and scrutinize its claims.
86 (Xen.) Ath. Pol. 3.3; see Shilleto (1880) 330.
if even more people gave money (δρυύριον). This, however, I know well, the city is not capable of completing the business of all those making demands, not even should someone offer to them any amount of money (χρυσίον καὶ δρυύριον).

The Athenian sheen that Thucydides gives his Thracians through nomos is effective: it helps explain Athens' choice to negotiate with the superlative archē among them, while making dealing with these barbarians not the same as dealing with Persia. But the historians are not alone in collapsing Athenian and Thracian identity: the Acharnians, near-contemporary with the events Thucydides describes, performs this strategy in action in the assembly.

When Theorus reports to the assembly on his visit to the court of Sitalces (141–50), attempting to curry favour for the Thracian alliance, it is precisely in terms of shared nomoi that his claim is made:

Τούτου μετὰ Σιτάλκους ἔπινον τὸν χρόνον. 
Καὶ δὴ τα φιλαθναιοι ἢν ὑπερφυῶς
ὑμῶν τ' ἐραστής ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὡστε καὶ
ἐν τούτη τοῖχος ἔγραφ', «Ἀθηναῖοι καλοί».
'Ο δ' ὦ λός, ὃν Ἀθηναίον ἐπεποίημεθα,
ἡρα φαγεῖν ἄλλαντας ἐξ Ἀπατουρίων,
καὶ τὸν πατέρ' ἡμεῖς ὑπάρκῃ βοηθεῖν τῇ πάτρᾳ:
ὁ δ' ὁμοσε σπένδουν βοηθήσειν ἐξων
στρατιῶν τοσοῦτον ὡστ' Ἀθηναίους ἔρειν
«Οσον τὸ χρῆμα παρνότων προσέχεται».

I was all this time drinking with Sitelces. Indeed he is exceedingly pro-Athenian, and a lover of you in the truest sense of the word: he writes on walls, 'Athenians are beautiful'. And his son, whom we have made Athenian, is longing to eat sausages from the Apaturia, and he beseeches his father to help his fatherland; and making an agreement he has sworn to help us having so big an army the Athenians will say, 'what a swarm of locusts is coming'.

The speaker's rhetoric configures the Thracian king in familiar terms designed to minimize the cultural differences between the Thracians and his audience (both intradiegetic, the assembly, and extradiegetic, the theatre): Theorus has been drinking with the king; he is described in the common currency of a political catchphrase φιλαθναιοί υπερφυῶς; he is, in good Periclean terms, an ἐραστής of the Athenian collective (ὑμῶν), a phrase whose connotations are played out with the addition of a sympotic, that is cultured Greek, practice of inscribing his beloved name.
Meanwhile his son, who was made an Athenian citizen, wishes to celebrate the Apatouria—a festival at which one is initiated into citizenship and one said by Herodotus to be definitive of Ionianism.

The diminishing of cultural difference between Thracians and Greeks/Athenians is evocative of Herodotus' Thracian *logos*. But this scene has added resonance for Herodotus' Thracian *logos*: Aristophanes makes his assembly speaker employ etymologizing wordplay to tell how Sitalces' son begs his father (*πατέρι*) to help his fatherland (*πατρία*). The wordplay, both of the character and poet, runs even deeper: Aristophanes' Theorus may also exploit an etymology of Apatouria from *δι-*copulative and *πατέρι*. At the same time, the poet portrays the Thracians as involved in the same game over the same word—Apatouria is the perfect festival because, as the scholiasts note, what the Thracians want is to deceive (*ἀπέτατον*) the Athenians. And of course, given that *πατρία* for Sitalces' son is now one word that refers to two places, the statement is as difficult to interpret as the 'empire' of Croesus' oracle; and, in Book 5, Herodotus' Paenonia.

The scene, to be sure, parody, but what it demonstrates, however exaggerated, are the strategies of persuasion in the assembly in relation to Thracians salient to Herodotus' Thracian *logos*: emphasis on similarity of *nomoi* (5.3–8) and a rhetoric that exploits wordplay (5.1–2). Dicaeopolis underscores the double-talk of this embassy by his comment, *τότο μὲν

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89 The scholiast uses the language of *nomoi* to explain this passage, saying it is *Διον άπατερου* (*specific to lovers*) to inscribe the beloved's name; cf. Wisser 97–9. It is telling that the characterization of the Macedonians as Greek in subsequent chapters uses the correct practice of the symposium as the standard: 5.18–21 and Fearn, Ch. 3 below. Cf. Eur. *Cycl.* 503–9.

90 The *scholia vetera* comment: '[The son] is said to be Teres. But some say he had the same name (*ἄδαρμος*) as his father Sitalces who was an ally of the Athenians. Thucydides mentions him but ascribes to him a different name (*άλοιπόνοος*)... If Thucydides is to be believed, the scholium may be read as further demonstrating Athenian Hellenizing reception of Sitalces by attributing to him the Greek practice of naming his son after his father; the fact that Sardos was popularly called Teres would also explain why Thucydides would go to such lengths to separate this name (and the person who goes by it, rather than his grandfather) from the mythic Tereus; it would also lead one to appreciate the degree to which Thucydides ensembles in 2.29 and later, selectively acknowledges one popular misnomer of the father of Sitalces to the exclusion of his son.


92 Starkie (1909) 41 sees further humour in use of *πατρία* as an old Ionic word. On *άδαιρησ* as common to etymologizing passages, see Woodhead (1928) Appendix.

93 See Starkie (1909) 41 on the implication of this origin in Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.8.

94 *χωρίς τούτοις* *δι* ἀποτέφθηκαν τοῖς Αθηναίοις (this is a really fine joke because the Athenians are being deceived). On the currency of this folk etymology see Olson (2002) 118 quoting Hellenic. *FäH* 4 P 123 and cf. Eoph. *FäH* 20 F 2.

95 On the extensive punning in this scene (beginning with Theognis and *χωρίς*) see Rennie (1909) 112–13 and Starkie (1909) 44 on *ἀποτεφθηκαν* and *ἀποτέφθηκαν*. On another note, lines 137–8 demonstrate the efficacy of topographical knowledge, such as the rivers of Thrace, in the assembly.
γ' ἡδὶ σαφές ('This then will be clear'), in response to the apparently equivocal, yet soon to be belied, claim that the Odomantians are the μοχιμότατον Θρακών ἔθνος ('most warlike people of the Thracians') – notice the superlative as a mark of ethnographic discourse.\(^{96}\) Exactly how distinctive this characterization of the assembly is to the topic of Thrace, is unclear, but in the Acharnians at least such punning and emphasis on affinity are portrayed as markedly different from the previous encounter involving Persians, a difference which seems reflected in Thucydides' own attempt to contrast Thracian and Persian nomoi. And it seems too coincidental that such features should characterize each of these Thracian logoi, Herodotus', Thucydides' and Aristophanes': together they may well gesture towards a historical reality – the shape Thracian debates of the late 430s and 420s took – even if one or more of these authors should be deemed to have influenced the other(s).\(^{97}\)

**Herodotus and Thucydides and the meaning of second-best**

Now we may return to Herodotus and the Herodotean Thucydides, and examine their apparent consensus on one point, that whichever ἔθνος may be superlative, the Thracians are the clear second. The agreement will prove deceptive, obscuring the dissimilarities lurking beneath the 'same' claim.\(^{98}\) A lexical point should first be noted: in contrast, Thucydides never actually speaks of a Thracian ἔθνος as such; instead he slips between talking explicitly about the Odrysian ἀρχή or βασιλεία (employing one or the other for their different connotations).\(^{99}\) At the same time, an ambiguity exists in his evaluation of 'second-best' status: πολὺ δευτέρα – 'certainly second'

\(^{96}\) The scholiast was not fooled: 'most warlike: this is a lie, because they are weak (ἀεσθικῶν) or few'. Aristophanes, of course, will undermine that σαφές claim by bringing on the Thracians themselves and thereby staging the gap that exists between the claims of the discourse as it is mobilized in the assembly, and the actuality. He is, however, engaged in the 'same' activity as Thaurus, that of representing Thracians before the gathered Athenians, albeit in another genre and to the opposite political end, but no less distorting: cf. Aristophanes' (mis)representation of Thracians as circumcised (Olson (2002) 121).

\(^{97}\) Of course, more generally the Acharnians' intertextual, if not also allusive, relationship with the Historia has long been recognized, and for some forms a criterion for dating the Historia, though such a basis for dating fails to recognize that even if Aristophanes is alluding to Herodotus, this need not be to the written text in our possession. On models of publication, see Thomas (2000).

\(^{98}\) See Gomme's futile efforts (1956) 245–6 to reconcile the accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides.

\(^{99}\) The progression of his excursus seems linguistically to 'other' his subjects: first, Odrysians have an ἀρχή (in 2.96.3 and 2.97.1), then it becomes a βασιλεία (2.97.4), and as such (the nearest feminine antecedent for μαυσώλειον, but less frequently used than ἀρχή) is compared to that [sic] of the Scythians (μαυσώλειον Σκύθων, 2.97.3), then the Thracians drop away leaving the Scythians to become an ἔθνος (2.97.6).
or 'second by a mile'\textsuperscript{100} raises questions about what comparative frame is implied: πολὺ δευτέρα when compared to all those that come after, or πολὺ δευτέρα in comparison with the superlative? The wider context Thucydides supplies, the manifest superiority of the Scythians in war, seems to favour the latter, more disparaging reading, but this is at odds with more common usage: just what kind of second are the Thracians?\textsuperscript{101} The tension between usage and context is quickly placed to the side by a description of the superlative Scythians, who, though admittedly unequalled in strength and number, are also unequalled in the degree to which they lack those qualities which could translate their strength and numbers into kratos; and ultimately, for Scythians to be superlative by any of the relative criteria that Thucydides allows them serves only to confirm the standard constituted by his own (Greek-reading, if not also Athenian) audience as absolute (e.g. ξύνεσις, εὐβουλία).

Herodotus’ second place is not only less equivocal, but also, we will see, more so. Herodotus introduces the Thracian etnos quite simply as ‘biggest of all mankind, after the Indians’ (Θηρέκου δὲ έθνος μεγίστον ἐστι μετὰ τῆς Ινδοῦ παντών ἀνθρώπων 3.1). In contrast to Thucydides’ μεγίστη, little qualifies Herodotus’ μεγίστου, not geography (τῶν γὰρ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ διὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ Ιωανίου κόλπου καὶ τοῦ Εὐξείνου πόλου, of those who are in Europe between the Ionian gulf and the Black Sea’) nor economics (χρημάτων προοίμων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης εὐδαιμονίας, ‘in revenue and in other kinds of prosperity’); or rather nothing qualifies the ‘Thracians’ second place short of all mankind (παντῶν ἀνθρώπων). And even those in first place, the Indians, are likewise minimally described and similarly absolute. But more equivocal in that, albeit conditionally and subjectively assessed, Herodotus does admit the possibility that these second-place Thracians could become κράτιστον: εἰ δὲ ὑπ’ ἐνός ἀρχοντος ἢ φρονεώς κατά τόμοτο, ἴματός τ’ ἐν ἐκαὶ πολλῷ κράτιστον πάντων ηθῶν κατά γνώμην τῆς ἐμῆ (‘if it should be ruled by one or be unanimous, it would be unbeatable and have the most kratos of all races in my opinion’). And in becoming so, presumably they would trump Thucydides’ Scythians both in strength and in having those other qualities the Scythians lack, for what else should superlative κράτος imply if not also εὐβουλία and ξύνεσις? If Thucydides introduces his Scythians to undermine the threat of the (πολὺ δευτέρα) archē of the Odrysians only to dismiss them as lacking those skills

\textsuperscript{100} See Shilleto (1880) 330-1: the former view is Arnold’s (1830), based on Soph. OC 1228. Most, however, opt for the latter interpretation.

\textsuperscript{101} See Jebb (1885) 193 on the phrase, who however interprets Thucydides’ usage to be the same as Sophocles’.
(possessed by Athenians in abundance) that would enable them to realize fully the potential of the unrivalled aspects of their *ethnos*, Herodotus' Thracian ethnography, by contrast, offers no such unambiguous security.

The passage is characterized by double-talk that is almost oracular: how will an audience read Herodotus' conditional utterance? Like Croesus they might hear in it precisely what they wish to hear: very definitely *only* potential (and inconceivable that it come about); or perhaps they might even go so far as dreaming of becoming the 'one' that might rule them. But the conditional alternative, εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἕνας ἄρχοι τοῦ φρονείον κατὰ τῶντό, in reality offers no such securities: the scenarios it entertains are not so terribly unlikely in the great expanse of time (whose force will be felt in 5.9), particularly if Thracians are in some important ways 'like' (some) Greeks, as one strand of Athenian imperial rhetoric represented in Aristophanes and by Thucydides seems to reflect: after all the Greeks did in the Persian Wars roughly (albeit briefly) 'think the same way', and Athens with her *archē* is now 'the one' by which other Greeks are ruled (and compelled to think the same way), the latter a situation that Herodotus' narrative renders particularly amazing, given that her inauspicious earlier 'silliness' (Hdt. 1.60) gave no sign of her future ξύνεσις. The passage must be seen as extremely provocative, granting the possibility of this absolute superlative status to *Thractians*, hampered only by what hampers Greeks: for if both could attain like-mindedness or be ruled by one, just who would become second-best?

The ambiguities become more apparent in the irregular syntax that concludes Herodotus' evaluation: ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτῳ ἐπορὸν σφι καὶ ἀμήχανον μὴ κοτε ἐγγένηται: εἰς δὲ κατὰ τῶντο ἄθενες. On the surface, the meaning that the context seems to require is something like this: 'But really this is impossible for them and inconceivable/impossible that it would ever happen; and indeed on account of this they are weak.' But on closer inspection, the apparently simple statement of impossibility may be seen to harbour deeper uncertainties about its claim. First of all, it is less than apparent that the subjectivity of Herodotus' previous claim (κατὰ γνώμην τῆν ἐμὴν) ought also to be imported to this claim, an uncertainty that may allow a gap to emerge between the personally attested conditional possibility and the emphatic denial that may reflect only popular opinion. Moreover, the future construction, optatives rather than indicatives, renders the scenarios he describes as possible rather than excluded out.
of hand, leaving it up to the readers to supply their own belief as to its likelihood.\textsuperscript{103}

More important is the construction in which Herodotus uses δυνηχεινον: had Herodotus used the standard construction, an infinitive dependent on δυνηχεινον,\textsuperscript{104} any uncertainty would have vanished, the absolute claim of the impossibility of the proceeding conditional would stand, and the subjectivity of the narrator would vanish as surely as Thucydides’ has in the analogous passage. But the clause μη κοτε εγγενται δεprives us of that security, and indeed of security in our very understanding of the language used: Herodotus’ use of δυνηχεινον is the single appearance in all of Greek literature of such a clause dependent on δυνηχεινον; elsewhere δυνηχεινον never governs anything other than a complementary infinitive, a construction that admits little ambiguity.\textsuperscript{105} Instead, the resulting expression may be simply construed in ways that on the level of connotation at least yield meanings at odds with one another: a strong assertion of impossibility, or a tacit admission of possibility, which expressly (syntactically) involves a stance of fear; or rather surfaces in and hereby belies the strength of the denial. The former is read by taking the approach of Stein in supplying an ού, presumably to be inferred from the alpha-privative, and reading in the utterance emphatic denial: ‘Ειν Αττικει ητατε γεσατο τουτο ου μη ποτε συνοι εγγενται,

9.113.2), or other perspectives (1.147.1, 4.83.2, 9.109.3, 9.113.2) may render the content of what has been previously expressed as in some way immaterial to the current situation (8.8.2, 9.27.4, 9.27.6, Athenian praeecessio, discussion of audience (4.83.2, 9.106), a state that may be only temporary (9.46.6). Moreover, the view expressed in the ἔλλα γερ statement might be flawed, or less valid than that which it denies, representing a difference of opinion from the narrator: see 1.147.1 (with 146.1 μια προς τον λούρεον), 6.124.4, 4.83.6.

\textsuperscript{103} See Goodwin (1889) §§435–6 on the future-less-vivid conditional. Cf. Pl. Lc. 200d for ἔλλα γερ following the future-less-vivid conditional where Nicias clearly still entertains a hope that Socrates might teach his son, though we the readers know otherwise.

\textsuperscript{104} Kühner-Gerz (1904) II.337d and 44.

\textsuperscript{105} The fact that elsewhere Herodotus uses the common construction of δυνηχεινον plus the infinitive renders this passage all the more striking: It is, however, worth noting that, when Hdt. uses δυνηχεινον elsewhere (with the infinitive construction), he does so in contexts that compromise its certainty: both Croesus and Cyrus are mistaken about what is δυνηχεινον when the former tests the oracles with something he thinks is δυνηχεινον (1.48), and the latter attacks the Massagetae on the mistaken premise that whenever he drove his army ‘it was impossible (δυνηχεινον) for that tribe (βῆθις) to escape him’ (1.205.1). By contrast, the final appearance occurs in a context that belongs to a different, more absolute, frame of reference, the human condition vis-à-vis the divine; δε μη εκεινηκε του θεου, δυνηχεινον διπληχειν διηθοτει (‘what must needs happen from the god, it is impossible for a man to avert’, 9.16.4). This usage is likely to reflect Herodotus’ philosophy about the human condition that by its nature does not allow for such absolute assertions: neither more generally (9.9.3), nor for the individual human (9.32.4). The collocation of διπληχειν and δυνηχεινον is deserving of greater discussion than is possible here: it is interesting that in classical authors outside Herodotus the ontological status of what is asserted as such is often denied or in some other way belied by the wider context: see Thuc. 7.48.5, Hippocr. Sacred Disease 21, Xen. Anax. 2.5.25; cf. Dion. Hal. Dem. 71, Plut. Mor. 164c3.
'What's in a name?' (5.1–2 and 3–10) 81

dahin werden sie gewiss niemals kommen.'¹⁰⁶ The second is to assimilate the μη clause into a final clause introduced by ὠδηγεῖν as if this adjective functions as an expression of fear or caution,¹⁰⁷ and the fear-inducing premise (i.e. the Thracians becoming κρότιστοι) leading then to the expression of the situation feared even as it appears to be excluded.

Herein lies the dichotomy: a syntactical construction that denies easy classification. Readers must choose what they will hear in these words: will it be emphatic denial, a process of attraction to ὧν μη, a choice which implicitly suggests the self-satisfied security offered by Thucydides' characterization of the second-place Thracians; or will latent fear be detected as motivating the assertion that for the Thracians to attain superlative κρότιστος is ὠδηγεῖν, its very obliqueness of expression giving voice to the fear that the words seem on surface to deny – in a sense, a 'lurking fear clause' that articulates lurking fear?¹⁰⁸ That all depends: Attic listeners would be confronted with a choice (if subconscious). They might hear emphatic denial, and that would reveal something about them, their evaluations of the Thracians; and these perhaps would be the same people who might have entertained the possibility that their own ἀρχή might one day be the 'one' to rule the Thracian ἀνθισ. But without the ὧν the syntax might induce other responses. What if the Thracian ἀνθισ did become united in thought, what if one entity did rule them? Like an oracle, Herodotus' utterance will interpret its interpreter.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Stein (1874) 6. Cf. Suhl (1907) 167 §2. Smyth (1936) §1804. Goodwin (1889) §309-6; this might be justified by seeing the negation in ὠδηγεῖν as adopting the function of ὧν, but again this unparalleled use of ὠδηγεῖν would imply the reader's choice (conscious or otherwise) in this construal.


¹⁰⁸ Asher (1990) 137 sees Herodotus here as 'significantly troubled by the huge number of the people and its potential might'. The passage is constructed to be significantly troubling, but its tone need not reflect Herodotus' state of mind, so much as his attempt to elicit that response in his readers.

¹⁰⁹ It is worth noting that on traditional understandings of Attic ὧν μη some apprehension is already implicit, though assuredly emphatically denied, whether one sees it as deriving from an elision (cf. ὥν ἡ δοκεῖ πόλιν at σφυρήσῃ, Az. Exel. 6.10; Xen. Mem. 2.1.23) or as a negative form of the independent subjunctive with μη, which had come already to express apprehension with a desire to avert its object; see Goodwin (1889) Appendix II. Thucydides suggests contemporary salience for Herodotus' play with the syntax of fear. By using the rare construction of the infinitive with φοβοῦσθαι (5.105.3), his Athenians demonstrate their total absence of fear by the absence of a traditional fear clause (ὡν φοβοῦσθαι διὰ κακούσησιν) (see Goodwin (1889) $572); to replace the independent clause with an infinitive is the logical corollary of the denial of the existence of any fear. The unconventional syntax gives the statement a particular irony: it assertsthat the basis of Athenian fearlessness is the adherence to φοβοῦσθαι with respect to the gods at that very moment when they are defying those conventions – both moral and linguistic – that pertain to humans; and here the genre in which this formulation occurs, the dialogue (5.8), is significant.
The text provides one final chance for an audience to consider the basis of the security of this denial: εἰς δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο διαθέβαις, 'Indeed for this reason they are weak.' But what is that reason? It is, in fact, the conditional expression whose impossibility has been by no means unequivocally demonstrated, an impossibility due as much to an incapacity of the Thracians (ἀποροῦν ὁποῖοι) as to that of an audience for whom it may be ὁμιμήκονοι to contemplate the alternative — for this reason they are weak. If Herodotus' conditional functioned as an oracle, ambiguously offering potential, what potential will its audience hear? Will they be enamoured of the possibility of being the 'one' (ὑπ' ἕνος) and of exercising ἀρχή over those who could have had superlative κράτος, or will they instead hear a warning and correspondingly feel fear that if the Thracians should 'think the same' the superlative κράτος would be the Thracians' to wield, one that might be like that which had once already been wielded against them when indeed the Thracians did seem to have the same opinion: 'They were destroyed in Edonian Drabescus by the Thracians en masse for whom the colonizing of this land was an act of hostility' (ὑπὸ τῶν Θρακῶν ἐγκατάρτων οἷς πολέμου ἠμὲν τὸ χώριον κτιζόμενον, Thuc. 1.100.3)? But perhaps such scenarios are all too much to contemplate; much more comfortable to stick with beliefs in one's own cultural supremacy, regardless of what history may have already demonstrated by the time one reads this text, if not yet fully apparent at the time of its publication in the form we now have.\footnote{Of course, it must be noted that fearful connotations of Thracian strength at the start of Book 5 are met by a realization at its end with an event unpleasantly reminiscent for some audiences: the death of Aristagoras at the hands of Thracians in Myrcinus (5.125).} Macan laconically comments on chs. 3–8, 'For the Greeks, esp. Athenians of the Periclean age, the interest in Thrace and its inhabitants was doubtless augmented by the fresh settlements there (cf. 9.75)'. This is no doubt true, but the question is just what Herodotus' text is doing with that interest. Herodotus may himself be tantalizing his audience when in just a few chapters he refers to boundaries of Macedonia that correspond anachronistically to those of his own time, referring to the mines 'which in later times than these yielded Alexander a talent of silver every day' (5.17.2), or when he describes the desirability of Myrcinus and the threat of it falling in Greek hands (5.23.2).\footnote{See Osborne, Fearn and Greenwood, Chs. 2, 3 and 4 below. Cf. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.11.} But if Thucydides indulges his audiences' (past? current? future?) imperial ambitions with his ethnography, Herodotus denies them such indulgences, saving his extended ethnographies (Egypt, Scythia, India) for what they are with certainty (from his vantage point at least) never likely to possess. And there is a darker
element to his Thracian logos, one in direct conflict with the apparent security and vision of the past offered by Thucydides' own Thracian logos and the narrow temporal confines of Thucydidean history.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE ISTER, AND BACK TO THE NARRATIVE, THE MEANING(S) OF SIGYNNAE – 5.9–10

But if such lurking fears and ὑπόνοιαι are not to overwhelm the narrative, and make it obviously other than it seems on the surface, some ethnographic wandering is badly needed; this time, all the way beyond the Ister. Relief comes in the simplicity of the lack of knowledge, lack of people: an ἔρημος χώρα and ἀπειρός ('empty land', 'boundless'); a single people, a single name; their culturally different, but nevertheless easily visualized clothing (Median); short, shaggy, flat-nosed horses, which no man can ride, but which are paradoxically swiftest (δεξιότατοι – the ethnographic superlative); an implicit urbane irony of geography that these funny ponies are neighbours of the Adriatic Enei (famous for their horses); a comfortable lack of rigour when it comes to interrogating colonial claims – a polite use of aphorism worthy of Sophocles, 'anything can happen given some time'; a name, Sigynnae, that seems to mean all too much, but only by comparison, and therefore apparently not much in absolute terms right here: and a demonstration at the Thracians' expense of what is ὀλχότα – the presence of bees does not, as Thracians maintain, explain why this area is uninhabited, but rather it is their absence that points to the explanation – it's too cold! From here – a quick visit – an audience may happily resume the historical narrative that will constitute Book 5.

The ethnography that Herodotus' narrative claims expertise of even as – or because – Herodotus paradoxically stresses its limits, reaches its limits

12 One he reminds his audience of with the prominence of Sophanes, 6.92 and 9.73–5; and of course the last dated event of the Histories takes place in Thrace: 7.133, 137.
13 Herodotus significantly stipulates 'Adriatic' Enei because there are two peoples that have the same name: according to Homer there are Enei also located in Paphlagonia in north-west Asia Minor (Il. 2.832): Myres (1907) 298. On the Adriatic Enei and their horses see already Alcm. 1.351; urban cultural knowledge here parallels that of 5.12–3 (see above n. 10), and together provides a structure: Greek cultural knowledge frames the Thracian excursus.
14 Herodotus is punner to the end: ἵπποι μὲν τῶν ταύτων λέγουσι δοκεῖοι λέγειν ὅτι ὀκότα . . . ὄλλα μὲν τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν δρικῆς δοκεῖον δοκεῖς ἔχει διὸ τὰ ψυχής ('In my opinion when they say these things they are not saying what is plausible . . . but to me the area above the Bear is uninhabited because of the cold'); note the exchange of ὀκότα for the α-privative. But he makes a more serious point, demonstrating how such rhetorical finesse aids the persuasiveness of an α-priv argument, while undermining the opposing view by locating it in the realm of speech (λέγουσι . . . λέγει) not 'reality' (ἐλεύ), and by moving from the personal to the impersonal use of δοκεῖ.
with a natural boundary," supplying what an audience experience as so 'natural' a transition as for them not to dwell upon what the presence of these apparently (or at least relatively) meaningless Sigynnae might mean. If, however, they do, two dimensions are revealed that speak to the ensuing narrative of Book 5 and to contemporary politics. The first relates to the Sigynnae's claim to be colonists of the Medes. Herodotus describes these Sigynnae's clothing as Median and cites their claim to be Median colonists. Herodotus, however, refrains from using the clothing as evidence for the claim, instead throwing up his hands by evoking the explanatory power of time as rendering anything possible. An audience may well passively choose to go no further in their enquiry, and see the inclusion of these details as ethnography for ethnography's sake. But the course of Book 5 will bring these issues closer to home, when the Athenian change from Dorian to Ionian garb in 5.87.3–90 might induce a realization about the instability of clothing as an indicator of ethnicity (rather than evidence of it), and when the claim to be colonists finds itself mobilized in the rhetoric of an Aristogoras desperate for an alliance (5.97.2). The truism, 'anything can happen in the course of time', masks ambiguity: while ostensibly facilitating 'understanding' about the past (i.e. Sigynnae could have settled beyond the Ister from Media), its gnomic quality allows it to look forward as well as backwards, transcending specific application to a particular past event to encompass such events as may lie in the future. And what may take place is likewise ambiguous, not necessarily limited to surprising colonial ventures (erga), but rather stretching also to surprising claims (logoi) about colonial status. How these Sigynnae became (γεγόνος) Median colonists Herodotus cannot say: was it an act of history or an act of political rhetoric? Anything can happen given enough time, as Book 5 and perhaps Aristogoras' rhetoric — will soon show.

There is a final twist in this Median tale: the most comprehensive scholarly accounts of these elusive Sigynnae see their claim of descent reported here as the product of paronomasia, a 'mistaken' inference from the name of a tribe attested in this region, the Maedi, and their clothing, broadly

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111 Liminx: μούνους δι δύναμις πυθήθαι ('I am able to learn of only these', 5.9.1); ἐγώ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ ἐπιμερδασθαι ('I am not able to guess', 5.9.3). Note the prevalence of his 'I' here and its relation to Thracian sources.

116 See Macan (1895) 1.4.6.

117 This is how Myres (1907) 360 takes it, and then demonstrates how Assyrian records of the Medes show that (past) time renders it impossible: 'Herodotus is inclined [sic] to admit a Median origin, only if time will allow it. But this is precisely what time will not allow...'

118 See Introduction, p. 33.
similar to that of the Medes.

The question then arises, whose mistake is this? In a passage rife with wordplay, we should not conclude too quickly that the mistake is Herodotus' or that he reports the mistake of others unawares. Given its context, we might recognize rather how Herodotus has created a narrative with the potential to entrap an audience carried along by its ethnographic stance – its claim to expertise – to accept a persuasive narrative, predicated on an implicit case of paronomasia and a visual referent of apparently the 'same' clothing, and to be induced to make the same easy conclusion (συμβαλλεσθαι) that the Sigynnae are insinuated to have made, descent as demonstrated by clothing.

But that leaves it to ask the meaning(s) of the name, Sigynnae. Aristotle's use of συγγυνον as the paradigmatic loan word, proof that a word can be 'ordinary' and 'rare' but not in relation to the same people, does more than suggest the currency of this word in Greek linguistic theorizing. It may also point to Herodotean engagement with such theory. That Aristotle's account omits the Ligurian word (and indeed the Sigynnae) could be significant: had it too belonged to the stock exempla in linguistic theory, Ligurian sigynnae would have further proved Aristotle's point; its absence in his account might suggest Herodotean innovation on a trope (independent of whether this word with this meaning had actually belonged to the region above Massalia). This cannot of course be proved. Instead, we may move to safer ground and remember the injunction that words have their meanings in context, and that context may be defined as not only geographical, but textual. What, then, would the 'meanings' of Sigynnae be in the context of Herodotus' Histories, and in the context of his contemporary audiences?

If one fails to pause and reflect, Herodotus' furnishing of multiple meanings functions as a display of erudition – dazzling, but otherwise meaningless, though whether one notices and what one's reaction to it will be if one

119 Myres (1907) 260: 'the Mædi (Məbd) in Western Thrace, who may have been kinmen of the Sigynnae, and may well have been confused, in local speech, with the Medi whose name would suggest itself at once to Greek observers, to account for the Sigynnae trousers'. See also Macan (1891) I.137. Thuc. 2.98.2 shows Greek knowledge of the Mædi. As for the Sigynnae, Ctesias locates a Sigynai in Egypt, PGH 488 F 55, and is followed by Herodian and Steph. Byz. i.e. Sigynnos. Only Apollonius seems to follow Herodotus when he links Sigynni with Thracians (4.320), likewise revelling in the rare sigynnae for spears (1.99). On the Sigynnae see Myres' article (1907), 'yet to be surpassed' according to the more recent Barrett (1979). There is a lovely irony that Herodotus' mysteriously named Sigynnae have generated their own onomastic folklore in the erroneous attempts to connect them with gypsies (Germ. Zigeuner, Hung. cigány): see Barrett's survey (1979).

120 Poetics 21. See pp. 59–60 above. The spelling and gender of this rare noun (and its meaning) vary in its few appearances in the ancient sources. Herodotus alone gives συγγυνον, otherwise it is overwhelmingly masculine, with a single or double nu.
should, will be a matter of ability and/or taste.\footnote{On the rhetoric of expertise, see Thomas (2000) Chs. 7–8.} If, however, one engages more closely with the apparent randomness of the facts Herodotus seems interested to espouse, one might recognize what is reflected in the two meanings of this word, shopkeepers or spears. The two lifestyles reflected in this single word tap into a topos of the Histories, the contrast between 'soft' and 'hard' lifestyles, introduced in Book 1 when Croesus advises Cyrus to take the Lydians' weapons and make them shopkeepers (1.155.4), and implicit in the comparison of the warlike Great King, Cyrus, with his successor, Darius (3.89.3). In either of those cases, an implicit point is that cultures do not remain the same: 'hard' peoples become 'soft' over time. Here Herodotus allows the single word with different meanings in two different places at the same time to provide a spatial analogue for how at different times (and 'in the course of time') a single people in the same place may (come to) be characterized in two different ways.

But beyond the thematics of Herodotus' text, there is another context for understanding the function of this polysemous word in Herodotus' narrative, or rather a solution to how these multiple meanings may have proved more interesting to certain audiences than they have to modern readers; and this time the answer lies in socio-political linguistics. How indeed does a γλωττία enter one language from another? And more particularly, why would Athenians of the fifth century have been familiar with the Cypriot word for spears? Why would (some) audiences' ears have pricked up at the word for traders beyond Marseilles? One onoma, also a nomos, furnishes an answer to all these questions: arché.\footnote{On Athenian efforts to gain Cyprus, see Meiggs (1972) 92–3, 472–86, and, Serghidou, pp. 272 and 285 below. On Athens' obsession with the wealth of the west see Aristoph.  Ran. 173–6, Wars 700; Plut. Nic. 11, Per. 20.3–4.}

The Paeonians (in the 'past'), the Thracians (of the ethnographic present), and the Sigynnæ (far away) emerge as three different (Thracian) ways to talk about the same thing, contemporary Athens. And this they do in logoi that interweave three intellectual discourses, those of history, ethnography, and linguistic theory, and challenge an audience to contemplate the equivalences that may obtain across time, space and language, and between viewer and subject. How will the reading strategies of these first chapters apply to the rest of Book 5?

Such close examination will always raise the question of whether a text can have (had) so much meaning (for its contemporary audiences)? But perhaps the more salient question is this: will modern audiences let it? While it is unlikely the reading proposed here will persuade in each of its
details, it is hoped that what it does persuade of is this, that any analysis of Herodotus' *logoi* would do well to take the advice of two of his most respectful readers: 'The difficulties in appreciating Herodotus lie not in his lack of organisation, but in an excess of relatedness . . . it is possible in one and the same story, for several different meanings to appear simultaneously or one after another', and 'there is little in Herodotus that is irrelevant'.

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123 Immerwahr (1937) 312; Wood (1972) 19. Many thanks to the participants of the original Cambridge Colloquium, and the 'Anatomy of a Cultural Revolution' Seminar for commenting on versions of this paper; thanks also to Paul Cartledge, Pat Easterling, John Henderson, Rosaria Munson, Robin Osborne, Rob Tordoff for their helpful comments and corrections, and above all to Emily Greenwood, the ideal interlocutor.